


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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON PHILOSOPHY

HELD AT PRAGUE, SEPTEMBER 2-7, 1934

THE REV. LESLIE J. WALKER, S.J., M.A.

ITS broad, winding river, crossed by a multitude of bridges; its surrounding hills, amongst which stands conspicuous the long line of the Hradcine, topped by a continuous stretch of stately buildings with the cathedral of St. Vitus towering above them; the wide expanse of its numerous streets, over which rise the spires of many churches, ancient towers, and the lofty walls of numerous municipal and university buildings; the long history to which its architecture bears everywhere striking witness and of which its inhabitants are justly proud, rendered the city of Prague a no less fitting background for the eighth philosophical Congress than that which Oxford provided four years ago for the seventh. Nor was the hospitality which Czechoslovakia offered to its members a whit less cordial or less generous than that of England. The delegates who gathered together from all parts of Europe, from America, China, and from Japan, were welcomed both by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Beneš, by the Minister of Public Instruction, Dr. Krémár, by the Mayor of Prague; and, were it not for his unfortunate illness, would have been received by the President of the Republic himself. The Společenský club was placed at their disposal. They were entertained at the Foreign Office to tea, and at the palace of the President to supper by his daughter, Dr. Alice Masaryk. Their railway fares and even their tram fares were considerably reduced. On Thursday they were conveyed by motor-cars to Konopiště, a beautiful castle, soaring above pine forests and overlooking an extensive lake, formerly the residence of the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, now taken

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over by the State, but maintained exactly as it was when the unfortunate heir of the Emperor Franz-Joseph was living there. The arrangements for the Congress were excellent, thanks to its President, Dr. Rádl, and to an extremely efficient organizing committee which placed itself unreservedly and unremittingly at the disposal of the 350 active and 150 associated members who attended the various meetings.

The subjects to be discussed by the Congress were divided into eight groups: (A) Logic; (B) Norm and Reality and the Methods of Natural Science; (C) Religion and Philosophy; (D) the Crisis in Democracy; (E) the Mission of Philosophy; (F) Psychology, Pedagogy, Aesthetic and Language; (G) the Theory of Knowledge and of Values; (H) Organization. In the morning the Congress was addressed on one or other of these topics by two selected speakers, who spoke for an hour each, after which there was an open discussion in which each member participating—to the relief of the audience but to the discomfort of the more verbose—was restricted to a speech of five minutes. In the evenings the Congress broke up into groups which were addressed for a quarter of an hour each by a succession of five or six speakers, and a discussion either followed each speech or was withheld until all had spoken.

* * * * *

Nominally, at least, the Congress had an aim—a practical aim. In inviting it to Prague, its organizers expressed the hope that its deliberations would have some practical issue, political, social, and moral, for the world at large. It is by philosophy, they urged, that the world should be directed, as Plato pointed out. On our arrival we were handed a bulky packet, containing over a hundred résumés of the papers which were shortly to be read, amongst them a "Philosophical Programme," drawn up by thirteen Czechoslovak philosophers. In it they set forth the principles which formed the basis of their own public activity, and of that of the distinguished philosopher-President of their nation, whose followers they claimed to be. Present-day philosophy, they alleged, suffers from excessive intellectualism and neglects the practical obligations of civilized life. It is descriptive, contemplative, analytical, abstract, theoretical, depersonalized, whereas it ought to "lead public life towards clear, theoretically elaborated, but also practical goals." As it is, philosophy exists for the philosopher's sake; it ought to exist in order to serve humanity and to be its guide alike in science, art, literature, politics, morals, and obedience to God.

It was on the same thesis that Czechoslovakia's distinguished Foreign Minister laid emphasis in his inaugural address. He hoped that the discussions in which so many eminent philosophers would

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engage might throw some valuable light on the unprecedented confusion in which the world finds itself to-day, alike in the domains of thought, of morality, of economics, and of politics, and not least in the domain of international politics. For my own part, said Dr. Beneš, I have ever been opposed to experimentalism and opportunism, for I am convinced that all political action should be inspired by determinate philosophic and moral thought, applicable to all civilized political societies. It is only the cynic who would identify political action with the maintenance of power at whatever cost or with the acquisition of wealth at the expense of others, oblivious of the fact that social life comprises spiritual as well as material factors, and that the aim of political strife should not be the subordination of spirit to matter but its victory over matter. All regimes have advantages and inconveniences, but the real question is "whether or not we accept as the true basis of modern civilized societies the idea that one of the essential ends of human activity is progressive development towards individual liberty and towards the expansion and inviolability of human personality, with the necessary reserve relative to the rights of other individuals and of the community—in accordance with classical formulae and with all the logical conclusions drawn from them by the philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries." The so-called crisis in democracy was not in Dr. Beneš' view so much a crisis of institutions as a crisis of men, of democrats themselves. It arose from the difficulty of finding leaders who were true democrats and of finding adequate means and methods whereby to safeguard in the highest degree human liberty and at the same time to reconcile it with the collectivist tendencies of modern societies and States.

It was evident from the outset that the crisis in democracy was destined to be the main topic to which the Congress would devote its attention. It was to be expected, too, that in the daily discussions of this topic, to which the largest room in the Faculty of Arts was devoted, the representatives of that nation which inaugurated the era of democracy in Europe toward the close of the eighteenth century should play a prominent part. Almost half the papers dealing with democracy emanated from France; four from Paris, two from Lille, and one from Besançon. All were agreed that the chief aim of democracy is the safeguarding of human liberty; and Professor Basch of Paris was at pains to show that, though art, save in Greece, has in fact flourished ill under democratic regimes, it at any rate ought to flourish where liberty prevails, and may possibly, when every citizen has become truly free, really equal, and has also been

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properly educated, be able to do so and even to evolve a new *art de la Cité*.

But what is democracy? And what is that liberty which it is the chief aim of democracy to preserve?

To define democracy as "that regime in which one attempts to make a people believe that it governs itself," is a jest that is not without profound wisdom, said Professor Barthélemy of Paris. He would himself define it, however, to be "the regime in which the greatest possible number of the members of a group participate in the most direct way possible in the administration of common interests." But the second part of his definition admittedly presents a difficulty. Direct decisions by a people on problems of public interest are impracticable. Semi-direct decisions, by means of a plebiscite or referendum, are cumbrous. Yet the alternative—representative government—is more remote than either from the logical ideal which the definition sets forth. Moreover, the astonishing impotence of parliamentarianism has led many to think that there is something wrong with the central machinery of democratic government. All that Dr. Barthélemy would insist upon, therefore, as essential to democracy is that hereditary rulers should be excluded, that the participation of the governed should be express, and that each individual shall participate in an equal way.

The other delegates from Paris were of much the same mind. Democracy and parliamentary rule are by no means synonymous, said Professor Guy-Grand. Democracy has to reconcile two ideas, those of liberty and of sovereignty, and there are two ways of doing this. If it be on the rights of the individual and the liberties of the citizen that emphasis is laid, the distinctive note of such a democracy will be *liberal*. But we may also conceive democracy as *massive*, and in that case concede rights only to the sovereignty of the people, realized in the nation, race, or proletariat, and handed over to some chief. In the one case we conceive democracy after the manner of Rousseau as a *popular absolutism*; in the other after the manner of Hobbes, as the absolutism of a *prince*.

Dr. Parodi agreed. "Dictatorship and democracy are not mutually exclusive," he said, "provided it is from the people itself that the dictatorial power emanates." A dictator or a party may realize what is to the general interest better than the citizens themselves, and they, realizing that he realizes it, may acclaim him as virtually their delegate. But, since it is essential to democracy not only that a nation should take itself for end and be the mistress of its own destiny, but that a national organism formed of citizens should participate in sovereignty, a dictatorship is justified only in time of crisis. In the long run a dictatorship will either return to democratic institutions, to freedom of inquiry and of criticism and to repre-

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sentative government, or it will be false to the unanimity on which it is based, and will develop into a monarchy properly so-called.

For Professor L. Rougier of Besançon the two principles essential to democracy are those of (1) *popular sovereignty*—rulers must derive their power from popular delegation, and (2) *the control of governmental action by the governed*. This latter principle, in his opinion, the *Führer-princip* violates; for without freedom of the Press and freedom of association there can be no control of governmental action. The choice between a totalitarian and a democratic State is the choice between a *directed* public opinion and one that is allowed freely to form itself amongst the public at large. Both have advantages, but a directed public opinion becomes subservient, induces in the masses the mentality of the courtesan, and, in encouraging a nation to believe that a patrimony common to all peoples is peculiar to itself, destroys mutual understanding and endangers both civilization and peace.

Liberty implies freedom of association, freedom of the Press, and the right to criticize governmental action. It implies also, for Professor Barthélemy, that the law shall leave to the individual a domain in which he shall be free to act as he pleases. Law is essential if liberty is to be maintained. Hence, with Montesquieu, liberty may be defined to be "the right to do anything which the law permits." Liberty and law are thus reconciled nominally. But there must also be in a democracy, said Professor Guy-Grand, equilibrium between the rights of the individual and the rights of the society to which he belongs. It is just this, however, that it is so difficult to establish and maintain; and neither the account which Professor Henri Goshier (Lille) gave of the ideas which underlay the French Revolution and of their subsequent development, nor yet Dr. Barthélemy's frank acknowledgment of the impotence of the parliamentary system was encouraging.

The tone of the papers read by representatives of Czechoslovakia sounded more hopeful, yet their enthusiasm for democracy as it is was not unqualified. Democracy, said Dr. J. B. Kosák of Prague, is "not to be confounded with its institutional and constitutional instruments," nor yet with political parties, of which many have allied themselves with a liberalistic capitalism from which in the name of democracy they must be severed. Similarly, Dr. Joseph Fisher, having assigned as the moral and philosophical basis of democracy the synthesis of universalism and individualism, admitted that in the social sphere and in the sphere of economics, this equilibrium is very far from having been established. If the *subject* of to-day is to become the *citizen* of to-morrow, economics must be controlled by society, which means Socialism, Dr. Fisher claimed.

Professor Glenn Morrow of Illinois, approached the question of

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democracy from the standpoint of liberalism. Its heart was still sound. It still found in human personality the chief source of value, refused to worship the State, and resolutely treated it as but a powerful instrument in securing the fundamental conditions of social life. Classical liberalism, however, had erred in trusting too much to man's reasonableness, and in clinging too tenaciously to the practical inventions of its predecessors. Whether liberalism is necessarily committed to parliamentary systems may well be questioned. Freedom of speech is sacred to it, but it has no real stake in permitting the radio and the Press to fall into the hands of an interested group. An unprejudiced and flexible liberalism should also countenance a much larger measure of control over the economic processes than the older liberalism would welcome.

No one seemed to be entirely satisfied with democracy as it is, but there were only two practical suggestions as to how it should be modified in order to meet present-day needs, one emanating from America and the other from France. Both involved a dualism, though of a different kind, and both had affinities with Fascism.

Professor Montague of New York advocated as "an escape for democracy" the establishment of an *economic* dualism in the shape of fascistic communes in which the unemployed shall be free to enlist for a period of years, during which they will be subject to strict discipline and will be economically insulated from the rest of the community, except in so far as it must support them until they can support themselves—a project that to some critics suggested a revival of slavery.

Professor Lavergne of Lille proposed that "in order to put an end to the weakness of the democratic State," there should be a *second universal suffrage*. As human beings all men are equal and have equal political rights, but all men must also have recourse to the public services, in respect to which they may be either private consumers or professional producers. Moreover, the general interest is very different from the sum or mean of private interests, and where it is sacrificed to a coalition of individual interests, a community cannot prosper. In addition to its individualistic base the State requires a second support and base, the will and the competence of all the *élites* and of all bodies whose culture and disinterestedness renders them capable of discerning and of willing the general good. There should be, therefore, not only an *individual* suffrage, but also a *social* suffrage, which should take account of superior human values. In this second suffrage representatives should be chosen by organized bodies grouped under three heads, scientific, practical or economic, and social.

From the views expressed by those who professedly spoke on behalf of democracy we must now pass to those expressed by repre-

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sentatives of totalitarian States. Signor Bodrero of Padua said that in his opinion the crisis in democracy was due to a wrong conception of democracy and to the fact that States which admitted universal suffrage were often governed by the wrong people. Democracy illustrated Graham's law: bad money tends to displace the good. The concept of the essential goodness of man, embodied in universal suffrage, makes the idea of the State immanent, not transcendent. It confuses what is good with what is actual, and pulverizes the State into disparate atoms. As Kant denied that there is knowledge of things-in-themselves, so there is no thing-in-itself recognized by the liberal democratic State, with the result that it has no principle that can save it in time of crisis.

Materialism also has invaded the activities of democratic States, which regard property, not as a religious fact, but as a material or economic fact, freed from any sort of moral or political obligations. The bourgeoisie, in granting universal suffrage, did so in order to save their own possessions. Yet no property is absolute if the holding of it be contrary to public interest. Social justice is of a higher order than private interests or private wealth, and of justice the State alone is arbiter. We want others to participate, concluded Signor Bodrero. We await the last word which shall relieve us from the bestiality of social life and shall restore to us the ideal of harmony, justice, and peace.

A revolution, said Signor Redano of Rome, is the coming of the people into their universality. This universality is the State or nation as expressive of the general will, the universal will of Hegel. This is not the will of a multiplicity of individuals, which, though it has force, also has weakness and is often the voice of the least competent. Will is not feeling. Nor from the clash of many wills and many interests is it possible to obtain that unity of will which is requisite for effective political action. In a well-conceived spiritual organism all think and feel, but only *one* wills, interpreting and directing all minor faculties with the maximum of respect for human liberty provided no harm is done to the State.

There was no paper dealing expressly with the democratic crisis from the German point of view. Dr. Feldkeller of Berlin, in a paper entitled *Geophilosophie und Historiurgie*, dealt with a much wider theme, the nature of true philosophy, which is, he said, the only means whereby men can be raised from materialism, superstition, and myth to genuine freedom of spirit. Such a philosophy is not that of Marx, but that of Plato, Buddha, and Hegel, whose philosophy is a living thing which appeals not to any particular race but to mankind as a whole. We are not at the end of a culture-period, as Spengler asserts, but at the beginning, as Keyserling claims, and the chief danger is that mere intellect may gain the victory over spirit.

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The remaining paper, which was read under the head of the crisis in democracy, was by Professor Vuk-Pavlović of Zagreb. In it he contrasted *politics*, which seeks to preserve inequality, supposes dependence, strives to keep others down, and envisages only legality, with *education*, which seeks to bring about equality and independence, strives to raise others up, and is concerned not with legality but morality. The paper was a forceful plea for free as opposed to State education, but had little to do directly with the main topic.

Another subject which aroused considerable interest was that of Religion and Philosophy. The two addresses which were given on Wednesday morning by Fr. Przywara,¹ S.J., of Munich and by Professor Brunschvicg of Paris, were reviewed at considerable length by the Prague papers on the following morning. Fr. Przywara distinguished three possible ways of conceiving philosophy, and over against each set a concept of religion which contrasted with it and yet was connected with it. Philosophy is concerned with the world itself, with its ultimate ground, with the "first and last" conceived as a necessity which holds for all actual orders. Religion is concerned with God Himself, with the reality of the world as ordered by God, with the "first" as Creator and the "Last" as Judge. Yet it is the actual that makes the necessary knowable; and the religious concept of God is the "pre-form" of the abstract philosophic absolute. Again, philosophy strives after an insight into ultimate necessity, whether conceived as categories or relations or unconditioned ground; whereas religion passes from belief to obedience, in complete surrender to the unseen coherence of the divine will; which is thus superimposed upon the philosophical idea of necessary connection. Thirdly, philosophy derives its questions from actual existence, it originates in man, whereas religion originates in free grace. Philosophy considers ever-creativity in the creature, religion the ever-being-created through the agency of the creative God; and without this the creature would become but the ever-vanishing expression of a divine immanence.

Professor Brunschvicg began by distinguishing the idealist attitude towards religion from the positivist attitude. For the one, *religions* (plural) imply a knowledge of a transcendent reality which is bound up with a knowledge of transcendent truth. In the other, *religion* (singular) is discussed as a human function on the same basis as science or ethics, and is judged by the same norms; all dogmas must be demonstrated by reason—a view which inevitably leads to scepticism, for there are many dogmatisms, all of which move

¹ Pronounced something like *chivāra*.

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in a closed circle of unproven hypotheses. If the cause of religion is not to be compromised, it must not be defended on the *terrain* of profane thought. It must construct itself from the outset on its own basis, without appeal to that worldly wisdom which St. Paul condemned. Nor can it ignore the existence of religions in the plural.

For religion there is no other basis but religion itself. Its content and its basis are identical. It is the *Word*, the interior light which illumines all men and gives coherence to their thoughts. There is that within us which renders intelligence something quite other than a passive accumulation of images, and love something quite other than an instinctive up-gush. Philosophy can have no God save the Word, comprised in that immanence which assures its perfect spirituality. Hence it can have no relation to external forms which make it dependent on spatio-temporal conditions and which drag religious thought back into the lower regions of matter and life. To regard God as a transcendent and all-powerful Being, whose anger may be averted and His grace merited so that we may enjoy in a posthumous eternity a rest that is refused us here below, is to make puny man the principle centre of the Almighty's interest. To regard God as the cause of the world as we apprehend it in space and time is to convert an abstract and immanent principle into an absolute and transcendent being. The problem of religion cannot be solved either on a physical or a biological basis. We can solve it only if we triumph over nature, abdicate a naïvely egocentric vision, renounce our terrestrial privilege, and expect of God only the understanding of what is divine and full and pure. It is time that we forsook the zone of passions which exalt, but also excite and obscure and dismember, engendering in cults and churches unverifiable and reciprocal accusations. *Beliefs are diverse, but there is only one religion*, said Kant. If religion is to be wholly united, it must be wholly spiritual.

If from the paper of Professor Lossky (Prague), who stressed the symphony which religion gives to free agents, especially in the Orthodox Church, we pass to that of Dr. Verweyen (Bonn), who maintained that religion is not dependent upon science, but is self-sufficient and is concerned not with the part but with the whole; and so to the paper of Professor Werner (Geneva), who lamented the subjugation of religion to determinate forms and, having discarded attempts to prove the existence of God as one proves a theorem in geometry, would have us descend into the abyss of the soul that we may there discover the infinity which it encloses and the liberty which makes us children of God, we approach very near to the thesis of Professor Brunschwig; and in the paper of the Berlin professor, Dr. S. Frank, approximate to it yet closer perhaps.

The spiritual position of the past to-day is crumbling, said Dr.

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Frank. All that men thought true is becoming doubtful, and we come back to the phrase of Socrates: we know only that we know nothing. This confession of human ignorance means that men are now trying to look not at a system of concepts, but at reality itself, that they may the better understand their position in the world. They are discovering that they are members of a totality with a centre which is the basis of all being. This mystical knowledge is a negative theology—a *docta ignorantia*, the learned Professor called it, citing Nicholas of Cusa, but with the emphasis laid on the noun. It is the philosophy of plenitude and manysidedness, of stability in manifoldness; and in contrast with the "Either—Or" of the popular preacher, and with the philosophy of onesidedness and of fanaticism—the philosophy of "As this, so that," is a philosophy of tolerance, not in the sense of condoning error, but in the sense of recognizing the manysidedness of truth and of affirming the coincidence of opposites. Universal concepts and the greater darkness pave the way to disaster, said Goethe. An all-embracing, concrete, supra-conceptual experience and that modesty which springs from religious humility are the only way to salvation.

Miss Forbes Liddell of Tallahassee also said that in philosophy a place must be found for *der Geist der stets verneint*, the Spirit which ever answers in the negative; for philosophy questions all; and though many, perhaps the greatest among philosophers, have maintained that God is, materialists, sceptics, and atheists have honestly reached the opposite conclusion. Miss Forbes regards any man as religious who "takes himself seriously as the agent of reality. The importance of self in religious experience is none the less 'derived from the essential connection with ultimate reality, God.' Philosophy, because speculative, contains its own negation, but religion is essentially positive, for its truth is not discovered through speculation or demonstration; it is manifested and enjoyed.

In addition to Fr. Przywara's paper, there were two other papers by philosophers who, as Catholics, acknowledge a revelation which in dogma finds intelligible expression. Between their position and that of the papers which have been briefly summarized above, there were inevitably marked differences, yet also, it would seem, some common ground, especially in the case of Professor Chevalier of Grenoble. Though man was a *faber* before he became *sapiens*, said Professor Chevalier, it is a mistake to regard human concepts as the man-made measures of things. Arts, like customs and traditions, are, as the ancients used to phrase it, gifts of the gods to men, who, without them, would have been impotent. Man has invented neither fire nor yet justice. Human laws do not constitute justice, justice implies an eternal law which, like virtue and power, comes from God. Man is not creative. It is a mistake to ascribe to man, with the

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Kantian, a creative power, determinative and perfectly free, which enables him to treat the given as if it were the product of his own constructive thought. It would be more exact and more in conformity with experience to regard his "intuitive knowledge", with Descartes, as an "illumination of the spirit whereby he sees in the light of God the things which it pleases him to discover by the direct impress of the divine clarity on our understanding, which is not considered here as agent, but only as receiving *les rayons de la Divinité*." To claim that man contains within himself the means of transcending himself and of fully realizing himself, is to run the risk of his falling back on himself, of his becoming fixed in a sterile immanence, in the vanishing deception of the moment—poor substitutes for the only immanence worth while, which is that of the transcendent in man.

Conceptual knowledge, which for Professor Brunschwig is a closed circle of hypotheses, is by Professor Chevalier, as by Descartes and by Augustine, ascribed to the illuminative action of that purely spiritual being which religion postulates. It thus forms an integral part within the whole, but only to become once again divorced in the thesis of Monsignor Noël, the distinguished representative of the Louvain school of Neo-Thomism, founded by Cardinal Mercier. For Monsignor Noël, as for Professor Brunschwig, philosophy comprises a closed chain of purely rational ideas, which, whatever be its history, is in nature independent of faith and distinct from theology. But to such ideas Monsignor Noël ascribes an objective validity which Professor Brunschwig expressly denies, at any rate in regard to their applicability to a divine being. He does not, however, connect them with faith, nor admit with Monsieur Blondel, that there can be a *Christian* philosophy. Philosophy leaves the door open to faith, but in itself it is the work of pure reason.

In one respect all are agreed. There exists a purely spiritual being in regard to whom we should humbly confess our ignorance, but whereas for those who think with Professor Brunschwig that our ignorance is mainly ignorance and but little *docta*, the other school claims with unanimity that our ignorance is *docta*, alike by faith and in philosophy. The divergence between Monsignor Noël and Professor Chevalier concerns only the way in which reason becomes *docta* in philosophy, and even there, as Monsignor Noël suggests, the difference may be largely one of words.

The Mission of Philosophy was another topic to which considerable time was devoted. It was discussed at group meetings on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday; and on the morning of Friday Professor Utitz of Prague and Senator Orestano of Rome (who took

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the place of Benedetto Croce) read papers on the same subject. The other topics which occupied the morning sessions (on Monday and Tuesday) were "The Frontiers of Natural Science," on which papers were read by Professor Bachelard of Dijon and Professor Driesch of Leipzig, and "Normative and Descriptive Standpoints in the Social Sciences," on which papers were read by Professor Hellpach of Heidelberg and Professor T. V. Smith of Chicago. No morning session was devoted to Logic, but with the philosophers this question took first place if we may judge by the number of papers, no less than twenty, which were read under the head of "The Importance of Logical Analysis for Knowledge."

The part played by England in the Congress was far from conspicuous. At the opening meeting the Congress was saluted by delegates from all parts of the world, but no one spoke on behalf of England; nor was there a paper read by an Englishman at any of the morning sessions. Of the three papers on Values one was by Professor J. Laird, but it was impossible to discuss it owing to the length of time that had already been devoted to Professor Hartmann's paper on the same subject. Dr. F. C. S. Schiller read a paper on "How is 'Exactness' possible?" Mr. G. E. Hemens and the author of this article read papers dealing with Philosophy and Natural Science. Miss Hilda Oakley contributed a paper on "Historical Necessity and Ethical Freedom"; and a paper on "Hegel's Logic and Modern Religion," written by the Rev. G. J. Shebbeare, was read by Mr. Muir of Merton. Six papers in all out of over a hundred, and there was a similar dearth of English authors in the Exhibition of modern works on Philosophy! A volume containing all the contributions, together with a summary of the discussions, is already in preparation and will be published in due course.

GREAT THINKERS

(III) ARISTOTLE

II

PROFESSOR J. A. SMITH

WHEN we turn to what may be called Aristotle's Cosmology (crowned as it is by the upper story of his Astronomy, which is a sort of "super-Physics") turn to his work traditionally called the *Metaphysics*, we are faced with something—an inquiry or doctrine—of a surprisingly different character. There what we find is the exposition of a sort or degree of knowledge superior to that of the Sciences. This is what we call his metaphysics, but he does not so name it; he names it Wisdom, or (in effect) Theoretical Wisdom. At times he calls it First (we should rather say Last) Philosophy, or, again, Theology (which means not knowledge of God or gods, but knowledge of what is divine). It is *par excellence* knowledge, the consummate achievement of theoretic or cognitive power. It is the supreme Science, *scientia scientiarum*. Of what is it knowledge? It is knowledge not about, but of, whatsoever is real, really real (and of that at its widest extent), and of its universal and necessary attributes. The latter are distinct from one another, and from that to which they indissolubly belong, and metaphysics apprehends all this in its distinctions and interconnections. Further, it is a knowledge of itself, a knowledge of knowledge, and so a *Wissenschaftslehre*, or "super-Logic." Finally, it is knowledge commensurate with the real Universe as a whole, so that nothing which is genuinely a part of that escapes its view.

Such knowledge is, according to Aristotle, no mere ideal desideratum: it is attainable and has in a measure been attained, even by (some) human beings at (some) times. Undoubtedly he claims for himself a share in it, and endeavours to impart it to others. His tone in the exposition of it is confident, didactic, dogmatic; he endeavours in it to proceed methodically, and to establish it by irrefragable reasoning—in a word, to give to it, as of right, the form of a system, set beyond the possibility of doubt.

These lofty claims may seem to us of a monstrous extravagance, or, to put our protest more temperately, quite uncritical, and made in ingenuous ignorance of the necessary limitations or the reach of Man's cognitive powers. By some they will be pronounced to have been finally put out of the court of Philosophy. But by Aristotle they

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were made, and to make them thought by him to be for Philosophy inevitable. In the history of Philosophy down to our own time they have been again and again renewed. In Aristotle's time, save by extreme sceptics, they were not openly challenged, and as yet not in the name of Faith or Supernatural Revelation, or at least only in weak and negligible forms.

One result of the entertainment of this ideal is that in Aristotle two "metaphysics" appear almost as rival conceptions of it—the sort of "Super-Physics" which emerges at the end of his *Physics*, and this one which is expounded in his *Metaphysics*. Though he distinguishes them, he nevertheless identifies them. The latter tends as the superior to displace the former as the inferior. What in the former is confused and obscure becomes in the latter clear and distinct. Yet Aristotle does not hold that at any stage what we possess in the way of metaphysics is an absolutely clear, distinct, unclouded or unhindered vision of the absolutely real, what M. Bergson has called *la vision* (or *intuition*) *intégrale de l'absolu*. On the contrary, he dwells upon the thought that the organ at our command with which we strain to see (know) what in itself is most fitted to be seen (known) is but as the eyes of owls that see only in the twilight, and so we fail to see, or all but fail to see, the midday sun and what it most illumines. Nevertheless, purblind as at its best our seeing is, what is seen by it is really seen; it is no mis-seeing. The seen (or the scene) is dim, confused, obscure, but, as we gaze in its direction, it grows in clearness and distinctness. It is as if the sun were rising and spreading its light all over it, so that it ever more and more revealed itself as it is.

What, then, according to Aristotle has thus so far been revealed to us of the total kingdom or Universe of real being, and in particular what of the highest region or stratum in its structure? It is difficult to find fit (they cannot be adequate) words to express what has there disclosed itself to us in the "divine" realm. It is a region occupied by a number of distinct Beings (— "substances") of the same general type, who together form a family or household. Among them (or, rather, above them) is One, who is the father of all, the lord and master of the whole household. The common type of which each is a singular or unique instance, Aristotle labours to bring before his and our understandings with increasing clearness and distinctness: in this endeavour he is driven to employ negations of, or contrasts with, what are to us more familiar types of Beings, or determinations of their relations to these (lower orders or grades of Beings, notably ourselves). They are, e.g. wholly immaterial: they have no "matter" in them, that is, no ingredient which is heterogeneous from others or another. To put this more positively, they are (in our language) purely *spiritual* Beings. But his most pregnant

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designation of them is to call them "perfections" (*entelechia*). They are in all ways and manners "perfect." Yet we must add that their being perfect is not the result of a process of perfecting. Theirs is not a perfected perfectness; it is an eternal perfectness, without beginning as without end. It is to be noted that unlike the "angels" of Christian theology, they are not created, but are essentially increate, eternal *à parte ante* as *à parte post*. Each is a perfect unity, perfectly unified and perfectly unique, a perfect individual.

If, for a time, we leave out of view the One (of which all that has been just said is eminently true), and we speak only of the others, of each of those it may be said that it has with each and every other a common nature or *whatness*, yet we must at once add that each possesses that common nature with a distinctive peculiarity or specialty, so that *its* nature is as unique as itself. Their common nature is, to use the words of a modern thinker, to be "a system harmonious and all-inclusive," and yet again the harmony and inclusion, the system, of each is diverse from that of any other and is genuinely unique. Further, each is in its own way and manner perfectly or indefectibly good; there is no defect in its ever-present perfectness; there is nothing which it has not got and does not possess and enjoy, nothing which it requires and has to acquire.

In contrast with the Supreme One, these divine Beings are finite or limited, and, therefore, what has been said of their mode of being is to be understood under that condition. It is of their essence to be limited. Two or three things are to be noted concerning them: (1) Their common nature is characterized by their self-subsistence or independence upon any thing other than themselves; (2) their being expands or runs out into a course of being or *existence* (one might almost say a "life" or "career"); (3) as they are powers, this expansion is into actions or exercises of power. Perhaps we may add that the actions which flow out from their nature do really flow *out*, and influence what is other than themselves, in which they call out responses. It is a bias of Aristotle's to view these Beings as primarily Intelligences, active or illuminative Intelligences. But, disconcertingly to us, he regards their ministry in the administration of the Universe as almost confined to the guidance in their courses of the principal celestial bodies ("the divine bodies") in the structure of the cosmical machine (or *mécanique céleste*). Later writers assigned to them in the divine administration other functions more appropriate to their nature as Intelligences, but of this there is in Aristotle no hint.

As in thought we, under Aristotle's guidance, descend to the lower stages of the hierarchy (what Mr. Mure calls the *Scala Universi*) of Beings which people the Universe, we encounter a rank or order of less perfect Beings. These are the Beings concealed behind the

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show of the world of sense, and yet revealed by or through it. Of them what has been said of the divine Beings holds only upon further conditions and limitations, or, may be said, *diminutis diminucendis*. It is immensely difficult to keep hold of the clue to the understanding of their nature or natures which we have found by studying that of the divine Beings, and to make due application or adjustment to them of the lessons learned from that study. They too are self-subsistent perfections, but they are doubly imperfect perfections; they are not only finite or limited, they are also complex. They are essentially dual Beings, and have two natures coupled in one. Their *whatness* is a union of two somethings or other of very different characters and properties: it is a one compacted of two, which may fall apart and subsist in separation one from another. To these two "parts" in their compacted or "concrete" natures Aristotle gives the names of Form and Matter. Every sensible or physical Being (it seems henceforward more natural to say Substance) is, therefore, a formed matter or materiated form, and within its unity sometimes the form predominates, sometimes the matter. As we continue to descend the scale the form in the combination recedes before the matter while the matter dominates, and therewith the physical substance declines in rank or status. But neither ever reaches zero: the Substance, as long as it remains a Substance, is still dual. If the two were really to come apart each would be, if a substance at all, an *incomplete* substance. Still, there is a difference between the two, and Aristotle frequently speaks of the Form of a concrete sensible Substance or itself a Substance.

Here I will ask the reader to imagine himself making a return journey from circumference to centre of the Aristotelian Universe, or its more or less sensible counterpart the Cosmos. In this descending journey the terminals are the outermost Heavens and the centre of the Earth. All the way he is passing through regions peopled by successively lower and lower, more and more imperfect, Substances. Let us suppose ourselves to have descended below the concave surface of the sphere of the Moon, into the sublunar region. Here begins what Aristotle in effect calls the "Mid-Air," and it stretches down to close upon the surface of the Earth. This region of Mid-Air is, according to Aristotle, what I may call the natural home of the simpler (but still complex) physical substances: there they subsist and exercise their proper actions upon one another. The simplest of all are the so-called four Elements, and the consequence of their actions upon one another is that there is a perpetual cyclical transmutation of each of the four into each other. But there is also a constant coming-to-be and passing-away of substances of a more complicated structure, especially at its lower levels. These are very like what we call 'organic substances' as we normally find them in

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the bodies of living things (but it includes also "minerals"). In fact, this whole region of Mid-Air is a sort of vast Chemical Laboratory in which substances of various sorts are synthetically produced and analytically destroyed.

Just at (or near) the surface of the Earth this substance-generating (and destroying) activity reaches a further elaboration: out of organic substances it produces organisms (employing also portions of sub-organic substances). These complex and elaborate structures are living beings, plants and animals, and to them we are wont specially to apply the name of Substances, because they seem obviously each of them to subsist of itself and apart from others. Among them are ourselves, human beings, and we regard Men as standing highest in the animal or living world. We should therefore expect living men to exhibit or to possess the common character of physical substances with a special clearness and distinctness.

Having now brought the reader down to the surface of the Earth, the natural home of living beings, but especially of Man, I will take leave to pass over Aristotle's account of living beings in general (his biology), and concentrate attention upon the account of Man (as the highest or paragon of animals, and so of all living beings). Man—every man—is a substance, a natural or physical substance. As such he—his nature—is essentially dual, a combination in one of two natures (or incomplete substances), compacted of a Form and a Matter. So far he, as a physical substance, is in no way different from any other physical substance. Nor is it peculiar to him that his form is a special form, and his matter a special matter, that his form and his matter are specially suited one to another or are strictly correlative. Nor, again, is it peculiar to him that, if they have ever been apart, or have fallen apart, neither is in its separateness what it was in the combination. All that is true of any and every physical substance. Hence it follows that, if we force the contrast between his form and his matter, and endeavour to conceive either by itself, ignoring its relation to the other, we fail to conceive it properly and give to ourselves an "empty" account of it. We must never forget—Aristotle does not forget—that Man is a complex or dual being, a combination of two parts distinct and distinguishable one from another, however close be their correlation and combination.

It might look as if, in the exposition of what may be called his Anthropology or Human Psychology, Aristotle was unfaithful to this conception of the nature of Man. For there, accepting for the formal and the material component of that nature the current names of Soul and Body, he begins by speaking of the former by itself, as if it were, so taken, a complete substance (in the *De Anima*). In another series of works he similarly treats the Body by itself, and lastly he devotes a number of special treatises to those operations

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of living things (or at least of animals) which involve interactions and co-operation between the one component and the other. In all these points there is nothing peculiar to human nature, and what he says is applicable *mutatis mutandis* to all living beings whatsoever, even to plants. The Greek word (*psyche*) which we translate "Soul" is used to name the formal component of all such beings: each one of them is an embodied soul or besouled body. Nevertheless, his chief interest is in the nature of human beings, that is, of ourselves. He does not really ever forget that by comparison with the divine Beings the undivine or sub-divine nature of Man is a union not quite perfect of two complementary but distinct and contrasting natures.

The Soul of Man, then, is a system of powers which is in his total nature united with those of a bodily organism, which is itself a system or apparatus of instruments suitable for use by his Soul. The system of soul-powers is a constitution with a definite arrangement and order of its constituent parts. They fall under two heads, (A) cognitive and (B) motive or executive powers. In the whole psychic constitution, and within each of these two sets, there is, besides arrangement and order, superordination and subordination: there are among the powers differences of level or rank. At the lowest level are powers which do their work blindly or in darkness: there are the powers we share with plants, such as those of nutrition, growth and reproduction. Next above them are those we share with other animals ("the brutes"), such as (in the cognitive set) the powers of the senses or of Sense, through which we become acquainted with the qualities and changes of quality of the physical bodies which make up our environment (and also with their shapes and sizes, and the changes of these): in the higher animals the reach of these sense-powers extends to the past (the power of Memory) and even forward into the future, or again to the apprehension of the helpful or harmful qualities of surrounding bodies. As these sensory powers are found in our nature, they have an even greater elaboration and a further reach than they have in any sub-human animal. All this has its parallel or analogue in the set of the motive, or, as modern psychologists would say, "conative" powers. In this account of the constitution of the human Soul there are two principles governing Aristotle's mind which are apt to escape notice: (1) that these "powers" are what our ancestors called "passive powers," powers that do not put themselves into exercise, but require to be stimulated and guided *ab extra* from and by the environment; (2) though they are powers (or capacities) of the Soul, their exercise requires the constant co-operation along with it of the powers belonging to its Body. Hence (1) we cannot by the senses perceive what we please or when we please, and (2) what perceives—or what endeavours to

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reach something absent—is not the Soul, it is the whole animate being or embodied soul. It is “we”—this or that man—who at this level cognize and “conate.” Yet we must not say that even “we” perform the manifold and various cognitions and conations which fill our lives; “we” rather suffer or undergo them.

But that is so, only so far as we regard Man as the highest of animals, his nature as a very elaborate or developed animal nature, and his Soul in the same way. And that is not the whole story of any of them. For, whether we think of him as cognitive or as conative, we are forced to recognize in him (within his nature and his Soul) what there is not to be found in any other animal. There is in him something in virtue of which he thinks and knows or understands in a way impossible to the brutes. This ingredient in his nature is called by Aristotle his *Nous*—a word which we translate “Intellect.” It is, he says, something “divine,” a divine Being or Substance, and of it he repeats the language he had used in speaking of the divine Beings of the highest rank in the Universe. It is notoriously difficult to extract from the text of Aristotle his theory of this Being or Power, but it seems to me best to take him literally to mean what is involved in the pregnant designation of it as “divine.” One of these implications is that it too is a self-subsistent or “independent” Substance in the manner in which the Beings styled “divine” are. Hence we shall have to say that it is ungenerable and indestructible, that is, is eternal, and that its simple essence freely and perpetually flows out into a course of actual existence; that, again, it is a perfecting perfection, and so on. No doubt, so to understand him, is to run ourselves, or follow him, into paradoxes, or as some might say into self-contradictions. If, we should like to ask Aristotle, if it is in itself a complete Substance, how can it be an ingredient or a whole together with another of a different rank? How can it be said (as he says) to come into that union “from outside”? How can a spiritual Being form one being together with a material and corporal being? He has foreseen, and indeed propounds, some of these questions, but he answers none of them. It might seem a little more justifiable for us to press for answers to another set of questions concerning the operations of this Power in our lives, and the traces of them there to be found which are evidences of its presence and work in us. Here he does (at least in respect of our cognitive experiences) do something to help us. The main significant fact in our cognitive life is that at times we come, as no animal can or does, to “understand,” to apprehend what is finally and indubitably real, fitfully, vaguely, confusedly, and obscurely to partake in a knowing which is certain or most certain or absolutely certain. Such knowledge *exists*, and is perpetually imparted, communicated, transmitted from intellect to

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intellect: it ceaselessly renews itself and leaves traces of itself on the historical record. We must, however, not attribute to Aristotle any doctrine that its perpetuity is a progress; so far as he says anything relevant to its character, he conceives it rather as a cyclical course of successive rises to a climax and declines from it, yet so that it never wholly vanishes from history. So at least he speaks of the course of human civilization, mainly viewing it as a course in knowledge. He says nothing of the same kind of the course of human conation or action, but probably he would have said much the same, and similarly of the outflow of Man's nature as a whole into actual existence or history.

In the facts which thus result and occupy the stage of Man's life—or at any rate those which fill the frame of the contemporary Hellenic world—Aristotle shows a wide interest, but his interest is not that of a mere observer or describer. He desires to see them in their arrangement and order, and in the end to understand and explain them to himself and others. In proceeding to do so, he once more distinguishes them into (A) the cognitive and (B) the conative, or, to use his own terms, the theoretical and the practical, fields. In his study of both these fields he endeavours to give to the fruits of his thinking the ordered (or methodical) and systematic form of a Science. It is because of his success in this design that he may justly be called the father of both Logic and Ethics.

His Logic—so to call his account of what has issued and continues to issue from the exercises of Man's distinctive powers of thinking has won and held the admiration of philosophers ever since his time. I need only quote Kant's judgment upon it: "Logic, as we have it, is derived from Aristotle's, who correctly settled the extent of its subject-matter, and omitted no essential point: all that is left to his successors is to improve upon its doctrine in the ways of greater accuracy, definiteness, and distinctness." It would be quite impossible for me here to furnish a *précis* of Aristotle's logical doctrine. I mention but a few of the leading principles that govern his Logic.

(1) It has for its subject-matter, primarily and chiefly, the whole of the processes of human Thinking, or, more precisely, of that sort or degree of it in which we think something *about* something else, affirming or denying "predicates" about "subjects." It recognizes (but does not specially study) simpler mental processes by which we clear up products of such processes and apprehend them so as to name them correctly, and towards the other end of its domain there are products that fall almost beyond "thinking about," and are hardly expressible in the form of predications about subjects. Nevertheless, its proper field includes not only what are simply "thinkings-about" ("propositions" or "judgments"), but also the more elaborate products which he calls "syllogisms" and we "reason-

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ings" or "inferences." Pushing his Logic ever further he extends it to take in still more powerful processes, the results of which are, though still formally "thinkings-about," more than "thinkings": they are knowings, knowledges, Sciences. All the same, they are continuous with "thinkings-about," and this may be expressed by saying that they are "knowledges-about," not "knowledges-of"; in them we know not what anything is, but only something about it, which is other than it. Even in the Sciences, where our knowing is most sure and certain, this is so: beyond such knowledge Science cannot go. If there be knowledge which is a knowing-of what in Science we know about, it falls beyond the domain of Logic. No "scientific" thinking can further or establish or "prove" it.

(2) All this "thinking-about" is the outcome of a power which is part of Man's nature. It is a distinctive or peculiar power of ours which is part of our natural endowment and which is absent from the nature of all animals lower than Man. But it is not what we have earlier called "Intellect," it is inferior and subordinate to that. It used to be called in English his Reason, because the most and best it can issue in is "reasonings." By contrast with it his Intellect used to be called his Understanding, but, most unfortunately for us, Coleridge reversed the uses, and so ruined *both* words for employment in the exposition of Aristotle's doctrine. Hence we can only say that, while the power ("Reason") of which Logic studies the working and results, thinks or knows *about* (thinks or knows something about something else), Intellect knows what is thought about without thinking about it. Hence the consideration of Intellect, and its activity (intellection or understanding) falls outside Logic, or occurs only in an appendix or epilogue to it.

(3) The Logic of Aristotle throughout considers the thinkings and the thoughts which it studies as expressed in speech, spoken or written. He never recognizes bare, naked, "pure" thinkings or thoughts: his Logic is not "pure Logic." That is implied in the calling of the science of them "Logic," for *logos* in Greek means simply "speech." Even when the thinking is as private as possible to the thinker, it is still embodied in inward speech (*la parole intérieur*). Doubtless that speech is not just the speech of ordinary intercourse, but it is not discontinuous with that: it is that stripped of its aesthetic, its action-directing, and its passion-exciting associations. Briefly, it is prosaic speech.

Hence—to repeat the last two points—the thinkings and thoughts which form the subject-matter of his Logic are (a) natural, and (b) concrete, thinkings and thoughts.

We must now turn to his account of the processes and results which are the outcome of Man's practical power or powers. That,

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too, is (or these are) a part of his nature, his distinctive or peculiar natural endowment, a part also which is absent in the constitution of the infra-human animals. Upon that scene, less well lit than the province of Logic, he opens his eyes wide, observing and describing the phenomena it presents in his near neighbourhood, i.e. in the contemporary Hellenic world. Here, too, his aim is to reach as nearly scientific an account of it as is possible, but, according to him, such a scientific account is less possible than in the case of Logic. His account of it is given in two treatises (the *Ethics* and the *Politics*) or in two stages. Of the relation between the subject-matters of the two treatises little more can profitably be said than that they are in a sense one and the same, and that the second carries out doctrines implicit or latent in the first, making them explicit and patent. But in this explication Aristotle is in thought following the explication of the subject-matter itself, bringing and presenting to view a further and fuller outcome into existence of the initial powers of Man's nature—his practical powers.

The leading or governing conception throughout both treatises is that Man's practical powers are his (or their) nature directed toward a special something (Aristotle calls it a special "end" or "good"), which by nature he has not got and does not possess or enjoy. While and because it is absent, the lack of it disturbs and disquiets him, he longs for it and strives or strains towards it. There is begotten in him a vague or dim notion, confused and obscure, of what is thus absent, an anticipatory notion of it—or if "notion" is too bold a word, a presentiment or fore-imagination of it. To this special or human (practical) end or good we usually give the name of Happiness, but the Greek word which we translate Happiness by no means signifies as the English word does that it is a state of Feeling, still less that it is a passive state, or indeed that it is a *state* at all. On the contrary, it was for him relatively easy, without parting company with contemporary Greek usage, to suggest that Happiness is to be conceived as a continuing or enduring condition of immemorial activity or doing, in which our practical powers are at work on the largest scale and in the fullest exercise. It is in such a condition that our natural practical powers will achieve their natural end or good, that our longings will be stilled, our strivings cease or come to rest, and, in a word, our natural wishes be gratified or satisfied. He takes it for granted that our natural human wishes (our whole power of Wishing) are rightly directed to what is in them wished for, and exerts himself to define, to clarify and distinctify, what that is which by nature we do wish for. His definition of it is, briefly, that it is the fullest and freest outgoing into actual existence of our nature-given practical powers, unhindered by internal friction or external obstruction.

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Success or failure in the attainment by a man of this end depends in part upon his good or evil fortune, but it also depends upon conditions within Man's power to determine. The most important of these may be called, as a whole, "Character" (*ēthos*). To be successful it is above all things necessary for a man to have become possessed of a good Character. This character Aristotle conceives as a group of distinct and describable excellences or "Virtues," or, rather, as a group of (practical) Virtues, consisting of two sub-groups, (A) the sub-group of Virtues of Character in a special sense (the peculiarly "Moral Virtues"), and (B) that of Virtues of a relatively more intelligent or thoughtful kind (the "Intellectual Virtues"). (A) are implanted in the lower and properly practical part of human nature, are seated and do their work there. He sets them before the reader in a sort of picture-gallery of types of man who possess them. Yet he regards these Virtues as, in spite of this separation, having a natural affinity, and so as fitted to form together a coherent and co-operating whole (a "Moral Character") under the headship of the supreme Moral Virtue of Justice. Each of them is formed and fixed by a process of Habituation or training, in which the individual has under direction learned to repeat actions of a certain kind with increasing regularity and ease or freedom from external pressure. In consequence he gradually comes to do similar actions of his own accord or "freely," to do them for their own sake or worth. But the individual is but part-cause of his Character, he is of it only a subordinate or secondary cause, rather a consenting than an originitive party to its formation and fixation. As it exists in him, it is very largely the product of the action upon him of his external (social) environment.

His undergoing of the discipline which forms it in him is a sort of apprenticeship in the business or art of human living. The Moral Virtues he has acquired are not yet truly consolidated or able fully to accomplish their collaborative work, and that is so because they subsist and work in relative darkness or twilight. To make these really effective he must learn to use them not blindly or purblindly but with open eyes, and to do so he must acquire or develop the Virtues of the sub-group (B). The members of this sub-group Aristotle again presents to the reader as a sort of family culminating in and presided over by the supreme Virtue of "Prudence" (or Practical Wisdom). It must not be forgotten that these members (and the whole sub-group) are, though called in English "intellectual," still "practical." They are, therefore, to be distinguished from the group of the theoretical Virtues of the Intellect, some of which have the same names. This difference is marked by the fact that the supreme or "sovereign" members of the one and the other group have different names, *Phronesis* ("Prudence") and *Sophia*

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(which we are obliged to translate Theoretical Wisdom). But the difference is still more patent in the types of men which are the concrete embodiments of each of these supreme Virtues, viz. the Statesman or "Politician," and the Philosopher or "Sage."

The former is the practical thinker *par excellence*, what he excels other men in is thinking practically. Because he thinks practically so supremely well, he is in practice the most originaive and the most effectively constructive of all human agents. He is the architect or master-builder of Man's practical world; he makes the fullest and largest use of the practical powers of men; he does most to further the actualization by men of the practical end or good, Happiness.

What he has in this way done is studied in the *Politics*. The main result of his practical thinking (or his thoughtful practice) is the institution of what the Greeks called the *Polis* (the "City-State"), and what he continues to do is to preserve it and guide its life, the whole course of its activity. By doing this, by devoting his thinking powers to that service he does more than any other type of Man to further the coming into existence of human Happiness, and that on the largest scale. But here it may be well to remember that Aristotle himself was not a practical Statesman or Politician, was not even a citizen of any City-State in which his life was passed. At Athens he was never more than a denizen or resident alien. He was, therefore, an outsider in respect of the political life in his neighbourhood or environment, or in it but not of it. Whatever may have been the effect upon him of that situation, we have to recognize that he regarded the Happiness which he called Practical as a *second-best* Happiness. Before his mind, in contrast with it there rose and stayed the ideal of a far higher Happiness, the Happiness of a life absorbed in the cultivation, promotion and extension of knowledge as a whole and for its own sake. This ideal he laboured throughout his life to make to himself and others clear and distinct, to commend it to those fitted to endeavour after it, to actualize it not in solitary contemplation but in the fellowship of a chosen *élite*.

It is as living, and successfully living, such a life that I have here tried to present him, rather than as the great man of science he also was or as the possessor of a glorified common sense which he was too. For over and above all he was a philosopher, and no one is a philosopher who does not strive to make the most of that which in him and in Man generally, dimly desiring its presence and feeling its sovereign power, we call the Intellect, and, to cover myself under the authority of one who knew him well, I recall that his master Plato called him 'the Intellect' of his school.

(Concluded)

THE MEANING OF ἀγαθόν IN THE *ETHICS* OF ARISTOTLE

PROFESSOR H. A. PRICHARD

I HAVE for some time found it increasingly difficult to resist a conclusion so heretical that the mere acceptance of it may seem a proof of lunacy. Yet the failure of a recent attempt to resist it has led me to want to confess the heresy. And at any rate a statement of my reasons may provoke a refutation.

The heresy, in brief, is that Aristotle (in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, except in the two discussions of pleasure—where ἀγαθόν is opposed to φαῦλον and μοχθηρόν) really meant by ἀγαθόν conducive to our happiness, and maintained that when a man does an action deliberately, as distinct from impulsively, he does it simply in order to, i.e. from the desire to, become happy, this being so even when he does what is virtuous or speculates. Of this heresy a corollary is the view that Aristotle, being anxious to persuade men first and foremost to practise speculation and secondarily to do what is virtuous, conceived that, to succeed, what he had to prove was that this was the action necessary to make a man happy. This corollary, however, which may seem only a further heresy, I propose to ignore. The heresy, in my opinion, is equally attributable to Plato, and for much the same reasons. But for simplicity's sake I propose to confine consideration to Aristotle, with, however, the suggestion that the same argument can be applied to Plato.

In attributing this view to Aristotle I do not mean to imply that he does not repeatedly make statements inconsistent with it. Nor do I mean to imply that the question of the consistency of these statements with the view simply escapes him; it seems to me that it does not, but that owing to a mistake he thought they were consistent with it. Nor do I mean to imply that his acceptance of this view appears on the surface; but rather that it becomes evident once we lay bare certain misleading elements in his account of the motive of deliberate action.

The first two chapters of the *Ethics*, and especially its opening sentence, are undoubtedly puzzling. Aristotle begins by saying: πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμίως δὲ προῆξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τὰγαθόν, ὃ πάντ' ἐφίεται. "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and purpose, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which

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all things aim." Then after pointing out that certain aims or ends are subordinate to others, he contends that there must be one final end to which all others are subordinate, and that this will be *ἀγαθόν*, the good, and that, consequently, knowledge of this final end will have great influence on our lives, since if we have it, we shall have a definite mark or goal to aim at. And he goes on to say that, this being so, his object in the *Ethics* is to discover what this final end is.

Here, as the rest of the first book shows, Aristotle, in his first sentence, is not simply stating a common opinion, but stating it with approval and on the assumption that it is an opinion which his hearers will accept and so which can be used as a basis for his subsequent argument. And, so regarded, it is very sweeping.

Even if he had said that in every deliberate action we have an aim or are aiming at something, we should have regarded the statement, put forward as expressing a fact obvious to everyone, and so as needing neither elucidation nor discussion, as sufficiently sweeping. But what he does say is more sweeping. In effect, taking for granted that there is always something at which we are aiming, he commits himself to a general statement about its nature, stating that it is always *ἀγαθόν τι*, or, as we may transliterate the phrase, a good.

But besides being sweeping it is obscure. Even if Aristotle had said that in all action we are aiming at something, we should have felt that the statement needed elucidation. But saying as he does that we are aiming at something good, we have an additional puzzle. If, instead, he had said that we are always aiming at a pleasure, or at an honour, or at doing some good action, then we should have at least suspected he knew what he meant, whether or not we agreed. But the meaning of *ἀγαθόν* is not clear.

Consequently to discover his meaning we have to find out not only what he means when he speaks of us in a deliberate action as aiming at something (*ἐφίεσθαι τί*) or as having a *τέλος* or end, but also what he means by *ἀγαθόν*. And of these tasks, plainly the former has to be accomplished first.

The idea, which of course underlies the *Ethics*, that in all deliberate action we have an end or aim, is one the truth of which we are all likely to maintain when we first consider action, "action" being a term which, for shortness' sake, I propose to use for deliberate action. The idea goes back to Plato; and Mill expresses it when he says that all action is for the sake of an end. We take for granted that in doing some action there must be some desire leading or moving us to do the action, i.e. forming what we call our motive, since, as we should say, otherwise we should not be doing the action; or, for this is only to express the same idea in

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other words, we take for granted that in doing the action we have a purpose, i.e. something the desire of which moves us to do the action. And, taking this for granted, we are apt to maintain that our purpose in doing the action always consists in something other than the action which we think the action likely to cause, directly or indirectly, such as an improvement in our health which we expect from taking a dose of medicine.

Further, taking this view of the motive of action, we are apt to express it metaphorically by saying that in any action we have an aim or that there is something at which we are aiming. For when we consider, e.g. taking a drug from the desire to become healthy, we are apt to think of the thing desired, viz. our health, as that by reference to which we have devised the action as what is likely to cause it, and so as similar to the target by reference to the position of which a shooter arranges his weapon before shooting. We are also apt to speak of our purpose metaphorically as our end, as being something which we think will come into existence at the end of the action. In either case, however, it is to be noticed that the terms "end" and "aim" are merely metaphorical expressions for our purpose, i.e. for that the desire of which is moving us to act. No doubt further consideration may afterwards lead us to abandon this view. For certain actions and notably acts of gratitude or revenge seem prompted by the desire to do the action we at least hope we are doing, such as the desire to inflict an injury to another equal to that to which he has done us. Yet we may not reflect sufficiently to notice this, or even if we do we may fail to notice that such actions require us to modify the view, or may even think, as Aristotle did, that the doctrine may be made to apply to them.

Plato, it may be noticed, expressly formulates this view in the *Gorgias*. In trying to show that orators and tyrants have the least power in States, he lays down generally¹ that a man in doing what he does wishes not for the action but for that for the sake of which he does it, this being implied to be some result of the action. And in support he urges that a man who takes a drug wishes not for taking the drug but for health, and that a man who takes a voyage wishes not for the sailing and incurring of dangers but for the wealth for the sake of which he takes the voyage. He is, however, here obviously going too far in asserting that the man does not want to do the action itself, 'or if the man did not want to do the action, he would not be doing it. What Plato should have said and what would express the view accurately is this: "A man undoubtedly wants to do what he does, and this desire is moving him. But the desire is always derivative or dependent. His having it depends on

¹ *Gorgias*, p. 467.

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his having another desire, viz. the desire of something to which he thinks the action will lead, and that is why this latter desire should be represented as what is moving him, since it is in consequence of having this latter desire that he has the desire to do the action."

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The view, therefore, implies the idea that the desire to do some action is always a dependent desire, depending on the desire of something to which we think the action will lead. But, as we soon notice, this latter desire must either be itself an independent desire, i.e. a desire which does not depend on any other, or else imply such a desire, since otherwise, as Aristotle put it, desire would be empty and vain. We are therefore led to draw a distinction between an independent desire and a desire depending on a desire of something which we think the thing desired will cause. Aristotle, of course, recognized and even emphasized the distinction, but unfortunately he formulated it with a certain inaccuracy. He implies that it should be expressed as that between τὸ βούλεσθαι τι δι' αὐτό, or κατ' αὐτό, and τὸ βούλεσθαι τι δι' ἕτερον. But the latter phrase must be short for τὸ βούλεσθαι τι διὰ το βούλεσθαι ἕτερόν τι, and, this being so, the former phrase must be short for τὸ βούλεσθαι τι διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι αὐτό, which, meaning wishing for something in consequence of wishing for itself, is not sense. The distinction should have been expressed as that between το βούλεσθαι τι μὴ διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι ἕτερόν τι and τὸ βούλεσθαι τι διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι ἕτερόν τι or, to be more accurate, between desiring something not in consequence of desiring something else, and desiring something in consequence of desiring something else to which we think it will lead. And in this connexion it should be noticed that the English phrase for an independent desire, viz. the desire of something for its own sake, which is the equivalent of Aristotle's βούλεσθαι τι δι' αὐτό, has really only the negative meaning of the desire of something which is not dependent on any desire.

Further, having reached this distinction, we are soon led, as of course Aristotle was, to hold that in every action we must have some ultimate or final aim, consisting of the object of some independent desire, and to distinguish from this aims which we have but which are not ultimate.

Having drawn this distinction we do not ask: "Of what sort or sorts are our non-ultimate aims?" since obviously anything may be such an aim. But we do raise the question: "Of what sort or sorts is our ultimate aim in various actions?"

To this question Aristotle's answer is ἀγαθόν τι, since his opening statement covers ultimate as well as non-ultimate aims. And the most obvious way to ascertain what Aristotle considers our ultimate aim is, of course, simply to find out what he means by ἀγαθόν. But,

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as should now be obvious, there is also another way. Like ourselves, he must really mean by our ultimate or final aim that the independent desire of which, or, as he would put it, that the desire of which καθ' αὐτό, is moving us to act. Consequently, if he says of certain things that we desire and pursue, i.e. aim at, them καθ' αὐτό, we are entitled to conclude that he considers that in certain instances they are our ultimate aim. Now in Chapter VI of Book I he maintains that there are certain kinds of things, viz. τιμή, φρόνησις, and ἡδονή which are διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα καθ' αὐτά; and to these he adds in Chapter VII, § 3, νοῦς and πᾶσα ἀρετή of which, together with τιμή and ἡδονή, he says that though we choose them for the sake of happiness, we also choose them δι' αὐτά, i.e. as being what they severally are, since we should choose them even if nothing resulted from them. And to say this is only to say in other words that in some instances our ultimate end is an honour, in others it is a pleasure, in others our being φρόνιμος, and so on. Consequently, if we hold him to this, the only possible conclusion for us to draw is that he considers (1) that in such cases our ultimate end is not ἀγαθόν τι, whatever he means by ἀγαθόν, and also (2) that our ultimate end is not always of the same sort, so that no single term could describe it. We thus reach the astonishing conclusion that Aristotle, in insisting as he does that we pursue these things for their own sake, is really ruling out the possibility of maintaining that our end is always ἀγαθόν τι, or indeed anything else, so that we are in a position to maintain that he has no right to assert that our ultimate end is always an ἀγαθόν, even before we have attempted to elucidate what he means by ἀγαθόν.

Further, if we next endeavour, as we obviously should, to do this, we get another surprise. Aristotle's nearest approach to an elucidation is to be found in Chapter VI, §§ 7-11, and Chapter VII, §§ 1-5. There he speaks of τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα as called ἀγαθὰ in one sense, and gives as illustrations τιμή, φρόνησις, and ἡδονή; and he speaks of τὰ ποιητικά τούτων ἢ φιλακτικά πως as called ἀγαθὰ in another sense, and he implies that these latter are διωκτὰ καὶ αἰρετὰ δι' ἑτερον and that πλοῦτος is an illustration.² Further, he appears to consider that the difference of meaning is elucidated by referring to the former as ἀγαθὰ καθ' αὐτά and to the latter as ἀγαθὰ διὰ ταῦτα, i.e. ἀγαθὰ διὰ ἀγαθὰ καθ' αὐτά. But this unfortunately is no elucidation, since to state a difference of reason for calling two things ἀγαθόν is not to state a difference of meaning of ἀγαθόν, and indeed is to imply that the meaning in both cases is the same. Nevertheless, these statements seem intended as an elucidation of the meaning of ἀγαθόν. And the cause for surprise lies in this, that if they are taken seriously as an elucidation, the con-

² *Ethics*, I, 7. 4.

² *Ibid.*, I, 5. 8.

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clusion can only be that *ἀγαθόν* includes being desired in its meaning, and indeed simply means *τέλος* or end. For if they are so understood, Aristotle must be intending to say (1) that when we say of something that it is *ἀγαθόν καθ' αὐτό* what we mean is that it is *διωκόμενον καὶ ἀγαπώμενον καθ' αὐτό*, i.e. simply that it is an ultimate end, and (2) that when we say of something that it is *ἀγαθόν δι' ἕτερον*, what we mean is that it is *διωκόμενον καὶ ἀγαπώμενον δι' ἕτερον*, i.e. simply that it is a non-ultimate end. In other words, if here he is interpreted strictly, he is explaining that *ἀγαθόν* means *τέλος*, and by the distinction between an *ἀγαθόν καθ' αὐτό* and an *ἀγαθόν δι' ἕτερον* he means merely the distinction between an ultimate and a non-ultimate end. Yet if anything is certain, it is that when Aristotle says of something, e.g. *πλοῦτος*, that it is an *ἀγαθόν* he does not mean that it is a *τέλος*, i.e. that it is something at which someone is aiming, and that when he says of something, e.g. *τιμὴ* or *φρόνησις*, that it is an *ἀγαθόν καθ' αὐτό*, he does not mean that it is someone's ultimate end, i.e. what he speaks of in Book VI, 9, § 7 as *τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς*. Apart from other considerations, if he did, then for him to say, as he in effect does, that we always aim at *ἀγαθόν τι* would be to say nothing, and for him to speak, as he does, of the object of *βούλησις* as *τὰγαθόν* would be absurd.

But this being so, what *does* Aristotle mean by *ἀγαθόν*? Here there is at least one statement which can be made with certainty. Aristotle unquestionably would have said that where we are pursuing something of a certain kind, say an honour, *καθ' αὐτό*, we are pursuing it *ὡς ἀγαθόν*, i.e. as a good. Otherwise there would not even have been verbal consistency between his statements, that we pursue, i.e. aim at, things of certain stated kinds, and that we always aim at *ἀγαθόν τι*. Again, unless we allow that he would have said this, we cannot make head or tail either of his puzzling statement in Chapter II to the effect that since, as there must be, there is some end which we wish for for its own sake, this end must be *τὰγαθόν*, or, again, of its sequel in Chapter VII, where he proceeds to consider what that is to which the term *τὰγαθόν* is applicable by considering which of our various ends is a final end. For we are entitled to ask: "Why does Aristotle think that if we discover something to be desired and pursued for its own sake, we shall be entitled to say that it is *τὰγαθόν*?" and no answer is possible unless we allow that he thought that in desiring and pursuing something for its own sake we are desiring and pursuing it *ὡς ἀγαθόν*.

But Aristotle in saying, as he would have said, that in pursuing, e.g. an honour, we are pursuing it *ὡς ἀγαθόν* could only have meant that we are pursuing it in virtue of thinking that it would possess a certain character to which he refers by the term *ἀγαθόν*, so that

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by *ἀγαθόν* he must mean to indicate some character which certain things would have. Further, this being so, in implying as he does that in pursuing things of certain different kinds *καθ' αὐτά* we are pursuing them *ὡς ἀγαθά*, he must be implying that these things of different kinds have, nevertheless, a common character, viz. that indicated by the term *ἀγαθόν*. It will, of course, be objected that he expressly denies that they have a common character. For he says: *τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγαθά*.¹ But the answer is simple; viz. that this is merely an inconsistency into which he is driven by his inability to find in these things the common character which his theory requires him to find, and that if he is to succeed in maintaining that we pursue these things of various kinds *ὡς ἀγαθά*, he *has* to maintain that in spite of appearances to the contrary they have a common character.

Nevertheless, though we have to insist that Aristotle in fact holds that in pursuing any of these things *καθ' αὐτό*, i.e. as we should say, for its own sake, we are pursuing it *ὡς ἀγαθόν*, we cannot escape the admission that in doing so he is being inconsistent. For to maintain that in pursuing, e.g. an honour, we are pursuing it *καθ' αὐτό*, or, as we should say, for its own sake, is really to maintain that the desire of an honour moving us is an independent desire, i.e. a desire depending on no other. And, on the other hand, to maintain that in pursuing an honour, we are pursuing it *ὡς ἀγαθόν*, or as a good, is really to maintain that the desire of an honour moving us is a dependent desire, viz. a desire depending on the desire of something which will possess the character indicated by the word *ἀγαθόν*, we desiring an honour only in consequence of desiring something which will possess that character and thinking that an honour will possess it. It is in fact really to maintain that in pursuing an honour, our ultimate aim, i.e. that the independent desire of which is moving us, or what Aristotle would call that which we are pursuing *καθ' αὐτό*, is not an honour but a good, i.e. something having the character, whatever it may be which is indicated by the word *ἀγαθόν*, we desiring an honour only in consequence of desiring a good. The principle involved will become clearer, if we take a different illustration. In Chapter VI Aristotle speaks of *ὁρᾶν* as one of the things which are pursued for their own sake; and if he had said that we pursue *ὁρᾶν ὡς αἰσθάνεσθαι* he would in consistency have had to maintain that what we are pursuing *καθ' αὐτό* is not *ὁρᾶν* but *αἰσθάνεσθαι*, and that the desire of *ὁρᾶν* moving us is only a dependent desire depending on our desiring something else which we think *ὁρᾶν* will be.

It will be objected that there is really no inconsistency, since

¹ *Ethics*, I, 6, 11.

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Aristotle conceives the characteristic referred to by *ἀγαθόν* as a characteristic of an honour and of anything else which he would say we pursue *καθ' αὐτό*, and that to speak of us as desiring something in respect of some character which it would have is not to represent our desire of it as dependent. In illustration it may be urged that to speak of us as in desiring to do a courageous action desiring it as a worthy or virtuous action is not to represent our desire to do a courageous action as dependent. But the objection cannot be sustained. For if we desire to do a courageous action, as something which would be a virtuous action, i.e. really, as something which we think would be a virtuous action, although our desire does not depend on a desire of something which we think a courageous action would *cause*, it does depend on the desire of something which we think it would *be*. And as a proof of this dependence we can point to the fact that if while having this desire, we were to do a good action of another sort, e.g. a generous action, the desire would disappear.

What is in the end plain is that Aristotle cannot succeed in maintaining that our ultimate end is always *ἀγαθόν τι* without abandoning his view that we pursue such things as *τιμὴ* and *ἀρετή καθ' αὐτό*, or, as we should say, for their own sake, and maintaining instead that we pursue them as things which we think will have the character to which the term *ἀγαθόν* refers. Nevertheless, in spite of having to allow that we are thereby attributing inconsistency to Aristotle, we have to admit that he in fact holds that in desiring and pursuing certain things for their own sakes we are desiring and pursuing them in respect of their having a certain character, viz. whatever it be to which he refers by the term *ἀγαθόν*.

So far the only clue reached to the meaning of *ἀγαθόν* is the idea that Aristotle used it to refer to a certain character possessed by certain things, the thought of the possession of which arouses desire for them, and indeed is the only thing which arouses desire for anything, except where our desire depends on another desire.

We have now to try to get to closer quarters with the question of its meaning. The question is really: "What is the character which Aristotle considered we must think would be possessed by something if we are to desire it, independently of desiring something else to which we think it will lead, that character being what Aristotle used the word *ἀγαθόν* to refer to?"

Here it seems hardly necessary to point out that the answer cannot be "goodness." To rule out this answer, it is only necessary to point out two things. First, if Aristotle had meant by *ἀγαθόν* good he would have had to represent us as desiring for its own sake any good activity, whether ours or another's, whereas he always implies that a good activity which we desire is an activity of our

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own, and in addition he would have had to drop, as he never does, the idea of a connexion between a good activity and *our own* happiness. And second, Aristotle's term ἀγαθόν is always ἀγαθόν *τινί*, as appears most obviously in the phrase ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν and in the statement in Book IX, 8, § 8-9, where he says that reason always chooses what is best for itself—πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ—and goes on to add that the man who gives wealth to a friend assigns the greater good, the having done what is noble (τὸ κάλον), to himself. Once, however, we regard this answer as having to be excluded once for all, there seems no alternative but to attribute to Aristotle a familiar turn of thought to which we are all very prone and which is exemplified in Mill and T. H. Green.

When we consider what we desire we soon come to the conclusion, as of course Aristotle did, that there are things of certain kinds which we desire, not in consequence of thinking that they will have an effect which we desire, but for themselves, such as seeing a beautiful landscape, being in a position of power, helping another, and doing a good action. We then are apt to ask, "What is the condition of our desiring such things?" and if we do, we are apt to answer—and the tendency is almost irresistible—"It is impossible for us to desire any such thing unless we think of it as something which we should like, since, if we do not think of it thus, we remain simply indifferent to its realization. Then, if asked what we mean by its being something we should like, we reply: "Something which would give us enjoyment, or, alternatively, gratification, or, to use a term which will cover either, pleasure." The tendency is one to which Mill gives expression when he says that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant are two parts of the same phenomenon; and Green exhibits it when he maintains, as in effect he does, that we can desire something only if we think of it as something which will give us satisfaction, i.e. gratification. In maintaining this, we are really maintaining that the thing which we at first thought we desired for its own sake, such as seeing a beautiful landscape, or doing a good action, is really only being desired for the sake of a feeling of enjoyment or gratification, or, to put it generally, pleasure, which we think it will cause in us. And correspondingly, where we think of the desire as moving us to act, we are really maintaining that what we at first thought is our ultimate end is really only our penultimate end or the proximate means, and that our ultimate end is really a pleasure which we think this will cause. We are, however, apt to think of a thing's giving us enjoyment, or alternatively, gratification, as if it were a quality of the thing just as we think of the loudness of a noise as a quality of the noise. And our tendency to do this is strengthened by the fact that the

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ordinary way of stating the fact that something X excites a feeling of pleasure, or of gratification, is to say that X is pleasant or gratifying, a way of speaking which suggests that what is in fact a property possessed by X of causing a certain feeling is a quality of X. The tendency is mistaken, since as anyone must allow in the end, something's giving us enjoyment is *not* a quality of it, and when we say that something *is* pleasant, we are not attributing to it a certain quality but stating that it has a certain effect. Nevertheless, the tendency exists. And when it is operative in us, we state our original contention by saying that in desiring to see a beautiful landscape for its own sake, we desire it as something which will be pleasant, and that when we are acting on the desire, our ultimate end is the seeing a beautiful landscape as something which will be pleasant, thereby representing what on our view is really the proximate means to our end as our end.

This being the line of thought to which I referred, it remains for me to try to show that it was taken by Aristotle. Before we consider details, we can find two general considerations which are in favour of thinking that he took it. In the first place, if we assume it to be indisputable that he thought that there are things of a certain sort which we desire for their own sake, but that in desiring them we desire them in respect of having a certain character to which he refers by the term *ἀγαθόν*, and then ask "What can be the character of which he is thinking?" the only possible answer seems to be: "that of exciting either enjoyment or gratification." And in particular two things are in favour of this answer. First it is easy, from lack of consideration, to think of exciting pleasure, as a quality of the thing desired—as indeed Aristotle appears to do when he speaks of virtuous actions (*αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις*) as *φύσει ἡδεῖα* and as *ἡδεῖναι καθ' αὐτάς*,¹ i.e. as pleasant in virtue of their own nature; and second, the perplexity in which he finds himself in Chapter VI when trying to elucidate the meaning of *ἀγαθόν* would be accounted for if what he was referring to was something which is not in fact a character common to the various things said to be *ἀγαθά*, although he tended to think of it as if it was. In the second place he applies the term *ἀγαθόν* not only to the things which we desire for themselves, but also to the things which produce or preserve them, and it is difficult to see how he can apply the term to the latter unless *ἀγαθόν* means productive of pleasure, whether directly or not. In fact, only given this meaning is it possible to understand how Aristotle can speak not merely of *τιμή* but also of *πλοῦτος* as an *ἀγαθόν*.

To pass, however, to special considerations, we seem to find evidence, and decisive evidence, in a quarter in which we at first

¹ *Ethics*, I, 8, 11.

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should least expect it. At the beginning of Chapter IV he directs his hearers' attention to the question: τί ἐστὶ τὸ πάντων ἀκροτάτου τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθόν, i.e. "What is it that is the greatest of all achievable goods?" and he proceeds to say that while there is general agreement about the name for it, since both the many and the educated say that it is happiness, yet they differ about what happiness is, the many considering it something the nature of which is clear and obvious, such as pleasure, wealth, or honour, whereas, he implies, the educated consider it something else of which the nature is not obvious. Then in the next chapter he proceeds to state what, to judge from the three most prominent types of life, that of enjoyment, the political life, and that of contemplation, various men consider that the good or happiness is, viz. enjoyment, honour, and contemplation. And later he gives his own view, contending with the help of an argument based on the idea that man has a function, that happiness is ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.¹

Here it has to be admitted that Aristotle is expressing himself in a misleading way. His question, "What is the greatest of goods?" can be treated as if it had been the question "What is a man's ultimate end?" i.e. τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς, cf. Book VI, 12, 7. For as Book I, Chapter II, § 1 and Book I, Chapter VII show, he considers that to find what is the greatest good, or the good, we must find a man's final end, i.e. that which he desires and aims at for its own sake, and in Book I, Chapter V he judges what men consider the good from what their lives show to be their ultimate aim. And his answer to this question, if taken as it stands, is undeniably absurd. For, so understood, it is to the effect that, though all men, when asked "What is the ultimate end?" answer by using the same word, viz. εὐδαιμονία, yet, as they differ about what εὐδαιμονία is, i.e. really, about the thing for which they are using the word εὐδαιμονία to stand, some using it to designate pleasure, others wealth, and so on, they are in substance giving different answers, some meaning by the word εὐδαιμονία pleasure, others wealth, and so on. But of course this is not what Aristotle meant. He certainly did not think that anyone ever meant by εὐδαιμονία either τιμὴ or πλοῦτος; and he certainly did not himself mean by it ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν. What he undoubtedly meant and thought others meant by the word εὐδαιμονία is happiness. Plainly, too, what he thought men differed about was not the nature of happiness but the conditions of its realization, and when he says that εὐδαιμονία is ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, what he really means is that the latter is what is required for the realization of happiness. Consideration of the *Ethics* by itself should be enough to convince

¹ *Ethics* I, 13, § 1.

us of this, but if it is not, we need only take into account his elucidation of the meaning of the question "*τί ἐστιν*": to be sure that when he asks "*τί ἐστι ἡ εὐδαιμονία*": his meaning is similar to that of the man who, when he asks "What is colour?" or "What is sound," really means "What are the conditions necessary for its realization?" We must therefore understand Aristotle in Chapter IV to be in effect contending that while it is universally admitted that our ultimate aim is happiness, there is great divergence of view about the conditions, or, more precisely, the proximate conditions, of its realization.

But, this conclusion reached, we can plainly take one step further and conclude that Aristotle himself is in agreement with the view that our ultimate end is happiness, and that, taking its truth for granted, his *Ethics* is concerned first to prove that it is by virtuous action that it will be realized, and then to work out in detail the character of virtuous action, so that we shall be better able to obtain our aim. In other words, we can conclude that his real answer to the question, "What is *τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς*, i.e. our ultimate aim?" is not, as we may at first think, *ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν* but *εὐδαιμονία*, i.e. happiness. Putting this otherwise, we can say that the accurate statement of his own view is to be found in I, Chapter 12, where he gives as a reason why *εὐδαιμονία* is *τίμιον*, whereas *ἀρετή* is merely *ἐπαινετόν*, that it is for the sake of *εὐδαιμονία* that we all do everything else.¹

Now, if by thus going behind Aristotle's terminology we are driven to conclude that Aristotle really considered our ultimate end to be always our happiness, or alternatively some particular state of happiness on our part—for sometimes he seems to imply the one view and sometimes the other—we are also driven to conclude that, though he at times makes statements to the contrary, he also holds that where we are said to have as our ultimate end *τιμὴν* or *ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν* or anything else of a kind which we consider a condition of happiness, the thing in question is really according to him only our penultimate end, and the desire of it is only a derivative desire depending on our desire of happiness. And then it becomes obvious that when he implies, as he always does, that in desiring one of these things we desire it as an *ἀγαθόν*, what he means by *ἀγαθόν* is productive of a state, or rather a feeling, of happiness, i.e. as I think we may say in this context, a feeling of pleasure. Further, this being so, we have to allow that he fundamentally misrepresents his own problem. Assuming that we all always have either a single ultimate aim, or at least, alternatively, an aim of one sort, what he ostensibly maintains is that we are

¹ [εὐδαιμονίας (i.e. εὐδαιμονίας) γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν. *Ethics*, I, 12, 7.]

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uncertain about its nature, and that therefore he has to discover its nature in order to help us to achieve it. But, as we must now conclude, what he is really maintaining is that though the nature of our ultimate aim, happiness, is known to us, for we all know the nature of that for which the word "happiness" stands, we are doubtful about the proximate means to it, and that consequently he has to discover the proximate means. In other words, in maintaining *ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν* to be our ultimate end of the nature of which we are uncertain, he is putting what on his view is really the proximate means to our end in the place of what on his view is really our end. And if we ask "How can he have come to misrepresent his own view so fundamentally?" then, if contentions already advanced are true, we have at hand a satisfactory answer. We can reply that the misrepresentation is due to his making two mistakes to which we are all prone; first, that of thinking of the property of causing happiness as a quality of what causes it, and secondly, that of thinking that where we are aiming at something of a certain kind for its own sake, and so having it as our ultimate end, we are nevertheless aiming at it in respect of its having a certain character.

By way of conclusion it may be well to refer to an objection which will inevitably be raised, viz. that I have been, in effect, representing Aristotle as a psychological hedonist, and that to do this is absurd. I admit the charge, but do not consider the representation absurd. It seems not only possible, but common to hold that there are a number of things other than pleasure which we desire for their own sake, and then when the question is raised, 'How is it that we desire these things?' to reply: "only because we think they will give us pleasure." In my opinion, the reply is mistaken, and is made only because we are apt to think of the gratification necessarily consequent on the thought that something which we have desired is realized as that the thought of which excites the desire. But the mistake is a very insidious one, as, if I am right, is shown by the fact that Green, in spite of all the trouble he takes to point out that Mill falls into it, falls into it himself.

ON VALUE

B. M. LAING, M.A., D.LITT.

No one who is interested in the problem of value and attempts to read through the literature on the subject can fail to be struck by the extraordinary diversity of opinion. Some of this difference of view is traceable to ambiguities in language; there are various terms employed, each of which, of course, may or may not express any valid idea—terms like value, values, kinds of value, sorts of things that have value, value-objects, things that have value. The terms value and values are subject to and lead to much confusion, even on the part of those who are aware of the existence of such a danger. Much of the difference may probably be due to two other important factors: first, the education and training in earlier years whereby emotional reactions to words instead of intelligent understanding of their meaning and validity are induced, and, second, the continual reliance upon moral experience, which reliance may seem to be necessary, but which may be invalidated by the consideration, generally overlooked and unappraised, that moral, like social, experience might not be what it is if certain views were not entertained and did not prevail. The latter possibility would put moral and social studies on a plane quite different from that of physical investigations, for the moral and social inquirer would always have to bear in mind that the facts with which he is confronted, and to which he seeks to appeal, may exist to confront him and his fellow-men only in the sense that they arise from the acceptance and effectuation of a belief or theory, and would not be but for the effectuation of the belief or theory. The other factor, that of the influence of education and training upon emotional reactions, is also important in relation to a study of value, for it is necessary to be on guard against confusing reactions to *words* and reactions to objects, things, or situations.

The question with which contemporary philosophy is mainly concerned is one regarding the nature of value. Other questions may also be discussed, such as the incidence of value; but the latter question is somewhat involved, and may be resolved into at least two; namely, what has value and where is that which has value to be located? The distinction between these two questions may seem overdrawn, but its significance may be brought out by noting that a person is said to be just, that what is valuable is justice, that therefore value attaches to justice, and justice is located in persons.

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In general, it would seem that value attaches to some quality—courage, honesty, justice, beauty, and so on—of some person, or object, or organization, such as a social system (which may be just or otherwise). It may be that some of these things may be also a value or have value, for instance, persons; or it may be that they are a value only because they possess some quality which is a value; but this is a point highly disputed and disputable. Many philosophers seem to be of opinion that the question as to what is the nature of value requires to be answered before an answer is obtainable to the question, what is it that is valuable or what are the values? Such an opinion is again disputable, for some theories of the nature of value are such as to give no guidance in the matter.

These preliminary remarks have been made in order to show that the problem of value is complicated, intricate, and full of difficulty and obscurity, and that a short article must very definitely be limited in its scope. Consequently the present effort is to be directed to a consideration of the objectivity of value, and, even then, only to a consideration of some points in connection with that topic, arising mainly, though not wholly, from a special type of theory originally formulated by, and associated with the name of, Professor G. E. Moore.

It is necessary to be clear about the nature of the distinction between subjective and objective when used in reference to the nature of value, for it is possible that some of the disputation that has taken place concerning *value* has been futile because of different meanings being attached to these terms. There are two other terms, also ambiguous, with which the terms subjective and objective may be, and indeed probably are, confused: these are the terms personal and impersonal. The latter distinction has arisen particularly in connection with the question as to where value is to be located, and the difficulty involved in it is no doubt in large measure due to a confusion between value and values. There are at least some values that are personal in that they are states, conditions, qualities, or activities of persons; and possibly, according to some opinions, persons themselves are values and, in fact, the only values. Now, if it could be maintained that all values were personal, there might be a *prima facie* case for holding that value was personal. But there would still be a question as to what this meant and as to whether it was justified.

One obvious meaning is that if there were no persons, that is no values, persons being assumed to be the only values, there could be no value, in the same way that there could be no yellowness if there were no yellow things. In this sense, value would be dependent on the existence of things that can and do have value. This view, however, is not obviously true; and it might be, and is, denied by some

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theories; for there is an obscurity in the word *exist*; and what is at issue is the relation of value to existence and the ontological status of value. It might be true that if there were no values or no valuable things in existence, human beings could not and would not know value; but there still might be a metaphysical sense of *to be*, according to which value could be said *to be* even though no instances of it, that is no valuable things, existed. This, of course, is the contention of realism. If this were granted, then the fact that values are personal could not without further examination of the matter be taken as sufficient evidence for the view that *value* is personal. It is therefore possible that value is non-personal and objective in this sense, and that yet values are personal. If, however, the proposition, which has been initially accepted, that all values are personal is rejected on the ground that some values are impersonal—for instance, a beautiful sunset or landscape, these involving no reference to persons at all—then the argument for the view that value is non-personal and objective is considerably strengthened. It could not be said that value is either personal or natural; and the conclusion would be that in some sense it is non-natural without being personal, and if personal implies being mental, then without being mental. Hence the terms subjective and objective do not coincide with the terms personal and impersonal or natural.

There is a second possible meaning of the view that value is personal. It is that which is bound up with the idea of *being relative to*. This idea of relativity has a wider aspect than that which is to be considered here, for it may be held that value is relative to circumstances, or to the situations in which it is found. What is being considered here is the idea of the relativity of value to persons. Value is sometimes said to be relative to the individual, or sometimes to persons in general. Though the first meaning of the personal nature of value which has been discussed in the preceding section may seem indistinguishable from this view, yet the relativity in question is not that of the existence of a quality being dependent upon the existence of what has that quality. To say that something is relative to an individual is sometimes thought to signify that the something in question is subjective; and the latter term is supposed to mean (to omit the now generally recognized absurdity of interpreting it as implying a mental state of the individual) *existing only for the individual*. What requires to be emphasized is that *being relative to* does not necessarily signify *depending for its existence upon*. There is no need here to examine and refute any possible account (if any is ever forthcoming) of how the roundness of a square tower is dependent for its existence upon an individual who is viewing the tower from a distance. There is no more *subjectivity* involved when the individual sees the tower as round than when he sees it at close

quarters as square. If the roundness is to be called relative to the individual, it is relative to his seeing the tower under certain conditions which are non-individual, objective, and certainly non-mental; but it is none the less objective, even though it is not what is called a quality of the real tower. The conclusion to be drawn is that to say value is relative to the individual is not necessarily to assert that value is dependent for its existence upon the individual. The idea of the relativity of value to the individual and the idea of the objectivity of value are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Relativity need signify nothing more than a matter of emphasis and selection in regard to what is objective; but emphasis and selection do not turn what is emphasized and selected into something subjective. Toil may induce a man to concentrate his attention upon rest and to be more appreciative of it; war, danger, and disorder may lead men's or some men's minds towards, and make them more appreciative of, peace, security, and order; and hence, unless value is being identified with the *sense* of value or an attitude towards things, varying views of what is valuable, which are well known to exist, do not point to the subjectivity of value. They may point only to the presence of factors which affect the apprehension of what is objective, which may even conduce to a failure to apprehend at all. Two or more people may differ as to the colour of an object; but such difference is not evidence that the object has not a specific colour or that the colour exists only for the individual. If, however, this relativity does exist, a special problem, it is true, arises; for just as in the case of things and their qualities it gives rise to the question, what is the real nature of the thing, so in connection with value the relativity has to be discounted in order to decide, if it can be decided, what the value of anything that is declared to be valuable or otherwise actually is.

The term *being relative to* may be and has been given another interpretation; value is something not merely existing for the individual or for persons, but it is something that is made or created by the individual in virtue of the fact that he adopts some attitude towards things or situations. This is the view against which Professor G. E. Moore directed his vigorous onslaught. The best-known form of the theory is that which maintains that things are valuable because persons desire them or have some emotion or feeling towards them. It is quite clear that on such a view if there were no persons or creatures having desires or emotions there would be no such characteristic as value; it is not quite correct even to make the latter statement because there is no such distinctive quality to be called value; there is only the characteristic of being desired or *having an emotion towards*. This means that *value* is reducible to terms of something else—in this case to a subjective process or attitude or state;

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and in this sense value is declared to be subjective. This view of value differs from the first meaning of the proposition that value is personal, discussed above, in that according to the latter value is recognized as something characteristic of personal states or activities or even of persons, while the latter does not hold that value is such a characteristic, but that it is nothing different from such a state, activity, or attitude. Against such a view it is held that value is not so reducible, that it is a unique characteristic of things—possibly of a great number of things different in many respects from each other, difficult to classify, and alike only in respect of being valuable or having the characteristic *value*. Value is a unique determination of objects; it is something that is judged or valued, not something that comes to be when judging or valuing occurs, nor when a thing is desired, for it is the value of the thing which is the ground of the obligation to desire it.

This is the objective view of value maintained by realists. The objectivity of value has been defended by other theories of a different philosophical type; wherein they differ fundamentally from realism is that they hold that there is a connection between value and mind, while realism denies this supposed connection. As for certain obvious reasons this connection cannot be between value and the finite mind, recourse is had to the idea of a divine mind in the case of a theistically inclined theory such as that of Professor Sorley, or in the case of idealism to an absolute system interpreted in terms of mind. For these theories objectivity means independence of finite minds; with this realism agrees, but it goes further in maintaining that value is not dependent on mind at all, that it is, as it were, a character real in its own right, and that, like any other predicate, it subsists independently of the subject that judges, values, desires, or experiences. This objectivity, stressed by realism, is yet held to be quite consistent with the fact that many, if not even most, instances of value, complex in nature, have among their constituents feelings or consciousness in some other form; for realism in making this admission is not admitting that the presence of feeling or consciousness in such instances is what makes the value of, or gives value to, them. In more technical philosophical terminology realism holds, first, that there is no analytical connection between value and desire nor, more generally, between value and mind; second, that the connection between value on the one hand and desire, or more generally mind, on the other, is synthetic, but that this connection is not necessary; third, according to some realists at least, that the connection between value and obligation is both synthetic and necessary.

The object of this paper is now to consider some points arising out of the idea of the objectivity of value in general, but in particular

out of the realist theory. Value becomes a rather remote and tenuous quality; and, even on the admission of some of the adherents of realism, very little of consequence seems to be inferrible from its view of value. Most people are concerned about values or about what things are valuable; and the realistic idea of value—the idea of value being the basic idea or at least one of the basic ideas, for realism seems to require two—provides no clue in this matter, everything depending upon the apprehension of or insight into value. The term insight, which is frequently used, is apt to carry with it the notion of peculiar difficulty in apprehending value and the need of special power and training. Value, apparently, is very shy and elusive. Realism, of course, cannot and does not assert that every claim to an apprehension of value is sound, for error seems possible here just as in other matters; experience bears witness to the diversity of opinion regarding what is valuable; and even among realists themselves there is considerable diversity of opinion, while the values which they do accept or declare to be truly values are one or more of those accepted for ages by mankind. In the case of varying opinion there is, unfortunately, no very clear and precise test to be applied to reach a decision as to who is right. When one man declares an object to be red or cold and another man disagrees, means have been found for explaining the difference between them; but it seems that no such means, at any rate of an indubitable nature, have been found for a decision in a conflict of opinion about value; and all that remains is a somewhat blind submission, so far as many are concerned, to the views of one or other conflicting expert or authority. From the point of view of practice the result is not so very different from the theory that value *is* satisfaction of a hormic tendency; in the latter case a person may be mistaken as to the nature (in a purely natural sense) of that in which he will find satisfaction; in the former case he may be mistaken as to the value of the object; in either case he will be striving after what he believes to be good, even though it will not really be so, and he will be doing what to some people he ought not to be doing. The view¹ that value is apprehended through judgment does not help in the difficulty, and is in itself somewhat misleading. It does not help, because judgment is not infallible or inevitably correct; and what at most is true is that value, in so far as it is apprehended at all, must be apprehended by way of judgment. But even this much does not appear to be quite true on analogy with other matters. What is judged is that something (X) has value, just as it is judged that grass is green. Value as an ultimate quality is not what is judged, any more than the quality *green* is judged or apprehended by a judgment. The apprehension of the quality is one thing; its attribution in the form of a

¹ Clarke: *The Logic of Value*, p. 255.

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judgment to something (X) is another thing. Error may occur both in regard to the apprehension and the attribution.

A consideration of the realist view of the relation of emotion or subjective attitude to value raises an issue which is extremely intricate and difficult, for questions of psychology are involved, and they might easily lead to a long digression, which must be resisted, concerning the conditioning of emotion and the significance of such conditioning for the problem of value. Against the view which would reduce value to a subjective state or process—satisfaction, pleasure, or desire—the realist maintains that what must be considered is the *appropriateness* of the response and that this appropriateness is dependent upon the value of the object or situation. The response or attitude is justifiable only when it is appropriate. This is another form of the argument that a thing is not good because it is desired, but it ought to be desired if and because it is good. Enjoyment of a landscape, a natural scene, art, or music is valuable and justifiable only if the natural scene is beautiful and the art or music is good. In fact, to enjoy what is really ugly or bad is doubly bad. Professor Laird¹ states this position to the effect that "it is necessary to maintain that the rightness of emotion is subordinate to insight and that the relevant insight must be insight into values." There occurs here that use of the word *values* which is fairly frequent on the part of philosophers, and it is not certain whether the plural of value is meant or whether the meaning is objects that have value. The issue is a little uncertain in consequence; but it is assumed here that the question raised is whether the appropriateness of the response is dependent solely upon the value of the object or upon the mere natural character of the object. A naturalistic theory, such as the desire-theory of value, would probably, with certain qualifications arising out of the conditions under which the satisfaction of desires is achievable, maintain that the important factor is the real, but natural, character of the object, and that the justifiability of desire is dependent solely upon this, the appropriateness or inappropriateness of desire being decided by reference to it, and the badness of desire being due to a mistaken apprehension of it. There is a sense, of course, in which the response may be said to be always appropriate: in normally developed adults the response is conditioned by what the person takes the nature of the object to be; but he may be mistaken; and the idea of appropriateness involves a reference to what the nature of the thing really is. What the realist is asserting is that to have rightness of emotion there must be correct apprehension of the object or situation; and it must be admitted as true that rightness of emotion is subordinate to insight, for the simple reason that *rightness* is being defined by reference to insight or knowledge. On

¹ Laird: *The Idea of Value*, p. 246, Sect. 11. Cf. p. 238, Sect. 7.

the realist view the nature of the object, insight into which is necessary, presumably includes its natural character as well as its value or non-natural character, but special emphasis is put on the latter. Now, it may be difficult to decide definitely, but at least a doubt may be expressed as to whether there are convincing reasons for believing that the required insight is insight into value rather than merely into the natural character of the object. Instruction and correction, designed to secure the appropriate emotional response or, in view of the absence of any guarantee that value is correctly apprehended and hence of any test as to what is the appropriate response, what is believed to be the appropriate response, are directed to bringing to notice natural qualities, and, it may be, structural properties of an object or situation. Specific individuals may have an inability in apprehending such qualities or properties, and such an inability is not different in nature from that found often in regard to other matters such as mathematics or even physics; consequently, appropriateness of response is in their case difficult to secure, and even if manifested may be only a matter of imitation or of *pose*. Specific individuals may also suffer from abnormalities which render appropriateness of response difficult or impossible. But underlying the instruction and correction there is the assumption that certain qualities call forth a certain emotional response, that is, that there are some such primary correlations empirically verifiable, and that, allowance being made for conditioning or maladjustment, what is necessary to secure the appropriate response is to get the individual to grasp the quality or property. As any object which in the realist sense is held to have value has probably one or more such natural properties, the correlation between the property and emotion may very easily be supposed to be a connection between value and emotion. The naturalistic theory might thus claim that it could give an explanation of appropriateness of emotion without resort to the idea of a unique quality *value* and that the latter was superfluous; that an emotion is appropriate because it is a response to the apprehended natural quality *x* and not to the apprehended *value* of *x*; that the connection is between the quality and the emotion and not between *value* and the emotion; and that the connection is synthetic and necessary in the sense of being empirically verifiable in the majority of cases and the exceptions being capable of explanation. At any rate, the naturalistic case seems just as strong so far as evidence goes as the realist case; and the dispute seems to become merely a matter of dogmatic assertion on both sides. The realist admits that what is appropriate is not analytically contained in the realist idea of value and that the connection between value and emotional response is synthetic; and the point of contention is whether the emotional response is conditioned by the apprehension of the non-natural

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quality *value* or by the apprehension of the natural quality or qualities of the object.

This controversy about the appropriateness of response is connected with a more general topic which raises one of two other points requiring to be discussed. The one point is the relation between value and obligation. The notion of appropriateness of emotion, of course, is one concerning what *ought to be* the emotion. Professor Laird¹ asserts that "there is a necessary and intrinsic connection between value and obligation," to which the qualification is added: "in every instance in which the thought of value may be a guide to action." This means that the idea of obligation is not obtainable by analysis of the idea of value, nor is it deducible from it; and consequently the idea of obligation is a basic idea like that of value. As value is said by some realists to be "that which ought to be," it is not clear whether all realists hold that value and obligation are both equally fundamental. There is a difference here which is important. According to the one view, to apprehend value is to apprehend obligatoriness, the latter being apparently regarded as a characteristic of value, and as objective therefore as value; according to the other view, obligation is a matter of attitude or response and hence subjective. It is questionable whether some realists are sufficiently careful in making their position clear, for they write as if they understood obligation to be a response—intrinsically appropriate—to value. In addition to the question whether realism intends to assert that the apprehension of value is the apprehension of obligatoriness, there seems to be obscurity or confusion regarding the nature of obligation; there is the question whether the apprehension of value gives rise to a sense or awareness of obligation, and there is the question whether the apprehension *ought* to give rise to such a sense or awareness. These two questions may suggest over-refined complication; but the point at issue is whether the *appropriate* response to value is the psychological sense of obligation itself or some other *emotion* which *ought* to occur.

An important issue requiring consideration is whether the realist theory of value fits in with or throws light upon the nature of obligation. As value is often declared to be "that which ought to be," and as this phrase seems to be full of difficulties, it is expedient that a beginning should be made with an examination of it. Now, it is not at all obvious that the apprehension of value reveals to us that it is what ought to be, and the statement probably involves a confusion between value and values, or things that have value. What is probably meant, and what would be generally admitted to be true, is that valuable things ought to exist. Secondly, the assertion that value is what ought to be is not based on the apprehension of value,

¹ *A Study in Moral Theory*, Ch. ii, p. 25.

but probably on the experience of obligation, and on an analysis of it in the first instance, the theory of value being built up to conform to what the analysis of obligation seems to require. Thirdly, there is a wide gulf between value as that which ought to be, and the nature of obligation; and a doubt must be expressed whether the realist view bridges this gulf. The idea of obligation implies that value not merely ought to be but ought to be *through human agency*; and even then what so ought to be are valuable things. Value may be realized without human agency; beauty, for instance, is realized in nature quite independently of human effort. It even seems that there is no necessity to admit that to realize beauty by way of art is an obligation; it does not seem to be an obligation to realize beauty for the sake of beauty; in fact, this has often been admitted; what has been maintained, though hesitatingly, in recent times to be an obligation is the promotion of beauty so that people may *enjoy* beautiful things; and the realization of beauty by way of art is obligatory in reference to such an objective, with an implication of a certain level of *personal being* thereby attained. Fourthly, there is considerable ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase *to be*. In a very important metaphysical sense value *is*. Some realists¹ declare that value is not an existent which comes into being with temporal existents or ceases to be when they cease to be. The sense, therefore, in which value *is* must be a sense different from that in which value comes to be through human agency. The latter sense is that value ought to be realized in the form of a valuable temporal existent; but to be realized is not the sense in which value *is*.

The difficulty here seems to be a real and an important one. The theory that value is objective and independent of individuals renders unmeaning the idea of an obligation to pursue value, in so far as obligation is taken to mean the pursuit or attainment of value. This is a difficulty which attaches to any theory, such as that of Professor Sorley,² which argues for the objectivity of value. The great idealists from Plato onwards, says Professor Sorley, have always recognized the values of goodness, truth, and beauty, which have been regarded as the true realities, and as such persisting eternally; the eternal validity of these may have nothing to do with their realization in consciousness; and they have a validity which is independent of their inadequate realization in the world or recognition by its inhabitants. The realist declares that the exemplification of value in temporal instances is not to be confused with the *being* of value, that what is worthy to be is worthy in exactly the same sense before any particular instance of it exists as it is after it exists, and that existence is not a necessary presupposition of value, for it may undoubtedly

¹ Clarke: *The Logic of Value*, p. 156.

² *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 484.

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attach to the potential or subsistent.¹ This view follows that of Professor G. E. Moore, in his *Principia Ethica*, where the distinction between the real and existent is vigorously emphasized. It follows from such views of value that value is not affected by man's pursuit or non-pursuit of it; its fate is independent of anything which human beings may or can do; they cannot create it nor can they destroy it. Wherein, then, lies the obligation to pursue and attain value?

Plato, it will be remembered, maintained in the *Republic* that the type of State-organization outlined by him was none-the-less desirable or valuable, even though conditions made its realization impossible. But if the value is there irrespective of its actualization in a temporal existent, what does it matter whether it is actualized or not? The only answer seems to be that in some respect its actualization itself is of value; and that it is because of this value attaching to realization that obligation comes to have meaning. In order to understand obligation it is necessary to interpret what *ought to be* as what *ought to be realized*, that is, in temporal form and through human agency. If this is so, the realist view of value requires to be at least modified in some way; for otherwise no connection, synthetically necessary or otherwise, is discoverable between value and obligation. The difficulty just stated is almost one of inner contradiction in the theory; for according to it value is a purely objective quality independent of any attitude of individuals and independent of realization, while yet, in order to interpret obligation, this objective value must be supplemented by a value which belongs to the realization of the former by human beings.

There remains for consideration the second of the two points previously referred to, one of which was the idea of obligation. This second point is one concerning the idea of greater and less value, and its possible meaning on the realist view of value. Professor G. E. Moore, in his *Principia Ethica*, maintains that good (or value) is an ultimate, simple, unanalysable predicate; and in expounding his notion of organic unities declares that the value of a whole need not coincide with the sum of the values of the parts or constituents, but may be greater or less than that sum. Other realist writers have followed him in this, and speak of greater and less value. The question that arises is whether it is possible to use such an idea at all so far as the realist theory is concerned. That in practice such a principle of more and less value is used must be admitted. It may even be necessary for the interpretation of human experience as well as for making decisions concerning conduct. That, however, is another matter. What is relevant here is that no idea or prevalent mode of speech should be adopted uncritically by a theory but that its adoption should be shown to be consistent with and intelligible in terms

¹ See Clarke: *The Logic of Value*, pp. 154, 155, 156, 215.

of its basic conceptions. Realism may be capable of providing a justification of the idea of greater value or of *being more valuable*; but it is necessary to point out that there is a difficulty, and one that requires to be met. It is true that, to use an analogy, one yellow may be said to be more yellow than another yellow; it is also true that one cold may be said to be more cold or greater than another cold. Whether such analogies are helpful it is difficult to say, for they might be taken to signify that value is a rather complicated affair. The analogy of yellow suggests a *standard* yellow with which other yellows are compared; but one yellow plus another yellow do not yield a quality yellow which is more or less yellow than either or both of these. The analogy of cold suggests physical units of heat which are measurable, and which provide an intelligible basis for speaking of greater and less cold. Either analogy may suggest the fusion of two or more *things* either yellow or cold in such a way that a definite yellow or a definite temperature results. Does realism imply that anything analogous to these possibilities is applicable in the case of its conception of value? Does it hold that the *value* of one thing may fuse with the value of another thing, and that there is a single resultant value in a manner analogous to the fusion of two bodies whereby their respective temperatures become adjusted and give rise to a resultant temperature which is that of the mixture? Does it believe that the value of one thing can be added to the value of another thing? Does it on the analogy of a standard yellow believe that there is a standard value? Professor Laird¹ discusses standards of value, but throughout he seems to be concerned with the fact that people, including philosophers themselves, do weigh the value of one thing against the value of another, and do judge one thing to be more valuable or less valuable than another; and his special problem is to show how this is done. What is at issue, of course, is not this but the question whether all this is consonant with a realist view of value as a simple, ultimate, unanalysable quality, and whether on such a view the notion of a standard of value is permissible. Resort to intuition does not help, because there remains a question as to what is intuited, as to what is meant by more and less value. In actual judgments about the value of things it is probable that there is much confusion between the terms value and values; even the latter term has two meanings—first, things that have value; second, the plural of value, which is a very questionable one. It is probable, too, that, since it is values, that is things having value, that are of interest, and as values have other properties than that of being valuable, these other properties affect one's estimation of their value and lead to varying estimates by different people. Probably also in many cases what is really meant by *greater value* is a greater number of *instances*

¹ *The Idea of Value*, Ch. x.

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of value or even a deepened sense of value. Because of such confusions it may be thought that to speak of greater or less value is quite clear and intelligible and justifiable. These considerations, however, remain irrelevant to the question whether *value*, as understood by realism, can be regarded as having degrees.

FROM DISENCHANTMENT TO CONSTRUCTION

MICHAEL KAYE, M.A., PH.D.

NOTWITHSTANDING persecution, the Jews have clung staunchly to God. But so have others. And is there any man's life which is free from the persecution of Death, which is not finally futility? "Surely every man walketh in a vain show"; "his days are as a shadow that passeth away."

Not that life and the world merit condemnation simply for the reason that "there is no new thing under the sun." With perfection all around, novelty might possess no charm. If vanity and repetition exist together, it is precisely because there is repetition of the vain. Thus to-day there is vigorous effort at social betterment; but similar efforts have been in the past—similar toil, similar failure, and similar martyrdom; yet permanent achievement is still for the future. "That which is crooked cannot be made straight: and that which is wanting cannot be numbered." If, then, without pessimism one may prophesy future earthquakes, why should one be thought fainthearted if, in a spirit of scientific detachment, one predicts a continuity of social upheaval and destruction? But suppose we imagine a universal peace established and even prolonged: shall we be wise to consider it deep-rooted? We have to remember the powerful men who have rejected such a Peace as not merely a dream, but a sickly dream. Doubtless the thought of Perpetual Peace is a fascination to the sensuous, the studious, the compassionate, and the timorous; but virility seems to find it suffocating. Thus in the world of men it is not simply that there has been no consolidation of persistent progress towards a goal universally accepted: more disturbing is that as yet there is no such goal which has won universal acceptance. Peace or War, Partnership or Paternalism, Organization and Security or Freedom and Uncertainty, Sufficiency and Equality or Wealth and Poverty, Material Power or Spiritual Power—the disjunctions here are many and urgent, and there is still no discovered way to their final resolution. Even, then, as we dismiss as mere romanticism the idea of a Golden Age in the past, from which all subsequent history has been as degeneration, we have still to protest that such an age is not either our troubled and dangerous present, or the future so far as it lends itself at all to discernment. Nor does the dawn of social perfection appear more near or certain than that complete extinction of life on earth which is foretold by modern astronomy.

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Of course, it is easy to rhetorize that even for man—or at any rate for the more fortunate of his kind—the world is not bad without qualification. Regrettably its goods are frail and fleeting, yet still they are actual and multifarious, and in divers degrees rapturous for the moment that they last. Progress may be an illusion, and man's finitude certain; yet knowledge, beauty, friendship, adventure, vigour—these things remain for his delectation. Though the end must be tragic, the passage may be spirited. Amid a mass of frustration there may be snatches of joy. Let us, then, live while we can; let us not surrender before we must.

But a consideration more objective, and perhaps more important, is that even though the world be unacceptable to man, its goodness may yet be absolute—for God. The world is not of our own making, nor primarily for our own judgment. It is not our responsibility, nor with any completeness can we grasp it or relish it. Even if it be allowed as incontestable that from his own standpoint it would have been best for man that he should never have been born at all, yet still this does not mean that his origin and perpetuation are accidental and lamentable from the standpoint of the world. It is grossly untrue that man is the measure of all things. Man is a part of the world, and not the world a part of him. In so far as by his will man alters the world, it is because it is integral to the world that so he should do. Otherwise it ignores his will, as in every case it eludes his span. Man is an element of the world, and the world is not his, but God's. Should, then, man condemn the world, this can hardly be of metaphysical importance. It is God's will that matters originally and finally. We have been placed in the world not for our own delight, but for His. We may revile the inhumanity of God's cruelty, yet what we intend to be rebellion God finds inevitable obedience. "Therefore I hated life; because the work that is wrought under the sun is grievous unto me." "When I applied mine heart to know wisdom, then I beheld that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun." Nevertheless, this is "the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep His commandments; for this is the whole duty of man."

But is such divine existence credible; and, if it is, how may it help us?

The credibility, it may be said with Professor Kemp Smith,¹ cannot be guaranteed by argument: its basis is intuition. We feel inexpugnably that Reality is Mind and its objective product. But once the truth of this intuition is respected—and it is not irrational to respect it if, as indeed is the case, we cannot disprove it—we can understand how the permanence of reality as an object of experience is assured, notwithstanding our own ephemerality; we can under-

¹ *Is Divine Existence Credible?*

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stand how reality is comprehensible, because comprehended, notwithstanding our failure to grasp it ourselves, and that for our science the rationality of the world is not more than a pragmatic postulate; we can understand how reality is unified¹—because it is the articulation of unity—notwithstanding that from electrons to elements, from matter to life, from life to mind, and from temporal particulars to eternal universals, there are jumps which our thought finds it difficult to bridge; we can understand how in the reality where there is succession as a fact, there is the repetition which renders comprehension more easy; we can understand how there is in reality a pervasive adoration—the whole world sings that it is all very good—notwithstanding the distresses and the tears of men. Thus our concept of universal deity seems to reinforce the fundamental presuppositions of scientific method, and to indicate how it is that the disinterested contemplation of ordered fact should appear so supremely worth while. But for this reason it becomes all the more important that we should avoid confusion as to the direction which this concept may give—or may fail to give—to our human morality.

Above all, we have to recognize that from the excellence of the world for God it is not a necessary inference that the world is intended for the good of man. We must face the challenge in the opening picture of Bertrand Russell's *A Free Man's Worship*. We must notice that precisely this is the difficulty of Theism, that, our earthly life being as it is, faith in God's love of men can be maintained only by faith in personal immortality, while yet ultimately the latter faith must be allowed to be dependent on the former. But there is no such circle in our view of the world as essentially God's expression and vision. For now it becomes simply unwarrantable dogmatism to hold that God's good is the irrefutable assurance of man's good. The world that is God's image and thought is the world in its absolute totality, the world in its diversity and prodigality. Therefore its Author appears as a mathematician, certainly, but not less conspicuously as the creator of stupendous drama, in which, though we may imagine that the whole is beauty, there is, besides comedy and idyll, abundant tragedy at once of the trivial and of the great. What David Hume² and J. S. Mill³ adduce as to human failure and human suffering need not disconcert our concept of Pantheism. The Author of Nature *is* the same as the Author of the Sermon on the Mount; and Nature, for all its amenability to the vision of beauty, *is* in large measure destructive of what men would cherish. Dr. Inge has said: "Whereas in the Being there are no negative signs, in values,

¹ Cf. B. M. Laing: "The Conception of Reality as a Whole," in *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, January 1931; and C. D. Broad: *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, pp. 17, 38.

² *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*.

³ *Nature*.

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and most distinctly in moral values, evil is no mere defect of being, but, to our minds at least, positive disvalue. This does make the identification of existence and value difficult."¹ I would say that it makes it impossible, and this for the reason that here the measure of value is appreciation by man. But there is no difficulty in the identification of value and existence if we regard as value what is appreciated by God. But in this case we have to reiterate that value for God may definitely involve the absence of value for man. This was perceived by St. Paul. The Potter has power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour. Yet our metaphysical picture is in large agreement with Dr. Inge's: "I mean by reality a kingdom of absolute or intrinsic values."² "The doctrine of values implies a super-individual subject, for whom the values are actual."³ But these values which are actual for God do not seem to be essentially and primarily such as are esteemed by men. Rather I would urge with the Absolutists that it is not merely to misinterpret, but to impoverish, reality, to regard humanity as either the centre of its actuality or the goal of its *nisus*. Of course, reality for God includes humanity, but also it includes much else. No doubt, also, as experiencers, men appear not merely as God's objects, but seem akin to Him as subject. Into a certain selection of the multitudinous characters of His spontaneous creation, God seems to delight in a vivid self-projection. Yet it may still be a feature of the universal drama that those characters which are like to God most should be destined for the greatest fall. "The religious man," writes Dr. Jacks, "so far as I understand him, is endowed with a keen and persistent sense of the difference between good and evil."⁴ Rather I would agree with F. H. Bradley, that what men call good and evil, the religious man is sensitive alike contributory to the perfection of Reality as the vision of Absolute Mind. Though an important truth from our own standpoint, it is not evidently so from the standpoint of the divine, that "We ourselves are the most interesting products of the universe we are trying to understand."⁵ It seems a religious conviction that God is actual, and His experience blessed, even though men be as the leaves of the forest. "Of old hast thou laid the foundations of the earth: and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure." "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord."

If, then, God's support of men against 'Nature' is doubtful, it is likewise not evident that among men He favours the righteous against the wicked. The righteous may make a kind of Pascal wager as

¹ *In Philosophy*, April 1934, p. 155.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 155.

⁴ *In Science and Religion* (1931), p. 169.

⁵ Dr. L. P. Jacks, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

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God's promise of beatitude to His disciples, and they may believe that, despite appearance, His word will be surely accomplished—if not here, then in the hereafter. "Many are the afflictions of the righteous, but the Lord delivereth him out of them all." There is the difficulty, however, that the righteous are not easily recognized. For it is not merely that God sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust; even more challenging is the prosperity of the wicked and the tribulation of the righteous; wherefore men's judgments concerning God's wishes might seem to be in need of revision. Moreover, these documents, individuals, and groups that purport to testify as to God's declarations are so many and frequently contradictory, that it becomes wellnigh impossible, from any impartial standpoint, to decide for the supreme authority of any; not such divine revelations can help us, for example, to discover for a certainty whether God is rather for exclusiveness and war than for universality and peace, or for the latter rather than for the former; nor is it here a comforting reflection that those against whom their opponents would have invoked the divine wrath as against diabolical oppressors, have yet so often, with sincerity and fervour, thought their cause divinely sacred. Finally, that their righteousness or obedience to God might be absolute, the righteous should not complain, but should persist in their acquiescence, even though God inflicts on them evil, and this after having promised them good; they must willingly accept from God everything whatsoever, not least deceit and suffering and death in return for their excellent obedience; they cannot, therefore, with any logical justification, expect as certain a divine reward; nor can they be sure that the punished are the rebellious, or that the rewarded are the obedient. In no way, therefore, does God seem clearly to indicate those who are more obedient to Him than others. This does not indeed mean that in a struggle, so long as the struggle is actually proceeding, it is logically absurd that each side should believe that it is itself the divinely favoured; for to each side, of course, the belief may be valuable pragmatically, and it can be pragmatically disproved only by final defeat. It does mean, however, that ultimately we are invited to acknowledge that the vanquished, no less than the victors, the wicked as well as the righteous, the apparently rebellious equally with the apparently obedient, are expressive of God's nature and involved in His blessedness.

Admittedly, then, Pantheism does not seem to clarify our morality; but at the same time it need not obscure it; it allows our morality to shine by the light which is its own. For the excellence of the world for God by no means makes it man's definite duty to respect it as good for himself. Rather it might seem conformable with the divine perfection that man should revile reality as, on the balance,

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hurtful, wasteful, tyrannical, and odious. In God's reality there are included the selfish, the grasping, and the cruel; there are included not less those who are ardent for service and reform. As we consider both the gospel of Nietzsche and the gospel of Jesus, it does not appear that, from the divine standpoint, either has precedence, or either is superfluous. Even, therefore, should the altruistic conclude that their purpose is finite, destined to frustration and final failure, they may still believe that their moral allegiance, against impossible odds, is itself divinely ordained. Not, of course, that this should reconcile them to the divine universe as it appears to men; they must still protest that, from the human standpoint, the universe seems exuberantly evil; to the universe which is itself the source of their impulse to transform it, they need not feel that they are at all obliged to render an unconditional obeisance. But from their recollection of the excellence of the world for God, it is open to them to extract this measure of consolation at least, namely, the perception that their moral heroism is not merely not metaphysically absurd, but is even metaphysically necessary. Thus Pantheism, while ineffective for the dissuasion of the selfish and the brutal, is also not contemptuous of the benevolent. It is not conspicuously adapted to inspire morality originally and positively; but it need not paralyse, or even depress, that moral enthusiasm which is already actual. What reveals value in facts universally should not evoke disparagement of the fact of moral seriousness. If anything, it might be thought an important item of the divine perfection that men should play their moral drama as though the part in its essence were the principle of the whole.

Moreover, even though impotent to generate moral effort, Pantheism may yet nourish it by providing it with a definite goal. If men would achieve for their fellows whatsoever is good, then it tells them that the highest good is the vision as enjoyed by God. It is precisely this vision, then, that it becomes the task of men as moral to endeavour to actualize in men universally. It is for altruistic education to arouse in each pupil at once a longing for this vision for himself, and a passion for its attainment by all others. Yet this also must be noticed by Pantheism: that such an education may find itself resisted. There may be an obstinate rejection not merely of its moral solicitation, but even of its selfish prescription; not a few men seem as though divinely ordained not merely to deride the good of others, but to misinterpret their own. As for the men who do indeed aspire to the divine vision for themselves, while yet indifferent to its enjoyment by their fellows, these also do not find achievement easy in the face of temptation, incapacity, and hostility. Yet by no means are the most successful in divine self-culture those who would mightily fulfil morality. Thus "The beatific vision can be seen by

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few and described by none. Nevertheless, it is a fact. As Whitehead says, 'The fact of religious vision is our one ground for optimism.'"¹ But I think that the human, as distinct from the divine, possession of beatific vision is better described as an aspiration than as a fact. It is not even obvious that the distribution of infinite experience to finite experiencers, of an infinite object to finite subjects, is at all what the divine reality allows. In this reality morality emerges and discovers a goal; but it is a presumptuous conclusion that the goal will be reached or that the effort will persist.

So our main reflection is this. Granted the perfection of infinite vision to God, it does not follow that the divine perfection must be beneficent to man also, while yet the infinite vision is only God's, and not man's own. But it is for man to aspire to make it his own; and, as a moral man, he should struggle for its achievement by men universally. Yet as a suffering man he should not be expected to thank God; but he will be wise to meditate, to the degree that reality permits him, on his essential identity with God. Therefore, also, he should not wish to petition God, though he may find it cleansing and invigorating to allow a figurative expression to his hopes; of course, his supplication of God may be divinely determined, but it is not with any clearness the necessary or the unfailing condition of his good. In his moments of joy it is fitting that man should adore God, but he should see to it that his adoration is spontaneous, and not the gross coin of the petition which is sycophantic. Best, however, is it with man when his adoration of God is as God's self-adoration, when it is as something inevitably pervasive of divine communion. Even so, however, it seems to be man's part that, while he remains human and finite, he should recollect, even at the very moment when he imagines that he has glimpsed the universal light, his obstreperous obligations to the cave. Not for man, then, seems divinely intended that comprehensive concentration which is God's; for though God may relish human sufferings as essential to the perfection of the whole, it likewise appears involved in this perfection that certain men should have the character of altruism, should be stung to fury by the sufferings of their fellows. Such is the universal drama and the divine blessedness.

¹ W. R. Inge, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

AN APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

PROFESSOR JARED S. MOORE

THE first important question which confronts the teacher of an introductory course in philosophy is likely to be the question as to how he may best *approach* the subject of what philosophy is, how to approach it in such a way as to pique the curiosity and excite the interest of the student from the beginning. After considering this question many times, it has recently occurred to the present writer that it might be helpful to make this approach by way of a parable, an allegorical account of what seem to be the three basic human desires—the desire to live, the desire to enjoy life, and the desire to understand life. He accordingly offers this suggestion for whatever it may be worth, and presents the following little tale as at least one possible working-out of that suggestion.

Once there were three brothers whose names were John, Jean, and Jolyon. As they approached manhood it became necessary for them to set forth upon the search for a livelihood, but before they did so they decided to meet together one day and reveal to one another their ambitions and hopes for the future. On this occasion some such conversation as the following ensued.

The eldest brother, John, was a burly fellow, with no nonsense about him. "The world is a hard place," he said, "at least, that is what everyone tells us, and from what I have been able to make out it must be so. After all, the one thing needful in life is TO LIVE, and I propose to satisfy that requirement, come what may. I shall go into some business, start at the bottom, and work my way up to the top. When I get there, then I may have time to look about me and see what pleasures the world may have to offer; but until then, I shall not allow myself to be swerved from my course by any allurements of the senses or any thoughts except those which are necessary to guide me in the attainment of my end." Now it must be admitted that John was a man of determination, and being a man of determination he went ahead and got what he was looking for; but he missed many things by the way, and when he attained his goal he was far from satisfied, and instead of finding happiness as he had hoped to do, he lived, I am afraid, a rather fretful old age, bored with himself, at odds with the world, and a dreadful nuisance to his friends.

Jean, the second brother, was of more sensitive mould. He listened

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rather contemptuously to what John was saying, and could hardly contain himself until his turn came to speak. "In what way," he then asked, "is the life you are talking about any better than that of a goat or an earthworm, or even of a weed or a microbe? Of course, one must live—that goes without saying; but what is the sense of just living, like any other creature? As for me, I intend not only to live, but TO ENJOY LIFE *while* I live; and not to wait for happiness to come after the struggle for life is over; for if I do, I may never find it." And who will say that Jean was not right in so censuring his brother's narrow outlook? He was of a happy disposition anyway, and though he was never so successful financially as John was, he was certainly a far pleasanter companion; and when he came to die, he had many to mourn him and to rejoice that they had known him.

The youngest brother, Jolyon, listened in thoughtful and dignified silence to all that his elders said, and when they were through he continued in silence for some little time, until his brothers showed signs of considerable impatience. "Out with it," said John, "what are *you* going to do with *your* life?" And Jean showed by his looks if not by words that he, too, was eager to know what the youngster of the family was thinking. At last he broke his silence. "There are so many things I want to *know*," were his first words. "I want to know what life *is*, what *I* am and why I am here. I want to know whether there is any meaning or purpose in life, whether there is a God, and what kind of a Being He is. I even wonder if it is possible to know *anything really*, and whether perhaps life itself may not be but a long dream, and the whole world but an image in a dream. And so, you see, neither of you seems to me quite to hit the point that most interests me. I don't for a moment deny that one must *live*, nor do I deny that life without happiness is a pretty empty thing; but *merely* to live and to enjoy it seems to me rather futile after all. If John, with his sole interest in living, is hardly better than a weed or an earthworm, are not you, Jean, hardly better than an earthworm yourself? Does not the earthworm, too, in its simple way, want to *enjoy* life as well as to live it? But we are not weeds or earthworms, goats, or even anthropoids: we are *men*, with capacities of thought and understanding which no other creature possesses. No, I would not be satisfied merely to live and enjoy life: what I want to do above all is TO UNDERSTAND LIFE. I may never understand it very well, but I do at least want to understand it as far as I am capable of understanding it."

The brothers were rather overawed by Jolyon's lengthy harangue, but they were used to his peculiarities—he always had been a dreamer, utterly unpractical, but a lovable boy for all that. So they set this down as just another of his queer notions, and brought

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their little discussion to an end in perfect harmony. And as time went on, each of the brothers attained after a fashion the goal he had envisaged for himself on that memorable occasion in his youth: John became a great merchant, with a seat on the Exchange; Jean, who was not a mere sensualist or voluptuary in his desire for happiness, developed into an artist of no mean talents; but Jolyon, who had begun life as a philosopher, remained a philosopher until the end of his days, getting as much happiness out of his thoughts as Jean did out of his art, and far more than John did out of his merchandise.

Our little parable represents fairly well, I think, the place of philosophy among the various human interests. Man seems to be controlled on the whole by three basic desires—(1) the desire to *live*; (2) the desire to *enjoy* life; and (3) the desire to *understand* life. The first of these he shares with all other living organisms, plants as well as animals; the second he shares with all other conscious beings; but the third belongs to man alone, and marks him off from all other created things. Though the desire to live is without question the most “vital,” as we say, of all of them, nevertheless man is never contented merely to live, and if his life is to be complete, some measure of enjoyment and of understanding is also necessary.

Out of these desires, furthermore, have arisen certain organized interests or institutions. (1) Out of the desire to *live* have sprung what we know as the Useful Arts—hunting, agriculture, manufacturing, business, medicine, and the like—to enable us to become properly adjusted to our material environment, and to satisfy our own inner material needs; codes of Morals to guide our conduct in our relations with our fellow-men; and Religion to bring us into vital personal relations with God. (2) Out of the desire to *enjoy* life have arisen various forms of Play (games, sports, etc.), and above all the Fine Arts—painting, sculpture, architecture, dancing, poetry, music, and the like. And (3) out of the desire to *understand* life have originated the Pure Sciences and Philosophy. In each of these, again, man has set up certain ideals, or goals at which to aim in the various activities: (1) the Useful and the Good as goals of living, at the various levels distinguished above, with God as the Highest Good of man the ideal of the religious life; (2) Pleasure and the Beautiful as goals of enjoyment, also at different levels; and (3) Truth as the goal of science and philosophy.

Philosophy and what is called “pure” (as opposed to “applied”) science, then, have for their sole task the attempt to understand—that is, to satisfy intellectual curiosity regarding—human nature, the universe in which man lives, and the living relation that subsists between them. As Aristotle said many centuries ago, a philosopher is just a man who seeks for knowledge—and knowledge for its own

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sake, quite apart from any practical advantages, any aid in the business of more successful living, that may result from such a search. This view of the function of philosophy has prevailed throughout the ages since the time that Aristotle first set it forth; but it should be noted that soon after Aristotle's death a quite different view appeared among his immediate successors, the Stoics and the Epicureans, who regarded philosophy merely as a means to human happiness, and so (as they taught) to human welfare. This latter, more "practical," view of the place of philosophy in the world has had many advocates from that time to this¹; so that in many persons' minds a philosopher is one who *lives* wisely, or who bears misfortune calmly, or who cares little for the ordinary pleasures of life. Accordingly, if one who claims to be a philosopher is discovered doing a foolish thing, or bemoaning an unhappy incident in his life, or indulging in the delights of a good dinner or an exciting detective story, he is thought of as in some way belying his profession by his conduct. But most professional philosophers would consider this an entirely erroneous view, sadly confusing the desire to understand life with the desire to live (or to enjoy life, in the case of the gourmet or the novel-reader). On the whole, as has been said, it is the Aristotelian view rather than the Baconian which has prevailed among those who call themselves philosophers, and it is that view alone which we shall herein support.

This interest in knowing for the sake of knowing is, as our friend Jolyon has already instructed us, one important characteristic which distinguishes man from the brutes. Animals use the knowledge which experience brings them solely as a guide to behaviour; man does this, too, but he also *reflects* upon his experience, treats knowledge as an end in itself as well as a means towards more successful behaviour—and in so doing, man is said to "philosophize." Without philosophy, therefore, said Bishop Berkeley, man is hardly more than a "thriving earthworm," not a man in any distinctive sense. As a matter of fact, every human being who has ever even asked questions about himself or the world in which he lives is an incipient philosopher: all of us have asked some of those questions, for example, which Jolyon propounded on the occasion of the meeting of the three brothers, and which made us say that he "*began* life as a philosopher." All that the *study* of philosophy can do is to develop our rather crude ideas through *disciplined* thinking—thinking under the guidance of others who have thought over these great problems before us. As William James once said, "Metaphysics [philosophy] means only an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently."²

¹ Notably, in modern times, Francis Bacon; and among contemporaries Professor John Dewey. It may be called the Baconian view.

² *Psychology, Briefer Course* (1892), p. 401.

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And F. H. Bradley, though speaking rather slightly of philosophy as made up of bad reasons for what we already believe on instinct, nevertheless added that the tendency to search for reasons for our beliefs is itself an instinct—i.e. a natural impulse of man.

We are now ready, perhaps—at least, more ready than we were at the beginning—to formulate a definition of philosophy. This is by no means an easy task, and many attempts with quite diverse results have been made to accomplish it, but we shall now proceed in all modesty to offer our own suggestions in the matter.

A DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY

Let us first state our definition, and then consider it in detail: *Philosophy is a rational inquiry into the meaning of experience.* The import of this statement will become clearer as we analyse it, explaining its various terms more or less in the reverse order to that in which they occur in the definition.

First, then, philosophy is concerned with "*the meaning of experience.*" The word "experience," one of the most common words in the philosopher's vocabulary, must here be understood in the broadest possible sense as a general term for "any event or series of events in the life of a person."¹ In our ordinary usage we are inclined to restrict the word to some *striking* or *unusual* event—we speak of having had a "wonderful" or a "strange" experience, but would hardly think of applying the term to such a commonplace "event" as feeling a book in one's hands or seeing a man walk by the window; and yet for the philosopher these latter are just as true instances of experience as the former. In a sense it is correct to say that all our knowledge of the world and of ourselves comes to us through experience, and it is the function of philosophy to *interpret* this experience, to discover its "meaning."

We used to hear it claimed by some that philosophy, unlike science and ordinary life, makes no assumptions. Few would have the hardihood to defend that claim to-day, but it is at least true to say that philosophy endeavours to make as *few* assumptions as possible. *Three* assumptions, indeed, are involved in our definition as we have considered it so far, and without these assumptions there could be no philosophy. These assumptions are: first, that the world, experience, *has* a meaning. If Macbeth was right in his cry of despair—"Life's but . . . a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing";² if the common saying, "Life is just one thing after another," is *all* that can be said about life; then, indeed, there ceases to be any place in the world for the philosopher. And yet in

¹ Merrington, *The Problem of Personality* (1916), p. 158.

² *Macbeth*, Act V, Scene 5.

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one way it is true that even to say that life has no meaning is to philosophize—the meaning of experience is nothing at all; but such a position, though it is in a sense a philosophical one, certainly renders any *further* philosophy impossible—we are stopped in our philosophical investigations at the very outset. Unless we assume, then, that experience has a meaning, there can be no philosophy in any valuable use of that term.

The second assumption whose acknowledgment is essential for the very existence of philosophy, is that we can *know* at least *something* of the meaning of things, that human reason is not utterly unreliable in its endeavour to interpret experience. This claim, on behalf of the human intellect is surely a modest one: we must admit that human reason *is* unreliable, else there would be no such thing as error; and perhaps we cannot expect to know very much about the meaning of life—certainly not as much as we should like to know; but if we could know *nothing* about it, if our reasoning powers were *utterly* unreliable, there could be no philosophy. True, just as there are some pessimists who deny that life has any meaning, so there are some philosophers—"sceptics," we call them—who deny that we can ever have any true knowledge of things; but this latter position is usually held as the result of quite a long process of argument, so it is really a *philosophical* position after all.

Finally, the third necessary assumption of philosophy is that it is *worth while* to attempt to discover the meaning of experience. For many years the present writer had presented to his students the first and second of these assumptions as necessary to the existence of philosophy, but the third had not occurred to him. Then, listening to the Presidential Address of Professor W. E. Hocking before the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1927, he was interested to hear the speaker declare that every philosopher makes *three* assumptions; and this interest grew even sharper when he found that Professor Hocking's first two assumptions were exactly the same as he himself had already ventured to suggest to his students! He waited eagerly for the third assumption, which followed immediately in the speaker's preliminary enumeration—"that it is worth while to" know the meaning of things, "and ought to be attempted."¹ And now the present writer gladly adds this third assumption to his own list; for surely, even if experience *has* a meaning, and even if we *can* know something of that meaning, yet if it is not worth while knowing what that meaning is, no one is going to take the trouble to philosophize.

We come now to the elucidation of another section of our definition. Philosophy, we say, is an "*inquiry into the meaning of experience.*"

¹ This address of Professor Hocking's may be read in *The Philosophical Review* for 1928. Vol. XXXVII, pp. 133-155.

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By using this word we are enforcing the truth that philosophy is largely a matter of asking questions, and does not pretend to give final answers to all questions. We can know *something*, we said, of the meaning of life; but we do not pretend to know *more* than "something." Many persons seem to think that if they once go into the subject of philosophy they may expect to find there an answer to every question that can enter into the mind of man; but if they approach the study of philosophy in that spirit, they are doomed to an early and sudden disillusionment. *Some* persons, I am afraid, do not even learn this lesson, and *act* at least as if they had discovered the final truth of things when they have read one book on this fascinating study, or taken one introductory course in it; though I can hardly think that those persons can really feel this way in the bottoms of their hearts. But often the asking of a new question is as important a step in the progress of philosophy as the attempt to answer an old one.

The inquiring nature of philosophy is well indicated by the etymology of the term. Two Greek words combine to constitute it: *φιλέω*, I love; and *σοφία*, wisdom. A philosopher, in other words, is literally and truly, not one who professes to be a "wise man" or "sage," but merely a "*lover of wisdom*." There is no arrogance, then, in the profession of philosophy: if a "philosopher" meant a "wise man," few would dare to claim the title; but no one can be accused of arrogance who merely asserts himself to be a "lover of wisdom."

That mysterious but highly influential character of the ancient world, Pythagoras (sixth century B.C.), is usually thought to have been the first person to call himself a philosopher. About a century later a group of teachers arose in Athens who were known as "Sophists"—that is, men of wisdom. Their great contemporary, Socrates, was often regarded as one of their number, but sternly repudiated the charge of pretending to be wise in the Sophists' sense of that term, saying that the highest wisdom for man consists in the knowledge of how ignorant he is, and that God alone can be called *truly* wise.

Philosophy, then, as Professor E. S. Brightman has said,¹ is not so much a "body of conclusions about experience" as "a spirit or method of approaching experience" and asking it questions. Or to return to the ancient Greeks, both Plato and Aristotle have told us that philosophy begins in *wonder*²—wonder about nature, about man, human destiny, and the meaning of life. And the true philosopher never ceases to wonder until at last he ceases to live.

Finally, to return for the last time to our original definition, philosophy is "a *rational* inquiry into the meaning of experience."

¹ *An Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 7.

² Plato: *Theaetetus*, p. 155 D; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, p. 982 b. 12.

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That is to say, it is an application of reason, rather than imagination, to experience; a *reflective* consideration of the meaning of things. In this, the philosopher is distinguished, for example, from the poet, who attains his conclusions through an emotional and imaginative response to experience, rather than through reasoning and argument. In fact, before there were any philosophers properly so-called in ancient Greece, there were the great poets of the ninth, eighth, and seventh centuries—Homer, Hesiod, and many others of lesser rank—who presented in an imaginative way many ideas which later philosophers developed in their own more argumentative fashion; and even the earliest philosophers themselves presented their arguments and conclusions in metrical form. Later, however, the two ways of dealing with experience became more and more distinct, though occasionally we find individuals who were able to combine the two types of approach—as, for example, Plato himself, and, later, Lucretius.

Philosophy, therefore, to vary somewhat the wording of our original definition, is *an attempt, through reasoning, to understand the nature of the universe and the place of man therein.*

THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY

But why should we study philosophy at all? Why take the trouble to inquire rationally into the nature of the universe and human life? Is our third assumption, which Professor Hocking told us about, true—viz. that it is worth while to try, so far as we can, to understand the meaning of things? In what way is it worth while?

From what has been said already it must be clear that the *primary* value of philosophy is not a practical but an *intellectual* one, its prime purpose not the guidance of conduct but the understanding of things in general—knowledge for its own sake. But what is to hinder our subject from *also* having, in some sense at least, a *practical* value? In stating that its primary interest is an intellectual one, are we not too sharply separating philosophy from ordinary life? Can theory and conduct be thus cut apart from each other, or is it not rather true that one's conduct is in large degree the *expression* of one's philosophy? Certainly these questions are well founded. It is absolutely true, and an important truth, that in ordinary life theory and practice are interdependent—our conduct is determined by our ideas, and ideas are in a very real sense instruments of conduct. And if this is true in ordinary life, there is no reason why it should not be true in philosophy. Let us consider, then, the question of the relation between philosophy and practical life.¹

¹ This subject is excellently treated by C. E. M. Joad in an article in *The Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 1928, Vol. III, pp. 349-356.

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Now the answer to this question depends largely upon what we mean by the word "practical." It is a notoriously ambiguous term, and most persons who utter it so glibly and frequently, as many do, have never stopped to consider what they mean by it. It is a popular word, and sounds well, so they use it freely! In one sense of the term—the narrow, *utilitarian* sense, as we may call it—philosophy is certainly *not* a practical study, and has, indeed, no practical value whatsoever. As has often been remarked, "philosophy bakes no bread": that is to say, it does not increase our *efficiency* in the specific activities of life, does not help us to secure wealth, success, or physical comfort. To secure these "useful" ends is the function of the useful arts and the applied sciences. Those who, like Francis Bacon and Professor Dewey, regard philosophy as having human welfare as its primary and sole end, are confusing, it would seem to those of us who disagree with their point of view, philosophy with what we now call applied social science. In the proper significance of the word, then, philosophy, like pure mathematics, is of absolutely no "*use*" in the world! And yet that statement is by no means intended to deny that there is a very real sense in which philosophy does have a "practical value," and we must now try to see what that meaning of the expression is.

It is in a much *wider* significance of the word than the foregoing that we can say that philosophy does have a practical value—namely, in broadening our knowledge of things, in increasing our appreciation of the wonders of the universe, and so in inspiring our daily life. Its practical value, we may say, is an *inspirational*, not a utilitarian, value. It promotes those virtues which we call "catholicity" and "tolerance"—an interest in a diversity of things, and a willingness to consider a diversity of points of view with respect and sympathy—destroying their opposites, narrow-mindedness and bigotry. It will not make us better cooks or lawyers, or more successful in business, but it *should* make us better men and women. There was *some* truth after all, then, in the view of the ancient Stoics and Epicureans that the study of philosophy should promote human welfare and human happiness; where they were wrong was in thinking of that as the primary purpose of philosophy, whereas it is properly only a natural consequence of that study.

In its broadening effect upon the human mind, philosophy is not unlike astronomy, the most inspiring in many ways of all the special sciences. Other sciences also have a notable broadening influence and inspirational value—history, archaeology, geology, for example; but none carries the human imagination into such wide reaches that everything else seems trivial as does astronomy. Outside the field of

¹ See Gamertsfelder and Evans, *Fundamentals of Philosophy* (1930), pp. 62-64.

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the sciences, literature, music, and the other fine arts also have much of this inspiring effect; and, above all, religion has the inspiration of life as almost (if not absolutely) its primary aim. It is with something like this in mind that the founders of the great fraternity of scholars, the Society of the Phi Beta Kappa, took for their motto the expression whose initials in the Greek constitute their title—*Φιλοσοφία Βίου Κυβερνήτης*, "Philosophy the guide of life."

Every enthusiastic student, whatever his field of special interest, is tempted to think of his own subject as the most important of all subjects. Like the pseudo-patriot who says, "My country, right or wrong, first, last, and all the time"; this is carrying things too far; but there is no harm—nay, rather, much good—in thinking of one's own subject as the most fascinating one in the world *for him*, and in saying why he thinks so. Perhaps, then, one such enthusiastic student may be permitted to say why philosophy is to him the most fascinating of all subjects, and perhaps his enthusiasm may in some degree infect one or two at least of his readers.

For the present writer, then, *the surpassing interest of philosophy* is to be found in three directions—(1) in the loftiness of its theme; (2) in the breadth of its scope; and (3) in the depth of its foundations.

The loftiness of its theme. The late eighteenth-century romantic philosopher whose pen name was Novalis, once said, in defence of philosophy against the criticism that it "bakes no bread": True, philosophy can bake no bread, but it "can give us God, freedom, and immortality." Now one may very seriously question whether in any sense it is strictly true that philosophy can "give" us God, freedom, and immortality; but it is certainly true that these and other lofty conceptions of the human mind¹ have been the constant concern of the greatest philosophers. All the sublime questions of religion are also subjects of philosophical consideration—Does God exist? If so, what or who is God? Does He care for us? Can we know Him as we can know a human being? Is He worthy of our love? Are we capable of choosing freely between right and wrong, or are we "fated" to act the way we do? Is this earthly life all, or does the real personality live on for ever after the death of the body? These are philosophical as well as religious questions, and the very asking of them ennobles the asker.

The breadth of its scope. Philosophers do not restrict themselves, however, to such exalted topics as these. Their field covers not only the problems of religion, but also those of all the sciences. In fact, there is probably not one subject of possible human interest which has not at least *some* philosophical significance. Go into any large

¹ To call these "conceptions of the human mind" does not, of course, imply that they are *only* human conceptions; any more than to speak of "man's conception of the universe" implies the non-existence of the external world!

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university or public library, and examine in the catalogue the titles beginning "The Philosophy of—," and you will be surprised at their number and diversity. No wonder we take pride in the "broadening" influence of our subject!

The depth of its foundations. To many this is the most alluring characteristic of philosophy. It probes to the very bottom of all its problems, and is concerned with what we call the "fundamental" issues of life and the "ultimate" nature of things—that is, the issues which lie at the very foundations of life, and the nature of things in the last possible analysis. "No wonder," we might say again, philosophers cannot hope ever to *answer* all the questions they ask, for however far they may go toward answering them, they can never reach the "bottom"; but they continue to *ask* them, nevertheless, and to get an enormous amount of pleasure out of their attempts to find at least *some* kind of an answer! In any important scientific investigation, the inquirer is pretty sure at some time to come to a point where *as* a scientist he ceases to be interested—"that is a philosophical question," he says, and turns his attention elsewhere. But that is the very point at which the philosopher *begins* to be interested, and his interest never ceases merely because he has reached some boundary beyond which he has no right or desire to pass.

It is in the nobility, catholicity, and profundity of his subject, then, that the philosopher makes his boast, and dares to defend his right to exist even in such a utilitarian and hedonistic age as the present, when the desires to live and to enjoy life seem far more weighty influences on the conduct of mankind than perhaps at any previous time.

QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE : HOW AND WHY

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NOT in the lay mind only, but also to a wide extent throughout the realm of Science itself, there exists the belief that no matter how thoroughly research is pursued, it can never yield anything more than descriptions of whatever it may be concerned with. Undeniably, such descriptions are becoming so complicated in detail, and at the same moment so far-ranging in their applications, that they inevitably assume the aspect of more or less final explanations; and previous investigators often regarded them as being actually explanatory, finding indeed in this supposed result one of the most powerful impulses to carry their inquiries to their utmost limit. This however, it is frequently contended, is at best a short-sighted error and at worst a misleading superstition; the truth, no matter how unwelcome it may seem, being that explanation is unattainable because it is a wholly non-scientific category and ideal. If then we wish to discover any sufficient reason, any ultimate ground, any final solution, we must turn from Science to Philosophy; and even so, many sceptics do not hesitate to add, we are foredoomed to disappointment.

Nor can we halt here. For to the further question, What then is it that Science describes? varying answers are given. These descriptions, it is sometimes said, can be of nothing more than phenomena or events, processes or transformations, world lines or co-ordinate systems. It should not escape our notice, however, that in marked contrast with nineteenth-century Science, very little is now regarded as being epiphenomenal; even "mind is not to be explained away as a mere epiphenomenon";¹ and the philosophic significance of this radical change in viewpoint can hardly be ignored by even the most positivist investigators; for if they insist on our keeping to "facts," this itself is a "fact" of cardinal import. But quite apart from this, such questions as, What is being continuously transformed? What do phenomena themselves involve or imply? are banished to that Limbo of meaninglessness which so many still regard as Philosophy's own peculiar sphere.

Similarly, again, with regard to the descriptive conclusions, taken as such. It is often urged that however extensive, intricate, and self-coherent these may become, they always remain the constructions of man's own intellect, and in that sense are either artificial or sub-

¹ Huxley, *Essays of a Biologist*, p. 71.

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jective, if not both at once. Further, they are incessantly open to modifications sometimes so thoroughgoing that they launch a series of Copernican revolutions at the devoted heads of the reflective lay public; nor can the most secluded philosopher always escape their swift and turbid backwash. Subjectivism and artificiality, this contention adds, are intensified by the ineradicably symbolic character of all scientific expressions and formulae without exception. Rooted in sense-experience and reared in abstraction, these must remain eternally divorced from what their symbols ultimately represent or refer to. They symbolize either the unknown or the unknowable, the Kantian noumenon or "the Dawn of Nothing"; so that, venturing to alter slightly a stanza of *Omar*, we must say that

Science is not glad or sorry, as I deem,
Labouring it dreams, and labours in the dream,
Till, when the spool is finished, lo! I see
The web, reeled off, curls and goes out like steam.

If, then, nothing more than this can ever be attained, scientific positivism seems suspiciously akin to philosophic pessimism. On the other hand, it is surely undeniable that when we consider these recurring modifications of scientific descriptions taken in their entirety, a few profoundly significant tendencies reveal themselves. The most obvious of these is a steady increase in Comprehensiveness which presents two aspects; for it affects in the first place the subject-matter of the descriptions themselves, and secondly the range of their applicability to Nature, to human experience, or to the Universe; and this is true however symbolic we may take the descriptions to be. Inseparable from Comprehensiveness, again, is the ever more intricate and more coherent interrelation between descriptive schemata which incorporates them within a unified corpus or Whole, incessantly growing in its definiteness in spite of its inexhaustibility. In other terms, the descriptions lose their original haphazardness and contingency in such a way that each in turn illuminates and interprets its associates, or becomes subsumed with these in some yet more generalized description.

Even more important than all this, however, is the uninterrupted trend from Probability to Certainty; and once any degree of Certainty has been obtained, onward to still more firmly based and more extensive certainties. "We see science," as Jeans expresses this vital principle, "moving towards a hypothesis which will cover all known facts with complete accuracy—if, indeed, it has not already attained such a goal. As our knowledge increases, the probability gradually changes into a certainty"; and thus the scientist unweariedly pursues, and occasionally captures, the "ideal of the theoretical physicist, highest purity, clarity, and certainty," as

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Einstein has recently depicted this.¹ The advance is gradual, continuous, and successful; and even if we believe that such Certainty can never be other than abstract, or if we rigidly restrict it to pure theory, so as to exclude the concrete, the practical, and the empirical, still the tendency is always operative and—to repeat—of the highest significance.

But there are excellent grounds for regarding the current emphasis on abstractness and theoretical purity, equally in their relation to Certainty and their opposition to concreteness, as a seriously misleading exaggeration. For another most prominent feature of Science is the gradually changing status of Experiment in its connection with Theory. It goes without saying that the false *a priorism* of previous centuries, which despised experiments as superfluous, has been abandoned. Nevertheless pure theory is rapidly acquiring a most remarkable dominance over wide fields of research, which manifests itself in several ways. To begin with, few modern experiments are simple; they are, on the contrary, extraordinarily intricate and delicate, and this largely because they are suggested and controlled by that vast and coherent corpus of theoretical certainties to which I have just referred. But these highly abstract conclusions may do far more than merely suggest new experiments; in many cases they positively *dictate* which must be attempted and which excluded, while at the same time they often predict the results with striking precision. To express this remarkable and typically modern state of affairs in terms of the history of Science, it implies that while early and primitive theories arose from experiments, the subsequent advance consists to a great extent in the uninterrupted inversion of this connection, so that, ultimately, increasingly elaborate experiments are dictated by increasingly abstract theory; while the more precise predictions are plainly the inevitable outcome of profounder certainties. I do not, of course, suggest that these conditions are universal, or ever will be universal; but they imply that only at the far outposts of research, and not at G.H.Q., can trial and error, hit or miss methods, be tolerated any longer.

Detailed instances of this scientific transformation would demand far too much space. It must suffice to indicate the many recent applications of mathematics not merely to physics and geology, astronomy and inorganic chemistry, but also, though admittedly not to the same degree nor with the same success, to biochemistry, biology, and psychology, to eugenics and genetics, even to economics and its allied political theory. In short, pure mathematics is progressively and irresistibly invading and dominating the territories of its sister sciences; this remains true even if, like other successful

¹ *The New Background of Science*, pp. 55, 224. Whyte, *Critique of Physics*, p. 175. Cf. also Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, pp. 96, 97.

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dictatorships, it is threatened with megalomania. However we may choose to interpret this, it shows quite unmistakably that abstract and concrete, pure theory and empiricism, *a priori* and *a posteriori*, are much more closely connected than their current opposition implies.

We must now consider the bearing of these conclusions on the descriptive and quantitative aspects of Science. Obviously, description answers the question *How?* which can never be asked too often nor dealt with too successfully. Similarly, quantitative expressions reveal *How much?* with the utmost precision. Yet the ultimate results of this procedure are far too frequently radically misunderstood. Undeniably, it yields a literally infinite series of revelations of *How* and *How much*. Nevertheless the really essential feature of the situation is that these never remain a mere series and nothing more. On the contrary they become more intimately correlated and more reciprocally interpretative, they gain alike in comprehensiveness, coherence, and certainty, in such a way that once again we envisage, in the end, that inclusive corpus which constitutes the ultimate aim of research and the highest ideal of knowledge; granted that these remain ever unattainable, still they are being asymptotically realized. And this implies that the answers to *How?* steadily assume a new form and character so that they finally yield the reply to *Why?* In other terms, scientific *explanation* gradually "emerges" from scientific *description*; there is a continuous change in the intellectual viewpoint which is never merely accidental but is literally inescapable. As Whitehead has well expressed this principle, "there is a motive of unrest which urges scientists beyond satisfaction with description, even the general description. It is the desire to obtain the explanatory description which may justify the speculative extension of Laws."¹ This contention is abundantly exemplified by Jeans' treatment of his data in *The New Background of Science*. "This is necessary," he observes, "to explain why a mass of gas gives a spectrum of sharp lines. . . . This explains why photons always travel with the speed of light. . . . The new quantum theory goes far beyond the explanation of the hydrogen spectrum . . . it explains a great number of phenomena which had previously defied explanation." Not even mathematics can be excluded, since "twentieth-century science, projecting the ideas of pure mathematics on to nature, finds that they fit as perfectly and as uniquely as Cinderella's slipper fitted her foot"²—an excellent illustration of the very essence of explanation as distinguished from description.

These references to mathematics necessitate the brief discussion of another inadequate view of Science, namely, that it is pre-

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 164.

² Pp. 190, 209, 55, 296; cf. p. 298.

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dominantly quantitative and only exceptionally qualitative, so that "scientific investigation ignores practically all those aspects of experience which cannot be weighed or measured. Judgments that are qualitative and incapable of justification by quantitative arguments have little place in scientific schemes."¹ But this is by no means the case, even in mathematics itself, no matter how prominent its quantitative aspects must always be. These are, however, not the essential features; on the contrary, the real essence of all mathematics consists (first) in order or system, and (secondly) in absolute precision; and although the latter ideal is most adequately attained in quantitative expressions, still these are never more than instrumental and subordinate. As Cassirer has maintained, mathematics is "not the general science of magnitude but of form, not the science of quantity but of quality."² This is most readily perceived in geometry, because the differences between square and triangle, circle and parabola, point, plane, and volume, are plainly qualitative, not, of course, merely as regards textbook figures which are nothing more than convenient symbols of the actual entities, but rather as subsisting between their distinctive properties. Thus "geometry can be developed without any reference to measurement. It is only in some special branches of mathematics that notions of quantity and number are dominant themes."³ It may even be argued, I believe, that the differences between numbers themselves are also to an important degree qualitative; certainly the contrasts between ultimate units are such—between length and mass, motion and acceleration—so that "physical science recognizes qualitative differences,"⁴ and "in metrical geometry there (are) quantities, such as a unit of space length, which could not be deduced from anything simpler, all the rest of geometrical structure being cases of order and arrangement."⁵ If then pure mathematics "recognizes qualitative differences," still more must all concrete sciences do so; and it is surely obvious that chemistry and biology, geology and psychology, would be fatally handicapped if they were restricted, as the writers just cited contend, mainly to "quantitative arguments" alone. This radically mistaken view is one of the unfortunate results of the current dictatorship of mathematical physics which has induced so many thinkers to oversimplify phenomena by reducing them to

¹ Barnes, *Scientific Theory and Religion*, p. 600. Eddington has emphasized this standpoint in *The Nature of the Physical World*. Similarly, "science deals with the calculable, measurable element in reality in abstraction from other elements." Matthews, *Dogma in History and Thought*, p. 21.

² *Substance and Function*, p. 92.

³ Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 176, 197.

⁴ Whitehead, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 41, p. 140.

⁵ Costello, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXV, p. 439.

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pure metrics. Quantitative precision, in brief, is indispensable and invaluable but never paramount; while from the philosophical standpoint it reveals the absolute precision of world structure; "the radius of the first hydrogen orbit, about a two-hundred-millionth of a centimetre, has a better claim than any other to be the ultimate footrule of the world."¹

Of course, the descriptive Hows never disappear unless they prove to be inaccurate; apart from this they must always be appealed to. Still further, their transformation into Why is invariably gradual and continuous, even on those rare occasions when the Why comes in a lightning flash of inspiration. Actually, it always "emerges," although the result is often a sudden and startling crystallization; and the final synthesis unifies, without obliterating, both concrete and abstract, empirical and pure, a *posteriori* and a *priori*; these must always be contra-distinguished, but never separated.

Nor, finally, is the How a strictly scientific answer while the Why is strictly philosophic; any such view simply introduces afresh the false dichotomy which destroys continuity and "emergence." The matter, once again, is essentially one of degree, and at no stage is it permissible to sever the philosophical viewpoint from the scientific. For although one's individual temperament usually determines which of these standpoints is adopted, still temperament is far too narrow and rigid; and the racial intellect ultimately ignores all such purely personal idiosyncracies as it incessantly strives to attain that "inclusive corpus," the highest ideal of knowledge, already mentioned. Its constituent factors must be regarded in two distinct, but inseparable, ways; in the first place as interrelated to each other so that we then obtain the linear and incomplete series with which Science is mainly concerned; secondly, as related to, and as finding their relevant place within, the whole corpus at any given time—the characteristic method of Philosophy; while as the corpus gains in its entirety it is inevitable that scientific theories and philosophic systems should become radically recast.

Now each of these two attitudes yields its own intellectual satisfaction. Nevertheless the racial consciousness, and often the individual consciousness likewise, can find *complete* satisfaction only by adopting the philosophic standpoint—that is, by grasping and envisaging the corpus in its diversified unity. For this is the ultimate goal attainable by intellect; beyond this it can never advance, except by expanding still farther the wholeness of the corpus itself. Thus to contemplate the entire corpus is to comprehend Why; to widen and deepen it is to substitute a higher, in the sense of more valid and more logical, Why for its predecessors; a Why which incorporates and remains continuous with a multitude of Hows. This conclusion

¹ Darwin, *New Conceptions of Matter*, p. 119.

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suggests two reflections, the one linked with ancient, the other with modern, speculation. For an Aristotelian God might comprehend the perfect Why; while the racial Unconscious, in its unceasing search for such a Why, may rightly be described as philosophic.

But this ideal Whole of knowledge, which though transcendent is being asymptotically attained, reveals, or expresses, or even symbolizes, the constitution or structure of Reality. In other terms, the real Whole is "structural" just as—to select a simple and at the same time a static example—the multiplication table is ordered throughout; a much more adequate parallel, however, is found in the dynamic, but again "structural," personality of a Lincoln or Napoleon; for although this undeniably transcends any exhaustive description and prediction, nonetheless its characteristic reactions are discernible by both the historian and the intimate friend. Quite similarly in principle, though on a far vaster and more intricate scale, man's expanding grasp of the corpus of knowledge is inseparable from a deepening insight into the dynamic, but nevertheless ordered, structure of Reality which must, from its very nature, be ultimate and final so far as it extends at any given moment; and in this contemplation the human spirit attains, to some degree, the Why for which it is ever searching.

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To the bulk of the British reading public 'contemporary French philosophy' would seem to be interchangeable with 'the works of M. Bergson.' And it can scarcely be otherwise when, as an erudite correspondent of *Le Temps* relates, Paris now prints in a week one million books—as many as were printed annually in the reign of the Roi Soleil. For the proportion of these devoted to philosophy is not small. One voracious reader and professor of philosophy in Switzerland, Monsieur J. BENRUBI, has withstood for thirty years the annual avalanche of philosophical books, read steadily on, abstracted and collated his gleanings. In him we have a most competent guide. Familiar with every rivulet and path, and with the historic formation of the country, he now reveals to us the whole panorama. His encyclopaedic enterprise,¹ treating some hundred and sixty authors, is neither a chronicle nor a classification, except in a secondary way. It aims principally at tracing cross-currents in recent philosophies so as to discover their internal connexions, and thence in what direction present French thought is heading. M. Benrubi's scrupulousness in seeing nobody is left out tends perhaps to overcrowding, and his emphasis on that which coheres may somewhat overshadow that which divides. And it may be inevitable, too, with a field of figures so vast, that the accounts of some should be insufficiently detailed. But the total effect is substantial, and his volumes are invaluable to whomever would appreciate whence and whither French thought is proceeding. There are three threads to guide us through the labyrinth. The distinct though still interacting tendencies are described as 'empirical and scientific positivism,' 'epistemological and critical idealism,' and 'metaphysical and spiritual positivism.' Each rests on certain characteristics manifested with varying explicitness in the thought of its many representatives. I indicate summarily and quite inadequately some points of M. Benrubi's conclusions. The first current (whose higher reaches pass by Comte, Condillac, Hume, Locke, and Bacon) is marked by its violent and negative attitude towards metaphysics ('a though born of a desire to exterminate the adversary'), by its denial of ultimate natures and final causes, its search for relationships, avoidance of hypotheses, rejection of philosophy as an autonomous science, uncritical acceptance of sense-data as ultimate, employment of comparative and wholly inductive methods, faith in universal determinism and satisfaction with mechanistic explanations. The second current (issuing from Kant and Renouvier and bifurcating into 'criticism of the sciences' and 'critical rationalism') exposes the shortcomings of positivism and its unjustified assumptions, attacks its determinism and its 'reductive' method, denies the unconditional value of scientific results, develops a constructive epistemology, stresses the creative rôle of mind in the construction of science, and conceives the main task of philosophy—an autonomous science—to be the progressive rationalization of Nature. The third movement issues largely from the work of the Bergsonians and their adversaries. Neglecting nuances, it is charac-

¹ J. BENRUBI: *Les sources et les Courants de la Philosophie contemporaine en France*. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques. 1933. 2 vols. 1p. 1058. 100 fr. Paris: Alcan.

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terized by a common acceptance of mind as the substance of reality and of personal consciousness as the point of departure, the strict inseparability of metaphysics and psychology, a reintroduction of finality in explaining the inferior by the superior, the defence of freedom and of an intimate connexion between philosophy and religion.

Two posthumously published articles by EMILE MEYERSON¹ and three volumes by Professor G. BACHELARD² of the University of Dijon are prominent among recent contributions to the epistemology of the sciences. M. Bachelard's last book, *Les Intuitions atomistiques*, might perhaps have been as appropriately entitled 'Les Illusions atomistiques,' though this would be to read into his work an irony he does not seem to intend, for it professes to be no more than an 'essai de classification.' No single definition, he points out, can both cover all and do justice to each of the very diverse types of atomistic assumption which science and philosophy have used in the speculative reconstruction of Nature. He therefore singles out the main conceptions of the atom in ancient and modern times, elucidates their presuppositions, and shows how the attempt to avoid the difficulties of one or another originates its successor. So far as analysis of natural phenomena tends to become thorough, it resolves into a search for the atom as its ultimate term. But atomism is to be justified only in and by the synthesis, and it is at precisely this point that arises the dilemma which M. Brunschvicg indicated, and of which we have instances enough throughout M. Bachelard's book. Either the atom is "too rich" in connotation, and the question of composition is consequently no sense; or the atom is "too poor," and the composition is consequently incomprehensible or incredible. Or, conversely stated, if all the essential characters of the composition itself are transferred to the definition of its ultimate constituents, then there is no genuine composition and "the explanation" is purely verbal. Yet, since every composition depends on *some* sort of environing field (for even the most elementary compounds—juxtapositions, mixtures—are at least partly determined by the properties of space, or of some other 'field' or 'medium'), atoms are not self-sufficient, and their relations to the external field assigned constitute a sort of 'reality of the second order' whose properties have, soon or late, to be introduced to supplement the original, inadequate connotation. And this radical form of deficiency shows up in more definitely scientific contexts. The analysis which purports to fix the character of the atom, and the synthesis which purports to recompose the sensible phenomenon, remain, in the end, unconnected. Failing to 'join up' with each other, they fail to corroborate or verify one another. These points are first of all illustrated by a full consideration of the views of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. From their naïve realism, a variety of doctrines develop, falling within two extremes, according to the number of characters attributed to the atom, viz. (a) a form "vraiment prodigieux," assigning all the phenomenon's properties, and (b) "the most restricted form conceivable," fixing on some one property as essential. Between the extremes, in order of increasing complexity, lie the very many forms of atomism which successive attempts to solve the problem of composition have engendered. Modern forms, seeking to liberate us from these primitive views, quit the position of naïf realism, and M. Bachelard devotes the second part

¹ 'La Notion de l'Identique,' pp. 1-18 of *Recherches Philosophiques III*, 1933-1934 (Paris: Boivin, 75 fr.) and 'De l'Analyse des produits de la pensée,' *Revue Philosophique*, September-October 1934.

² G. BACHELARD: *La Valeur inductive de la Relativité*, 1929. Pp. 284. Paris: Vrin, 12 fr. *Le Pluralisme cohérent de la Chimie moderne*, 1932. 1 p. 237. Paris: Vrin, 25 fr. *Les Intuitions atomistiques*. Bibliothèque de la Revue des Cours et Conférences, 1933. Pp. 102. Paris: Boivin, 15 fr.

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of his book to surveying more recent and less simple-minded attempts. Scientific (as distinct from philosophical) atomism claimed, "under cover of positivist precautions," to reduce physics to a systematic phenomenalism experimentally verifiable. But the instability of this intermediate position, now falling back towards naïf realism, now leaning on a predominantly rationalistic organization of experience, called for its rejection. The whole investigation reopened with Hannequin. The realistic position abandoned, a solution was attempted along Kantian lines, viz. from the hypothesis that physical atomism is imposed on science not by Nature but by the method of physics itself in particular, and by the conditions of cognition in general. The last stage of the examination brings us to the atomism of contemporary science: "il faudrait y voir une tâche de catharsis"! In the last metamorphosis ("axiomatic atomism") the atom postulated is "intimement opaque," only its function can become transparent. The purpose of its definition is to enable us to understand the theory and the facts, not to describe the atom itself. Atomism has thus become the name of a *technique* "with its own instruments, methods, and experimentation." Its postulates are required to be treated as neither true nor false (surely, therefore, unsuitably called 'axiomatic') but as being "merely the basis of a construction." It is this construction alone that may claim to be true, though its purpose is less to express the reality known and more to effect a co-ordination of the conceptions by which "we think reality," and in particular, to enable us to conceive a technique suitable for making further discoveries. Theories have now to be estimated by their efficacy. M. Bachelard says much that is suggestive to the reader interested in the formal character and limitations of attainments in natural science.

Two recent works on child psychology,¹ by Professor M. FOUCAULT of Montpellier and Professor J. PIAGET of Geneva, are important contributions to their branch. M. Foucault shows sufficiently that the potentialities of the Binet-Simon method are far from being exhausted. It was admittedly only a first step. It has already been corrected and supplemented by psychologists of two continents, and now Professor Foucault proposes three further revisions. The method should be (i) made applicable to subjects over the age of ten (the apprentices, secondary pupils, "and even university students"); (ii) so adjusted as to measure mental aptitude as well as mental age. And (iii) the very basic conception of intelligence on which the method was originally based must be rendered more precise. It is the first two of these projects that determined the course of M. Foucault's researches at Montpellier during the last ten years, and his experiments and results are here fully reported and discussed. He considers the Binet-Simon method approximately adequate for subjects under the age of ten, but doubts whether Simon and the bulk of American psychologists are right in supposing intellectual development to cease at so early an age as ten or twelve. The doubt led him to devise two series of tests, one for children between ten and twelve years, the other for older subjects. The character of these tests and the technique of their application are fully explained, and 'a table of normal values' is constructed from the results of their application. Before calculating these values, however, M. Foucault deals in a non-theoretical way with two important "questions préjudicielles," viz. whether intelligence develops at the same rate and attains the same maximum indifferently to the sex of the subjects; and how far the subjects' development

¹ M. FOUCAULT: *La Mesure de l'Intelligence chez les Écoliers*, 1933. Pp. 135. Paris: Delagrave. 5 fr. J. PIAGET: *Le Jugement moral chez l'Enfant*. Avec le concours de sept collaborateurs. 1932. Pp. 473. Paris: Alcan. 60 fr.

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is affected by the economic positions of their families. M. Foucault is not a psychologist who 'measures' without concern for what it is he is measuring. As a contribution to positive science, his research is 'conservative' in the best sense of the word. The analyses are carried out with extreme thoroughness, and the ease and lucidity of his writing shows how a somewhat special subject can be treated exactly without the use of the vague pseudo-technicalities of many modern writers. And the reader will be grateful to his author for explaining so clearly and amply each application of a mathematical formula he is about to make before he makes it.

It is not with measuring child intelligence, but with differentiating the approximately constant stages traversed in its development and accounting for the successive transitions, that Professor Piaget is concerned. Consequently his method differs from that of M. Foucault, and proceeds by free conversation rather than by questionnaires and tasks antecedently determined. And the material to be investigated is not the moral sentiments or the moral conduct of children, but their moral judgments. How does the child represent to itself 'a rule,' and how does he put it into practice? These are the most general questions M. Piaget raises, and he begins by analysing such 'representations' and 'puttings into practice' in the situations in which they develop most freely, viz. in child play. Four stages of development are discernible in the results reported: (i) where the response is a purely motor and individual one; (ii) where it is egocentric and imitative only (each is 'out for himself'); (iii) a stage of nascent co-operation motivated by concern for mutual control; (iv) one in which the dominant interest is in the rule itself ('recherche de la règle pour la règle'), hence, codification of rules. M. Piaget's account of the differentiation of (iii) from (ii) is important. When the child sees that 'to win' involves observance of rules common to itself and its partners, and when its pleasure in play has become socialized and is no longer egocentric or centred in its motor responses, it has entered on the third stage. The development marked by this transition is analogous to its advance from finding pleasure in "monologues collectifs" (in which the child talks only for its own pleasure, the presence of others serving simply as an 'incitement') to finding pleasure in social conversation. Rules are now "authentic norms" ("fabrications of reciprocity and co-operation") and are regarded as carrying their own authority and justification. From responses to 'rules of the game,' the author passes to responses more specifically moral, to which adult constraint attaches. His examination of children's attitudes towards 'objective responsibility' focuses directly on the judgments they pass upon instances of culpable clumsiness, theft, and in particular lying; their replies furnishing indirect evidence on how they conceive one and another particular kind of duty. Moral judgment is found to pass through the same general stages as judgment of other kinds; its normal development being towards a level at which a need of sanction is no longer felt, and not (as M. Fauconnet holds) towards one in which an enfeeblement of a primitive sense of responsibility is evident. M. Piaget determines further his main conclusions by confronting them with the theories of Bovey, Durkheim, and Baldwin. This extraordinarily interesting book justifies the attention of a wider public than one of professional psychologists.

The Parisian who would pursue university studies through later life enjoys an advantage not provided for the Londoner so minded, and not equally sought by him. Professors of the Sorbonne and the Collège de France deliver courses of advanced public lectures which continue throughout the whole academic year. The current list announces the following in philosophy and psychology: Professor E. Le Roy, 'The New Mechanics and the Theory of

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Knowledge'; Professor E. Gilson, 'The Social Ideal in the Middle Ages' and 'The Metaphysics of Duns Scotus'; Professor A. Rey, 'The History of Hellenic Science and its relations to Philosophy'; Professor M. Brunschvicg, 'The Problems of the Nineteenth Century'; Professor A. Lalande, 'Le Raisonnement'; Professor E. Bréhier, 'The Conception of Creation in the Philosophical Doctrines of the Seventeenth Century'; Professor J. Laporte, 'The Religious Thought of Pascal'; Dr. C. Lalo, 'Art and Action'; Professor Fauconnet, 'Problems in Sociology'; Professor M. Mauss, 'Sin and Expiation in Inferior Societies'; Professor G. Dumas, 'Pathological Psychology'; Dr. H. Wallon, 'Problems of Pedology and Pedagogy.'

S. V. KEELING.

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

IN his introduction to the logic of morals¹ KARL MENDER (Vienna) maintains that only two kinds of ethical inquiry are fruitful—the psychology or biology of morals and the logic of morals. The first of these is an empirical science which discovers what value judgments have actually been made and correlates them with various other factors. In this way it provides material for the logic of morals, which neither discovers empirical facts nor analyses them, but simply points out logical relations. In this book Menger discusses the nature of ethical judgments and carries out some investigations of the logical type.

In discussing ethical judgments Menger is careful to avoid making any himself. This does not mean that he avoids giving examples, but that he himself neither accepts nor rejects any of them. None the less, in discussing the matter at all he is really admitting a third type of ethical inquiry. He calls this epistemological, and remarks that ethical questions only require a few simple epistemological statements.

There are, he points out, two indubitable facts: first, that every sane man classifies many types of behaviour into good, bad, and indifferent; and secondly, that while there is considerable agreement between the classifications of different men, there is also considerable disagreement. When we turn from these facts to ethical systems, we find a great deal of discussion about ideals. We find the questions, "What is good?" and "What is right?" and that the answers consist in some general principle such as "It is right to obey any law which you can will to be a universal law"; "It is right to do what leads to the well-being of the State," and so on. But these general principles are sterile, and do not enable us to deduce specific rules of conduct. We first accept a number of specific rules which for the most part have no logical relation to one another, and then we use the general principle to describe them. But in using this principle we are simply providing a complicated synonym for "good" or "right." Thus the best way of drawing up a moral system is to collect a great number of specific rules. And it is mistaken to think that in drawing up such a system we are *discovering* what is good or bad. We are simply stating what we want. Thus there is a certain analogy—but one must not press it too far—between ethics and geometry. In both we get a number of different systems, and provided that each system is self-consistent it is not the case that one is false and another true.

After this discussion of ethical judgments, Menger starts on his logical

¹ *Moral, Wille und Weltgestaltung. Grundlegung zur Logik der Sitten.* Julius Springer Wien 1934. Pp. 143.

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investigations, of which I can only give a very rough account. It is clear that the value of such investigations must depend on extreme accuracy and detailed statement. Roughly speaking, they are concerned with classifications on the basis of different hypotheses, and my main aim in the following is to indicate some of the hypotheses and some of the principles of classification.

Menger first describes the formation of classes where inclusion in a class is determined by attitude—acceptance, rejection, or indifference—to an ethical rule (norm). An ethical system made up of two rules involves nine classes (some of which may be empty), the general principle being that a system which contains n rules involves 3^n classes. After discussing these classes, he gives examples of a certain duality. Consider a class of men M and a class of norms N such that each member of M either accepts, rejects, or is indifferent to each member of N . We can classify the rules of N through their relation to any one member of M , and we can classify the men of M in relation to any given rule of N . We can say any two men are in agreement when they agree in their attitude to every rule of N , and we can say any two rules are coupled when every member of M has the same attitude to the one as to the other. After further consideration of this duality, Menger discusses a new classification. Consider a class of men M and a class N of all the rules which prescribe for a given situation, e.g. how to behave on Sunday morning. Suppose every member of M divides N into two sub-classes, the rules which he accepts and the rules which he rejects. Suppose also that the former class can contain "disjunctive norms," e.g. that a member of M accepts rule 1 or rule 2 and rejects all the rest. This provides a basis for the division of M into sub-classes which is discussed in great detail.

In his next investigation Menger begins with the fact that a man may accept a rule for himself without wanting other men to accept it. Suppose, for example, we call a man "polite" if he observes certain forms of behaviour, "impolite" if he does not observe them, "sensitive" if he is only willing to associate with polite people, and "insensitive" if he is willing to associate with both polite and impolite people. We then get four groups: (a) men who are polite and sensitive; (b) men who are polite and insensitive; (c) men who are impolite and sensitive; (d) men who are impolite and insensitive. Menger points out with whom any member of each group is willing to associate, and then, since actual association is dependent on *mutual* willingness, with whom he can in fact associate. Thus, for example, any member of the group (d) is prepared to associate with any member of all the other groups, but in fact can only associate with every member of (b) and every other member of (d). What groups can we form, Menger asks, such that no group contains any member with whom any other member will not associate? We can form the following: a group containing every member of (a), a group containing every member of (d), and a number of groups each containing one member of (c). And then we can distribute the members of (b) among these groups in any way we like. It is clear, he points out, that if a group such as (c) is very large, many of its members must either abandon their attitude or live in isolation.

Menger concludes with a practical suggestion. At present the only way of imposing a law on any group of citizens is to impose it on all. It might be possible, he suggests, to form sub-groups of citizens united by desire for the same rules, and restrict legislation enforcing these rules to members of the sub-group. This scheme, he believes, would have many advantages, and is not so impracticable as might be thought.

The Law of Contradiction, by FRIEDRICH CONZE, is a study in dialectical

¹ *Der Staat von Wiesbaden*, 1932.

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materialism. In the first two chapters Conze claims to give the traditional views of this law and indicate their presuppositions, while in the third chapter he discusses the conditions of its validity. He starts by giving five different ways of formulating it, and these include what he calls the psychological version, namely, that we cannot at the same time think of contradictory judgments as true. But it soon becomes evident that in Conze's view the law applies as much to decisions as to thoughts, and most of the first chapter is concerned with the circumstances in which a person would neither think contradictory thoughts nor make contradictory decisions. At the end of the chapter Conze links up the five different formulations of the law, and in Chapter II discusses its relation to the law of identity.

In Chapter III Conze comes to the question of its validity, and first dismisses the theories which base this on *a priori* grounds. He then discusses nominalistic inductive theories, which he states to be *bourgeois* in origin and outlook. He claims to show that a *bourgeoisie* and capitalistic tendencies existed even in the fourteenth century, that the prominent nominalists took part in the political activities of this *bourgeoisie*, and that nominalist theories express its outlook (ideology). Loss of touch with concrete reality is one of the main features of this outlook. And every ruling class exhibits this defect, because touch with reality depends on work, that is, on the production of changes in the material world.

Nominalism leads to pragmatism, which has the merit of recognizing that thought and truth are dependent on practice, but shows its cloven hoof (it is a *bourgeois* theory) by failing to specify the kind of practice on which truth depends. Pragmatism leads to Marxism, which supplies the required specification. Truth depends on work, i.e. a social activity, which produces material changes that outlast itself. Other kinds of practice only lead to illusions—for example, the illusions of capitalists and "theoretical men." It is only work, and not mere practice, which guarantees the law of contradiction—and guarantees it in the sense that no effective work is possible unless contradiction is avoided.

Conze then discusses the dependence of thought on practice in greater detail. Thought is a form of adaptation to environment, a reaction to external stimuli which is not complete unless it produces external changes. Incomplete reactions do indeed occur, but are products of disease—substitutes for the practical activity which the "theoretical man" desires but cannot achieve. The "theoretical man" is the least likely person to discover truth, for thought is only true when it leads to the conquest of material conditions.

I would like in conclusion to draw attention to the forthcoming publication of two volumes on contemporary British philosophy by RUDOLF MEIZ. The author is very anxious that an intimate connection between German and British philosophy should be established, and points out that a fruitful connection depends on mutual understanding. His exposition ranges from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present day, but is mainly concerned with recent movements. The table of contents indicates an extremely comprehensive treatment, and it seems likely that the book will justify the publisher's claim of being the most comprehensive work on the subject.

¹ *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien*, Felix Meiner, Leipzig. Pp. 850. RM.30. After publication RM.40.

HELEN KNIGHT.

NEW BOOKS

Modern Tendencies in Philosophy. (Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volume XIII.) (London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1934. Pp. 236. Price 15s. net.)

This volume containing the President's Address and the Symposia read at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association at Cardiff in July last year is of particular interest as a weather signal of the direction in which the philosophical wind is blowing—all the more so perhaps as the International Congress of Philosophy that was held at Prague in September was absorbing the attention of some of the senior members of both societies and the papers were mainly given by younger men. But it is also one that is particularly difficult to review owing to the wealth of matter contributed by different hands which it contains, and I have had to ask the Editor of *PHILOSOPHY* for special indulgence if I am to make it more than a bare record of "transactions." Even so, it can't be very much more.

In his Presidential Address under the title "Humanity and History," Professor J. W. Scott propounds the question "What was Idealism? What did it try to say and do?" He answers: Idealism arises when the mind, confronted with the representation of reality as a turmoil of material atoms, protests that value too is real. It goes on to corroboration when it shows reality to involve a system of categories both of actuality and value which can only be supplied by a Subject. It means in fact that we see what we are in what we know, and accordingly that knowledge consists in "letting ourselves down into what we report." But this definition raises the further question what Subject or self do we mean, and what is the object into which it thus inserts itself? Taking the world of men for illustration, the writer answers that the self is the moral self, the self of ideals and purposes, and the object is the process of events. History is thus definable as the mixing of moral purpose with events. But unfortunately the moral purpose so seldom succeeds in establishing itself that history turns out in the end to be mainly a record of "that which might have been and nearly was." In other words, Idealism points to possibilities rather than actualities, and "Plato's defence stands—that the ideal is none the worse for never having been realized, so long as you can prescribe a small change which would realize it."

In the emphasis that is laid on self-activity, creation, and freedom there is much in the address that is true and vital. But in the idea of history as the pursuit of an ever-elusive perfectibility there is a note that reminds us of the neo-idealism of Gentile and his disciples rather than of the robust doctrine which has been mainly influential in this country, and according to which philosophy is the attempt to see the ideal, not as something floating ineffectually above the world of the actual and powerless to be born, but as what is most real and decisively operative in it. I can hardly think that Professor Scott means to renounce the natural won gains of the latter doctrine, yet his address left me wondering.

The five symposia that follow fall into two groups according as they deal with subjects of more general interest or with others of a more technical kind, relating to the theory of knowledge. Neglecting to some extent the

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order in the book, and taking the former group first, that which deals with "Liberty and the Modern State" will probably attract most attention in the readers of *PHILOSOPHY*. Mr. C. E. M. Joad here leads off with an attractive paper which might be called Mill's essay "On Liberty" up to date. From what he finds an embarrassing wealth of arguments for liberty of thought and action he selects three: its necessity as the condition of all advance in the mind of the race; the absolute value which attaches to truth; and the contribution it makes to other values that enter into the constitution of human personality. But he admits that there must be limits to individual liberty, and, finding himself faced with the same difficulty which Mill felt in laying down the principle of State action, proceeds, like Herbert Spencer, by way of evacuating government of positive ends and confining its function to that of securing a "minimum background of ordered security" and "a minimum standard of behaviour" in the relation of the citizens with one another. Extremes meet, and Mr. John Strachey, starting from the opposite pole in the name of Karl Marx, carries this evacuating process a step further by treating State control as a product of class conflict and bound in the end altogether to disappear in the classless society which is the aim of Communism. His defence of the suppression of freedom in the intermediate stage is probably the best that can be offered for it, namely, that the amount of suppression needed by proletarian rule is incomparably less than that necessary in the case of a ruling capitalist class, and that, such as it is there is a discernible limit of time to the necessity of maintaining it. Those who doubt the validity of these promises are asked not to "wait and see," but to "go and see"—presumably to Russia. Professor Field modestly resists the temptation to attempt a reconciliation of these "mighty opposites," and after a defence of British Idealism as we have it, e.g. in Green, against Mr. Joad's imputation of supporting an immoral theory of the State as the source of all rights, brings the discussion down from these theoretic heights by warning us against the mistake of treating the question of liberty as entirely a matter of State interference (all co-operative activity involves the subordination of the individual to corporate ends), and by calling attention to the psychological effect of suppression on the mind not less of suppressor than suppressed. His paper is a valuable reminder of the extraordinary complexity of the problem and of the necessity of keeping clearly in view the fact that the aim of all statesmanship worthy of the name is that of increasing the opportunity of self-development on the whole.

In the second symposium in this group on "Artistic Form and the Unconscious" the *pièce de résistance* is the opening paper by Mr. J. M. Thorburn, in which through a series of sympathetic references to Goethe's reflection on the subject he leads up to the contrast between visual art, appealing to the spatial or static, and auditory, resting on the temporal and changing;—the one courting sensible clarity, the other imaginative illusion; the one more intellectual, the other more emotional; the one appealing more to the conscious, the other to the unconscious. The chief illustration is found in the contrast between painting and music, but the distinction also applies to poetry, e.g. between the dramatic as in Shakespeare and the lyric as in Goethe. A dualism of this kind, even in the relative sense claimed for it, lends itself to criticism, and Mr. Hannay has little difficulty in showing that visual art is as ancient and as deeply welded to archetypal emotion as auditory. Mr. Thorburn had illustrated his thesis by referring in somewhat ecstatic terms of praise to Ernest John's psychoanalytic treatment of Hamlet as a victim of the Oedipus complex. To this Mr. Hannay acutely replies that the analysis in question rests on a confusion between Hamlet as an

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historic character (who may or may not have suffered from an incestuous obsession) and Hamlet as conceived by Shakespeare, who shows no trace of it. Mr. P. Leon with his usual freshness and energy pushes home the former of these criticisms by pointing out that the distinction, on which so much stress had been laid between visual and auditory art, is a psychological one and has no real bearing on aesthetics. What is relevant to aesthetics is the manner and the degree in which the difference between them is transcended. Similarly with reference to the second of Mr. Hannay's criticisms, selecting three out of the twenty meanings of the "unconscious" which the psychoanalysts have confused (the primary creative element in mind, the passive and retentive element, and the region of complexes), he insists that only the first of these is of any real significance for aesthetics.

Coming to the larger and more technical group, the discussion of the claim of the new science of "philosophical analysis" under the title "Is Analysis a useful Method in Philosophy?" occupies a far larger space than any of the others in the book, indicative perhaps of the interest it is at present attracting among experts. Mr. Max Black, in the character of an anxious inquirer who is willing to give the method every chance, offers an ingenious account of what in a simplified world might be expected of it. Even so, he is visited with a sense of what he calls its "sins of omission," and ends, as I understand him, with what is practically a doubt as to whether the degree of abstraction which is necessary in order that it may do its perfect work is not fatal to its utility in concrete circumstances. Mr. J. T. Wisdom follows with what believers and sceptics alike will agree is a masterpiece of exposition of the scope and method of the science. It is all the more to be regretted that the limits of this review forbid a detailed report, and compel me to confine myself to the barest statement of the features in it that are attacked by the third symposiast. As contrasted with the other kinds of analysis, e.g. "scientific" which proceeds by definition of terms and "logical" which is concerned with the analysis of inference, "philosophical" analysis aims at the more explicit apprehension of the structure of facts, as expressed in words or sentences, by translating them into the elements or more ultimate facts concealed beneath them. Thus when you hear of a nation you get nearer the ultimate fact by translating it into terms of individuals with such and such common features, when you hear of individuals by translating them into terms of sense-data and mental states. Similarly when you have a universal of the form $2 + 2 = 4$ you get nearer the "fact" indicated by translating it into the concrete "two S's are P and two other S's are P, etc." To doubts such as Mr. Black had suggested as to the utility of the method, Mr. Wilson contents himself by replying that to those who have followed his account of it "it will be clear that it is an old and useful method in a certain kind of philosophy." Accepting this statement, Mr. Maurice Cornforth, in what some will find the most interesting paper in the book, goes on, from a Marxian point of view, to arraign the whole "kind of philosophy," in which a place for analysis is claimed, as not only in itself useless for any real advance in knowledge, but as a poisonous outgrowth of the bourgeois civilization—equally with religion devised to "extenuate and justify class oppression." Against the idea of a world which, according to the analyst, "must divide into a kind of mosaic of atomic facts," Mr. Cornforth puts forward that of "a world of continual becoming"; and against the idea of levels of primariness of propositions, obtained by formal analysis, the different levels of knowledge that the advance of material science is continually revealing.

While rejecting the proposal to merge philosophy in physical science, whether on Marxian or any other principles, many readers will share with

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Mr. Cornforth the suspicion of the methods of the "atomic logic" favoured by the analysts. In order to be complete, an analysis of any kind must take account of all that is contained in the *analysandum*; but what are we to say of one which (to take Mr. Wisdom's own example) analyses the whole which we call a nation into a mere aggregate of the individuals who compose it, and an individual into an aggregate of sense data and mental states to the exclusion of the unity of consciousness that holds them together and makes them *his* mental states? Like Mr. Black I am a sympathetic inquirer on the whole subject; but a voice keeps whispering in my ear that until the method is purified, I will not say of its realism (this is the attractive feature of it) but of its nominalism,¹ it must remain a comparatively barren one.

Meantime, the kind of difficulty it raises is illustrated in the remaining two discussions. In that on "Communication and Verification" Professor Susan Stebbing is not slow to see the danger that any form of analytic philosophy resting on sense data and mental states runs of falling into a pure subjectivism, and after a series of acute criticisms of other logicians ends by falling back on the common-sense solution that we can communicate with one another because we have experiences "of the same sort" as others have, leaving as Professor Heath later points out the idea of "common sense" for a future application of "our analytic labours." Professor L. T. Russell follows Miss Stebbing with a particularly lucid and likewise critical paper. He refuses to be trapped in the abstraction of a direct exclusively individual experience, and takes his stand on the concrete fact of society as a group of individuals already in communication with one another by means of verifiable *reports*. This again is common sense, but, as he is well aware, requires further positive development in a freer atmosphere, and we can only regret that he has not found time to go on to give it. Even Professor Heath seems to suffer from the prevailing atmosphere and only finds courage at the end of his all too short paper (and that in a note) to whisper the idea of language as the creation of "objective spirit" as possibly supplying the missing clue.

In the last symposium, on "The Element of Immediacy in Knowledge," Professor Aaron, perhaps too hastily, takes the question raised by the title to be, not that of the nature of what is "given" to mind at its lowest, but that of the existence of an element of immediacy in knowledge "with mind at the height of its cognitive activity." Finding, however, that this interpretation seems to evaporate the question (nothing to him seeming more obvious than that the answer must be in the affirmative, and that knowing when used in a precise and strict sense means direct knowing), he is fain to try to give point to his contention by attributing to idealists the sin of denying any such element of immediacy and identifying knowledge with discursive thought. Professor C. A. Campbell in the concluding paper has little difficulty in showing how wide of the mark any such interpretation of idealist doctrine is. For the rest he has some penetrating things to say of Professor Aaron's treatment of the famous $7 + 5 = 12$ as an example of unmediated intuition. But again, as with the writers in the previous symposium, modesty or perhaps time triumphs, and we are left without the constructive development of the subject which no one is better fitted to give than the writer of this paper.

Attempting to summarize and taking the papers in the volume as a whole,

¹ The characteristic feature of which is what Whitehead calls "the itch," which is "the diseased philosophy" "to express itself in the form of 'Some S is P' or 'All S is P'."

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they seem to me full of vitality, of sound scholarship enlightened by acute criticism, and of a spirit of open-mindedness which is more than mere tolerance of differences and which augurs well for the future of philosophy in this country. If I have complained of a certain timidity on the part of some of the younger men in showing colours that are suggestive of views which for the moment are out of the limelight, it is only to remind them in terms of the title of the volume that "modern" is only a euphemism for "recent" and "tendencies" for "fashions."

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Problems of Mind and Matter. By JOHN WISDOM, Lecturer in Moral Science at the University of Cambridge. Lately Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews. (Cambridge: At the University Press. 1934. Pp. xv + 215. Price 6s.)

This book is an attempt, as Mr. Wisdom says in the preface, "to give an elementary, but not too inaccurate introduction to the applications in philosophy of what is now sometimes called the analytic method." There is an introduction, in which a few examples of the method of analysis are followed by notes on some of the most important words used with technical meanings by analysts; and the rest of the book falls into two parts, the first dealing with problems involved in the relations of matter and mind, the second with such problems of cognition as the analysis of perception, the analysis of our knowledge of material things, and the analysis of what is being said of a statement when it is said to be true.

I shall not attempt to give an account of the contents of the book in detail, but confine myself to a few points.

Facts and events.—At the outset (21), Mr. Wisdom describes a fact as what a sentence expresses. Later on, this, I think, is modified so as to run, a fact is what a complete sentence expresses (28-29).

As illustrations of complete sentences we may take: This is white, Jack loves William, Othello is jealous of Desdemona on account of Cassio, and such sentences as Orange is between red and yellow.

To explain what is meant by a complete sentence, we have to note that there are two kinds of elements in a fact, constituents and components. Mr. Wisdom confesses (24) that he cannot define constituents or components, but only show "ways of picking out" what he means. It will be enough to say here that in the sentence This is white, *this* is constituent and *a white* component, in the second sentence above, *Jack* and *William* are constituents and *loves* component, in the third *Othello*, *Desdemona*, and *Cassio* are constituents, and *jealous of . . . on account of* component, and in the fourth, *orange*, *red* and *yellow* are constituents, and *between . . . and* the component. We can say that components are either qualities or relations. But it will not do to say that constituents are the elements of facts expressed either by proper names or by demonstrative pronouns, if we admit with Mr. Wisdom that universals are sometimes constituents in facts (as in the fourth example). For the same reason it will not be possible to accept the preliminary account quoted from Mr. Mace, "The constituents . . . in a fact are the elements in virtue of which one characterized thing might be merely numerically distinct from another, i.e. distinct without difference of character." (22) For Mr. Wisdom insists (208) that "in the sense applicable to universals, exact likeness vanishes into identity."

A simple complete sentence will then be one which contains only one component, and only as many constituents as its component requires—i.e. one

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constituent if its component is a quality (This is white), two if its component is a dyadic relation (Jack loves William), three if its component is a triadic relation, and so on. A complete fact "which is not made up of other facts" (24) will be expressed by a simple complete sentence.

A simple incomplete sentence will be one "obtained from a simple complete sentence by omitting one of the names which makes it up and filling the gap in the sentence with the word 'something' or 'x' or some other mark equally non-informative" (27). Mr. Wisdom gives the sentences "Wong is happy," "Something is happy" as complete and incomplete respectively.

It is better, he says, not to say that incomplete sentences express incomplete facts, but rather to say that they incompletely express facts which are complete. But "incompletely" here must not be taken to involve incompetence on the part of the user of an incomplete sentence. All generalizations of science are incomplete sentences (28-29). (His reason is that they do not name any particulars, though that will not quite do, if some complete sentences contain only universals.) Now it is just the merit of scientific generalizations not to name particulars: they are not intended to be complete expressions of (complete) facts.

A further distinction is necessary if we are to see the relation between facts and events: viz. a distinction between universals. Sometimes one universal specifies another, in which case the latter is more generic than the former. E.g. *red* specifies *coloured*; *running swiftly* specifies *running*. A completely determinate shade of red is an absolutely specific universal.

We can then express the relation between facts and events. A fact "which is not made up of other facts" and which is complete, particular, and specific, is one whose component is an absolutely specific universal (quality or relation) and whose constituent or constituents are particulars. Every such fact is concerned with one moment (e.g. this is pulling that now with such and such a force, etc.).

Thus facts are not identical with events, since events occupy time. But "to every fact which is complete particular and specific there corresponds an event including the same particular and the same universal and occupying a period which contains the moment which the fact is *at*" (32).

This leads Mr. Wisdom to speak of a complete particular specific fact as "an infinitely thin temporal slice out of an event"; an event being "a pattern of complete particular specific facts."

I am not in the least sure about this. Let us look at it more closely. And let us confine ourselves meanwhile to spatio-temporal events.

In the first place it would involve (i) that since any "event" whose duration includes the instant t_1 can be sliced "temporally" in only one way at t_1 , there would only be one fact at t_1 corresponding to this event, and (ii) that for every different fact at t_1 there would be a different event whose duration included t_1 : e.g. if the fact that this rod has lengthened now in a specific degree is a different fact from the fact that this rod has now increased in temperature to a specific degree, then the lengthening of the rod will have to be a different event from its increase of temperature; and so if each fact ("not made up of other facts") contains only one component, then no "event" ("not made up of other events," we might say by way of qualification) will be able to manifest more than one component at anyone instant; and this will be your criterion of "one event, not made up of other events."

If you want to hold that from one "event" many complete particular specific facts can be derived by "slicing" at an instant, your slicing will have to be other than purely temporal. It is worth while to ask, what other kinds of "slicing" could we have?

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Let us start with a given volume (v) marked off in space, and consider everything that happens within it during the interval t_0-t_2 , including the time t_1 . Let us call everything that happens within v during t_0-t_2 , the "flow of events (v, t_0-t_2). A purely temporal slice in this flow at t_1 would be got by taking a narrower and narrower duration including t_1 , still keeping the whole flow within v for this duration. Passing to the limit, we should get what might be called the "complex fact (v, t_1). To get anything like Mr. Wisdom's complete particular specific fact we must clearly do something very different. For a complete particular specific fact corresponds to a sentence with only one component, and with only so many particulars as the component requires.

A further slicing could be made, spatially. We might discover within the flow (v, t_0-t_2) a set of smaller volumes $v_1, v_2, v_3, \dots, v_n$ such that the set of flows (v_1, t'), (v_2, t''), (v_3, t'''), etc., made up what we regarded as one event in a much more significant sense than the original flow: t' , t'' , etc., being successive small stretches of t_0-t_2 . We might call this a "strand-flow (t_0-t_2 , within v). (Compare a tiny fish swimming in a pond, the complete "flow" including water and fish, the selected set of volumes being confined to those occupied by the fish). We could then take the particular flow whose stretch—say t''' —included t_1 , and cut it temporally at t_1 , through the appropriate volume (v_3): hoping thereby to get a complete particular specific fact.

If, however, this kind of slicing, which is both spatial and temporal, is to result in a single fact such, e.g., as *merely* This here is now white (without any other quality or relation being found here now), it will follow that every different quality and every different relation occupies a separate space. The ultimate single-constituent facts will then be expressed by sentences of the form "specific red is here now, and nothing else is here now," "specific sound is here now, and nothing else is here now," etc. (leaving aside the question what ultimate relational facts would involve).

This is a logically possible view, so far as spatio-temporal events are concerned. But it would give rise to some difficulty in regard to mental events, which Mr. Wisdom considers to be temporal only and not spatial. It is not easy to see how a single complete specific mental fact *and nothing else* could result from a purely temporal slicing of mental events at a time t_1 , unless every different mental quality and every different mental relation occupies a separate time. The ultimate single constituent mental facts would then be expressed by sentences of the form "specific awareness is now, and nothing else is now," "specific pleasure is now, and nothing else is now," etc.

If you are to succeed in obtaining a plurality of distinct facts about a number of separate selves at any moment t_1 , you will clearly have to slice your temporal cross-section at t_1 further, in some new way. You cannot make a spatial slice, since mental events are not spatial. You will have to recognize between the different particular selves an ultimate distinction which is not manifested by differences of either spatial or temporal position. Let us see what this involves. At any time there is a plurality of selves S_1, S_2, S_3 , etc. To get a single complete particular specific mental fact at t_1 we shall have to make what might be called a *selfo*-temporal cut of the flow of mental events at t_1 , hoping that it will result in such a fact as " S_1 is feeling specific pleasure p_1 now, and nothing else is now the case of S_1 "; " S_2 is having specific awareness a_2 now, and nothing else is now the case of S_2 ," etc. Each self at any instant, that is, will contain one specific character, and nothing else. Whether this could logically be the case in special circumstances or not, I do not think it is generally (or even ever) the case. I believe that a temporal cross-section of a self will generally (and I think always) result in an extremely complex "state" (I use the word without any necessary suggestion that a "state" is a state of

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some "substance"). And I believe that the same is the case with spatio-temporal events. I do not think that such a complex "state" is a "fact" at all; and that "facts" have a quite different relation to events from that described by Mr. Wisdom. If facts are derived from events, it is by what could be called slicing only in a very metaphorical sense.

Mental facts and material facts: and events.---In the introduction Mr. Wisdom gives definitions of mental and material facts: "a mental fact is one which contains as component *conscious* or some universal which specifies *conscious*"; while a material fact "is one which contains as component some species of *has a spatial character*, or some species of *has some extensive character*, or some combination of these" (31); and since he holds that there is no generic universal specified in both *conscious* and *has a spatial character* or *has some extensive character*, and that material facts are not necessary constituents of mental facts (206), he concludes that mental facts are distinct from material facts.

In Part I he considers various questions about the relations between mental events and bodily events, concluding in Ch. III that mental events are not also bodily events. I cannot see that this conclusion is made out.

It appears to be based on the relation between facts and events we have been discussing: viz. that to every complete particular specific fact not made up of other facts there corresponds an event which contains the same component and the same constituent or constituents. And of course if a fact is a mere thin temporal slice of an event, it *would* follow that if a mental fact is different from a material fact, and does not contain a material fact as a constituent, then the event of which a mental fact is a slice must be different from the event of which a material fact is a slice. This would also be clear from the fact that, according to Mr. Wisdom, mental facts contain no spatial element but only a temporal one, whereas material facts contain both spatial and temporal elements. But if it is not the case that facts are merely temporal slices of events, if some other kind of "slicing" is involved in the passage from events to facts, then there is nothing to prevent two different facts from being "sliced" out of the same event; and consequently it *may* be possible that the "event" corresponding to any mental fact also always in fact corresponds to one or more material facts. The question whether this is the case would have to be settled by a careful discussion of the relevant facts. Like Mr. Wisdom I can see no principle to the effect that mental events *must* also be material; but I think that his line of argument requires him to say that mental events *cannot* also be material; and I do not see that this line of argument is conclusive.

Cause, production, explanation.---Mr. Wisdom distinguishes between a complete cause and an occasion, which is only a part of a complete cause (67). Cause he describes in terms of production, and in terms of explanation. If S is a complete cause, and S_1 its effect, then S produces S_1 , and this can be expressed otherwise by saying that S forms the complete explanation of S_1 (83). The entities S and S_1 between which the cause and effect relation holds are sometimes described as "events" (e.g. 83-87), sometimes as "facts" (88), sometimes as "situations" (88, 93, 94), sometimes as "manifestations of sets of values of variables" (91). This variation in terminology is to be deplored, especially in regard to such a discussion as that of causality, where precision is more than usually important.

If we keep to ordinary language, what we mean by a cause is always something different from the complete flow of events within a particular volume or set of volumes during a particular stretch of time (plus certain non-spatial events during this stretch in the case of a cause involving mental events, if

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mental events are non-spatial); for any such flow of events contains a great deal that could not be included in any relevant statement about a cause. This seems clear if Mr. Wisdom is right in saying that a complete cause is also a complete explanation of its effect. For explanation seems to involve some kind of selection from events other than mere temporal or spatial slicing. And if *S produces S_i* can be stated otherwise by saying *S explains S_i*, it looks as if we cannot say that one complete flow of events *produces* another complete flow of events. Again, while there is propriety in speaking of one set of facts as the *explanation* of another set of facts, it is difficult to see how there can be propriety in speaking of one set of facts as *producing* another set of facts. If facts are selections (of a kind other than merely temporal) from events, then when we can say "these facts explain those facts" it may be legitimate to say also "any flow of events from which such facts as these could be selected *would be succeeded by* a flow of events from which such facts as those could be selected"; but the word "production" would not fit either facts or events.

That is exactly the view I should take; for the notion of production seems to me to be of an entirely different order. But whatever view be taken on this matter, it seems to me that by using the variety of terms he uses—"fact," "event," "situation," and so on—Mr. Wisdom is escaping the real issues, and making it difficult to distinguish things that ought to be distinguished.

Nevertheless, Ch. VI, to which this discussion refers, contains in its twenty pages a number of extremely important points. It deals with the question, Do bodily events produce mental events? and is concerned with the statement and examination of general principles in the light of which the question must be answered. The whole treatment is developed out of Stout's statement that "when anything changes, it does so always in *some respect*. The change affects some general aspect of its nature, and its successive phases consist in specific and particular variations of this generic character" (quoted on p. 87); and in his consideration of this, Mr. Wisdom states three principles, the principle of continuity, and two principles of resemblance, one referring to causes and one to effects, in a way that should help greatly to clarify future discussion on the subject. He concludes, in opposition to Stout, that bodily events cannot produce mental events and vice versa, though bodily events may occasion mental events and vice versa.

The chapter on Freewill should be compared with Broad's inaugural address on *Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism* and with Moore's discussion in his *Ethics*. Broad argues that any such statement as "you ought not to have acted as you did" has not the significance we generally attach to it unless you *could* have acted otherwise in a genuinely categorical sense; and concludes that there seems no genuinely categorical sense in which you could have acted otherwise, and therefore, that statements such as "you ought not to have acted as you did" cannot mean what we generally take them to mean. Wisdom (writing before Broad's discussion was published) takes a different line. He stresses rather "blame": "you are to blame for this"—"What blame requires," he says, "is that, however far back we go in setting out the causes of your act, we shall never come to a time at which a set of purely external circumstances, i.e. not involving you and your will, formed a complete cause of your act" (118). And if we accept the law of causation in the strict sense according to which every event without exception is completely determined, blame requires that the causes of the causes of . . . the causes of your decisions, however far back you push them in time, shall include determinations of your will by your will (118). Thus, if the strict law of causation is true, blame requires that "the series of determinations of the will by the will is endless" (130). Even on the modified law of causation, that

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every event except the first events in the world history is determined, blame would require that the series of determinations of the will by the will stretched back to the beginning of the world. Thus in either case blame requires that the self must have existed not only before birth, but as long as anything existed.

Mr. Wisdom accepts this conclusion, which, he says, is "not incredible" (and I should agree to that) "but merely surprising to the western world" (123).

I am, however, doubtful whether by it he would secure what we want. I should agree with Broad, that unless there is a categorical sense in which we could in the past have acted otherwise than we did, then what is ordinarily meant by saying "you ought not to have done that" rests on a mistake; and I should add that unless there is a categorical sense in which *in future* you can avoid doing so and so, and can do so and so instead, then what we ordinarily mean by saying "if you do so and so you will not do as you ought, you will be to blame" rests on a mistake. Broad does not see any way of giving us this, but he is clear about what he is refusing to us. Wisdom's suggestion does not give it us; and I cannot agree that his suggestion gives us all we need.

I should press the antithesis: if universal causation, as interpreted by Broad and Wisdom, be accepted, then the ordinary concepts of ought and of blame must be rejected. And I should seek a reinterpretation of the notion of causation, looking for it to a closer examination of the concept of *production*, which as I suggested earlier, does not seem to be applicable either to the succession of events or to the linkages of facts which give us one kind of explanation. All genuine productions seem to me to be acts, and acts do not seem to me to be reducible to successions of events. And while *change in a particular thing* can be described as the characterization of the thing by different specifications of the same generic variable at successive times, this seems only to be an external description. I can hope to understand change of a thing, if I can find some way of regarding it as the outcome of an act on the part of the thing; an act of production into actuality of what previously was mere potentiality. In the case of an apparent change in material things, I find I can get no clue to an understanding; but in the case of selves, I think I can see some faint light. And so I should stick to the case of selves leaving the case of apparently material things until the case of selves has been disposed of. Thus I regard the whole problem as one requiring an exploration of the whole conception of change, and as consequently forcing us to go below the level on which ordinary formulations of the principle of causality rest. This, however, is merely a confession of personal dissatisfaction with present day discussions, and not a claim to have any satisfactory solution to offer.

I have left myself no space to deal with Part II, on Cognition, but the reader will find it equally suggestive and worth careful study. The book as a whole forms an admirable introduction to the analytic method. Where its edges are ragged one is provoked to do some knitting on one's own; and Mr. Wisdom's general practice provides an excellent example of how to do it.

On pp. 203, 205, there is a small misprint. $n - 2$ should be $n + 2$.

L. J. RUSSELL.

And the Life Everlasting. By JOHN BAILLIE, D.Litt., Hon. D.D., Professor Elect of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1934. Pp. xii + 294. Price, 10s. 6d. net.)

Much water has passed under the bridge since Kant could assume that God, Freedom, and Immortality were the supreme objects of philosophical speculation; there are to-day not a few who would not hesitate to declare that

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the very title of Dr. Baillie's book disqualified it for notice in a philosophical journal. The charge is indeed due in great measure to the effect of Kant's own contention that no *knowledge* properly so called of these objects is possible, although a reasonable *faith* in them is postulated by the facts of our moral consciousness. He has at least convinced many of us, who yet do not regard religion as no topic for a philosopher, that religious conclusions cannot be legitimately based upon premises which abstract from all moral and religious experience. If his own "moral" argument for immortality be stated, as it is, in an unnatural and unconvincing form, this is, at least in part, because he, although giving a *moral* foundation to the belief in it, ignores the specifically *religious* experience of communion with God, on which Dr. Baillie, following the tradition of Jewish and Christian thought, would prefer to rest it.

In thus making the belief in immortality a corollary of belief in God, Dr. Baillie of course by no means stands alone. But few philosophical apologists for that belief have so explicitly and deliberately taken as their starting point the Christian hope of eternal life, in its proper context of the Christian life of faith in and communion with Jesus Christ as the crucified and risen Lord in whom God's love has been made manifest to men. This gives to the book before us its special character and its special value. It is primarily a study, not of the objections which may be raised against a belief in a future life for human souls, and of the possible answers which may be made to these, nor even of the "intimations of immortality" which may be received in rare moments of exaltation, wherein men may seem to themselves to be transported beyond the world of everyday experience; but rather of what has been and is to a multitude of Christians, very various in temperament, in ability, in culture, even in the fashion of their piety, an integral part of that outlook upon the world by which their daily life is determined and controlled.

Dr. Baillie begins his discussion with an account of the "modern revolt against other-worldliness" which has so greatly changed the mental atmosphere from that in which the bringing to light of the hope of immortality was regarded as the chief benefit conferred by the Gospel, and that hope itself was rarely disowned altogether by anyone, however heterodox, who pretended to any sort of religious faith. He inquires into the historical origins of this revolt, and insists upon the importance of acknowledging "the proper claims of earth" if we are to commend to our contemporaries the doctrine of a life after death. Then, after referring us to the experience of the first disciples of Christ, who believed that their Lord, who had died, was alive for evermore, and found in His resurrection the earnest of their own, he sets this faith of theirs against the background of the universal anticipation of a "ghostly survival" in the underworld and, like others (notably Dr. Charles) before him, points out that the Christian hope is no lingering relic of this anticipation, but continues a development which in Greece, in India, in Persia, in Judaea, was "born of a new kind of religious experience," the culmination of which is to be seen in that which the Christian Church claims to have of an "eternal life" in God imparted by the power of the risen Christ. The Christian notion of this eternal life is compared and contrasted with the alternative conceptions of a "corporeal immortality" and of "reabsorption," and its nature further elucidated. Dr. Baillie's discussion is unspoiled by indulgence in fanciful speculation. "The only knowledge," he says (p. 251), "we can have of eternal life is that which comes to us through our present foretasting of its joys."

I find little to criticize in this admirable book, which is distinguished by the candour shown alike in the appreciation of difficulties and in the frank exhibition of the ground and inspiration of the position which the author is

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concerned to maintain. I am disposed, however, to think that Dr. Baillie, in dealing with the religious experience lying behind Plato's hope of immortality, lays too much stress on a supposed "Orphic experience of oneness with God," too little on his recognition that in his philosophy itself, as the apprehension of the Forms behind the shows of sense, he was actually in communion with the Eternal. It was surely this which in his case corresponds to the Jewish prophets' sense of communion with the God of Israel as involving the participation in His undying life, rather than an eschatology which supplied him indeed with some of the imagery of the "myths" whereby he filled the place of a detailed knowledge which he knew to be lacking, but not with the substance of that view of the world as ordered by the principle of Goodness which was for him the presupposition of all our thinking.

A passage which I have already quoted from Dr. Baillie shows that he is fully alive to the truth that the Christian hope of immortality, being rooted in the actual experience of God's presence, is never rightly understood if it is supposed to be concerned only with another life than this. In another place (p. 159) he emphatically declares: "The denial of immortality always seems to me to be more disquieting for what it is a sign of than for what it is in itself. That a man should be doomed to go through this present life without any sense of God's accompanying presence is a much greater tragedy than that he should be faced with the prospect of extinction when at last he dies." But he has not perhaps sufficiently considered the bearings of the fact that not only those who face death in the spirit of the well-known lines, "I warmed both hands before the fire of life; It sinks, and I am ready to depart," but even those whose mood is that of the *Nunc dimittis* may acquiesce for themselves in an end which seems reasonable and welcome, and feel no desire for the prolongation under new conditions of activities which, with their congenial setting of time and circumstance, seem to be drawing to a natural close. It may, however, be allowed that these last, unlike the former sort, may be driven by their faith in Him from whose service they are accepting their dismissal to look forward, not so much in their own interest as in that of the multitudes who, unlike themselves, have not seen God's salvation during their earthly life, to some further opportunity of enjoying that vision which has here been denied to so many of their brethren.

On p. 182 Dr. Baillie seems, by the way, to imply that the phrase *τοῦ ποιητικῶς* is actually used by Aristotle; this, of course, is not the case; his nearest expression is *τοῦ ὁ ποιῶν*.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development. By WERNER JAEGER. Translated by RICHARD ROBINSON. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford, 1934. Pp. 410. Price 18s.)

It is only the plain truth that "in the eleven years since its publication Professor Jaeger's great work *Aristoteles* has profoundly altered the general view of Aristotle among philosophers and classical scholars of German-speaking countries. It has almost destroyed the view that Aristotle was uncompromisingly opposed to Plato, and also the view that his extant writings present a homogeneous system in which nothing is contradicted and nothing superseded" (a note prefixed to the book). The same is, it seems, not true of English-speaking countries, where the prejudices exposed by Professor Jaeger are still strong. No doubt the book has won an immense reputation amongst us, and many who have never read it can expound its conclusions. But, as I can bear witness, the power of Professor Jaeger's

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argument is known only to those who have themselves been caught by his glittering eye, and compelled to hear him to the end. Mr. Robinson is to be congratulated on having preserved so well the peculiar impersonal firmness of the original—in addition to giving us an intelligible translation. Even where the argument is most concise, he succeeds in leaving the emphasis in the right place. Mr. Robinson has also translated all quotations from the Greek—a very wise plan, by which some who have only a remote interest in the subject of the book will be able to appreciate its method and manner.

As to the controversies of recent years, their result has, so far as one can judge, been entirely favourable to the thesis of the book. The novelty of Professor Jaeger's idea has been disparaged, and his analysis of the treatises criticized. But what matters is that no other *gesamtbild* of Aristotle's mental evolution has been set up to challenge his. It is, I presume, unthinkable that anyone should wish to return to the idea of an Aristotle in hopeless antagonism to Plato from the first; not only for psychological reasons, but because the evidence of the exoteric works cannot be explained away. Nor, again, will anyone in future wish to view the main treatises of Aristotle otherwise than as the result of a gradual growth; even the uncompromising von Arnim paid his opponent the compliment of borrowing this principle from him. For my own part I can go further and express my complete faith in Jaeger's chronological analysis of the treatises, with the exception of the group of physical works. Given the *Protrepticus*, the *Politics*, and the two *Ethics* as works of one author, what else can be said but that, under his influence, the sciences of politics and ethics changed their nature, and gradually gave up the claim to govern the life of the State and the individual by reference to an ideal norm? Again in metaphysics: if Professor Jaeger means that the study of "physical substance," which was at first a mere preliminary to metaphysics, eventually achieved a position as the core of metaphysics itself, and that consequently books Z—Θ, together with book M 1—8 and the eighth chapter of book A, belong to the later version of the lectures on metaphysics: if this is a correct statement of the view, it seems to me an irreproachable explanation of the treatise as it stands.

The chapter entitled "The Organization of Research" is more difficult to judge fairly. Here Jaeger appears a little uncertain of his own position, and it is not surprising that he has caused some anxiety to other students of philosophy who are loth to see Aristotle dwindle into a mere empiricist. The chapter aims at showing that "while the central philosophical disciplines only received during this period certain alterations characteristic of the spirit of the new direction that his work was taking, it was the wide field of nature and history in which he was really productive." The evidence for this falls into two parts. First, it is known from external sources that Aristotle encouraged his students at the Lyceum to collect historical and scientific data, and collaborated with them. Secondly, in the *de Partibus Animalium* (by the way, how is it known that this work is late?), Aristotle urges that the philosopher, in his unceasing search for fresh forms, must approach the highest and the lowest realms of nature impartially. In treating of the celestial substance of the stars we have frequently to resort to conjecture, whereas "respecting perishable plants and animals we have abundant information, living as we do in their midst." "Research," then, is the key-word of the Lyceum; treatises like the *Nicomachean Ethics* and passages like the inserted chapter in *Metaphysics A*, are the result of a somewhat insincere attempt to find an opening for it without demolishing the old foundations.

Now as to the external evidence, it may, I presume, be treated very lightly.

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and it deserves only an external explanation. Only when he was established as a scholar had Aristotle any facilities for an "organization of research"; but his ambitions in that direction may have begun much earlier. Conversely, it is unsafe to argue that, because he then prescribed research for his pupils, he was in love with it himself. If he felt that they were better occupied in writing *πολιτεiai* than in irresponsible speculation about the good for man or the number of unmoved movers, he was probably quite right. Meanwhile he may, like Hegel, have taught them his own philosophical system "with naïve inflexibility."

If so, the facts which are here used to show that Aristotle had become diffident about his own first principles, can easily be used to show the reverse.

But these are small points. What is more serious is that the passage from the *de Partibus* should be described as "reading like a programme for research and instruction in the Peripatetic school." Certainly it shows a friendly attitude to the visible world and a readiness to learn humbly from experience; but need we think that the reverse attitude was characteristic of Plato or a student of Plato's? In its cautious statement about celestial physics, the passage as a matter of fact merely echoes *de Caelo* 286a 4 and 287b 28 - a work whose whole point of view, according to Jaeger, is that of the later Academy! Plato himself is not far from the spirit of the passage in his remarks about the forms of hair and mud. This, and the rest of the *de Partibus*, is indeed interesting as showing the relation between the two branches of physics, celestial and sublunary; but I do not see that it discusses the relation of metaphysics to either, or the relation between experience and *a priori* reasoning in general. The wish is father to the thought with Professor Jaeger when he sees, in this passage, a bold and novel defence of empirical research.

It is not, then, without reason that the chapter on "The organization of Research" has caused anxiety, and at least once a phrase has crept in which seems to conflict with the case that is being defended. ("The man who made empirical investigation an end in itself was Aristotle," p. 336.) There are other points which we should like to see dealt with, when a new edition is again called for. For instance, in the *Ethics*, where both versions exist, why is the later version so like the earlier? Everywhere but in the sixth book the versions correspond so closely that it is difficult to believe them separated by as much as twenty years.

D. J. ALLAN.

Kant. By A. D. LINDSAY, Master of Balliol College, Oxford (London: E. Benn, Ltd. "Leaders of Philosophy" Series, 1934. 1p. 328. Price 12s. 6d.)

One would think it an impossible task after this long lapse of time to write an outline book on Kant that was at once a first-rate introduction and yet both brilliantly original and thoroughly sound, but this seemingly impossible task has been achieved by the Master of Balliol. The book will not satisfy a student who looks upon a commentary as a substitute for reading the original and expects to learn philosophy without any hard thinking on his own part, but for any other students it may be heartily recommended. Any philosopher, however far advanced, will be the better for reading it, and no Kantian scholar can afford to neglect it.

Most attention will no doubt be roused by the author's novel treatment of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, though he also deals with Kant's other main

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works. There are so many different strands in Kant's complex web of thought that it is sometimes hard to believe that different commentators are writing about the same man, and which are to be most emphasized will naturally depend partly on the individual taste of the commentator and not be a matter for argument. Further, no intelligent person will suppose that a study of the *Critique of Pure Reason* could have been achieved in 125 pages without very grave omissions, or that in deciding what is to be retained and what omitted the author can or ought to be uninfluenced by his own philosophical views. We think nowadays that nineteenth-century commentators generally emphasized far too much those elements in Kant which could be regarded as imperfect anticipations of, or stepping-stones towards, Hegel, and similarly, in less degree, it might be objected by other commentators that the Master of Balliol lays rather too much emphasis on mental activity in his interpretation of the critique. They would say that the doctrine of the synthesis is a doctrine rather of the unity of experience than of an empirically observable process in time by which we make it a unity, and would be shocked by the bald statement that "the conception of synthesis is dominant with Kant because he holds that knowledge is always a process in time."¹ For surely, they would say, the act of knowing is, in Kant's view, non-temporal and emphatically not a process in time. However, no doubt the Master could have given a fuller justification of his position had the size of the book permitted it. Another point in connection with the synthesis where he joins issue with orthodox views is in his contention that even according to Kant's mature view perception is possible without the categories, and that it is only the thought of what we perceive as physically objective which presupposes them, and his consequent denial of the doctrine that the imagination is the understanding working unconsciously. He is thus able to give a much more attractive presentation of Kant than the one according to which what is given is simply a chaos of unrelated elements, of which we cannot be in the least conscious till it has been unrecognizably transformed by an act of synthesis outside time in which we with incomprehensible accuracy unconsciously apply the categories. What Mr. Lindsay says is certainly what we should wish Kant to have said, and I feel half-converted to his interpretation myself, but I am not too clear as to the relevance of most of the quotations adduced by him in this connection. Nor do I see how his account can be reconciled with Kant's insistence in the crucial opening passage of the second edition transcendental deduction, which therefore cannot possibly be dismissed as pre-critical, that all relation comes from the understanding, and his express identification there of all "spontaneity of the faculty of representation" with the understanding.² But it is a line of thought that certainly deserves very careful consideration. It admittedly "cannot be put forward as an account of what Kant did say"³; but then, "no mere interpretation of what he says will give a defensible doctrine. Whichever interpretation we adopt, we have to say of it, *This* is the line of argument in Kant which, if consistently worked out, as it was not consistently worked out by Kant, will give the most fruitful results."⁴ The account of Kant's proof of the categories also differs radically from others in that it logically implies that freedom is presupposed not only in morality, but in the theoretical distinction between objective and subjective in phenomena, though the author admits that Kant would not draw this conclusion himself. The connection of reason and practice for Kant is strongly (perhaps too much) emphasized, and even "theoretical reason" is said to be practical because it directs the use of the understanding and formulates ideals, i.e. it is responsible for the practi-

¹ P. 64.

B. 130.

² B. 117.

Ibid.

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cal conduct of the operation of attaining scientific knowledge. The fundamental doctrine of Kant seems to be for Mr. Lindsay, that "the aim of life and, therefore, of philosophy, is action and not contemplation."¹

The chapters in Kant's *Ethics* and the *Critique of Judgment* contain many valuable points in a condensed form, but I must confess that I felt somewhat less enthusiastic about them than about the chapter on *The Critique of Pure Reason*, largely because there is less of Mr. Lindsay in them. There is no doubt a great deal to be said in favour of letting the author commented on tell his own story, but it is surely carrying this principle to excess to occupy at least a third part of the two chapters in question solely with quotations. The chapter on the *Critique of Judgment* concludes with a brilliant summary of Kant's philosophy, though one which does not leave me without some uneasy doubts as to what exactly the warrant in Kant's writings is for everything Mr. Lindsay says. In particular I should hold that Kant made a much sharper distinction between phenomena and noumena than appears from this account, that he did not in any way think of phenomena as noumena partly known, but as a second, quite different set of objects. I know the opposite is very often maintained nowadays, but those who maintain it unfortunately do not quote the passages which are supposed to support their interpretation, and I am unable to find any which to my mind give this support. But again, if this is only an interpretation of Kant in the sense that it is "the line of argument which, if consistently worked out, as it is not consistently worked out by Kant, will give the most fruitful results," Mr. Lindsay may well be right. The brief last chapter on *The Influence of Kant's Philosophy* is excellent.

A. C. EWING.

Immanuel Kant's *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by T. M. GREENE and H. H. HUDSON. (Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Co. 1934. Pp. lxxxv + 200. Price 15s.)

While the translation is the joint work of Professors Greene and Hudson, the former assumes responsibility for the Introduction, the content of which was written under the supervision of Professor Kemp Smith. After an interesting account of the *Aufklärung* comes a useful sketch of Kant's early career. Of peculiar interest at the moment is a section dealing with his clash with State-censorship. In an article, *Was heisst Aufklärung?* published eight years before the appearance of the first sections of the *Religion*, Kant had indicated his acceptance of the principle of the general control of university and church by the State. In 1768 Wöllner, head of the State department of church and schools, had issued an edict threatening civil punishment and dismissal to all under his jurisdiction who deviated from adherence to Biblical doctrines. Book I of the *Religion* passed the censor, but Book II was turned down on the ground that it controverted the teachings of the Bible. Kant's way out of the difficulty was to get the necessary imprimatur from the Philosophical Faculty at Jena, which held the right to authorize the publication of books dealing with religious subjects. His justification of this evasion was that though a priest is not free to teach what he pleases, a scholar is bound to make known his carefully proved and well-intentioned opinions. The King, who was not satisfied, censured Kant severely and drew from him a pledge to refrain from all public statements on religion as His Majesty's faithful servant.

¹ P. 304.

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It is disappointing to find, in what purports to be an Introduction to the translation which follows, no treatment of the subject-matter of the work (Hasenfuss's *Die Grundlagen der Religion bei Kant*, 1927, might well have been referred to), nor any treatment of the obvious difficulties arising from a consideration of the relation of the *Religion* to the three great *Critiques*. The translators tell us that since Kant fully explains his conceptions, there is no need to restate them! This is surely an odd position to take up, especially as the writers attempt, in this very introduction, some sort of characterization of most of Kant's other works. A useful purpose might have been served if the writers had indicated the difficulties with which Kant had surrounded his philosophy of religion by reason of the critical position, and by reason also of the uncertain correlation of his various antitheses; nomenal and phenomenal; intelligible and sensible; theoretical and practical reason; the Ideas of reason and the postulates of practical reason.

Occasionally the writers appear to betray a lack of grasp of Kant's fundamental positions, or at least to express those positions in misleading language. Perhaps the worst example is on p. lxxvi, where it is stated that "the main tenor of Kant's writings indicates a prior philosophical allegiance to the insight based on reason and sensation alone."

In the *Translators' Preface* it is stated that "an inaccurate English translation of some parts of this treatise was made by John Richardson, a Scot, and printed in 1798 under the title, *Religion Within the Sphere of Naked Reason*." A footnote adds that the translation appears "in the second volume of Richardson's collected translations of Kant, entitled *Essays and Treatises*." There is surely a serious confusion here. John Richardson published in 1836 a book entitled *Metaphysical Works by Emanuel Kant*, containing translations of the *Logic*, *Prolegomena*, and *Inquiry into the Proofs of the Existence of God*. But there is no evidence that John Richardson had anything to do with the *Essays and Treatises*. The printer's name was William Richardson, but the works were claimed to have been done into English "by the translator of the *Principles of Critical Philosophy*." This latter work which appeared in 1797 consisted of a selection from the writings of Kant, expounded by T. S. Lock and translated from the German "by an auditor of the latter." It is generally understood that the "auditor" was Mr. A. F. M. Willich, author also of *Elements of the Critical Philosophy*, 1798. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the references to Richardson on pages xliii, lxxi, lxxix, lxxx, lxxxiii, and lxxxiv would appear to be erroneous.

Another inaccuracy appears on p. lxxxiii, where Meiklejohn's translation of the *Kritik, d. V.* is shown as a translation of the first edition of that work. His translation follows the second edition (which, by the way, should surely be mentioned on p. lxxxiv).

A slighter inaccuracy is F. A. for F. E. on pp. xxxvii and 192.

The imperfections of the Introduction are in large measure redeemed by the excellence of the translation, which successfully copes with the well-known difficulties of Kant's composition.

In itself, the *Religion* is of considerable historical importance, for apart from its interest as a product of the *Aufklärung* it throws some light upon Kant's own religious thought. His view of the moral life as a life of individual self-determination in which neither God nor man can assist, but in which each individual must carry on his separate struggle by his own unaided strength, left little possibility of anything like a sense of personal relation to God. Kant's own private conception of God appears to have been extremely crude. All his religious views followed from his ethics, and, so far as the demands of his moral theory are concerned, God might be little more than

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an eternal principle or *Deus ex machina*, though, it is true, he more than once professed his devout belief in God as a being worthy of adoration. As for religious observances, he tends to regard them as more or less useful concessions to the immaturity of the popular mind. For the fully developed mind the "ought" is the controlling element. "Everything that man imagines he can do, over and above good moral conduct, to make himself well-pleasing to God is mere mock religion and pseudo-service of God." "The right course," so the Essay concludes, "is not to proceed from grace to virtue, but rather to progress from virtue to pardoning grace."

F. E. ENGLAND.

Idealismus, Jahrbuch für die idealistische Philosophie. Edited by Ernst Harms. Vol. I. (Zürich: Rascher & Co. 1934. Pp. 280. Price 10 mks.)

At a time when Europe seems to be in the throes of a violent reaction against all that idealistic philosophy is usually understood to stand for, and when even in its spiritual home in Germany, as we write, an open attack is being levelled at its central citadel in the Kant Society with its thirty-two branches, the appearance of an ambitious year-book devoted to its exposition might seem to be a somewhat hazardous enterprise and to require some justification. The explanation is partly to be found in the fact, mentioned by the editor in the Introduction, that the design was first formed so long ago as 1926, at a time when there were marked signs of a revival, not only in Germany under the lead of such writers as Husserl and Cassirer, and in Italy under that of Croce and Gentile, but in England and America through the new bent that had been given to realistic philosophy by Alexander and Whitehead and by the recent utterances of distinguished physicists. Across the prospect that had then opened brightly for a journal of the kind, supported as it was by the promise of help from leading writers and a leading Leipzig publisher, came the cloud of the revolution of 1932, making the production of it in Germany itself practically impossible and involving the withdrawal of many of the promises of contributions. Another part of the explanation consists in the fact that, as the editor also explains, it is only the external frame of the Year-book that happens to be German. In the articles and reviews it aims at being in every sense international, and invites contributions from competent writers in their own language from all parts of the world. But the most important part of the explanation, as also its all-important justification, is the wide sense that is here meant to be given to the word "Idealism." Various definitions are offered of this in the first number when used in the narrower sense (e.g. by Laird on page 36, and by Jessop on page 59); but in the Introduction it is defined by the editor in so wide a sense as to exclude nothing but materialism and relativism, and thus to include all forms of philosophy (whether positivist or realist or idealist in the narrow meaning of the word) which acknowledge the decisive importance of *ideas* in the life of man as a means of obtaining knowledge of himself and the world.

An enterprise, entered on under these circumstances and with the object of offering an open channel for all forms of constructive thought, has a right to claim the sympathy and encouragement of all who share the faith of the editor in the living force of ideas and his conviction that the time has come for the encouragement of a far more catholic interest on the part of nationals of different countries in the best that is being thought and written elsewhere on the right interpretation of human experience. If there is any field in which the "intellectual co-operation," which one of the chief committees at Geneva has at heart, is more important than another, it is in the effort to trace out

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men's spiritual affinities with one another and with what is greatest in the world.

In the hope that the Editor of *PHILOSOPHY* may find room for a second notice dealing with some of the more important articles, it seems best to confine the present one to a short indication of the plan which it is proposed to follow in the Year-book, and of which we have an impressive specimen in this first volume. Seeing that, as the editor and several of the chief contributors remind us, philosophy draws its life-breath from the continual effort to face new problems or new forms of old ones, more particularly as these arise in connection with the great questions of the being of the self and of the world, the first (and in the present volume by far the largest) of the four Parts into which the book is divided is occupied with symposia on the Self, Being, Spirit, and the Absolute contributed to by German, Swiss, English, American, and French writers. We should have welcomed contributions from the Italian school of neo-idealists, but for some unexplained reason we are disappointed, and can only hope that they will be stimulated by what they here find to assert themselves in future volumes. The second part is devoted to biographical accounts of leading idealistic thinkers who have died since the beginning of the century, and are here represented by Wilhelm Dilthey, F. H. Bradley, and Felix Ravaisson. The third part, which some will be inclined to regard as the most valuable of all, is designed to contain bibliographies and histories of the influence of great philosophical writers from Plato downwards, and the editor offers an attractive programme of ancient, early Christian and Platonic, mediaeval and modern names which will take several years to work off. What we have here to expect may be seen from the two exhaustive historical reviews of the "Schelling Literature" and of the "Transformation of the Picture of Hegel since the turn of the Century," accompanied with a German bibliography from the same date to the present time. The last part is devoted to notices of new books, and is that which seems to have suffered most from the circumstances under which the Year-book has been produced. It would indeed have suffered more but for the indefatigable labours of the editor himself, who has contributed no less than fourteen of the notices it contains. But it should be remembered that this is a matter in which the publishers of a new journal depend largely on the generosity of writers in the department to which it devotes itself. If readers of *PHILOSOPHY* who are accustomed to contribute reviews to it or to other British or American journals would send their names to the editor at the publisher's address as a sign of their willingness to receive books for this purpose, or to write notices of any particular book they have themselves been reading, they would be rendering valuable assistance to an enterprise which seems to me to be as unique as it is timely and important.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

The Platonic Legend. By WARNER FITE. (New York and London: Scribner's Sons, 1934. Pp. viii + 331. Price 10s. 6d.)

In the publisher's "blurb" attached to the volume it is rightly described as "this amazing book." It appears to be an attempt to play the fashionable game of "debunking" at the expense of Plato. Anyone who finds anything of value in Plato is dismissed as a "disciple" for whom "Plato is divine." What there must be in Plato to attract so many different people in all ages to him as disciples, Professor Fite does not think it worth while to inquire. For him there can be nothing of value in the work of the neurotic effeminate snob

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and second-rate artist which is all he finds in Plato. Its main interest for him seems to be to bring out by contrast the superiority of the "modern" point of view of the ordinary citizen of the United States.

How are these results arrived at? Partly by the assertion of personal impressions. "My own judgment would be that the *Gorgias* is an attempt to be impressive which succeeds only in being ill-tempered and absurd." "The total impression that I get from the dialogues is that Plato's art is . . . for the most part the art of a clever but prosaic mind." "Of no other literature is it more difficult after reading to retain a clear impression." "My own feeling is that Plato's understanding of human nature was superficial and childish." Why Professor Fite's impressions are to be preferred to the impressions of almost everyone else who has studied Plato with any care we are not told. But it is amusing to find Professor Fite so often accusing Plato of arrogance.

For the rest, a great part of the argument depends on a series of dogmatic assertions, question-begging epithets, insinuation of motives, and misrepresentation of arguments and sometimes of facts. A few brief instances, taken from a much larger number, will illustrate Professor Fite's methods. He is determined not to admit that Plato in the *Republic* really contemplated the possibility of anyone born in the industrial class being promoted to the ranks of the guardians, or vice versa. Though it is clearly asserted in the myth of the gold, silver, iron and brass races, he argues that that, being a myth, is obviously not meant to be true. "Behind the words of the dialogue we can hear both Socrates and Glaucon laughing heartily at the thought of fooling the people by a device so transparently audacious." It is admitted that Plato says the same thing later. But "what Plato is thinking of here I will not venture to say." And that, apparently, proves the point. Again, he says, what is roughly true, that Plato speaks of sex-desire as a natural craving of the same order as hunger and thirst. But he goes on to the absurd distortion of this, "Meat, wine, and women—they are the same sort of thing." He is quite ready to use contradictory arguments when they suit his purpose. When he wants to depreciate Plato's originality, he argues that "the striking features of the *Republic* were mostly copied from Sparta." When he is emphasizing Plato's remoteness from real life, he calls the *Republic* "the most Utopian and impracticable of all social schemes." Nor are his statements of fact to be relied on. It is quite false, for instance, to say that Plato "conceived the idea of making a philosopher of the younger Dionysius": in fact, he only went to Syracuse very reluctantly with small hopes of success.

Some of the more general discussions, for instance, on the significance of personality, ought to be of greater interest. But throughout, as it seems to me, the account of Plato's views is a one-sided exaggeration, even when it starts from an element of truth. And Professor Fite's views which he opposes to Plato's are far from clear: so far as I can follow them they seem to me as one-sided and exaggerated as his own interpretation of Plato. Throughout the book, indeed, the whole tone is one of advocacy and special pleading, which deprives it of any claim to be seriously considered. It is a pity, for there is undoubtedly room for a sane and balanced criticism of Plato. Of course, no one, in spite of Professor Fite, really believes that Plato's philosophy is absolutely true on every point. But perhaps those of us who have worked at the interpretation of Plato have been at times a little over-anxious to understand and explain, and not ready enough to criticize. Yet our mistake, if mistake it be, has surely been only an exaggeration of a sound impulse. For criticism that is not based on sympathetic understanding is worthless. Professor Fite, however, as the above quotations indicate, goes much further

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than a mere defect in understanding. There is a note of personal animosity, which suggests that the book was written under the influence of some strong emotional complex. But that is a matter for a psycho-analyst rather than a reviewer.

G. C. FIELD.

Essays on the Logic of Being. By FRANCIS S. HASEROT. (New York, U.S.A., and London: The Macmillan Company. 1932. Pp. xiv + 641. Price 20s.)

This book is concerned with metaphysics, interpreted as ontology. Mr. Haserot states that he accepts the 'Aristotelian position (1) that metaphysics is the science of being, and (2) that it is a logically simple and an ultimately prior science.' However, his work is, if Aristotelian, then Aristotelian with a strong flavour of Hegel. But though the manner may owe something to Hegel, the thought is all his own. It is not easy to determine what exactly that thought is. Mr. Haserot's chief aim seems to be to establish the thesis that value is an ontological category. The book is divided into two parts, of which the second is mainly devoted to considerations with regard to value, the first to other categories. Each section is called an 'essay,' but the various essays are connected in the manner of successive chapters.

Mr. Haserot begins by pointing out that 'every philosophy presupposes a theory of communication, and conversely every theory of communication implies a philosophy' (p. 3). Accordingly, he deals with species of communication, language, and words. His discussion of language is limited to the consideration of 'the use of spoken or written words.' A word is defined as 'a sound or mark which has content.' This content is said to consist 'either in an external item referred to or in a function performed in an expression which contributes in giving the expression a certain qualified meaning' (p. 15). He adds: 'Instances of the latter type of functional word are: in English, *and*; in Greek, *ay*. These, however, are recognized as words not because they are names of the characters of things but because they are indicators of the type of reference which other words are used to represent.' It is characteristic of Mr. Haserot's method that he makes no attempt to explain how we are to understand the important words 'reference' and 'meaning.' The former word is not even mentioned in the index, and nowhere is it discussed. Yet it is by the help of *reference* that he attempts to explain *meaning*, whilst *meaning* is said to be 'the distinguishing mark of truth' (p. 82). 'The process of discovering truth,' he says, 'is the process of distinguishing those propositions which mean something from those which do not.' He had just said, 'Any proposition which has meaning, i.e. which refers to something, is true; any which does not is error.' This remark remains obscure, since Mr. Haserot fails to tell us what we are to understand by "refers to something." Certainly it would be unreasonable to expect a clear account of *reference*; the problem is too difficult. But there is ground for complaint in Mr. Haserot's failure even to see that there is a difficulty. The difficulty into which he thus falls may be seen by his essay on *Nothing*. 'A word,' he says, 'is a sign, vocal or otherwise, which stands for or represents something. If so, then every word must refer to something; that which refers to nothing is not a word. But obviously the word *nothing* refers to nothing. Shall we, hence, cease to call it a word?' But, he continues to argue, 'since *nothing* quite obviously performs some sort of function as a word, we shall have to find out what that function is in order to resolve the difficulty engendered in allowing it both to be a word and to stand for nothing. *Nothing* in some sense must be something'

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(p. 105). He concludes that 'the negation of reference, i.e. the absence of content in linguistic expression, constitutes the nature of nothingness' (p. 108). But error also is said to be 'absence of meaning, i.e. the non-reference of an apparent expression.' Accordingly, 'error and nothing constitute the same concept.' To the present reviewer these statements seem to provide instances of what Mr. Haserot calls 'nothingness'; he has so used his words that they are what he well calls 'apparent words,' i.e. words which 'differ from genuine words in that they lack reference; they differ from mere empty sounds, e.g. nonsense syllables, in that they seem to have reference' (p. 16). The distinction which he thus draws between what he calls 'apparent words' and 'real words' is certainly important, and much that he says on this topic is useful. For example: 'Whether words are real or apparent does not depend upon the words themselves but on those who employ them. A word has content as content is attributed to it. To the individual who gives a word reference it is a genuine word; to him who does not it is an apparent word' (p. 16). But here again Mr. Haserot leaves us in doubt as to what he means by 'giving a word reference.' He wisely remarks, 'Talking nonsense is a satisfaction of which humans are not to be deprived. But there is an element of danger in it when individuals become serious and lose the sense that they are talking nonsense.' This danger Mr. Haserot does not seem wholly to have escaped.

His theory of communication is bound up with his theory of 'the universal.' Mr. Haserot thinks that the universal has been rejected because it has been misinterpreted. Accordingly, he attempts 'to present an account [of the universal] so direct and clear that its being need involve no element of doubt' (p. 85). His view is that the universal is 'the logical form in which particulars participate.' What, then, is a particular? About this Mr. Haserot is not very clear. Much of what he says suggests that he means by a particular what McTaggart meant by a substance. Thus he says that 'the parts of particulars are particulars' (p. 170). But he also says, 'Every quality of a particular is itself a particular,' so that he does not seem to make the distinction between particulars and universals that McTaggart made between substances and characteristics. His clearest statement is: 'By a particular we refer to a singular item not predicable of any other item' (p. 90). A particular is also said to be 'a relational complex, i.e. a situation' (p. 166). But are the elements of the relational complex *particulars*, or are they *universals*, or are they something else? Mr. Haserot gives no hint how he would answer this question. He contents himself with such remarks as: 'Every particular, furthermore, is an instance of a universal. And the universal characterizes the particular, i.e. the universal determines the relations which constitute the essence of the particular' (p. 168).

Mr. Haserot's treatment of value, in Part II, is very lengthy and difficult to follow. All that can be done here is to indicate his general point of view. 'Whatever else value is,' he says, 'it is that principle according to which judgments of better and worse are made' (p. 310). He points out that this statement is not offered as a definition of value but 'as a condition to which a definition of value must comply' (p. 317). Value is indefinable. The point of the statement of the condition 'to which a definition of value must comply' (although value is said to be indefinable) seems to be that it is intended to make clear that 'the existence, that is, the being of value, cannot be denied unless this denial is accompanied by the denial of any distinction in things of better and worse.' It is in this way that Mr. Haserot attempts to establish value as an ontological category. He does not, however, leave the matter there. He attempts to show that the 'attainment of wholeness, i.e. the

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attainment of rationality, is the attainment of value' (p. 616). A rational form is 'a system of logical relations' (p. 490), and mind is a rational form. Accordingly, 'The mind is objective' (p. 492), and 'There is one mind only.' From this point of view it may be admitted that value is an ontological category. But Mr. Haserot's discussion of value is beset with the vagueness, and hindered by the unclearness, of his discussion of the other categories.

L. SUSAN STEBBING.

The Domain of Selfhood. By R. V. FELDMAN, M.A. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1934. Pp. 212. Price 10s. 6d.)

We are told on the dust-cover of this book (the author of which is Research Student in the Philosophy of the Jewish Religion at Jews' College, London) that "the manner is now rhapsodic and now reasoned-out." As most readers of *Philosophy* have probably a rather decided preference for reason to rhapsody as the vehicle of philosophical ideas, it seems proper to give some prominence to this information. The term "rhapsodic" may not, indeed, be an altogether adequate term to describe the somewhat grave and stately rhythms of Mr. Feldman's prose, but in its negative import, as excluding close, cautious, clean-cut argumentation, it does unquestionably apply to a substantial portion of his work. The picturesque diction which Mr. Feldman favours is often aesthetically pleasing, but it grows increasingly irksome to the reader whose main interest lies in appraising the intellectual validity of the theses that are advanced. Many of Mr. Feldman's pages are as thick with metaphors as the *Song of Solomon*.

The author's flowers of speech do not, however, conceal, but only render less obvious, the fact that he really does have something important to say. The concept of "self-respect," which is the corner-stone of his philosophy, is a concept which has as yet been most inadequately explored, and Mr. Feldman has done a genuine service in insisting so emphatically upon its significance.

The attitude of self-respect, Mr. Feldman contends, is something central and inalienable in human experience. When we analyse its nature and study its implications, it is found to point the way to certain ontological propositions of the most fundamental kind. We are led to assert (1) the real existence, in some sense, of that "ideal self" whose jussive authority is recognized by the agent in every experience of self-respect; and (2) the real existence of God, a Perfect and Personal Creator, Whom it is reasonable to postulate if we are to give any plausible account of the existence of the kind of being which analysis shows our self to be. ("To eliminate God is to treat human nature as a greater mystery than it deserves," as Mr. Feldman rather strikingly phrases the thought in his *Introduction*.) Interpreting the being of the ideal or "archetypal" selves in terms of timeless Platonic "essences," Mr. Feldman now arrives—a little rapidly—at the framework of an ontology. But it cannot be said ever to become very much more than a framework. The mutual relationships of God, archetypal selves, and empirical selves are stated rather than explicated. On the other hand, there follows a good deal of highly interesting discussion of certain basic sentiments of human nature which, through the medium of the ideas evoked in inherent connection with them, are held to give what the author calls "revelational" knowledge that is in harmony with the ontology outlined. In this part of the work there are some penetrating psychological aperçus (as in the analysis of "pity"), and the reasoning, while seldom stringent, is frequently suggestive. There is much to ponder also in Mr. Feldman's account, in the chapter entitled "The Lamps

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of Self-respect," of the relation of self-respect to the cardinal virtues, and in his defence of the view that self-respect is the "prius of Duty." The last part of the book is chiefly occupied with criticism of opposing philosophical standpoints.

For reasons already pointed out, the value of Mr. Feldman's arguments is often difficult to assess. The reader who (unlike the present reviewer) is not in initial sympathy with Mr. Feldman's general position is unlikely to derive conviction from his chosen method of persuasion. The argument for the real existence of the "ideal self" is particularly unsatisfying in view of its virtual neglect of the point of view—which we may admit requires to be supplemented—from which the ideal self undoubtedly appears as a construction on the basis of empirical content. As regards the second of his major propositions, however, it is only fair to say that Mr. Feldman does not claim to have effected a demonstration. The existence of God is powerfully suggested, but not compelled, by the argument from "self-respect." It is an hypothesis, but one which, the author claims, is confirmed "in a cumulative and summative fashion" by other aspects of experience. It is needful to remember here, as often elsewhere throughout the work, Mr. Feldman's acceptance of the rule "drawn from Maimonides" that "anything which satisfies a developed religious consciousness and is opposed to no coercive demand of reason may be accepted as valid."

Perhaps the greatest merit of the book is that it does succeed, by concentrating upon the nature and implications of self respect, in drawing attention to aspects of the life of the self which are apt to be ignored or slurred over in empirical philosophies. The book's deficiencies in the way of straightforward argument and thorough analysis have been sufficiently indicated. One must not, however, ask from Mr. Feldman more than in this volume he has attempted to supply. There are hints given of works projected for the future, in which partially neglected topics of the same general theme will receive more detailed treatment; and it may be proper to regard the present work rather in the light of a preliminary survey. If the author will consent to put a heavier bridle upon his Pegasus, the sequel should be full of interest.

C. A. CAMPBELL.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Moralist. By C. W. HENDEL (Oxford University Press. 1934. Two volumes. 25s. net. Pp. Vol. I, xii + 316; Vol. II, viii + 348).

In his *Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume*, Mr. Hendel has already shown distinction as an interpreter of eighteenth-century philosophy; but he tells us in the preface to these two stately volumes that his work on Hume was only an interlude in a study of Rousseau that began twenty years ago. It is natural, therefore, to take up this book with the highest expectations, and I am confident that few, if any, will lay it down with disappointment. True, there has been much recent work on Rousseau, and there are indications that the present literary output regarding the eighteenth century (much of which attained a high level) is rapidly decelerating; but there is still plenty of room for work of the best kind.

The fascinations of great writing, of moving appeals, of vivid intuitions of genius and of the stimulating sort of contradiction, both logical and moral, have continued to make Rousseau eternally readable; and the extent of his influence upon many fields, although easy to exaggerate, has been, on any

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showing, most considerable. The man of whom Kant could say that he had been the first to discover the soul of man, as Newton had been the discoverer of physical Nature, and of whom Hume could say, "I think Rousseau in many things very much resembles Socrates; the philosopher of Geneva seems only to have more genius than he of Athens, who never wrote anything," was certainly great, so great indeed that the current enthusiasm for him in his adopted country, France, and in many other lands is readily explicable without any reference to the disputable question of his influence on world-history.

In these volumes Mr. Hendel, like many of Rousseau's contemporaries, treats Rousseau as a moralist, and withal as a practical moralist intent upon promoting virtue, freedom, and sympathy within the human species. Rousseau appears in these pages as the great modern Platonist, the grand projector of political visions whose spirit overshadowed their letter, the grand deviser of far-reaching schemes of education, a diviner of genius in all matters pertaining to the soul and to the profundities of religion, and, to descend to smaller matters, a critic of the theatre. Among many of Rousseau's statements Mr. Hendel might have chosen this as his motto, "Everyone has his vocation on earth, mine is to say hard but useful truths. I have tried to fulfil that vocation without suffering from the evil the wicked wish me for it and which they will do to me when they can. I have preached humanity, kindness, tolerance, so far as it has depended on me, and it is not my fault if they have not listened to me" (Hendel's translation II, 241).

Mr. Hendel's method has been to study this philosopher, projector, student, writer, and enthusiast during his maturity, and, in the main, for the two decades between 1744 and 1765, relying principally upon letters and other manuscripts, and all in a biographical way. These were the years of the *Discourse on Inequality*, the work for the *Encyclopædia*, *The New Héloïse*, *Émile*, and the *Contrat Social*; and Mr. Hendel has successfully avoided the temptation of making confusing excursions into the later or into the earlier phases of Rousseau's career. On the other hand, he depicts on a wide canvas, not Rousseau only, but also a great part of the ideology of Paris and of Europe in the middle years of a remarkable century; and so he deserves our most grateful thanks.

Mr. Hendel's sympathy with Rousseau and his deep admiration for him are everywhere apparent. The hero shines so brightly that the commentator declines to use a spot light; and this matter-of-course enthusiasm has certain disadvantages. I submit, for example, that thirty-eight pages are far too many for the *Letter to D'Alembert*, and I should make the same submission even if I were wrong in supposing (as I do) that the letter is pretty poor stuff, although it borrows some interest from a certain resemblance to Plato and from the light it sheds upon Rousseau's relations with Geneva. (To describe the letter as "epochal" as Mr. Hendel does in II, 129, seems to me unintelligible.) Again, it seems to occur far too seldom to Mr. Hendel that certain signal weaknesses in much of Rousseau's argument (for example, in the *Contrat Social*) are scarcely less apparent (to many readers) than its incontestable genius. In his account of that work, in a sense the culmination of his commentary, Mr. Hendel, it is true, occasionally refers to contradictions, but always in an incidental way, without any serious attempt at critical appraisal; and this instance, I think, is typical. It may be a pity (if it is true) that no one can be a hero to his valet; but literary valets are usually more entertaining as well as more useful, when they are prepared to drop the official mask and have the temerity to become confidential. Mr. Hendel, however, is so very correct in his attitude that he

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never tells us explicitly what Rousseau's bodily afflictions were, his nearest approach to plain speaking on this matter being the very wary statement that "an Armenian, loose-flowing costume" was "a style of apparel better suited to Rousseau's particular ailments than the breeches of the period" (II, 265).

Mr. Hendel has put so much accurate and varied learning into his book that any complaint at all on that score may well seem ungrateful. A critic, however, has always a licence to carp, and therefore I may be permitted to suggest that there is prejudice in certain of Mr. Hendel's comments, and (what is much more perplexing for the reader) a frequent failure to give any clear indication whether Rousseau or Mr. Hendel is the prejudiced party. Here I shall select the references to Hobbes for comment; and although I do not suggest that these are altogether typical, I have (I believe) reason for doubting their complete singularity.

In the first 200 pages of his first volume, Mr. Hendel mentions Hobbes's name at least seventy times. That would be a liberal allowance, even granting (a) that the discussion in this part of his book is mainly concerned with political problems, (b) that it deals with a period during which Rousseau was very intimate with Diderot, who then was a profound admirer of Hobbes, (c) that Montesquieu (quoted I, 182) referred pointedly to Rousseau's attack upon Hobbes's "système terrible," (d) that in the rare passages cited in which Rousseau explicitly mentioned Hobbes, Rousseau (at this period) called Hobbes a "blasphemer" (I, 42), a "sophist" (I, 73), and such-like names, (e) that Pufendorf and others whom Rousseau studied very carefully had been greatly influenced by Hobbes, and (f) that Rousseau seems to have been profoundly shocked at Hobbes's picture of ungoverned man and the *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Despite these circumstances, it seems pretty clear that the majority of these seventy references indicates rather what Mr. Hendel was thinking about Hobbes than what Rousseau was thinking about him; and although, so far as I know, there is no evidence that Rousseau had studied Hobbes with any high degree of assiduity and fairness, I should hope (and I believe) that Rousseau's ideas about Hobbes were less remote from their historical original than Mr. Hendel's appear to be.

Thus Mr. Hendel informs us (I, 155) that Hobbes, like Bodin and some others, "shyly" incorporated the people's consent into his theory of instituted sovereignty; and he later says that Hobbes was not only "shy" but "sly" about this important matter (II, 162). But when we turn to the sly and sly old fellow himself, this is what we read (*Leviathan*, ch. 17). "The only way to erect such a common power . . . is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will; which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man. . . . This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a *commonwealth*, in Latin *civitas*."

Again, Mr. Hendel habitually contrasts the "sly" Hobbes with the "noble" Pufendorf. So far as I have observed, he invariably treats Pufendorf as a hostile critic of Hobbes, whereas, in fact, Pufendorf was a mediator between Hobbes and Grotius (or the Grotians). Thus (I, 144-145) he praises Pufendorf for expressing what was really a Hobbian theory stated in very Hobbian

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language, and remarks, quite falsely, that Pufendorff's meaning was very different from Hobbes's.

More generally, so far as I can see, Mr. Hendel frequently conveys a false impression by failing to recognize adequately that most of the fundamental notions connected with the social contract were of very old standing, and in no way peculiar to modern times. Anyone, during many centuries, who believed with the Roman jurists, the canonists, or the conciliar party in the Church that either secular power, or the organization of the Church, came from the people and was instituted by them, had employed very similar conceptions to those of the "contract." Mr. Hendel, however, tells us (I, 100) that "the genealogy of the general will begins with Jean Bodin." Then he says it didn't (same page) because it had once been Greek and mediæval. Then he says that Grotius "started it up" again (as if Grotius's attention to it had been in some way singular). Then (next page) referring to the passage from Hobbes I have already quoted, he says that Hobbes showed a deplorable lack of logic in holding that a union of wills must be a union of persons (in which case Rousseau's *volonté générale* was just as bad) and in the end highly commends Pufendorff for calling the State a moral person (as if the Hobbian sovereign had been supposed by its author to have no moral duties). And surely it is odd to find references to the revenue from the Crown Lands discussed (I, 117, cf. I, 160) as if the very idea of such a thing had been a vagrant idea of Bodin or Aristotle, that is to say, without any reference to feudalism, or to the actual Crown Lands that persisted in European monarchies in Rousseau's own time.

I think Mr. Hendel's book may reasonably be commended for the care and perspicacity with which it is written. I wish he had not said, however, that some of the ideas of the Abbé de St. Pierre "jibed very well" with one of Plato's fancies (I, 123), although I suppose the "jibing" was intended to indicate agreement. Again, the word "repugns" is repugnant to me; and although the Americanism "it was up to him" may be pardonable (even when frequently employed), I am inclined to think that Mr. Hendel should have renounced expressions like "won out" and "put us wise" when translating Rousseau's noble prose. And, talking about translation, the phrase "I am not it all of your advice" (II, 162), is surely neither English nor intelligible, unless one remembers the French expression it was doubtless intended to render.

JOHN LAIRD.

L'Esthétique de la Grâce; Introduction à l'Étude des équilibres de structure.

By RAYMOND BAYER, D.-ès-L. (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1933. Tome I, Pp. viii + 635. Tome II, Pp. 581. 2 Tomes ensembles. Frs. 100.)

Léonard de Vinci; La Grâce. By RAYMOND BAYER, D.-ès-L. (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1933. Pp. 303. Frs. 30.)

It is legitimate to take either the subject or the object of aesthetic experience as the starting-point for one's inquiries; owing to the pre-war partiality for exclusively psychological investigations, modern writers generally adopt the latter course, and Monsieur Bayer is no exception to this rule. For him the fundamental problem, on which the solution of every other hangs, is to discover those peculiar structural qualities on which the aesthetic object depends for its appeal, and in virtue of which we invest it with the sacred aureole of beauty.

A work of art is in fact a certain organization of colours, musical tones, words, or other materials selected by the artist for the accomplishment of his

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secret purposes. Hence, like other sciences, aesthetics uses a number of auxiliary sciences as its tools—the history and technique of the various arts, anatomy, the physics of motion and of the properties of raw materials; they all shed light on the nature of the finished work and on the causes that have produced it. Now a comparison between the different arts, major and minor, leads to the detection, amidst the diversity of their several embodiments, of certain underlying resemblances based on a similarity of *structural equilibrium*; these resemblances have given birth to the categories of beauty, grace, sublimity, etc., which are really no more than names for types or aspects of dynamic equilibrium between the object's component parts.

Let us pause a moment at this theory of equilibrium, an hypothesis as central to this writer's conception of art as to the doctrines of a modern school of political economists. He does not maintain that we ever perceive directly this subtle play of forces; but the audible or visible object is related to its dynamic substratum *as effect to cause*. So far so good; granted the existence of a material world external to ourselves, the objective factor in aesthetic experience can only be fully explored in terms of a specific combination of molecules in space, which, according to modern physics, would signify a particular distribution of energy. But for a purely objective theory, which aims at independence of the artist's creative deed, it is surely an error not to distinguish between the physical ingredients of art and the other mechanical equilibria manufactured by men or studied in the field of nature by physicists and astro-physicists alike.

The discovery of recurring types of structural equilibrium provides a clue to the Kantian riddle of the aesthetic judgment. Now what strikes one most forcibly about the opinions of different individuals, in different historical epochs, about art, is their extraordinary diversity, their evident relativity to the private interests, to the degree of culture, to the religious convictions or the aesthetic sensibility, of each person who registers a reaction; hence impressionistic criticism, revolutions in taste, and discrimination between styles. There is thus in the normal aesthetic judgment a *de facto* relativity to the state of mind of the individual when he is confronted by a work of art and "chaos is come again."

But, if the object possesses an intrinsic pattern or structure on which its whole claim to beauty lies, then, besides the fluctuating preferences of ordinary life, there must be an invariable, ideal judgment, solely determined by the actual exigencies of a material thing. This truly judicial decision, alone capable of furnishing a code of unalterable norms, is, however, no longer an aesthetic judgment, a judgment of value or of taste, because it is founded on real facts and aims simply at separating the chaff of error from the good grain of truth; the metamorphosis is complete, beauty has been absorbed without residue by logic.

Let none draw the paradoxical conclusion that perfect taste is the absence of all taste whatever; for the ideal aesthetic judgment, which reconstructs the object as it is in itself, unaffected by subjective fancies, is determined immediately by taste and only mediately by the thing perceived. There are three links in this causal chain, instead of two; the pattern or structure of the work of art, the "rhythmic-resonance" it provokes in the person who abandons himself to contemplation, and the inward or outward formulation of a preference basing itself on a psychic disturbance. This subtle analysis, establishing so firmly the reality of ideal laws to which judgments of beauty should approximate, only lacks the clarity and completeness that an investigation of the psychological or subjective aspect of the problem would have given it.

A specific "rhythmic resonance," a spontaneous organization of mental

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energy, is the subjective counterpart and effect of a particular structural equilibrium, itself the material embodiment of a rhythmic design in the artist's mind; it is also the unique source of "the pure aesthetic sentiment," a pleasure so distinguished from technical satisfaction or sensuous enjoyment. The moods described by Volkelt and the philosophers of *Einfühlung* are no more than an "extra-aesthetic" accompaniment of this fundamental phenomenon. This exclusive "formalism," shared by another young philosopher, E. Souriau, appears to be a strong current in modern speculation in aesthetics; we have always regarded it as one of those doctrines condemned by their onesidedness, and in this instance many of the author's own examples of grace in art contradict it flatly.

We have reached a point where the concepts that designate different categories are simply names for various ways of organizing the play of energy; we receive our orientation entirely from the object. Now the principal types of structural equilibrium are these; when there is an excess of energy over what is required to maintain stability, we have *the graceful*; when it is exactly equal to its task, we have *the beautiful*; when stability is threatened by a deficiency of energy, we have *the sublime*; and when there is a sudden rupture of equilibrium, we have *the comic*. This is not the occasion to criticize in detail a theory of the categories, or to wonder what has become of the tragic; we will confine ourselves to the main object of the author's researches, to *the graceful*.

The characteristic features of grace, in art or nature, are a certain ease or facility, an easy superiority of the self over mental impediments or of energy over brute matter, rightly observed but wrongly interpreted by Herbert Spencer. His mechanical hypothesis of a minimum expenditure of force is open to two grave objections; it accounts only for physical, not for spiritual, grace, and even then it formulates a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for the appearance of grace in the material world. None can doubt that the greater the quantity of energy employed, and the more of it is wasted in the performance of a given movement, the clumsier that action or movement will appear; but, on the other hand, all our bodily habits, such as walking, are accomplished with a minimum of unnecessary expenditure, and yet they are hatten of charm for the beholder. The movements of an athlete, of a bird, or of a quadruped, are more or less graceful according to the degree of effort we estimate has been required to release them, but every effortless movement does not bear the stamp of grace.

Moreover, this aspect of the beautiful reappears on a plane altogether ignored by Spencer, and shines in the motions of the soul as well as in those of the body; when spontaneous impulse gently displaces the inhibitions of convention and morality, we have the natural grace of children, or the rarer variety that sometimes emerges from full maturity. So much for the graceful in nature; it is time to pass on to its embodiment by artists in the materials of fine and applied art. A detailed inquiry into the objective features of this aesthetic category as they appear to the eye in works of art or nature cannot be overlooked, because it constitutes the most original and precious contribution of R. Bayer to the topic under discussion.

The most detailed application of his principle is furnished by his penetrating essay on Leonardo da Vinci. He contends there that the dominating influence on the greatest of all the Florentines was not the painting of his *quattrocento predecessors* in Florence or Milan, not the sun illumined face of his native Tuscany, but a unique combination of philosophical and technical forces. His dual starting-point is the doctrine of "splendour," as formulated in the mystical Neo-Platonism prevalent at this time, and, above all, in the writings of Marsilius Ficinus, and the technique of two different mediums; bronze

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statuary suggesting the power of reflected light, oils—as contrasted with tempora—the possibility of establishing an almost imperceptible transition from one tone or colour to its neighbour. But it was his genius—and genius is a “sudden mutation” without ancestry or heirs—that transformed problems of metaphysics into experiments with light, and that produced the wonder of chiaroscuro from the technical peculiarities of different mediums. It was his genius that lent him the grace of a Botticelli or a Correggio, without depriving him, like them, of tri-dimensional solidity, and that gave birth to one of the rarest and most perfect examples of the alliance between grace and beauty.

Let us now turn to the adventures of the graceful among the different arts. In architecture its salient characteristic is antagonism to the monumental, to vast and ponderous masses of stone; in the minor arts we find that grace of static forms is not inherent but rather derived from the living organisms they faintly resemble; in painting and sculpture, besides the portrayal of movement or of incipient movement, there is the fusion and continuity of tone and colour, the delicate suggestion of this or that emotional timbre; in poetry, the lyrical fragment, the nostalgic elegy, the pastoral idyll; in music unaccented rhythms are favoured for the waltz, the mazurka, or the dance suite; in melody a Mozart weaves subtle liaisons or continuous embroidery, while the lovely tone of the flute, the lute, or the harp can easily migrate from key to key. But the apotheosis of the graceful is in the art of dancing, the only art of which the raw material is the movement of the human body; here at last we visit the home of our category. What is the good of all the muscular exercises of the ballet dancer, the *raison d'être* of her stern bodily discipline? To become able to defy the law of gravity, to approach the freedom of the bird, without, at the same time, allowing the fatigue and strain of her muscular prowess to appear in her face or in her gestures; the most arduous feats are accomplished with the most supreme facility.

This summary, however brief, gives some idea of the wealth of observation, research, and original thought, brought by the author to his task. To our mind the essential weakness of his study lies in a faulty methodological assumption; for it assumes that the key to the major problems of aesthetics resides solely in the object, in the realm of substance, whereas to us subject and object are complementary factors, of which the former is the more fundamental. Hence, we believe, an exhaustive description of the aesthetic categories would necessarily include both aspects, mental and material, and our final definition would be an amalgam of the two. Envisaged from this angle, the category of the graceful is no longer independent or irreducible, for it becomes an irradiation from the wider category of beauty; fallen from the paradise of mind, it confines itself to those sublunary regions where things are thrall to the unrest of motion.

Whatever the defects of an excessive preoccupation with the aesthetic object and of an exaggerated emphasis on form, this study should be regarded as a standard work on the category of the graceful, and as a major contribution to the progress of what is variously known as “Kunstwissenschaft,” “science de l’art en générale,” or simply, “science of art.”

LAWTON L.

Vale. By the Very Rev. WILLIAM RALPH INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., Dean of St. Paul's, 1911-1934. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1934. Pp. 127. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

This small volume has more than a personal interest, as on the thread of an outline of his life the distinguished author discusses the subjects which he has studied and written upon, and the causes in which he has been interested

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and to which he has lent his influence. It is entirely free of egotism, and the autobiographical element might have been more prominent without risk of any such charge. It confirms the growing recognition of the Dean as possessing one of the acutest and finest minds in the Church of England; it corrects prevalent popular misconceptions of his personality and increases appreciation of his character. His reserved references to his domestic relations will bring him nearer to the hearts of those whom some of his outspoken opinions may have estranged, while it still betrays some of his prejudices on social questions, although the expression is now more temperate. His home and early environment leads him to give an account of the ecclesiastical development in his Church during his lifetime. For Anglo-Catholicism he has no affection, and regarding Modernism he also makes reservations.

The part most interesting to the readers of *PHILOSOPHY* is that in which he gives an account of the development of his interest in mysticism, leading on to his thorough study and authoritative writings on Plotinus. For what may be called the abnormal accompaniments of mysticism, trances, visions, voices, he has no liking and discounts their value; but he does share with the mystics the certainty of the immediacy of man's relation to God. Whether his much more favourable estimate of Plotinus will find general acceptance is a question on which I do not feel competent to pronounce any confident opinion. Even Baron von Hügel is charged with misunderstanding this thinker, whose cause the Dean has so warmly espoused. These studies have led him in his theology to emphasize the transcendence of God. What he finds lacking in the Platonism, which he advocates as a basis for a distinct type of Christian thought, is what led Augustine beyond it, the absence of the doctrine of Incarnation. For pragmatism he has no use.

His latest interests have been the relation of science and religion and Christian ethics. He finds in the view of the Universe in modern science a support to his own emphasis on divine transcendence. He is an uncompromising protagonist of Christian ethics, for the guiding principles of which he finds an adequate source in the teaching of Jesus. He writes at length and with strong conviction on Eugenics; he is a defender of birth-control by the use of contraceptives; he advocates a smaller population, since there are difficulties about adequate emigration as the remedy of our social ills. He seems to me to oppose without reason quantity and quality of population, nature and nurture as the condition for securing quality. His attitude to the toiling masses is unsympathetic and even contemptuous; he misrepresents the motives of many socialists. He does not seem to realize how serious is the disease in "the body politic," and an inadequate diagnosis leads him to offer quite insufficient and inefficient remedies. The conditions under which he has lived his life and done his work have imposed limitations on his understanding and sympathy, which appear in his attitude to, and treatment of, the social problems of our day. This to me is "the fly in the ointment" of a life which as a whole must command admiration, and of a work as scholar, thinker, and teacher which demands our gratitude, and I gladly offer my personal tribute of both in commending this admirably conceived and expressed "farewell."

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

La Notion de Renaissance dans l'Histoire de la Philosophie. By ÉMILE BRÉHIER.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. 32.
Price 2s.)

In his Zaharoff Lecture at Oxford last year Prof. Bréhier, of the Sorbonne, sets himself to examine "the indubitable philosophical renaissance"

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which marks the first third of our century. Abstaining from all criticism or evaluation of the contemporary contribution, he devotes his hour to disengaging its essential traits and to elucidating their significance. For his material he draws almost wholly, as he admits, on the recent work of his own countrymen, and though, as he says, his findings have a sufficiently general import, one may perhaps question whether much that is most characteristic in present-day philosophy can enter unqualified into those formulae which adequately resume the essential tendencies of recent French thought. A proper presentation of the contemporary contribution necessitates first an interrogation of the work of the last century, with a view to defining in what the novelty of the new work consists, and in what the continuity of the old. And, though this retrospect is only preparative, it is, perhaps, in the penetrating observations of these five pages that the most instructive and suggestive part of the lecture is found.

M. Bréhier maintains that an improper usage of the history of philosophy during last century had the paradoxical consequence of checking what spiritual influences the past might well have exercised upon it. It was to refute or escape from a scepticism drawn from the notorious and persistent disagreement among philosophers on central and traditional issues that the outstanding thinkers of last century lent their powers. This escape was to be effected either by suppressing those contradictions through an appeal to evolution or to progress, as with Hegel and Comte; or else, as with Renouvier, by accepting the contradictions and submitting the doctrines from which they arose to the arbitration of a free, reflective volition. That each epoch has its own culture, of which its philosophy, its science, and its art are just as much aspects as its political regimen or its industry, is a dogma that passed current last century for an indubitable truth if not an axiom. For the genuine philosopher, however, it had the most serious consequence that he is perforce a product and never a producer. For if a philosophy is the resultant of a development at once necessary and superior to the individual, then the individual can do no other than await, and find his 'convictions' in, the verdicts which contemporary history allows him. But this, and the passive attitude it induces, would, as Renouvier maintained, be the abolition of any genuine philosophy at all. It was the sense of security in affirmation, its removal from the reach of scepticism, which this doctrine conferred, that recommended the attitude of 'inertia.' But, M. Bréhier emphasizes, it is in this very inertia, and the conception of the legislative power of the present in which it is set, that we must seek an explanation of the rupture in the continuity of philosophy which became so evident in the latter half of last century.

The philosophical renaissance of our time wholly rejects this interpretation of the philosophical effort, and, more in the spirit of Renouvier, regards philosophical conclusions not as being imposed on us by our place in time and history, but as issuing from an exercise of free reflection which aspires to attain to reality itself. Its dominant characteristic is the effort to define mind in its concrete activity as immediately known, and not in its products; it is, in this sense, an attempt to return to a direct vision of the real. The work of Bergson dominates our whole period. Despite differences of temperament and of intention among other thinkers, M. Bréhier finds in their researches a striking convergence towards a more concrete conception of mind. Further, the present scene of European civilization has re-enforced the conception that the spiritual life cannot be regarded as something acquired and definitive: spiritual effort cannot evince that stability which properly belongs to matter. Hence the distinctive character of the later phase of Bergson's idealism—its uncertainty concerning the place and future of spirit

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in human societies). A right conception of mind is not to be had from contemplating any of its particular manifestations at this or that particular period: it is to be identified with no single form of science or religion or art or social reform. As a philosophy of the sciences its business is not so to synthesize their results as to draw from them an image of the natural world, but to elicit from the actual course of scientific thinking what is significant in its procedure and in its direction—"ce sont, dans chaque sorte d'activité, les moments de tension, de travail effectif, d'innovation, qui intéressent la philosophie; c'est eux qu'elle essaye de capter pour arriver à une définition concrète de l'esprit." If we apply Bergson's method, which "exclut toute construction et arrête la recherche au point précis où s'interrompt l'expérience," and retain only the orientation and direction of mental process—we shall find, as Lalande and Meyerson have shown in detail, that whether it be the domain of morality or that of science in which mind is active, its process is always orientated in the direction of greater assimilation and increasing elimination of differences. Besides this orientation of reason towards identity, there remains another possible orientation of the real—that of vital activity. Whether or no it can be shown why the one rather than the other should be the norm of our action, it is abundantly clear, M. Bréhier thinks, that we are immersed in a reality which is hostile to reason, which is sometimes victorious over it, and which ultimately eludes its grasp. Perhaps instead of seeking to determine the relation between reason and reality our proper course would be to show that there is no genuine problem here. These thirty years have also witnessed the rise of a philosophical tendency which, quite opposed to the essentials of Bergsonism, is in fact a recrudescence of romanticism. The dominant attitude of this movement is that "we expect all from the object and nothing from ourselves; it is from the action of objects on minds that we are to look for all happiness, all value, all truth."

So, in summing up, M. Bréhier is led to distinguish three tendencies in contemporary thought, and to indicate "a vast oscillation" between them. Over against the Bergsonian development, he describes "deux philosophies qui n'ont matériellement rien de commun. L'une est tournée vers l'histoire, et l'autre plutôt vers des réalités transcendantes, qui s'impose à la manière d'une sensation ou d'un sentiment; mais dans l'une et l'autre, il y a pourtant une même orientation; l'une et l'autre, elles se détachent des activités où l'esprit se manifeste d'une manière vivante, pour demander une direction à des réalités fixes et toutes faites; l'une et l'autre, bien qu'elles aient à l'égard de l'objet une attitude toute réceptive et passive, sont pourtant amies de constructions métaphysiques et dialectiques."

S. V. KEELING.

The Philosophy of John Dewey. By W. T. FELDMAN. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1934. Pp. vii + 127. Price \$1.75; 8s. net.)

John Dewey is admitted by the author of this critical survey of his philosophy to be "one of the truly seminal minds in contemporary philosophy"; and one of the rewards or penalties of being "the dominant figure in American philosophy" is to become the subject of theses for doctorates in philosophy. This book originated as such a thesis, and like many of the kind show an orderly arrangement, careful elaboration of argument, and a freshness which are not always found in works written under other conditions.

The author attempts, by comparison of many passages in Dewey's writings, to show where the latter stands in regard to certain general principles or

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ideas—such as organism, empiricism, temporalism, Darwinism, practicalism, futurism, creative intelligence, continuity, moralism. Many of these terms may appear somewhat barbarous captions, but they belong to the philosophy under review. The criticism which is enforced is that Dewey's statements on any one point are not always congruous, that his views on different points are not always consistent, that he wavers between different meanings of some of his most important terms, but that this instability of thought is frequently due to "his unusual sensitiveness to diverse considerations." The general result of the analysis is to reveal Dewey's theory as a contradictory mass of ideas and motives, and as a failure so far as a coherent synthesis is concerned.

The book is expressly limited in its scope, and the author safeguards himself against a possible line of criticism by definitely stating his method and aim. He confines himself to analysing and formulating Dewey's motivating ideas and their interrelations in so far as they influence his argument; and he considers that this is a task preliminary to the analysis of his arguments and the assessing of his philosophy as a whole. Yet the treatment gives the impression of being by one who stands outside Dewey's type of philosophy and who, though appreciative of his many good points, has quite definitely little sympathy with it. The reader is not led into the heart of that philosophy; there is no consecutive presentation of it; and the discussion can be followed intelligently and appreciatively only by those who have a prior acquaintance with Dewey's views. Dr. Feldman, of course, takes his stand upon a more traditional view of the intellect, logic, and truth than does Dewey; and he criticizes the latter on that basis. But then Dewey may not assign the logical and metaphysical value to the traditional logical canons which Dr. Feldman does; and in the absence of agreement on these points the charge of inconsistency against Dewey may be simply irrelevant.

B. M. LAING.

General Sociology. By H. P. FAIRCHILD. (New York: J. Wiley & Sons. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd. 1934. Pp. x + 633. Price 23s.)

Sociology is defined by Professor Fairchild as "The study of man and his human environment in their relations with each other." This definition brings out at once the difficulty of the claim which is made for the recognition of Sociology as a distinct and comprehensive science of society. In the first place, this "human environment" is made up of the individuals who are to be related to it, and it differs, therefore, for different individuals and groups of individuals. Further, even assuming the possibility of generalization, a science of society so defined would not be complete; for it is difficult to see how the relations between man in society and the physical environment can be ignored, since one is constantly modifying the other in a never-ending process of change. There is, indeed, a case for Sociology as the study of the dynamics of social development, which would take account of all the influences that have modified the character of social relationships and, unlike the separate social sciences, would give due weight to each. But this is not the kind of synthesis which is contemplated or attempted in this book.

It is unfortunate that there is so little agreement among Sociologists themselves as to the scope of their subject. Some are satisfied to pursue special inquiries, in the hope perhaps of contributing material for more comprehensive studies in the future. They are usually content to confine themselves to those aspects of society which lie outside the scope of the separate social sciences. Others, however, like Professor Fairchild, claim the whole field of all the social sciences as their territory. The discussion of the claims of Sociology to

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recognition as a complete science is, for some reason which is not very obvious, postponed to Chapters V and VI of the book, and there is little attempt to define the scope of the subject. In any case, this discussion seems to bear little relation to the rest of the volume, which consists largely of an attempt to bring together the material and the main conclusions of the separate social sciences into some kind of synthesis. This appears to be a different conception of the nature of Sociology from that which is advanced in the chapters mentioned; it does not "apply the scientific method to the materials of Sociology," the phenomena of which, according to Professor Fairchild, "may be objectively observed, accurately recorded, and systematically classified"; and it possesses difficulties of its own, which are amply illustrated in this book. These difficulties must be obvious to every student of the social sciences.

In the first place, the material is so vast that it is impossible to reduce it to a single survey, except by making the treatment so superficial as to destroy much of its value. It is not possible in this review to do justice to the scope of Professor Fairchild's book, which ranges from the origins and development of human society to the American immigration problem, and from the institutions of the State and religion to standards of living and birth control.

A further difficulty arises from the unmanageable character of the material and the fact that so much of it has to be used at second hand. There is as yet no unanimity in the conclusions reached in the different social sciences; and since it is impossible in a general survey of this kind to state all the conflicting theories which emerge, the author is inevitably driven to the more or less arbitrary selection of particular theories, which is in itself unscientific. This is strikingly exemplified in the chapter on "The Control of Production." This chapter advances a complete and isolated theory of Profits which seeks to demonstrate, by what many people would regard as unsound reasoning, that there can be no such thing as Profits. It is hardly fair to the inexperienced student to leave him in ignorance of the very existence of other possible views on this and other controversial matters, even though, as Professor Fairchild somewhat naively suggests in the Preface, to introduce him to them may "confuse him unnecessarily" and "create an unwarranted impression of disunity and inconclusiveness." Surely the student who is going to be confused by the knowledge that there are conflicting views on social relationships had best leave the social sciences alone.

On the topics which are more usually found in works on general Sociology, Professor Fairchild writes freshly, and with a full realization of the new contribution which modern studies in social psychology have made to the interpretation of social phenomena. Particularly valuable is his analysis of the functions of the State, the requirements of "normality," the nature of law, and the means of control. And in the suggested distinction between what is described as "social engineering" and mere social reform, Professor Fairchild gets to the heart of the problems of modern society.

ROBERT PEERS.

The Ideals of East and West. By KENNETH SAUNDERS, Litt.D. (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1934. Pp. xxiii + 248. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

In these days, when there is so much discussion in regard to the relation of nations and races to one another, and of their conflicting interests, it is of interest and importance to discover from what motives, for what ends, under what standards, their mutual contacts are taking place. This volume, therefore, has not only a theoretical, but also a practical interest. The title is not, however, strictly correct, as the ideals are all of the East; even Christian

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Ethics had its origin, and drew its character from the East; but it might be justified on the ground that it is a Western mind that is dealing with Eastern thought and it is to Western minds that the book is addressed. One great impression the book makes, and it is this, that "one touch of nature makes the whole world kin"; striking resemblances even more than differences arrest the reader's attention and hold out the promise of fuller understanding and closer co-operation, and even a growing approximation. The author is very hospitable in his own thinking and appreciative of other ideals than that which has shaped his life; but he indicates his acceptance of Christian ethics, while recognizing that these other ideals have a valuable contribution to make to the full exposition of the Christian ideal as presented by Jesus. It is a problem of the future, whether the distinctively Christian ethics, with such influence from other ideals, will dominate the morality current in the world as all parts become more and more a whole, or syncretism or eclecticism will prevail.

The writer seems most at home in dealing with the ideals of India, China, and Japan, as his previous studies have been mainly in this field, and there I do not feel competent to offer any critical comments. He deals with the ideals of the Greeks and Hebrews very capably and sympathetically. With his presentation of Christian ethics I am in general agreement; but, in dealing both with the Hebrew and Christian religions he seems to me to commit himself to far too negative statements. "The Bible as a whole is not history in any modern sense" (p. 167). This bald statement would lead many to a conclusion beyond any that literary and historical criticism justifies. So to speak of "the theological tracts known as the Four Gospels" (p. 205) is not to discriminate, as modern scholarship does, the historical values of the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel, or even among the Synoptics. To assert that "Christianity won the ancient world largely as a mystery religion, and in Pauline and Johannine thought we see abundant proof of the influence of these cults as well as of Hebrew Prophetism, Platonism, and Stoicism" (p. 204), is a far too confident solution of a problem on which many of the best scholars are not yet agreed, if they ever will be. In view of the present situation in Germany, one cannot but wish that the words, "I cannot shirk the conviction that the Jews have deserved much of the persecution that has come their way" (p. 170) had never been written. While it is good for us to see ourselves as others see us, and to recognize how far short Christendom falls from the standards of Christ, the author seems to me to identify himself too unreservedly with the adverse judgment of Asiatics; but that may be a fault that leans to virtue's side.

The exposition of the ideals which is given with its historical background is in each case followed by illustrations from the relevant literature. These are well chosen and well arranged, but my mind is in doubt whether such illustrations should be thus apart from, and not woven into, the exposition. In view of the wide spread of Islam and the recovery of Turkey and other Islamic peoples, it is strange that there is no reference to that religion, except in the Epilogue (pp. 239-246). Neither this nor the Prologue seems to me to add anything of substantial value, although they are interesting as a literary excursion into realism. The Table of Contents is quite inadequate, as an outline of each chapter, indicating the divisions, would be useful. As inadequate are the two indexes; and in a book of this kind the use should be made as easy as possible by such aids. I can commend the volume as a useful textbook, the value of which is enhanced by the illustrations given from the literature.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

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Treatise on Right and Wrong. By H. L. MENCKEN. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. ix + 277. Price 10s. 6d.)

We are all apt to settle into the grooves of routine in accomplishing our daily work, the moral philosopher no less than anyone else. In most work, routine is an advantage, but to the philosopher it spells danger, the danger of taking for granted the validity of the traditional doctrines of the schools. There is always, therefore, room for books which survey the moral code of our society from an unconventional point of view, and which vigorously challenge accepted beliefs. The latest free-lance criticism of morals comes from the distinguished American journalist, H. L. Mencken.

The title of the book is misleading, but the Preface corrects any false impression which it creates. No systematic study of Ethics is attempted. Most of such studies seem to the author to be quite useless. Right and wrong are simple matters. Unfortunately their nature has been obscured by the subordination of Ethics to Theology, and to some extent by the errors of philosophers. The one need is the correction of these errors so that a scientific study of Ethics can be undertaken. Mencken admits to a dislike for metaphysics that must almost equal his dislike for theology.

In the first chapter, three ways of accounting for ethical ideas are distinguished—Revelation, Reason, and Instinct, and we are shown how in men's attitude to work, to slavery, and to the place of women in society, the appeal to revelation has been compelled to give place to the appeal to reason. The author then turns to Metaphysics, and in some twenty pages discusses the views of philosophers on the problem of Free Will, concluding that we have a pragmatic sanction, and only a pragmatic sanction for the belief. This discussion is followed by an historical survey, or series of surveys, of changes in men's moral ideas. The history is written from the point of view of a good hater of religion, and apparently with the object of exposing the iniquity and stupidity of the Hebrew and Christian conceptions of Morality. A final chapter, on the state of Morality to-day, discusses in a somewhat casual and general way the problem of sexual relations in the modern world.

There are, undoubtedly, many passages in this book which direct attention to genuine moral problems, and which should provoke the reader to that "thinking in morals" for which Mencken pleads, but there are certain features of the book which counteract these effects and leave the reader disappointed.

For one thing, the attack is directed against a belief that one imagines few people accept to-day, the belief, namely, that "what God wills" is the final criterion of right. Many would call themselves Christians who would not subscribe to Mencken's belief that "the Christian theory is that the Bible is a complete guide to conduct." Nor are the author's weapons always well chosen. We are not encouraged to use our intelligence in moral matters when we find that Mecken can attach any importance to the fact that "the last word in the Old Testament . . . is 'curse,'"

Again, there are so many inaccuracies in the descriptions of the theories of philosophers—e.g. T. H. Green is included in the list of determinists and Jonathan Edwards among the champions of Free Will—that one must conclude that the author's dislike of philosophers is "hatred at first sight."

But the most serious defect is the absence of any sure and stable basis for criticism. Mencken remains uncertain whether Reason or Instinct is the real ground of moral distinctions. Both to him are "sanctions." There is no recognition of the distinction between problems of origin and of value. The importance of Intelligence is emphasized, yet sound morals are described

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as "a simple response to a kind of instinct, shared with the ants and bees"—as though the man who ruthlessly seeks to acquire wealth or power at the expense of his fellows cannot appeal as convincingly to instinct as the man who respects property.

At root Mencken rests his case on the almost universal acceptance by man of five fundamental prohibitions—those directed at Murder, Theft, Trespass, Adultery, and False Witness. When one considers how often a defence of Religion has been based on the remarkably widespread belief in the existence of divine beings, and how little importance this writer attaches to such a defence, one finds it difficult to attach much value to H. L. Mencken's positive views on Ethics.

IDRIS W. PHILLIPS.

Ethics and Moral Tolerance. By ARTHUR KENYON ROGERS. (New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1934. Pp. 323. Price 10s.)

After, or through, a criticism of Professor Warner Fite, of pragmatic ethics (represented by Professor Dewey) and of "rationalist" or "absolutistic" ethics (represented chiefly by Nicolai Hartmann), the author gives his own standpoint. This one feels inclined to describe as materially, if not formally, after the classic type, hedonist, but with qualitative as well as quantitative standards, quality, however, being apparently reducible in the last analysis to quantity. Mr. Rogers himself classifies it as an "ethics of sentiment" *à la* Westermarck, differing from the latter chiefly in not relinquishing the claim to validity or objectivity, for the nature of which one must refer to Mr. Rogers's own carefully qualificatory and not easily translatable language (chiefly in Chapter V). From this standpoint a plea is put in for tolerance in morality—that is, for "limiting progressively the field of the distinctive moral judgment of censoriousness" or of blame or disapproval or condemnation. The grounds on which this plea is based are many, but the chief, it would seem, is that though this moral judgment must rest upon a feeling ("private" apparently), we cannot be sure that there is a moral constitution common to all men, and above all, we cannot know for certain that in the case of a particular condemnation the person condemned shares or can share our feeling with regard to the cause of condemnation (see especially Chapter VIII). Condemnation, blame, or disapproval is for Mr. Rogers, as for most people, something more than the mere recognition of the wrong or bad for what it is. If it were merely that he could not reasonably urge the limitation of its field so long as the field of the wrong or the bad is not limited. Quite rightly he says it involves hostility and self-righteousness. One cannot, therefore, help sympathizing with his proposal for a limitation of it. The difficulty, however, is that, as in the phrase quoted above, he makes the judgment or sentiment of disapproval as thus defined the very differentia and essence of morality and of the "ought." He is therefore in effect saying that the less morality the better, and that the moral life is not the best life or that which we ought to preach and practise, but, on the contrary, may be a vice to be condemned. Such language may be allowed as a brachylogy in ordinary life of those who wish to protest against a blind, cramped, or distorted life which, commonly enough, would substitute itself for the moral life, but when it is introduced into philosophy it reduces the latter to barren logomachy. One sympathizes with Mr. Rogers's aim as well as with his analysis of condemnation. But if he thinks them both through he may find himself urged to preach an ethics which, neither hedonistic nor "of sentiment," excludes *completely* all condemnation but also—and this is important—its correlatives, approval.

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admiration, respect, self-respect—in short, all valuing, on which he relies so firmly. In other words, he may have to preach the morality of love, with both profounder scrutiny of the facts and more transcendent soaring of the imagination than his present pedestrian and opaque empiricism will allow him.

Reading smoothly and pleasantly, the book is, nevertheless, throughout marked by a difficulty of which it is hard to say whether it issues from complexity and subtlety of thought matching the complexity and subtlety which, he rightly points out, characterize the ethical experience itself, or merely from the obscurity and confusion inherent in the position taken up.

P. LEON.

Books received also:—

- W. CAREY WILSON. *Spiritual Convoy*. London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd. 1934. Pp. 223. 5s.
- W. CAREY WILSON and H. R. SURRIDGE (Foreword by The Rt. Hon. EARL SPENCER). *Our County and Ourselves, Northamptonshire and its Amenities*. Kettering: Leader Press. 1933. Pp. 34. 1s.
- G. W. KAVEESHWAR, M.A. *The Metaphysics of Berkeley Critically Examined in the Light of Modern Philosophy*. Khandwa: Ashavati Kaveeshwar. 1933. Pp. vi + 360. 5s. 6d.
- J. McT. E. McTAGGART, Litt.D., LL.D., F.B.A. (Ed. by S. V. Keeling, D.-8s-L.). *Philosophical Studies*. London: E. Arnold & Co. 1934. Pp. 292. 12s. 6d.
- O. HOLMBERG. *David Hume in Carlyle's "Sartor Resartus."* Lund: C. W. K. Gleerups Förlag. 1934. Pp. 19.
- A. EDEL, Ph.D. *Aristotle's Theory of the Infinite*. New York: Privately printed: The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 1934. Pp. 102. \$1.
- P. A. CAMPBELL. *Generation of the Universe and "Design for Living."* E. Cleveland, Ohio: Copies obtainable from the author. 1934. Pp. 101. \$1.50.
- W. TEMPLE, Archbishop of York. *Nature, Man and God*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1934. Pp. xxxi + 530. 18s.
- J. M. CREED, D.D., and J. S. BOYS SMITH, M.A. *Religious Thought in the Eighteenth Century. Illustrated from Writers of the Period*. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1934. Pp. xl + 301. 10s. 6d.
- P. SHANKUNNY, M.A., LL.T. *God, One God, The Only God. A Mystic Finger-post for the Earnest Seeker*. Tellicherry, India. Published by the author. 1934. Pp. 135. Rs. 2.10.
- I. CLYDE. *Eve's Sour Apples*. London: E. Partridge Ltd. 1934. Pp. 224. 6s.
- A. ADLER and F. G. CROOKSHANK. *Individual Psychology and Sexual Difficulties* (11). London: C. W. Daniel Co. 1934. Pp. 62. 2s. 6d.
- T. WIGLEY, M.A. *A New Highway towards Christian Reality*. London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 272. 8s. 6d.
- R. O. MOON, M.D., F.R.C.P. *Medicine and Mysticism*. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1934. Pp. 57. 2s. 6d.
- O. FENICHEL, M.D. (Tr. by B. D. Lewin, M.A., and G. Zilboorg, M.D.). *Outline of Clinical Psychoanalysis*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. 492. 18s.
- H. M. MORAIS, Ph.D. *Deism in Eighteenth-Century America*. New York: Columbia University Press. London: P. S. King & Son. 1934. Pp. 203. 15s. 9d.
- S. H. MELLONE, M.A., D.Sc. *Elements of Modern Logic*. London: University Tutorial Press Ltd. 1934. Pp. xi + 333. 5s.

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- I. HENDRICK, M.D. *Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. xi + 308 + xii, ros. 6d.
- J. DEWEY. *A Common Faith*. New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. 87. \$1.50. 7s.
- F. C. S. SCHILLER. *Must Philosophers Disagree? And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1934. Pp. xi + 359. 12s. 6d.
- A. C. DAS, M.A. (Foreword by Sir S. Radhakrishnan, D.Litt.; Introduction by Dr. A. N. Mukherjee, Ph.D.). *Sri Aurobindo and the Future of Mankind*. University of Calcutta. 1934. Pp. xvi + 130.
- A. WALEY. *The Way and its Power, A Study of the "Tao Tê Ching" and its Place in Chinese Thought*. London: G. Allen & Unwin. 1934. Pp. 262. 7s. 6d.
- VARIOUS. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1933-1934. Vol. XXXIV. London: Harrison & Sons. 1934. Pp. 309. 25s.
- W. McDUGALL, F.R.S. *The Frontiers of Psychology*. London: J. Nisbet & Co. 1934. Pp. xi + 235. 5s.
- LL. W. JONES, M.A., Ph.D. *An Introduction to Theory and Practice of Psychology*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1934. Pp. x + 308. 12s. 6d.
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- J. W. DUNNE. *The Serial Universe*. London: Faber & Faber Ltd. 1934. Pp. 242. 10s. 6d.
- A. NORMAN. *Chère Ye, Or, The Blessed Life*. London: J. Clarke & Co. 1934. Pp. 106. 5s.
- VARIÉS. *Science et Loi, Exposés*. (Cinquième Semaine Internationale de Synthèse.) Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. vi + 227. Frs. 20.
- A. ETCHÉVERRY, D.-ès-L. *L'Idéalisme Français Contemporain*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. 376. Frs. 35.
- H. DELA ROIX. *L'Enfant et le Langage*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. 118. Frs. 12.
- J. F. M. STERCE (Dr.). *Onder Amsterdamsche Humanisten*. Hilversum: N. V. Paul Brand's Uitgeverijbedrijf. 1934. Pp. ix + 140.
- FR. E. GIROCHETTI, O.F.M. *La Filosofia di Giambattista Vico*. Milano: Società Editrice Vita e Pensiero. 1935. Pp. 197. Lire dieci.
- G. SAITTA. *Il Carattere della Filosofia Tomistica*. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. 1934. Pp. 146. L. 15.

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THE PRESENT NEED OF A PHILOSOPHY

(LETTERS TO THE EDITOR)

MY DEAR EDITOR,

I had hoped that others would continue the very interesting discussion to which Sir Herbert Samuel's letter to you in the April number of last year gave rise. But as no one has done so in the January number, rather than let it drop, I venture to send you a few notes partly in agreement with what Sir Herbert has urged upon philosophers in view of present circumstances, partly in defence of what seem to him and some others, who have written to you, the abstractness and remoteness of their discussions and the unnecessary technicality of their language.

I think that we should all agree that philosophy has something to do in the world. Like the arts and sciences it has a mission, and one which, in a generation like the present, rightly described by Sir Herbert as "dissatisfied, anxious, apprehensive," it is specially incumbent on it to lay to heart. It shares with literature and science the responsibility of doing what it can to remove the source of its dissatisfaction and to allay its anxieties and apprehensions. We ought, I think, further to agree that in its terminology it should approximate to literature rather than to science in the avoidance of technical language—not because it is less concerned than science with the accurate use of words, but because the objects and experiences with which it deals are the common property of every man, and it is not so much its function to point to new ones as to penetrate more deeply into the meaning and significance of the old ones.

I think we should still further agree with Sir Herbert (going deeper) that the interest has recently tended to shift from the problem of the nature and limits of knowledge to that of the nature of reality—not because the former is unimportant, but because the study of

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knowledge, apart from that of reality, is like the study of the shadow apart from the substance. Finally, we should agree with what he says at the end of his letter about the advantage of taking our stand upon some comprehensive, now generally recognized, feature of reality, and that we might be content with him to accept as such the idea of evolution or progress, whether it shows itself unconsciously in the life of nature or consciously in the life of man.

Doubt begins only when it appears to be suggested that, this idea once accepted, we are rid of all philosophical abstraction and have little left to do than the comparatively easy work of applying it to practice. It has, on the contrary, appeared to some of your correspondents that this idea may itself, as commonly used, be one of extreme abstractness, and that, the moment we begin to think about it, it is seen to raise problems of great difficulty. To mention only some of them: Accepting the distinction between unconscious and conscious evolution, how are we to conceive the relation between the two? It has been a common mistake (it is said to have been that of nineteenth-century philosophers) to lay the emphasis on the unconscious side of evolution even in human affairs, and to rely on what Mr. H. G. Wells somewhere calls "the mechanical benevolence latent in things" for the achievement of progress. Granting that the Great War has blown this superstition to the winds, and that we have come to see that evolution, scientific, economic or other, even with "rationalization" thrown in, heads straight for disaster, unless guided by some conscious idea of what Mr. Collingwood calls "the ultimate end," there is still the question of what that end is to be. Granted that here also our eyes have been opened and we see the vanity of wealth, power, territory, even the spread of material well-being, when taken as ends in themselves, and that we should be agreed that the only life worth living, whether for nations or individuals, is one, as Lord Listowel expresses it, "resplendent with scientific truth, with religious vision, with moral and artistic beauty." there still remains the problem, raised by Sir Herbert Samuel himself in an acute form, as to whether the values indicated in this summary are merely "human inventions," "fictional abstractions" for which we have no right to claim that they constitute what Mr. Collingwood again calls "the inward essence of things." Granted finally that we are agreed, among others with Professor Whitehead (who is quoted both by Sir Herbert and Mr. Collingwood as an authority), in rejecting the Relativism which regards them as merely emotional in origin and temporary and local in validity, and in holding that they are of universal and absolute validity, there is still the question of the degree in which they are realizable under temporal conditions. It is a very old doctrine that man's life as a history in time is doomed in the end to failure of complete achievement, and therefore of

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complete satisfaction, and that his finitude throws him forward to the idea of a timeless reality in union with which alone, whether in this world or in another, his heart can find satisfaction, its anxieties and apprehensions be laid to rest. Recently this doctrine has tended to sink into the background. Modernism has been defined as the effort to take time seriously. But already some are beginning to suspect that it is possible to take time too seriously, to the exclusion of the complementary idea of the timeless as the "frame of reference" within which the temporal appears as only one phase of it. "It is a common failing," writes Dean Inge, "both of realists and idealists that they do not take *timelessness* seriously enough."

All these questions we should surely agree are tremendously important for the highest kind of practice—sometimes when we consider them they seem to be the only important ones. Yet who will deny that they are all also tremendously difficult ones, and that the unfortunate people, who are afflicted with the "disease of thought" and whose calling dooms them to a lifelong wrestle with them, deserve every allowance if their methods seem to us provokingly tentative and slow, sometimes even wholly irrelevant. It is no reply to this plea to say that in all the centuries from Socrates till now these questions would long ago have been answered, if answer were possible along the lines of traditional controversy. I believe with Lord Listowel that the great philosophers in all ages not only have had their answers to them, but have sought to apply them to practice. But their answers were in the language and adapted to the needs of their own time. Each new age speaks in a different language, and all these problems have to be faced anew by each generation, and, as we know to our cost, do not become simpler, but on the contrary far more complicated as time goes on and new aspects of truth come into view. It is for this reason that there will always be need of new philosophy, as there is of new science and new literature, to satisfy the mind and heart of its own age. Instead of complaining of the dearth of this at the present moment, I am sometimes amazed both at the amount and the quality of it. If it is difficult to point out "a philosophy" which may be recommended to inquirers, this is partly, as Professor Laird has pointed out, because philosophy as a whole would be the poorer if there were only one, partly because speculative philosophy is itself at the present moment in a peculiarly interesting crisis. To speak of this at length would carry me beyond the limits of a letter. It is sufficient to point to the approximation to one another of some of the great historic lines of thought, especially those of realism and idealism, as represented by such writers as Whitehead and Bradley, as an extraordinary and entirely hopeful sign of the times.

I come back therefore to my plea, addressed, Sir, with your per-

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mission to the readers of *Philosophy*, for the exercise of a large indulgence to the writers for it, whether professional or unprofessional, even when their speculations and controversies seem only to have a remote bearing on what is commonly regarded as "practice." Philosophy, like heaven, is a house of many mansions, and for my own part (supposing myself to be there) I should welcome to a place in it even the movements and methods with which, from a practical and even a philosophical point of view, I have the least sympathy.

I am, etc.,

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

ROTHERFIELD.

MY DEAR EDITOR,

I have been following with interest the letters appearing in your Journal on the "Present Need of a Philosophy." This appears to have been discussed largely from the point of view of determining the present task of philosophy. If philosophy has any immediate service to render in these days, apart from that of giving satisfaction to the mind of the man who attempts to frame the philosophy, it must be to one of two classes, (1) those who are concerned with the practical problems of so altering the conditions of life as to ensure to all the necessities of physical well-being, (2) those who are primarily concerned with attempting to correlate the more recent conclusions of biology, psychology, sociology, and the physical sciences, giving order to their claims, and placing them in a perspective of sufficient accuracy to provide a reliable and healthy outlook. This group includes the numerous camp-followers of the philosophies, and those who, like teachers, have the responsibility of guiding younger minds.

I believe the contribution which philosophy can make to the first group is remote and indirect. But it can aid the second group directly and immediately. In order to do so it must face some of the problems with which this group is most vitally concerned. As a member of this group I am taking the liberty of writing you in order to suggest some of these problems, and to request that, if possible, some of them may be discussed in the pages of your Journal. The problems raised are concerned less with the conclusions of modern sciences than with the determination of the exact spheres within which those conclusions may be held to be valid, and they are created largely by a consideration of the various methods which the sciences adopt. They are, therefore, concerned more directly with questions of epistemology than of metaphysics proper.

I suggest a few of these problems:

(1) It appears to be generally assumed that one of the chief tasks

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of philosophy at the present time is to unify the conclusions arrived at by the various sciences, so as to present one harmonious world-view, free from inconsistencies and self-contradictions. What grounds have we for assuming this? Considering the wide variety of methods which are adopted by the various branches of philosophy and science, and the wide variety of terms in which they seek to express their conclusions, is it reasonable to believe that we can unite them in any single statement without doing violence to the exact meaning of the terms we are trying to unite, and so spoiling the value of our effort? May it not rather be the task of philosophy to delimit more exactly the spheres within which the conclusions of any particular branch of study may be held to be valid, and resolve their conflicting claims, not by denying that they conflict, but by preventing their encroachment on territory in which they can make no claim to speak with authority? The present rather chaotic condition of our thought appears to me to be directly due to our failure to determine more exactly the sphere within which any particular set of conclusions may be held to be valid, and only indirectly to our failure to unify those conclusions, for I do not see how the latter is possible until the former has been done.

(2) Is the character of the conclusions which science comes to in its study of natural phenomena determined beforehand by the method of inquiry which it adopts, and the terms in which it chooses to express them? The physical sciences adopt a method of study based on calculation and measurement, a method found in its most perfect form in the study of pure mathematics. The adoption of this method necessarily limits their inquiry to the field of objects which are susceptible of treatment by this method, which are measurable or calculable. Science will necessarily conclude that nature is quantitative in character, and works according to laws which can be mathematically formulated, for because of the method it adopts it can reach no other conclusion. This raises two questions, (i) Although science is restricted to the study of material susceptible to treatment by methods of calculation and measurement, it does not follow that these objects can be exhaustively described in the terms which science uses. The problem is then to determine to what extent the descriptions of science are exhaustive, whether any characteristic of major importance is left out, and, consequently, to what extent the conclusions of science may be relied upon. (ii) Some modern scientists are now assuring us that science cannot explain everything, but leaves room for religion. But is not this a conclusion which might have been drawn merely from a study of the method of science, without any consideration of its results? Can there really be any conflict between science and religion unless science moves outside territory marked out for it by its methods? Ultimately these

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both boil down to the question of whether or not it is possible to determine the sphere within which scientific conclusions may be held to be valid, and the weight which we should attach to them, by a study of the methods of science alone, independent of a knowledge of the particular conclusions which science has developed.

(3) The biological sciences are making clear to us the non-rational inheritance which underlies man's development of rational thought, and still permeates it to a considerable extent, even when man is not conscious of the fact that it does so. The sociological sciences are building up a picture of the practical problems with which man was most vitally concerned in the earliest stages of his social development. Social psychology is informing us that the forms in which reflective thought first developed were determined by the nature of the concrete objects with which the reflection dealt, and by the practical purposes which these concrete objects must be made to serve—that is, that the forms of thought were adapted to the nature of concrete objects to the limited extent necessary in order to achieve certain practical results. Genetic psychology assures us that in the mind of the child a similar course of development is followed, that the forms of thought which develop in the mind of a child are determined by the fact that they must be applicable to the concrete objects with which a child is first concerned, but that they correspond to this reality, not completely, but only enough to make it possible for the child to satisfy inherited tendencies to action. This makes it reasonable to suppose that if a child could be brought up in an environment which lacked the concreteness of ours, or if its inherited tendencies could be altered, the forms in which it thought might also differ from those natural to us. Apparently the fundamental forms of our thought remain the same throughout life, however complex a superstructure we may build on them, so that when, as adults, we attempt to frame an interpretation of the mental and physical worlds with which we have to deal, we inevitably do so in forms of thought developed through their application to concrete facts to the limited extent necessary to meet practical needs. This gives little reason to suppose that our thought is capable of encompassing reality truly, but only in a degree sufficient, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, to be of practical value. Such a conclusion would have far-reaching results for philosophy.

Take a particular example of this problem. In our philosophies we are inclined to accept uncritically the bifurcation of reality given us by thought, as, for instance, into material and spiritual, and often to make it, consciously or unconsciously, the basis of calculations as to the ultimate nature of all reality. But the habit of bifurcating reality apparently had its origin in the child's habit of distinguishing certain aspects of its concrete environment as pleasant

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or unpleasant, warm or cold, self or not-self, according as they met certain needs or satisfied certain desires. That is, the habit of mental bifurcation was pre-conditioned by certain needs, and arose out of the application of thought to its environment to the limited extent necessary to satisfy those needs. It would, therefore, seem to be perfectly legitimate for us to use this habit of bifurcating reality in developing a system of thought governed by some purpose, but is it legitimate for us to use this form of thought and develop on the basis of it a system of thought which claims to give an impersonal description of reality, in the sense that it is based directly on facts, and not coloured by any sort of personal bias?

Are we to infer, as some modern scientists are suggesting, that our knowledge of reality is like a map which we develop, indicating certain features only of reality, varying in its nature according to the purpose it is intended to serve, as maps of England would differ if intended for motor traffic, railway traffic, or for a geological survey? Is our whole system of knowledge, then, organized sub-consciously for practical purposes, in order to satisfy, whether immediately or remotely, certain pre-existing needs? If so, it would appear that the next great task of philosophy is that of reclassifying the various branches of philosophic and scientific study in terms of the purposes they are intended to serve, of reorganizing the whole field of human inquiry in terms, not of its results, but of its origins. It will be its task, not to unify results, but to co-ordinate methods, perhaps into one organic whole, by assigning a distinct field and a distinct function to each.

For many of us these are serious problems. And in any case a consideration of them might lead to a valuable house-cleaning of philosophic thought. If it is possible to have them discussed in your Journal, I should be very grateful.

I hope that I have not taken your time unnecessarily. Please excuse me if this should prove to be so.

Sincerely,

W. S. TAYLOR.

INDORE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE,
INDIA.

January 20, 1935.

MY DEAR SIR,

The address by Sir Herbert Samuel at the Annual General Meeting, reported in the current issue of *Philosophy*, is, presumably, intended to summarize and finalize the discussion on the present

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need of a philosophy which he opened in his letter to you last April. May I, as a business man interested in philosophy, or, more accurately, a student of philosophy engaged in business, add something to that discussion which does not seem to have been emphasized either by Sir Herbert or by his critics?

Sir Herbert asks that we put aside epistemology, as the ordinary man is beginning to suspect that the philosopher is obsessed by meaningless generalizations; he asks that our great philosophers should create a new philosophy based on the conception of Conscious Evolution.

Mr. Coombes states that philosophy, as conceived by the layman, is too abstract to be intelligible, and too remote from the affairs of everyday life to be practical. Yet he goes on to say that all men of affairs are really philosophers.

May I suggest, in answer both to Sir Herbert Samuel and Mr. Coombes, that the whole trouble lies in the truth of the statement made by Mr. Aldrich in his letter, namely, in the fact that too few men of affairs care about becoming philosophers? Surely our present need is not so much for a new philosophy as for more philosophy.

As Professor Laird says, we do not yet need to cry "Stop thinking about everything except what is urgent." We do not need so much to restrain or direct the thoughts of our great thinkers as to persuade those who are not in the habit of thinking philosophically at all to start thinking philosophically.

"Our great men," I fear, would take far too long to agree as to the exact form and nature of the new philosophy which Mr. Coombes would like presented to the lay reader in simple language. But the institute would indeed be doing a great work if it could persuade more men of affairs to care about becoming philosophers.

Let the Institute be a sort of missionary society on behalf of philosophy, a society for converting men of affairs to philosophical ways of thinking. By promoting the study of all types of philosophy (epistemology included!) it will be giving the men of affairs a philosophic outlook, a philosophic mind; it will be enabling him to do what he almost never seems to be capable of doing now—viewing his affairs, his business, national affairs, world affairs, *sub specie aeternitatis*; it will enable him to withstand the bullyings of the popular press and the persuasive misrepresentation of Governments.

Professor John Macmurray hints that philosophers make poor men of affairs. Is not our solution then to make men of affairs philosophers?—not Pragmatists, or Behaviourists, or Materialists, or Idealists—or "Conscious Evolutionists"; just philosophers, to find each his own philosophy.

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Once the philosophizing starts, the philosophy will begin to take form; and a far more healthy product it will be than any artificially put together by a committee of great thinkers, "leaving epistemology in the background," in order that they formulate a philosophy to suit the man of affairs

I am, sir,

Yours faithfully,

H. N. PARSONS.

"COTTESLOWE," SALTERTON ROAD,
EXMOUTH, DEVON.

October 5, 1934.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

(SUMMARY)

SIR HERBERT SAMUEL gave his Presidential Address to the Members of the Institute at University College on January 22nd. There was a large attendance. He took as his subject "Philosophy, Religion, and Present World Conditions."

The present generation, said Sir Herbert, takes no great satisfaction in the world as it finds it. The Great War, the great depression, the establishment of arbitrary power in several of the countries of Europe, the spirit of violence that has been let loose, all lead the new generation to ask--What kind of world is this into which we have been born? Some among them, without beliefs, without hopes, are ready to accept any creed, however irrational, however destructive, which offers a new and different civilization. In presence of these conditions, where does religion stand, and where stands philosophy?

Looking back over history, it is plain that the chief agent in promoting morality has been religion. But in our age this force has been weakening. There is a growing divorce between religion and daily life. The hold of the creeds upon conduct has been lessening. The chief reason for this change is the new factor of modern science. It is "the conflict between science and religion" which, more than any other one cause, has thrown the modern world into the state of intellectual confusion in which it finds itself. It is vital that there should be a reconciliation between the two.

This reconciliation is not likely to be helped by the new views of physics of which, in this country, Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans are the principal exponents. Intended to strengthen our faith in religion, those views seem more likely, if accepted, merely to weaken our faith in science. The suggested Principle of Uncertainty at the heart of nature is not accepted by Einstein, Planck, and Rutherford. Quite recently Sir James Jeans himself, in his Presidential Address to the British Association at Aberdeen, has declared that, whether we take the wave-theory of the structure of the atom or the particle-theory, causation does, after all, apply. "The indeterminism of the particle-picture," he says, "seems to reside in our minds rather than in nature. . . . The wave-picture . . . exhibits a complete determinism." He adds, "Things still change solely as they are compelled, but it no longer seems impossible that part of the compulsion may originate in our own minds." It would

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seem to follow that, before there were scientists, the electrons may have behaved differently from now, and if human minds ceased to pay attention to them, they would apparently revert to their former behaviour. We may wonder what was the reaction of the British Association for the Advancement of Science to this new doctrine.

As to Philosophy's own contribution—her influence on the modern world has been lessened by the tendency to use a specialized language, and to engage in discussions that are mainly dialectic or even linguistic. But now, in this country and elsewhere, philosophy is growing more and more self-dependent, vigorous, and original. Both the student and the layman may find in the philosophic writings of to-day a greater degree of actuality and of clarity than for a long time past.

But it must be admitted that, in so far as philosophy has had an effective influence upon the course of recent events, that influence has sometimes been harmful. Particularly has that proved to be so in Germany. The ideas of Fichte, of Hegel, and now of Nietzsche, can be seen to be among the principal causes of the unrest of the modern world.

It is the Hegelian doctrine of the reality and supremacy of the State which is the root of much of the evil of our times. This doctrine surely rests upon a delusion. The State can be nothing other than a collection of men and women who have organized themselves for purposes of joint action. Apart from them, there is nothing; just as the swarm is nothing apart from the bees. It is true that men, like bees, have an innate tendency to co-operate; it is true that if they were not organized in a State they would be different from what they are, and inferior; and it is true that, when occasion requires, they must be ready to make sacrifices of their own individual advantage for the sake of the social advantage. But this does not confer "reality" upon the forms which they may adopt for the purposes of joint action. Still less does it endow the system, which they have themselves created, with an absolute sovereignty entitled to a blind obedience. The notion that the State is an entity "real in its own right" may be seen on examination to be nothing more than an imagination of sophisticated metaphysicians wandering in a vacuum remote from actuality.

In Britain, however, thought has moved upon other lines, and the effect is seen in a different direction of public opinion, a different national policy, and different results to the welfare of the people. Perhaps philosophy, both in this country and elsewhere, may even now be on the eve of furnishing to the world that broad guidance for lack of which it wanders bewildered.

There is ground for believing that this last half-century and the

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years immediately ahead of us may be of special significance, because the present age is the first to become conscious of its own evolution. Now, for the first time, there is a race of beings on this planet which is aware, in part at least, of the cosmic process. Evolution there has always been; now, for the first time, there may be Conscious Evolution. If, as we now know is the case, unconscious evolution has enabled animals to be the prototypes of simian man, and simian man of man in civilization, there is no reason why conscious evolution should not raise us, and with vastly accelerated speed, to something as much higher again in the scale of being.

The principle of conscious evolution will naturally take account of three main factors—first, the physical basis of human life, that is the number and the quality of the human beings brought into the world; secondly, their physical environment; thirdly, their environment of ideas.

We see, taking their places in an ordered scheme, the new science of eugenics, the work of the educationalists, industrial organization, politics both national and international— all the branches of sociology. We see ethics entering in; trying to find what things are good, what aims are worth pursuing; teaching that each society exists only to promote the perfection of its members, that each nation should help, not thwart, the efforts of the rest. Ethics sets the goal for politics and economics, for all the vast variety of activities which make up the seething life of the modern world.

Religion may powerfully co-operate. "The paramount virtue of religion," says Matthew Arnold, "is that it has *lighted up* morality; that it has supplied the emotion and inspiration needful for carrying the sage along the narrow way perfectly, for carrying the ordinary man along it at all."

We must be on our guard against putting too high the evils and the dangers, real as they are, of our times. The countries where a militarist philosophy is supreme are still a small minority in the civilized world. In the economic sphere the average standard of living, taking mankind as a whole, has certainly been higher in our own times than it has ever been in the course of history. We have succeeded in fending off the two great scourges of all earlier ages—famine and plague. We have succeeded in harnessing the forces of nature so effectively that our problem is less the maintenance of production than efficient direction of distribution. If there is violence, let it be remembered that violence is no new thing. If disasters bulk large in our daily reading, let it be remembered that modern means of communication make us aware immediately of every misfortune in every part of the globe. Rightly concentrating our attention especially upon the abnormal in order to effect a cure,

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we may be inclined to underestimate the normal. We must see world conditions as a whole.

Those are the lines, perhaps, on which may emerge the guidance for which the new generation is eager. There may yet be revealed the vision without which the people perish. We may hold the faith that Philosophy, together with her sisters Religion and Science, will yet succeed in pointing the paths along which man should move—now for the first time with a consciousness of what he is doing and where he is going. They are paths that shall lead towards a society better than that about us—in which there shall be dignity, as well as activity, in private life, simplicity in manners, beauty in environment, majesty in the State and tranquillity in the world.



GREAT THINKERS

(IV) PLOTINUS

THE VERY REVEREND W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., F.B.A.

TIMES have changed since Pfeleiderer, in 1883, after summing up Neoplatonism in three contemptuous sentences, concludes, "In this convulsed state, entirely destitute of contents, consciousness has disappeared, and with it the very possibility of the religious relation, in favour of an orgiastic tumult of feeling." Had Pfeleiderer ever read a word of Plotinus or Proclus? If not, he had many to keep him company among the philosophers of his generation, though to be sure, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann realized the importance of the latest era in Greek philosophy. Jowett, in his introductions to Plato, never shows the slightest interest in what Platonism became under the Roman Empire. Edward Caird had certainly read Plotinus; but his lectures upon him in his *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, though highly praised at the time, are even more misleading than the ignorant neglect of writers like Pfeleiderer. When he says that the philosophy of Plotinus "involves a negation of the finite or determinate in all its forms"; that "the world of pure intelligence is opposed in the sharpest way to the world of spatial externality and temporal change"; that "he develops to its extremest form the dualism of form and matter"; that in its ascent "spirit divests itself of one element of its life after another," it would be easy to refute every one of these statements from the *Enneads*. There is no "dualism" in Plotinus; his hypostases flow into each other with "nothing between"; "there is nothing Yonder that is not also Here"; "to try to rise above Intelligence (or Spirit, νοῦς) is to fall outside it"; and life in the *κόσμος νοητός* is not poorer but much richer than the life of sensation and merely "psychic" interests.

It is now generally recognized that Plotinus is one of the greatest names in the history of thought. Vacherot calls the *Enneads* "the vastest, richest, and perhaps the most powerful synthesis in the whole history of philosophy." Thomas Whittaker calls Plotinus "the greatest individual thinker between Aristotle and Descartes"; Drews, "the greatest metaphysician of antiquity." Eucken draws special attention to his influence upon Christian thought - an influence greater, he thinks, than that of any other thinker; and Troeltsch, whom until his death in 1927 I should have ranked as perhaps the deepest philosophical theologian in Europe, urges that his importance

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is far from being merely historical. "In my opinion," he writes, "the deeper stress of the scientific and philosophical spirit in modern times has made the blend of Neoplatonism and New Testament Christianity the only possible solution of the problem at the present day, and I do not doubt that the synthesis of Neoplatonism and Christianity will once more be dominant in modern thought." This conviction is leading many Christian apologists back to the study of the Schoolmen. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps, owes as much to the Neoplatonists as he does to Aristotle. This means a return to realism, rationalism, and mysticism. The faith that these three can be combined is the hall-mark of Platonism.

Although Plotinus writes as if he lived in a timeless world, and although there seems to have been a kind of convention not to mention historical events, whether past or present, the Neoplatonists were children of their age, like everyone else. Plotinus was profoundly loyal to the Greek philosophical tradition, and never willingly deserts his master Plato. But the problems of his age were not the problems of classical Greek thought. Philosophy in antiquity had been the centre of liberal education. It was rooted in the civic life of the self-governing town or canton. But this type of polity was now obsolete. Philosophy made no attempt to adapt itself, except by withdrawing altogether from politics and sociology. Under the Stoics it was a protest against political changes; under the Neoplatonists it tried to resist the Christian theocracy. Later revivals of Platonism have had the same character. The Renaissance scholars revolted against medieval theology, the Cambridge Platonists against "Hobbism," modern Platonists against various tendencies of thought which are in different ways anti-Hellenic.

Besides the political changes, we have to notice the prevalent *theocrasia* or fusion of religious cults, the inroads of Oriental worships, the growth of superstition (though Greek thought remained rationalistic), pessimism about the future of society and reverence for antiquity, a far-reaching modification of the older Hellenic and Roman ethics, and an intense individualism in place of the public spirit of earlier periods. The real Greeks and Romans were not far from extinction; the Empire was largely populated by Orientals and Germans, whose traditions were quite different. Literature, art, and culture generally, were already stricken with barrenness, though this was the age of the great jurists. Only religion was full of life, and philosophy, which was now theocratic as it had never been before in Europe. But philosophy was on the whole true to the Hellenic tradition, and the mutual hostility of the rival schools had much abated. Both Plotinus and his predecessors, such as Numenius, tried to find room within Platonism for much which was derived from Aristotle, and for something from the Stoa. Plotinus has

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little or nothing to say about Oriental religions. He must have seen a great deal of Christianity at Alexandria and Rome, but like other pagans at the time he probably failed to realize its importance. It was a "barbarous theosophy." (Even Proclus in the fifth century apologizes for believing in angels. "The word is not foreign and peculiar to barbarous theosophy; Plato in the *Cratylus* calls Hermines and Iris angels.") He attacks the half-Christian Gnostics, because they aspired to be philosophers, and, he may have thought, caricatured his own system. Judaism was "a philosophic religion"; but those who so called it were probably thinking of Philo and other Hellenizing Jews.

Neoplatonism had two main objects. On the theoretical side it aimed at providing a genuinely Greek philosophy which should bring to an end the quarrelling of the sects by amalgamating all the best that the "great men of old" had thought and taught. On the practical side it sought to meet the earnest religious needs of the time. How was the soul to return to God? How was the gulf between them to be spanned? How were the benefits which the popular mystery religions offered to confer by sacramental rites to be secured within the limits of Hellenic rationalism? Could a deeply religious mysticism be built on a rationalistic foundation? The philosophical importance of Plotinus resides in his attempts to answer these questions, which, it need not be said, are as fundamental in our day as they were in his. The *Enneads* are the record of the wrestlings of a man of genius with this tremendous problem.

After his death it was impossible to maintain the debate on the same level. Within two generations," says Dodds, "the dialectical tension of opposites which is the nerve of the Plotinian system was threatening to sink into a meaningless affirmation of incompatibilis; and 'unification' had ceased to be a living experience or even a living ideal, and had become a pious formula on the lips of professors." With Iamblichus, a new orientation begins. The Plotinian *θεωπία* is changed to *θεουργία*; ritual magic takes the place of contemplation. This was exactly what Plotinus wished to avoid; but in his anxiety to obliterate all hard-and-fast lines across the field of thought, and to depict the ascent of the soul not by "quanta," but by continuous progression, he laid stress on the doctrine of "sympathies" running through the whole of nature, and so left the door open for magic, which it was difficult for a third-century thinker to repudiate entirely. But this perversion destroys the noble rational bases of Plotinian mysticism, and contaminates philosophy with superstitions which belong to the lower levels of religion. The importance of the change was recognized by Olympiodorus, who says that, in contrast with Plotinus and Porphyry, the "priestly school" of Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus put "the hieratic art" before philosophy.

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The new religions of salvation were in truth very unlike the old Greek tradition. The eastern faiths, such as Judaism, present us with a world historic, dramatic, and mythical, The real is the historical. On the other side we have a rationalist conception in which the transitory as such is the unreal, and in which it is difficult to account for any real change. This is, of course, one of the most fundamental cleavages in thought, down to our own day. "Thy sons, O Zion," and "Thy sons, O Greece," came together in Catholic Christianity, which gained by doing justice to two entirely different ways of envisaging reality; but the two agree no better than oil and water, and some of the chief theological controversies have no other origin.

Bréhier, whose studies of Plotinus contain some original reflexions, says that from the first century onwards there were small communities of contemplatives, especially in Egypt, who had no sympathy with the sacerdotal cults which became prominent in the same period. The emphasis on contemplation in Plotinus may be traced back to this type of religion. For him, even nature and art are inferior degrees of contemplation. But the thought of Plotinus is firmly rooted in realism. The intelligible, or, as I have preferred to render it, the spiritual (since we can hardly avoid the "intellectualist" suggestion of the word intelligence) is, after all, only the interior face of things. The intelligence enriches, not impoverishes, sensation. "Sensations are obscure thoughts, and intelligible (or spiritual) thoughts are clear sensations." Thus he can refine and spiritualize even the sensuous.

This fluidity of concepts would hardly have satisfied the geometer Plato. It is so essentially bound up with degrees of value that it would have puzzled Sir James Jeans's mathematical God. Scholastic philosophy is often accused of arguing from rigid concepts which do not agree with our experience of reality. Plotinus, for whom, in the world Yonder, all things penetrate and flow into each other, escapes this criticism. Modern thinkers are more likely to complain that in this system nothing is more fluid than human personality. "There is no point," he says himself, "where a man may fix limits and say, so far it is myself." In the highest stages of the spiritual life the feeling of separate individuality disappears; there is no more any memory of self. We possess ourselves, but for that very reason we do not think about ourselves. All our activity is directed upon the stage next above us. We become that object; we offer ourselves to it as a 'matter' which it informs; we are only potentially ourselves." It follows the self-consciousness, which in some modern philosophies is the impregnable citadel of thought, is not only unessential, but is a sign of imperfection. Even in our mechanical work, he observes, we often do best when we are not thinking about the motions of our hands. Whether Plotinus can reconcile this picture of

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life in the spiritual world with his assertion that 'our individuality must be preserved,' is uncertain. He tries to envisage a state of being in which living creatures are distinct but not separate. Love and sympathy make them all one; but his world Yonder is certainly not "an indifferentiated jelly."

Bréhier has revived the debate, which seemed to have been almost closed, whether any genuine Oriental influence can be found in Plotinus. The majority of recent writers have decided that Neoplatonism is wholly within the Greek tradition. But this throws back ~~the~~ problem upon Plato, whom Livingstone has declared not to be a typical Greek, and of whom Whittaker has said that he diverged much further from Hellenic ideals than Plotinus. "Plato's ideal society is in contact on one side with the pre-Hellenic East"—he is thinking especially of Egypt—"and on the other side with the Orientalized Europe of the Middle Ages." Plato's schemes of political and social reform did not interest Plotinus; and we can hardly narrow genuine Hellenism by excluding Plato, or the Orphics. Bréhier, however, regards rationalism alone as Greek; the mystical ideal of the complete unification of being in the Godhead, guaranteed by intuitive evidence, he traces to Eastern influence. But mysticism does not need to borrow from exotic sources; it is personal religion in its innermost essence; it springs into being whenever and wherever the human spirit is driven back from external activities to contemplate its own nature and its relations with the eternal.

It is true that problems of personality, and of self-consciousness, press upon Plotinus with a weight unknown to classical Greek philosophy. The method of rationalism is changed when the reasoning subject changes with the objects which it contemplates. Mysticism can thus be superimposed upon rationalism without destroying the rationalist foundation. In this way, though Plotinus is far enough from the post-Kantian idealism, in which the mind creates a world internal to itself, it is true that he is one of the founders of modern epistemology. The reluctance of Porphyry to admit that the spiritual world is not external to spirit (*οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ τὰ νοητά*) shows that the teaching of Plotinus was still unfamiliar and difficult to students of philosophy. It is also true that, especially in the sixth *Enneads*, he insists on the ultimate identity of our selves with the universal Being, and speaks of separate individuality as an illusion from which we should free ourselves. This, Bréhier argues, is Indian and not European philosophy.

Porphyry tells us that Plotinus, before he went to Rome, was desirous of studying the philosophy of Persia and of India. With this object he attached himself to the army which the emperor Gordian led against Persia. A more unfavourable opportunity of studying the wisdom of the East can hardly be imagined, since

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Persia was the enemy, and Gordian never contemplated carrying the Roman arms to the Indus. The sacramental cult of Mithra could have had no attractions for Plotinus, who was no churchgoer, and shocked his friends by saying to them, "It is for the gods to come to me, not for me to go to them." "Das Denken ist auch Gottesdienst," as Hegel said to his housekeeper. "The universal Power," he says, "is within you. It has not to come and so be present with you; it is you that have turned away from it. It is there all the time; you are not far from it, but you have turned your face the other way." But may he not have been attracted by Indian thought, which was fairly well known at Alexandria? The Greeks had long been interested in the gymnosophists, who seemed to have solved the problem of invulnerability. Even Socrates, according to Aristoxenus of Tarentum, cited by Eusebius, had an argument with an Indian at Athens.

To estimate the resemblances between Neoplatonism and Indian thought would require much more knowledge of the sacred books of the East than I possess. But I think there is one decisive and all-important divergence. In Asiatic thought, all between the illusory world of sensation and the undifferentiated Absolute seems to drop out. We start from the infra-real and we end with the supra-real. Reality thus becomes empty of contents, and salvation is the attainment of a condition not unlike dreamless sleep. But this is not at all the tendency of Neoplatonism. The heaven of Plotinus is throbbing with life and rich with colour. The hypostasis of *vous* appears under the triple aspect of a world of ideas, as in Plato, the origin of forms as in Aristotle, and a system of monads united by sympathy as in the Stoics. This, and not the ineffable One, of whom nothing can be predicated, is the real world of Neoplatonism. There is nothing, I think, to correspond with it in Indian thought, and the difference seems to me fundamental. I agree with Bréhier that "the theory of the intelligence is the affirmation of the reality of rational, moral, and aesthetic values, which dominate the sensible world and the judgment which we form about it." But he finds in Plotinus a fusion of this Platonic conception of the intelligence, as realizing itself in a system of articulated notions, with that of a spiritual attitude, out of relation with scientific knowledge. The attempt to combine mystical religion with philosophical realism is at the centre of Plotinus's system; I am not aware of anything much like it in Indian speculation. We might possibly say that the relation of Plotinus to Greek rationalism is not very unlike that of Spinoza to Descartes.

One difficulty which modern critics find in Plotinus is that the creation of the universe is not satisfactorily explained. Plotinus must have been aware that "it had to be" is no explanation, and that the alleged necessity of the supreme principle "as it were over-

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flowing," and so creating down to the lowest grades of possible existence does not quite carry conviction. But I do not know of any other philosophy which has really accounted for the universe; its existence must, I think, be accepted as a brute fact, or a starting-point. But besides this the category of *procession* was in antiquity what the inverse process of evolution has been to us, the universal framework into which all diversities are fitted. There was the same tendency to make it the fundamental law; and we, who have seen the misuse of the conception of evolution in our own day, can make allowance for a similar unthinking acceptance of procession or emanation in antiquity. For a Greek, the explanation of a thing must always be sought in what is above it, not in what is below. By their fruits, not by their roots, we shall know the value of and meaning of things. The "nature" of "matter" (which in Plotinus is not "material"—here one is tempted to find a resemblance with the most modern physics) is to be the recipient of forms; it is nothing in itself, but is the potentiality of all things. At every stage in the ascent there is an inferior element which aspires or strives to be taken up into the superior; there is "divine matter" even in the intelligible. There is thus a double movement, a way down and a way up, running through the whole of nature. The ascent of the hill of the Lord is carefully and lovingly described; the descent is—well, what had to be if there was to be a world at all.

The question whether it would have been better for the soul to have remained "Yonder" is a great problem for Platonists. Plotinus, for once, summons up courage to say that the divine Plato contradicts himself. The *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus* "do not say the same thing." Plotinus cannot be acquitted of vacillation; but on the whole he distinguishes between the natural and necessary act by which the soul animates the body, and the voluntary act by which it entangles itself with "the things that are Here." He follows the *Timaeus* rather than the *Phaedrus* with the figure of the soul moulting its wing-feathers.

A kindred problem was whether the soul ever "descends entire." Must we not say that part of it remains impeccable in the world Yonder to which it belongs? The question may seem unreal; but it is important in view of the Plotinian Doctrine that we can only know what is akin to ourselves. If the soul were wholly immersed in "matter," how could it escape, since in this philosophy there is no divine rescuer, no Word made flesh? The Christian mystics of the Middle Ages had the same doctrine. At the centre of the soul there is a something, which they called the Spark, or Synteresis, which "can never consent to sin." This Spark, according to some of them, is super-personal; it is, says Eckhart, "so akin to God that it is one with God, and not merely united to Him." It is, says Hermann

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of Fritslar, "a power or faculty in the soul, wherein God works immediately, without means and without intermission." So Plotinus says, "Sin is always human, being mixed with something contrary to itself." The later Neoplatonists, with whom the Plotinian mysticism had partially lost contact with spiritual experience, all, with the exception of Theodorus and Damascius, forsake Plotinus here. "If the will sins," asks Iamblichus, "how can the soul be sinless?" The soul, according to him, descends entire. Proclus, more decidedly than Plotinus, repudiates the notion that there is any moral lapse in the soul's incarnation; it is a necessary movement; or if a motive must be assigned, "the soul comes down because it wishes to imitate the providence of the gods." All souls must trace the circle again and again.

The problem of the status of Time in reality has always been a crux which tends to divide philosophies into two classes. For a Platonist, the transitory is, as such, the unreal, and therefore, it would seem, there can be no *devenir* in reality. And yet, "things that are born are nothing without their future." They yearn to continue in existence, because perpetuity is the symbol or copy of the permanence of eternity, and they also press upwards, whether consciously or not, to reach the next stage above that in which they now are. "Time is the activity of an eternal soul, not turned towards itself nor within itself, but exercised in creation and generation." "It is the span of life proper to the soul." This is quite intelligible; Time is the moving image of eternity. But what the modern thinker wants to know is whether happenings in time in any way determine the condition of real beings in the eternal world. A man, it appears, may lose his soul, but not a real soul, not the soul that would have been his if he had not been a bad man. Is the life of heaven, as we may call it, unaffected by anything that takes place in time or history? The very beautiful description of the happy life of spirits Yonder gives no hint of a negative answer. "A pleasant life is theirs in heaven; they have the truth for mother, nurse, real being, and nutriment. They see all things, not the things that are born and die, but those which have real being; and they see themselves in others. For them all things are transparent, and there is nothing dark or impenetrable, but everyone is manifest to everyone internally; for light is manifest to light. For everyone has all things in himself and sees all things in another; so that all things are everywhere and all is all and each is all, and the glory is infinite. Each of them is great, since Yonder the small also is great. In heaven the sun is all the stars, and each again and all are the sun. There pure movement reigns, for that which produces the movement, not being a stranger to it, does not trouble it. Rest is also perfect, because no agitation mingles with it." There is nowhere any hint of progress, except

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the *introrsum ascendere* of the soul. Nor, it would seem, can there be anything like a single purpose in the life of the universe, which is being achieved in the course of ages. Innumerable finite purposes there may be and are; but the great soul of the world, the spiritual ocean in which sensible reality is bathed, revolves in the circle of its own perfection, giving birth to endless cycles in the world of becoming, which reflect it but do not alter it in any way. The universe is perpetual, as its creator is eternal. We can understand how unwelcome to every Platonist is the astronomers' doctrine that the whole world is running down irreversibly like a clock. "Your clock must have been wound up once," he will say to the men of science, "and it will be wound up again. You say that that is impossible; but it is not more impossible than the last winding up, of which you can only say, with Eddington, that it must have 'started with a bang.' " As for history, I fear the consistent Neoplatonist must agree with Bosanquet that it does not matter very much. The serene indifference of Plotinus to the calamities which were destroying civilization strikes a chill in the twentieth-century European. We cannot rise to this philosophic calm, and perhaps we would not if we could.

The Greeks had no symbol for zero, and could not anticipate Scotus Erigena's dictum that the Godhead, or Absolute, *non immerito Nihilum vocatur*. They called the Absolute the One, and also the Good. The mystical trance is evidence that there is something in us which can bring us, on very rare occasions, into contact with the primal source of all reality; and the fact that even in the spiritual world there is a unity in duality of subject and object, the two being reciprocally interdependent, and in complete harmony, but not completely fused, points to an absolute unity from which both spring. The argument, as usual in this system, has two aspects, one metaphysical, the other experiential. In spite of the beauty of the language in which Plotinus, like other mystics, tries to express what human speech cannot describe, we must not exaggerate the importance which this culminating revelation has in his system. The centre of the philosophy is that life in the "intelligible world" which we can enjoy with the help of a faculty "which all possess, but only a few use." "The vision is for him who will see it"; but the path thereto is long and arduous, traversing first the field of the civic virtues, which Plotinus would not have us neglect, then the discipline of purification, then the contemplation which leads to illumination. The "unitive life" lies beyond, a goal hardly to be attained while we are on earth. Nevertheless, it is towards this consummation that we must look. "We are like a choir of singers who stand round 'the conductor, but do not always sing in time because their attention is distracted to some external object. When they look at the conductor

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they sing well and are really with him. Then we attain the end of our existence and our repose. We no longer sing out of tune, but form in very truth a divine chorus round the One."

Those who have accused Neoplatonism of "peeling the onion"—of straining at infinity and grasping only zero—must remember the importance which is given to *Love* in this philosophy. It is the "spirit of love" which attains, and love, as we all know, neither effaces our own personality nor desires to clasp a shadow. That the object of love is in a sense our own transfigured superselves is true; but we may refer to the passage already quoted about beatitude as the perfect attainment of sympathy. Plotinus's God, we are told, is not a personal object. No, but He is a super-personal subject. Spinoza and some of the mystics have felt the same and been content.

"The fire still burns on the altars of Plotinus." He is the supreme prophet and teacher of one very important branch of religious philosophy. God is spirit. God is knowable. Earth is the shadow of heaven, but "the shadow is a true shadow, as the substance is a true substance." Three classes of men are beckoned to the great quest—the philosopher, the lover, and the servant of the Muses. Truth, Goodness, and Beauty are the ultimate values which are also the supreme realities. To live resolutely in the Whole, the Good, and the Beautiful, is, as Goethe says, the whole duty of man.

REASON AND THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING

PROFESSOR C. A. CAMPBELL.

THE problem of suffering is essentially a problem in philosophical theology. For many philosophical systems the phenomena of suffering set no special problem at all. The most influential philosophies of the present age, for example, have almost nothing to say on the subject—and there is no reason why, on their metaphysical principles, they should say anything. The problem is a relevant one only for those philosophies which claim to be in at least general accord with the “religious interpretation of the universe.” But for them it is crucial. Given a *Weltanschauung* like that of Absolute Idealism, for which the ultimate principle from which all things derive their being is an Infinite and Perfect Spirit, and it becomes at once a clear obligation to offer some explanation of how we are to reconcile the Goodness of God with the existence in the world of so much suffering which is *prima facie* just bad. As we all know, the problem is an extraordinarily hard one to solve. But, inasmuch as the religious interpretation of the universe demands its solution as a condition of its own possibility, its importance is proportionate to its difficulty.

In what follows I shall be playing, almost throughout, the not very congenial part of destructive critic. Actually I do hold, and am also anxious to recommend, a certain positive doctrine. But there are some occasions, and this seems to me to be one of them, upon which the almost indispensable preliminary to recommending effectively a positive point of view is to draw attention to the gravity of the difficulties which beset any other. Why I regard this as such an occasion will probably be appreciated when I explain that the positive point of view which I favour is that associated with the name of Rudolf Otto. Otto's solution, as is well known, involves appeal to the “supra-rational” character of the Divine Perfection: and the demand for a “rational” explanation of all things, whether on the earth below or in the heavens above, is so deeply engrained in Occidental habits of thought that those of us who feel obliged, like Otto, to proclaim a definite *ne plus ultra* to the human reason are fully prepared to find our views received with much initial suspicion, and even contempt. We fully expect to be accused of an *ignava ratio*, which flies for refuge to an *asylum ignorantiae*. But our withers remain unwrung. For us, the attempt to interpret the nature of God in conceptual terms exhibits the same kind of “courage” as

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would the attempt to express the square root of -1 in a rational number. Be that as it may, the simple fact has got to be reckoned with that there does exist in most quarters a strong—and in many respects, I agree, a healthy—dislike of embracing any kind of supra-rational hypothesis until all rational hypotheses have been tried out and found wanting. And that is why I am preferring in this paper to attempt a work of destruction rather than of construction, to criticize certain rationalistic solutions of the problem of suffering rather than to expound and defend the supra-rationalist solution which finds so much better expression than I could possibly give to it in those pages of *Das Heilige* which contain its author's exegesis of the Book of Job.¹

Our space is brief, so let us, without further preamble, settle down to our problem. And let us begin by noting that it is not, of course, *all* human suffering which constitutes a problem, even a *prima facie* problem, for the religious interpretation of the universe. We can quite well think of God as manifesting Perfect Goodness in His relations with man, without having to regard Him as a "Universalistic Hedonist" in action—a kind of colossal Jeremy Bentham doling out the greatest possible pleasure to the largest possible number. The present Master of Balliol once protested that far too many people seem to believe not that "man's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever," but that "God's chief end is to glorify man and make him enjoy himself for ever." A similar thought was in Dean Inge's mind, I suppose, when he wrote recently that some people pray to God as though he were a kind of benevolent fairy. Needless to say, no serious religious thinker acquiesces in this vulgar identification of the Divine Goodness with indiscriminate pleasure-giving. On the contrary, it is frankly recognized that certain kinds of suffering occasion no perplexities whatever. Thus no one, I imagine, experiences any difficulty in reconciling with God's Perfection the existence of suffering that is *deserved*, and is roughly proportionate to desert. This, we should say, is but justice: and justice is a virtue. It is the existence of so much apparently *unmerited* suffering that engenders our doubts. "How can a just God let such things be?" we ask, confronted by some peculiarly heart-breaking spectacle of this kind. Never to have been stirred to such questioning is, I should say, much more likely to be the mark of an insensitive egoism than of an exalted spirituality. What we have to investigate here is the claim to adequacy of the several

¹ I may perhaps be permitted to add, in order to forestall any suggestion of philosophical eclecticism, that my adoption of a supra-rationalist position in respect of the problem of suffering is only a particular application of the metaphysical principles which I have advocated at length in my *Scepticism and Construction*.

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replies which such questioning has evoked from those who are resolute to maintain the fundamental truth of religion.

These replies (so far as known to me) fall roughly into two groups: as might, indeed, be conjectured from the nature of the problem. For, on the face of it, it looks as though we must, if we are to get any kind of solution, maintain one or other of two positions. We must maintain *either* that the suffering which creates our problem is not really, but only in appearance, evil, *or* that God is not in the fullest sense Perfect. What it seems manifestly impossible to hold together is the real evilness of suffering and the absolute Perfection of God. Accordingly, attempted solutions of the problem of suffering tend naturally to take the course either of explaining away the evilness of suffering or of compromising the Perfection of God.

Of these courses the latter is much the simpler, though also, I think, much the least plausible. God's perfection is compromised, not of course by admitting any defect of moral excellence, but by the denial of His Omnipotence. If we are prepared to regard God the Creator in the light of an artificer operating upon a material which is given to Him from without, and which is therefore capable of offering obstruction to the ideal achievement of His purposes, then it is clear that we need find no incompatibility in the existence of much suffering that both seems, and is, evil with the prevailing justice and loving-kindness of God. Evil does exist in the world on this view, but it would not if God could help it. To put it crudely, but not, I think, unfairly, God is doing the very best He can.

But to put it thus crudely is, I think, to become conscious at once of the intensely unsatisfactory character of a solution along these lines. To derogate from God's Majesty and Dominion by the admission of an alien power which can thwart the full realization of the Divine Will is surely to adopt a point of view profoundly repugnant to the religious consciousness. Faith in God, we are wont to believe, bears in its train the "peace that passeth understanding." But is this ineffable tranquillity of the spirit really possible if the God in whom we believe is recognized to be so limited that, for aught we know, He may be prevented by agencies over which He has no control from the carrying out of His beneficent aims? The "peace that passeth understanding" is, surely, the fruit of a deep and steadfast faith that *all* things are in the hands of Perfect and Almighty God. In the absence of this faith it cannot, it seems to me, be long sustained in the soul of any thoughtful person. From many points of view, without doubt, the hypothesis of a Finite God—for that is what the denial of God's Omnipotence amounts to—is an attractive one. But to adopt it is, I think, to do violence to an aspect of the religious consciousness which it is difficult not to believe integral and indispensable.

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I think it would be wasted labour to dwell at greater length upon this (as it seems to me) hopeless expedient of surrendering the Divine Omnipotence. I propose to turn at once to the examination of the more interesting and more widely sponsored type of solution which aims at *arguing away the evilness* of suffering. A great number of considerations have been marshalled in this interest, and I shall try to set out, and then criticize, the more important of them as fairly as I can.

The first suggestion with which I wish to deal is one which, if valid, offers us an absolute release from our difficulties. We saw that it is only unmerited suffering that provokes our doubts of the goodness of God. What if there is really *no* human suffering which is unmerited? To maintain this in any literal sense may seem to be, and I think it is, an outrage upon humanity. But it is a suggestion which it is impossible to ignore, for there is a good deal in the utterances of religion which seems to lend it countenance. Moreover, did not one of the most inspiring and influential lay thinkers of a recent generation, Thomas Carlyle, express himself constantly in language which implies agreement with this attitude? The point of view is, I suppose, that we are all in the last resort such miserable sinners, such "vile bodies," even the best of us, that any happiness or even amelioration of suffering which God may be pleased to bestow upon us ought to be regarded as an act of grace and mercy, not as something which our merits entitle us to claim from God as our right in the name of justice. If we can maintain this attitude, if we can believe that we deserve the worst that can possibly befall us, our complaints will be changed to thankfulness for even the most exiguous allotment of happiness. In Carlyle's famous words, "Fancy that thou deservest to be hanged (as is most likely), thou wilt feel it happiness to be only shot: fancy that thou deservest to be hanged in a hair-halter, it will be a luxury to die in hemp!"

Now I am far from denying that there is latent here a profound religious truth. But it is one which may very easily pass over into a profane and vulgar error, and it does so pass whenever it takes the form (as with Carlyle's words) of implying that all human suffering is, in the ordinary sense, *deserved*. In the presence of, and by contrast with, God's ineffable Holiness, the religious man is conscious of his own unutterable unworthiness, that before God he is but "dust and ashes." That is, I think, no more than the bare truth. But it seems to me that Rudolf Otto is incontrovertibly in the right in insisting that the religious man has in such experience passed to a plane clean beyond that in which *moral* categories, and the conceptions of crime and punishment, are relevant. In such experience the religious man is not, or certainly need not be, proclaiming his consciousness of moral wickedness. What he is proclaiming is his sense

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of unspeakable insignificance before the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* of Deity. To suppose that the religious man's self-abasement in the presence of the Holy springs from the felt contrast of his own moral depravity with God's moral Perfection is, I think, utterly to mis-read, and profoundly to diminish, the significance of authentic religious experience. God-consciousness may, indeed *must*, I should say, in so far as it is deep and pure, induce in the subject a frame of mind which accepts without railing whatever adversity may be in store for him. That is a matter to which we may return. But my present point is that it is emphatically not because God-consciousness makes us aware that our sinfulness is so heinous that we *deserve* the worst that can befall us, as due *punishment* for our misdeeds. To believe that would surely be to make complete nonsense of morality. It would stultify all the standards by which we appraise, roughly though it be, the relative worth of persons. If everyone deserves the worst, nobody can be any better nor any worse than anybody else.

If a doubt should still remain in anyone's mind as to the actual existence of suffering that it is hopeless to regard as deserved, I do not know how it can withstand even the briefest reflection upon the agonies which little children may be called upon to bear. Little children are not miserable sinners. To refuse to admit that at least much of their suffering is wholly unmerited would be, not to put to a fine a point upon it, just silly. But must we not, if we are candid with ourselves, say essentially the same thing about an appreciable amount of adult suffering? Clear cases may be rare, but I imagine that every one of us is acquainted personally with at least one case concerning which, if we were compelled to choose outright between believing that the suffering is deserved or believing that God is unjust, common honesty would oblige us to lean to the latter alternative.

I pass on to consider a second mode of argument. This turns upon a thought which finds an apt expression in a passage from R. L. Stevenson quoted by Professor Sorley: "That which we suffer ourselves has no longer the same air of monstrous injustice and wanton cruelty that suffering wears when we see it in the case of others."¹ The sentiment which these words express has had the endorsement of many thinkers, notably of Sorley himself. For this reason alone, if for no other, it would merit our respectful attention. Its implication with respect to our present problem is, I think, obvious. What is suggested is that it is only in so far as we regard suffering from the *outside*, and not as it is as experienced by the sufferer himself, i.e. in its *real* nature, that suffering seems to impugn the goodness of God. Let us inquire, then, concerning the grounds and validity of this point of view.

¹ Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 349.

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In the first place we may, I think, admit quite freely that it is generally the sufferings of others which stimulate our doubt of the existence of a good God. But at least part of the explanation of this may be very simple, merely the fact that there are, after all, comparatively few of us afflicted with sufferings of our own so extreme and so seemingly meaningless in character as to affect seriously the habit of thought engendered by our religious upbringing. Sympathy with the sufferings of others, rather than one's own suffering, is thus very understandably the most prolific source of doubt. Many a man whose own lot is cast in pleasant places feels himself quite incapable of thanking God for his private blessings because of his acute realization that if God is indeed the ultimate author of man's weal and woe, there are other men that have as good cause for cursing as he has for praising. And all honour to humanity that it should be so! There are surely few more pitiable spectacles than that of the man who complacently sings hallelujahs to God for his individual prosperity, utterly untroubled by the thought that the "Giver of all good things" seems also to give some very bad things—to other persons.

But in the argument we are reviewing, the claim is made that the basic reason why it is the sufferings of others that stimulate doubt is that the imagination of the onlooker tends to exaggerate the harshness of the suffering, reading into it a cruelty which it does not possess for the sufferer; does not, therefore, possess in itself. I have not seen very clearly stated anywhere the reasons which may be supposed to account for this exaggerative tendency, but we shall perhaps not go far astray if we distinguish three.

Attention might be directed, firstly, to the power of accommodation to pain of the human body-mind. It is generally what seem to be long-drawn-out agonies that especially distress the spectator. But the spectator tends to forget that to a great extent pain is a relative thing, relative to the average feeling-tone of the subject, and that for this reason long-continued pain tends to bring about its own amelioration.

This line of argument, however, will clearly not take us very far. The principle of accommodation upon which it rests is, I think, sound enough, and the spectator probably is apt to ignore its operation. But after all, the initial suffering, often hideous in its violence, is only too real, and the period which must elapse before substantial abatement is possible is only too real also. Nor can we find solace in the hope of future compensation, in this life at any rate, for frequently the very possibility of this is peremptorily ruled out by death.

Secondly, it may be pointed out to us that the sufferer is in many cases conscious of a personal sinfulness which makes his suffering,

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though it wears for the onlooker the appearance of "monstrous injustice," seem to himself no more than a just retribution.

Here again there is a distinct measure of significant truth. We do not know the heart of man, but we are, as a rule, afforded better facilities for knowing the heart of man when it is creditable to himself than when it is not. There are perhaps not many persons who take careful measures to conceal their better qualities from the public gaze, and there are, perhaps, not many persons who do *not* take determined steps to conceal the more depraved elements in their nature. I am willing to concede that we do tend to over-estimate rather than to under-estimate the moral excellence of our fellows. But even allowing so much, it is evident that we are again not conducted very far on the road to a solution of our problem. For we have already agreed, I hope, that it is preposterous to regard all suffering as *deserved* suffering. We can accept a range of adequacy for our present principle of interpretation, but to apply it in a universal way would be a cruel impertinence, and I do not think that it merits further consideration.

The third reason for supposing that we exaggerate the sufferings of others may be conveniently considered in connection with some words of Professor Sorley's, taken from the same passage in which occurred the citation from Stevenson already alluded to. "The spectator who sees the causes of suffering," says Sorley, "often lacks insight into the way in which it is faced by the soul that is on trial, and fails to allow for the faith that frees the spirit."

Now I should be the last to deny that faith *has* this sustaining power. I believe that a faith that is profound and pure confers upon its possessor a steady serenity, an indefeasible well-being of the spirit, which abides triumphantly in face of the direst and most seemingly meaningless sufferings. But offered as a solution of our present problems, this principle seems to be open to quite unanswerable objections.

The first of these is the very obvious one that again our principle will apply only to a very limited number of cases. Some, but certainly not *all*, undeserving sufferers have their sufferings leavened and lightened by the sustaining power of faith. Nor will it do to suggest that it is the victim's own fault if he does not possess this bulwark, in that faith is a free gift open to all, and the lack of it a sure symptom of moral and spiritual ill health. For this is just not true. Whatever case can be made out for it in respect of grown men and women, there is no case at all for it in respect of children. And, unfortunately, children can suffer, and suffer very horribly. The problem of suffering would be immeasurably eased if suffering happened to be confined to the adult population of the world. But it happens not to be.

And the second objection seems equally fatal. The principle

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advocated, if offered as a solution of the problem of suffering, appears to involve a *petitio principii*. Faith in God, it is suggested, can transmute suffering. But then our whole problem is, is it not? to determine whether faith in God, faith in the infinite Perfection of the Being upon Whom all things depend, is able to sustain itself, for a reflective mind, in the face of certain kinds of suffering. We cannot solve our problem by surreptitiously presupposing an affirmative answer to it. I agree that we do, in fact, and that not infrequently, see faith in God rising superior to sufferings which to human eyes, including those of the sufferer himself, seem void of any conceivable good purpose. But it is always open to the critic to take the view that this betokens nothing more than the incapacity for critical reflection of a mind preconditioned in certain ways of thinking and feeling by religious education and tradition. I do not myself regard the critic's interpretation as a universally adequate one. But if, on the other hand, faith in God's Perfection is sustained by reflective minds in the face of suffering which appears to them, in spite of their best efforts of thought, to be totally meaningless: in the face, that is, of manifestations of God which, if judged by the standards accessible to man, must be denounced as imperfect or even crassly evil: then, it seems to me, there is good ground for supposing that such persons are acknowledging, though it may be with but a dim and inchoate consciousness of the fact, the suprarational character of the Divine Perfection. If there is not present in their minds, at least implicitly, the recognition that our human standards of Perfection—Justice, Benevolence, and the like—are not so much wrong, as just beside the point, when applied in appraisal of the value of the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*, I do not for myself see how the attitude of faith can in the circumstances possibly support itself.

This, however, is a partial digression into the positive. Let me resume the thread of my criticism.

We have considered now, at perhaps sufficient length, the three main grounds for the claim that it is only for the onlooker that suffering appears incompatible with the goodness of God. It seems to me clear that neither singly nor together are these grounds capable of removing our difficulties. There remain over an appreciable number of cases to which they have no significant application. And a real solution must be capable of covering all cases. It may be that the intractable cases are relatively few. But in principle one such case would suffice. For none of us, I presume, would be satisfied with a vindication of God as good "for the most part," as "almost" perfect.

I pass on now to examine a third line of defence, of a rather different character. Is it possible, perhaps, to justify suffering on

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the ground of its *disciplinary* value, on the ground that it is a necessary condition of the developed moral will? It is through toil and pain, we are told, and the readiness to endure these for the sake of a higher end than mere happiness, that the moral will can alone reveal its potential splendours. A will "purified in the fire of suffering" is no cliché of sentimental romanticists. It stands for authentic reality, and a reality which the suffrages of the best minds would acclaim to be almost the finest and highest thing in human experience. Would we really in our best moments, it is asked with point, wish to rule out the condition of its possibility by having a world so ordered that suffering is always in strict proportionment to desert?

I agree that we should not. I have been urging, it is true, that it is undeserved suffering that constitutes our problem, but that is not at all because I maintain anything so absurd as that all undeserved suffering is *ipso facto* bad and incapable of justification on the hypothesis of a good God. I have stressed undeserved suffering merely because deserved suffering constitutes no problem at all. I agree *in toto* with those who hold that, short of religion, the moral will is the thing of greatest worth in life, and also that the highest reaches of its achievement are to be attained only in and through much "hazard and hardship."

But it is very necessary, I would suggest, that we keep our heads before this attractive, and in many ways exhilarating, solution of our problem. Before venturing upon sweeping generalizations we must ask ourselves candidly and judiciously—judiciously, for it must be remembered that, rightly or wrongly, we *are* putting God on His trial, and that if you wish to rule out such an attitude as intolerable presumption you are coming near to sharing my dissatisfaction with the pretensions of a purely *rational* theology—we must ask ourselves candidly and judiciously, I say, whether there are not cases of suffering which palpably refuse to be made intelligible in terms of our present principle. And if we do ask ourselves, to me, at least, it seems perspicuously clear that there are many such cases. I do not want to over-stress the appeal to the sufferings of children, though I think that Dostoevsky showed a sure instinct in selecting this as the overwhelming obstacle to Ivan Karamazov's acceptance of the essential goodness of the universe; for no one can seriously maintain that the torturing of little children offers a field for the discipline and purification of the moral will. But even if we appeal only to cases of adult suffering, we can, I think, find ample evidence of the insufficiency of this principle of justification. It seems an obvious condition of the disciplinary value of any suffering that at least it should not rise to such a pitch of intensity as to numb and stupefy the spirit of the sufferer. But is this morally desirable condition always preserved? I shall say nothing of "mental" suffering,

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for the situation in its regard is a complicated one and could only be unravelled at many pages' length. But even if we confine ourselves to physical suffering, our memories of the recent World War must be dim indeed if we do not find ourselves ready to agree that there are assuredly some sufferings—of a quality and degree possible, perhaps, only to the modern man with his finely strung nervous organization—which pass beyond all reasonable bounds of human endurance: sufferings which are not a *discipline* of the soul but the soul's very *destroyer*, because transforming men for the time, even the best of them, into mere animals, beings that are sentient and nothing more. It is the apparent meaninglessness of sufferings like these that has driven so many of the more sensitive spirits who participated in the carnage of 1914-18 into a despairing scepticism, or worse. And I gravely fear that "rational theology" will knock upon their doors in vain.

It is time to take note, however, of an objection which some may feel disposed to raise against the *principle* underlying much of our criticism. I may be accused of viewing the whole problem of suffering from an unduly abstract standpoint. It may be agreed readily enough that the extremities of suffering to which I have been alluding are to be wished away, *if* considered by themselves. But, it may be argued, we have no right to consider them by themselves, for we see them, or see at least the possibility of their occurrence, to be inextricably connected with the conditions of a world of a certain kind; a world, namely, which is a fit place for the development of souls. We cannot conceive the possibility of the latter without presupposing the possibility of the former. Accordingly, before we rush to condemn the world because it admits of these extremities of suffering, we ought to remind ourselves that a world that does not admit of them would not be a world ordered, in Keats's famous phrase, as a "vale of soul-making." And since we are agreed upon the pre-eminent value of soul-making, we may reasonably be led to doubt whether this is not, after all, the "best of all possible worlds": whether any imagined "better" world by contrast with which we should be entitled to criticize the excellence of the present order, would not actually be a worse world. Would we consent to banish the possibility of even the most excessive suffering if the order which would have to be substituted would leave no scope for the making of souls?

I do not know whether this line of thought brings conviction to any reader. It brings none to me. In the first place, even if we grant that the possibility of the suffering that so revolts us is involved in the possibility of the world as a value of soul-making, is it so very certain that we should be prepared, in our best moments, to accept the former as the price of the latter? I should grant, though

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all might not, the relative infrequency of the more hateful kinds of suffering. But even so, is not the price too great? There is a fine sentence in Pushkin which Mr. Middleton Murry somewhere quotes: "The Russian wanderer needs the happiness of *all* men wherein to find his own peace." It is in that spirit that Ivan Karamazov finds himself driven to reject the world, "out of love to humanity." And it is in that spirit that many outside the pages of a novel have felt that acquiescence in the world is possible only by the forfeiture of self-respect.

But even if we do not press this point, it is surely extremely difficult to see on what grounds it can be affirmed that the possible occurrence of the kind of suffering we are considering is an inevitable consequence of a world that is ordered for soul-making. The possibility of *suffering* is, of course, involved. But it is far from obvious why God, in creating the world-order and, presumably, determining therein the conditions of human suffering, could not have so conditioned suffering, both as to intensity and in other respects, as to make impossible those examples of it which look so much more akin to the diabolical than the Divine. For God, most of us believe, is Omnipotent, not a craftsman who has been compelled to set to work with a partly recalcitrant material. And if it be said that to take God's Omnipotence in this wise, as meaning that He can do anything at all, is but a crude error, and that His Omnipotence signifies only that He is not limited from without, but only by His own nature, which He expresses or manifests in the creation of the world, the answer of the critic is only too plain. "If this world is indeed the expression of God's nature," he will say, "then to be sure, it is idle to rail against God for not preventing its horrors. But how can I possibly be expected to reverence and acclaim as supremely Perfect a Being whose nature finds self-expression in an order manifestly so very far from perfect?"

I pass on to consider a further line of argument sometimes suggested by the defence—one upon which, however, I do not feel it necessary to dwell at length. It may be pointed out to us that at least most of the sufferings which so distress us are the result of the wickedness of the human race. The horrors of war, for example, are due to man's inhumanity to man, and for their prevention require only the replacement of the individualist spirit by the spirit of brotherly love. The remedy for our ills is, in short, in our own hands. If we do not utilize it, it is *our* fault. It is absurd for man to regard as ground for impeaching the goodness of God evils for which man is himself responsible.

Now this defence cannot mean, of course, anything so ridiculous as that each *individual* man is responsible for the evils in question. If only we could say this, we should have an easy escape from our

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difficulties. It is obvious that it is, at most, only "man" in the sense of "some men" that we can deem responsible. The actual victim of the suffering may have had no part in the guidance of events which led to his misfortunes—may even have protested loudly against the fateful policy. Talk of the corporate responsibility of the human race is, of course, little more than talk. If the sins of the fathers are visited on the children, it may serve the fathers right, but nothing should persuade us that it is just to the children. But I feel sure that the defence we are considering cannot mean anything so crude and perverse. It must mean simply this, I think, that the responsibility for our distresses rests with man, and not with God, and that it is against man, therefore, and not against God, that our righteous indignation should in fairness be directed.

I am afraid that this way out is not any more satisfactory than its predecessors. It really seems impossible (if we adhere to ordinary religious postulates) not to lay the ultimate responsibility upon God Himself. Man has free will, we are told. But we are told also that man's free will is a gift from God. God is the Creator of creators. Even if we suppose, then, that God has deliberately limited His own power by the creation of free agents, so as no longer to be able to interfere effectually with the course of events, how are we to acquit God of the responsibility for the tragic consequences of His original act of Self-limitation? If that act was a real creating of real creators, and thus a real abandonment of control over the course of history, it has the appearance of being a somewhat venturesome proceeding: and the more unhappy victims of its effects, and the more compassionately disposed of their fellow-mortals, can hardly be expected to salute its wisdom.

But, you will perhaps say, this hypothesis of God's abandonment of control over His universe is purely academic. No religious man, as such, believes for a moment that God the Omnipotent Creator has deliberately degraded Himself to the rôle of God the passive spectator. I am inclined to agree. But does it not seem to follow that if God does retain control, then He does directly permit to occur (since He could, if He would prevent) some most atrocious massacres of the innocent? Our old difficulties return upon us.

There is but one more topic that I wish to broach in connection with our problem. I must say something about a certain time-honoured, if not to-day particularly fashionable, expedient for reconciling suffering with the goodness of God. I mean the appeal to a future life, in which any grave maladjustments of mundane happiness to virtue will be redressed. I could not here—nor indeed anywhere—do even approximate justice to the problems which beset the conception of immortality; but there are certain points

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to which it seems desirable, in the interests of the present thesis, to direct your attention very briefly.

Let me begin by remarking that there are two distinct questions on this matter which must *each* be able to receive an affirmative answer if we are to find in Immortality the solution of our difficulties. The first is "Have we reasonable *independent* grounds for believing in a future life so ordered as to bring a rough equivalence of happiness for sufferings which we cannot justify to ourselves having regard to this life alone?" And the second question is "Even if we have the assurance of a future life so ordered, is that assurance sufficient in itself to vindicate to us the essential goodness of the scheme of things?"

On the first question I want to make only two observations. I would remind you that many of the arguments for a future life make no pretence of proving a future life of *this* kind. And I would underline the word "independent." Our immortality must not be a mere *ad hoc* hypothesis with no other credentials save that it is necessary if we are to justify certain kinds of suffering.

On the second question, however, there is a consideration of a somewhat less obvious character which must be more fully elaborated. I should be inclined to agree that there is no kind of suffering that is incapable in principle of being compensated, compensated in the eyes of the sufferer himself. There is not, I suppose, any physical suffering known to us which is much severer than that which may have to be endured by a woman in travail. And yet we know that more often than not the woman who has become a mother is eager to proclaim, even while her bodily anguish is yet fresh and vivid before her mind, that it was all more than worth while. The pain of the past has been more than compensated by the present value, and no whit of rancour, no faintest sense of injustice, intrudes upon her joy and thanksgiving to God for His gift. Such an example, I feel, may not unreasonably arouse hope in us before our tremendous problem. But a little reflection shows that we must be cautious about applying its lesson. The compensating experience in our illustration is apprehended by the subject of it as bearing a very definite relation to the experience which it compensated. The preceding state of pain is recognized as the natural condition of the ensuing happiness, in visible organic connection with it. And in this relation the pain itself becomes charged with a deep significance. I strongly suspect that there must be a relation of this sort if the compensating happiness is to be accepted as really a justification of the preceding suffering. We require to be able to see that the preceding suffering had a meaning, that it was a condition of the fulfilling in us and by us of a valuable end.

Applying this result to our present problem, it seems to me

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doubtful whether we can say, after all, that the assurance of a future life, even if it be of a kind which will furnish an equivalence of happiness for sufferings that considerations drawn from this life do not make intelligible, is enough in itself to restore our confidence in the goodness of the Power that rules the universe. We must also have the assurance that, in *that* life at least, the most seemingly meaningless of our present sufferings will reveal themselves as essential elements in some noble purpose. It may be that this assurance is capable of attainment. But it seems certain that it is to be attained not through the eye of reason but through "faith" alone. We do not, with the eye of reason, even *begin* to see how the torturing of helpless infants can minister to some noble purpose. It is not that we can only see now "as in a glass, darkly." We just don't see at all.

One word more and I have done. It is a gloomy picture that I have been painting. But, looked at from the point of view of "pure reason," is it not a pretty gloomy reality? I read not long ago a report of an address by the Dean of St. Paul's in which, after admitting that Christianity had not yet entirely solved the problem of evil, the Dean went on to say that "this is a world for brave men, not for those who are afraid of pain." But let us not deceive ourselves. Less than seventeen years ago brave men, very brave men, were being reft of their very sanity by the sufferings endured and witnessed on the battlefields of France. Is it a world that can be borne even by brave men? One is sometimes tempted to say rather that this is a world for callous men, men insensitive in their own bodies and without bowels of compassion for others. If souls of finer fibre *do* find the world endurable; if they do (as we know that they may) preserve through all an imperishable faith in the Perfection of the Supreme Being upon whom all things depend; then it can only be, surely, because this Supreme Being, as He is made known to them through religious experience, is felt so to transcend our finite comprehension that any attempt on our part to grasp and pass judgment upon His universe is repudiated as palpably absurd; if not, indeed, as bordering upon the impious. We ought not, indeed we are not able, to renounce the use of our intellect. But we can, I submit, in virtue of an experience profounder than the intellectual, recognize the intellect's limitations, its hopeless incompetence to adapt its puny this-world concepts to the Infinite Majesty of the Godhead. That such a recognition is present, implicitly if not explicitly, in every authentic religious experience, is the central contention of Otto's great book, to whose inspiration I once more gladly acknowledge my indebtedness.

MR. DUNNE'S THEORY OF TIME IN "AN EXPERIMENT WITH TIME"

PROFESSOR C. D. BROAD

I WANT to state the theory in *An Experiment with Time* as clearly as I can in my own way; then to consider its application to Precognition; and then to consider whether there are any other grounds for accepting it beside its capacity to account for the possibility of Precognition. Mr. Dunne himself holds that the theory is required quite independently of explaining Precognition. He also holds that the facts which demand a serial theory of Time require that the series shall be infinite. Both these contentions might be mistaken, and yet Mr. Dunne might be right to the extent that it is necessary to assume *a series of at least two terms for the special purpose of explaining Precognition.*

It seems clear from Chapter XIX of *An Experiment with Time* that Mr. Dunne starts from a suggestion made by Hinton in his book *The Fourth Dimension*. It will therefore be well to explain Hinton's suggestion before trying to state Mr. Dunne's theory. But there is one preliminary step which it will be worth while to take before dealing with Hinton's suggestion. We are going to be concerned with the notion of "spaces" or "spatial manifolds" of more than three dimensions; it will therefore be wise to begin by defining certain terms and stating certain elementary facts which are constantly needed in this connection.

MANIFOLDS OF n DIMENSIONS

A spatial manifold is of n dimensions if exactly n independent variables have to be fixed in order to determine a point (i.e. a completely determinate position) in it. Thus, in a spatial manifold of n dimensions, we shall need n independent simultaneous equations to determine a point. And a point is something which, being completely determinate, has "*zero degrees of freedom.*"

Now suppose we were given $n - 1$ independent simultaneous equations. These would leave *one* degree of freedom in a n -fold. They would therefore represent a *line* (straight or tortuous) in that n -fold. We will call a line in a n -fold a " $(1, n)$ -fold." Suppose we were given $n - 2$ independent simultaneous equations. These would leave *two* degrees of freedom in a n -fold. They would therefore represent a *surface* (flat or curved) in the n -fold. We will call a surface

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in a n -fold a " $(2,n)$ -fold." In general, m independent simultaneous equations would leave $n - m$ degrees of freedom in a n -fold, and so would determine a set of points in the n -fold which we will call a " $(n - m, n)$ -fold." Plainly a $(0,n)$ -fold is a *point* in a n -fold; and a (n,n) -fold is identical with the n -fold itself. Conversely a (m,n) -fold is a set of points in a n -fold determined by $n - m$ independent simultaneous equations.

In a three-fold a *point* is a $(0,3)$ -fold, and requires *three* independent equations; a *line* is a $(1,3)$ -fold, and requires *two* independent equations; a *surface* is a $(2,3)$ -fold, and requires *one* equation. The three-fold itself is a $(3,3)$ -fold.

In a four-fold a *point* is a $(0,4)$ -fold, and requires *four* independent equations; a *line* is a $(1,4)$ -fold, and requires *three* independent equations; a *surface* is a $(2,4)$ -fold, and requires *two* independent equations. There is also a fourth kind of set of points here, viz. a $(3,4)$ -fold, which requires *one* equation. The four-fold itself is a $(4,4)$ -fold. And so on for any number of dimensions.


Now it is useful to look at this from another point of view. We can start with a fixed number of independent simultaneous equations, and consider what kind of manifold these equations will determine in manifolds of various dimensions. Thus:

One equation determines a *point* in a *one-fold*, a *line* in a *two-fold*, a *surface* in a *three-fold*, a $(3,4)$ -fold in a *four-fold*, and a $(n - 1, n)$ -fold in a n -fold.


Two independent equations *cannot* occur in connection with a *one-fold*; they determine a *point* in a *two-fold*, a *line* in a *three-fold*, a *surface* in a *four-fold*, a $(3,5)$ -fold in a *five-fold*, and a $(n - 2, n)$ -fold in a n -fold.

Three independent equations *cannot* occur in connection with either a *one-fold* or a *two-fold*; they determine a *point* in a *three-fold*, a *line* in a *four-fold*, a *surface* in a *five-fold*, a $(3,6)$ -fold in a *six-fold*, and a $(n - 3, n)$ -fold in a n -fold. And so on.

It remains to consider one important consequence of this which we shall need in discussing Mr. Dunne's theory. Take a single equation, involving only one variable, e.g. $x = a$. In a *one-fold* this represents a *point* at distance a from the origin along the only axis.




In a *two-fold* it represents a *straight line* at right angles to the X-axis, which cuts the latter at $x = a$.




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In a three-fold it represents a *plane* at right angles to the X-axis, which cuts the latter at $x = a$.




In a four-fold it represents a (3,4)-fold at right angles to the X-axis, cutting the latter at $x = a$. And so on.

Now consider a single equation involving two variables, e.g. $x = y$. In the case of a one-fold this is meaningless. In the case of a two-fold it represents a *straight line* bisecting the angle between the X and the Y axis.



In the case of a three-fold it represents the *plane* which arises from drawing through every point in the previous straight line a straight line parallel to the Z-axis. This plane bisects the angle between the planes ZOY and ZOZ and contains the Z-axis.



In the case of a four-fold it represents the (3,4)-fold which arises from drawing through every point in the previous plane a straight line parallel to the U-axis. And so on.

Exactly similar remarks apply to curves. Thus the equation $x^2 + y^2 = a^2$ represents a *circle* of radius a with the origin as centre in a two-fold. In a three-fold it represents the *cylindrical surface* obtained by drawing through every point in the circle a straight line parallel to the Z-axis. In a four-fold it represents the (3,4)-fold obtained by drawing through every point in this cylindrical surface a straight line parallel to the U-axis. And so on.

HINTON'S SUGGESTION

Suppose that there were a *material thread* at rest in a *plane*, i.e. a material (1,2)-fold at rest in a two-fold. Suppose that a certain *straight line* moved in this plane with a uniform velocity at right

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angles to itself. Provided that the thread always makes an angle of less than 90 with the direction in which the moving line travels, the moving line will cut the thread in a *point* at each moment and in a different point at each different moment. Suppose that there were an observer whose field of observation at any moment is confined to the contents of the moving line at that moment. Instead of perceiving a *stationary thread* he would perceive a *moving particle* occupying various positions in the various lines which constitute his successive fields. This will be obvious from Fig. 1.

If there were a number of such linear threads in the plane there would be an equal number of material particles observed in each field. It is evident that the velocities of these particles, as observed by this observer, would be completely determined by (a) the velocity of the moving line, which we have assumed to be *uniform*, and (b) the purely *geometrical* properties of the threads. Suppose that the equation of a thread is $y = f(x)$. Let the velocity of the moving




FIG. 1.

line be c along the X-axis. Then the observed velocity of the corresponding particle will be at any moment dy/dt . This $= (dy/dx)(dx/dt)$, i.e. $c(dy/dx)$.

We can now extend this as follows. Suppose that we now have a tortuous thread in a *three-dimensional space*, i.e. a (1,3)-fold at rest in a three-fold. Suppose that a certain *plane* moves at right angles to itself in this three-fold with uniform velocity. At any moment it will cut the thread at a *point*. Suppose that there is an observer whose field of observation at any moment is confined to the contents of this moving plane at that moment. Instead of perceiving the *stationary thread*, as such, he will perceive a *moving particle* occupying various positions in the various planes which constitute his successive fields (see Fig. 2).

If there were a number of such threads in the three-fold, there would be an equal number of material particles observed in each field. The velocities of these particles, as observed by this observer, would be completely determined, both in magnitude and direction in the field, by (a) the velocity of the moving plane, which we have

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assumed to be *uniform*, and (b) the purely *geometrical* properties of the threads. Suppose that the equations of a thread are $x = f(z)$ and $y = g(z)$. (It will need two equations because it is now a (1,3)-fold.) And suppose that the moving plane moves along the Z-axis with velocity c . Then the observed velocity of the particle along the X-axis of the observer's field will be dx/dt , which $= (dx/dz)(dz/dt)$, and therefore $= c(dx/dz)$. Its observed velocity along the observer's Y-axis will be dy/dt , which $= c(dy/dz)$.

We have now to extend this one step further. We now imagine a tortuous material thread in a four-fold, i.e. a (1,4)-fold. Suppose that a certain (3,4)-fold moves at right angles to itself with uniform velocity in this four-fold. At any moment it will cut the thread in a *point*. For the (1,4)-fold requires three independent equations, and the (3,4)-fold requires one equation. So their intersection is represented by four simultaneous equations. It therefore is a (0,4)-fold, i.e. a *point* in the four-fold. Suppose that there is an observer whose field of observation at any moment is confined to the contents of this moving (3,4)-fold at that moment. Instead of perceiving the




FIG. 2.

stationary thread, as such, he will perceive a *moving particle* occupying various positions in the various (3,4)-folds which constitute his successive fields. If there were a number of such threads in the four-fold, there would be an equal number of such particles observed in each field. The velocities of these particles, as observed by this observer, would be completely determined, both in magnitude and direction, by (a) the velocity of the moving (3,4)-fold, which we have assumed to be *uniform*, and (b) the purely *geometrical* properties of the threads.

Since a thread is now a (1,4)-fold it will be represented by three simultaneous equations. Suppose that the equations of a thread are $x = f(u)$, $y = g(u)$, $z = h(u)$. And suppose that the moving (3,4)-fold moves along the U-axis with velocity c . Then the observed velocity of the particle along the observer's X-axis will be $c(dx/du)$; along his Y-axis it will be $c(dy/du)$; and along his Z-axis it will be $c(dz/du)$.

Now a "rigid body" is a set of particles in a three-dimensional space, such that every pair of particles in the set keep at a constant distance apart. It will therefore be the intersection of a *bundle* of (1,4)-fold threads with the moving (3,4)-fold. The condition of

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rigidity is that for every pair of threads, r and s , in the bundle $(x_r - x_s)^2 + (y_r - y_s)^2 + (z_r - z_s)^2$ shall be independent of u .

This completes my account of Hinton's suggestion. The main interest of it is this. It shows that, if we assume one additional spatial dimension beside the three that we can observe, and if we suppose that our field of observation at any moment is confined to the contents of a (3,4)-fold which moves uniformly at right angles to itself along a straight line in this (3,4)-fold, then there is no need to assume *any other* motion in the universe. This *one uniform rectilinear* motion of the observer's field of observation, together with the *purely geometrical properties* of the stationary material threads in the four-fold, will account for all the *various observed motions* (various both in magnitude and in direction) of the material *particles* which are the appearances of these threads in the successive fields of observation. From this point of view there is no advantage in carrying the suggestion further, viz. into five or more dimensions. There will always have to be a field moving with uniform rectilinear velocity at right angles to itself; so that no further simplification is introduced to balance the added complication of an extra dimension. But, although such an extension of Hinton's suggestion has no advantage from the point of view of simplifying the treatment of the motion of matter, it may be of use for other purposes. It may, e.g., be of use for explaining Precognition. If so, it will be worth trying.

MR. DUNNE'S THEORY

(1) *Formal Exposition.* Mr. Dunne's theory, in its purely formal and geometrical aspect, is simply an extension of Hinton's suggestion. The *moving field* of Hinton's observer is now treated in the way in which Hinton treated the *moving particles* of ordinary common sense.

In order to explain this extension we will consider first the artificially simplified case of Hinton's theory, illustrated in Fig. 1, where the threads are confined to a two-fold and the observer's field of view at any moment is confined to the contents of a straight line which moves uniformly at right angles to itself in that two-fold. We will then proceed to the extension of the actual case, where the threads are (1,4)-folds and the observer's field is a moving (3,4)-fold.

Starting with Fig. 1, let us draw an axis OZ at right-angles to the paper, and a plane through OY bisecting the angle between the planes YOX and YOZ. Call this plane YOL. Now imagine a plane moving at right angles to the Z-axis with uniform velocity c . This will cut the plane YOL in a series of straight lines parallel to YO, such as Y'O' (see Fig. 3).

Suppose that there is an observer whose field of observation at any moment is confined to the contents of the moving plane at that

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moment. Then he will observe in all his successive fields a straight line which keeps parallel to his Y-axis and moves from left to right along his X-axis. The velocity with which it moves along his X-axis will be c . For it will be the rate at which successive lines parallel to $Z'O'$ in Fig. 3 increase as the moving plane takes up its successive positions along OZ . Now at every moment $Z'O' = OZ'$, since the plane YOL makes an angle of 45° with YOX and YOZ .




FIG. 3.

And the rate at which OZ' is increasing is c , for we have assumed that the moving plane travels along OZ with velocity c .

We must now turn our attention to the thread in the plane YOX in Fig. 1. Imagine lines drawn through every point of this thread parallel to the Z-axis. The *thread* is now replaced by a *corrugated sheet* with its corrugations stretching indefinitely parallel to OZ. Our original thread was the section of this sheet by the plane YOX. The moving plane will cut this sheet at every moment in a wavy line exactly similar to the original thread and exactly similarly situated in each successive position of the plane (see Fig. 4).




FIG. 4.

An observer whose field of observation at any moment is confined to the contents of the *moving plane* at that moment will have the following experiences. He will perceive a *stationary sinuous thread* and he will perceive a *straight line* which keeps parallel to his Y-axis and *moves from left to right along his X-axis with uniform velocity c* . The moving straight line cuts the stationary thread at a *different point* at each different moment until the line gets to the right-hand end of the thread. After this the thread will continue indefinitely to

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be perceived simply as a stationary whole without any line moving along it and cutting it.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the observer's field of observation at every moment were confined to the contents of the *straight line* in which the moving plane intersects the fixed plane YOI. at that moment. In that case all that he would perceive would be a *single particle moving up and down* along the X-axis. He would perceive *no* moving straight line and *no* stationary sinuous thread.

It is now quite easy to extend this reasoning to the actual case of a thread in a four-fold. This is a (1,4)-fold, and is therefore represented by three independent simultaneous equations, $x = f(u)$, $y = g(u)$, and $z = h(u)$. Suppose we now assume that our original four-fold is a (4,5)-fold, and that the fifth dimension of the five-fold is the axis W. These three equations will now represent a (2,5)-fold, i.e. a *surface*, in the five-fold. Since the equations do not contain W, this (2,5)-fold will be the surface obtained by drawing through every point in the original thread a straight line of indefinite length parallel to the W-axis. It will, therefore, be a corrugated sheet of the kind already described. The original thread will now be the section of this sheet by the (4,5)-fold $w = 0$. So it is now represented by the *four* equations $x = f(u)$, $y = g(u)$, $z = h(u)$, and $w = 0$.

Let us now suppose that there is in the five-fold a manifold whose equation is $u = a$. This will be a (4,5)-fold. It will intersect the corrugated (2,5)-fold in a *line*. For between them we have the *four* independent equations $x = f(u)$, $y = g(u)$, $z = h(u)$, and $u = a$. These will determine a (1,5)-fold, i.e. a line. It is clear that this line will be symmetrically situated as regards the axes U and W.

Lastly, consider a moving manifold whose equation at any moment t is $w = ct$. This will be a (4,5)-fold moving at right angles to itself along the W-axis with uniform velocity c . As t varies continuously we get a series of such (4,5)-folds further and further along the W-axis. Each of them will intersect the (4,5)-fold $u = a$ in a (3,5)-fold; for between them they give the *two* independent equations $w = ct$ and $u = a$. This (3,5)-fold will intersect the corrugated (2,5)-fold in a *point*. For the intersection is determined by the *five* independent equations $x = f(u)$, $y = g(u)$, $z = h(u)$, $w = ct$, and $u = a$. It is therefore a (0,5)-fold, i.e. a point. Lastly, the (4,5)-fold $w = ct$ will intersect the corrugated (2,5)-fold in a *line*. For the intersection is determined by the *four* independent equations $x = f(u)$, $y = g(u)$, $z = h(u)$, $w = ct$. It is therefore a (1,5)-fold, i.e. a line. It is obviously a line exactly similar to the original thread, whose equations are $x = f(u)$, $y = g(u)$, $z = h(u)$, $w = 0$. The only difference is that it is in the (4,5)-fold $w = ct$ instead of the (4,5)-fold

Now let us suppose that there is an observer whose field of

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observation at any moment t is confined to the contents of the (4,5)-fold $w = ct$. At every moment he will perceive the (1,5)-fold which is the intersection at that moment of this moving (4,5)-fold with the corrugated (2,5)-fold. He will therefore perceive a *stationary sinuous thread* in a *four-fold*, and not a stationary corrugated surface in a five-fold. He will perceive the (3,5)-fold, which is the intersection at any moment of the moving (4,5)-fold $w = ct$ with the stationary (4,5)-fold $u = w$, at a different position (viz. further along the U-axis) at each successive moment. He will therefore perceive it as a *three-fold* which keeps at right-angles to the U-axis and *moves steadily along it* with a uniform velocity c . It will be perceived as cutting the stationary sinuous thread at a *different point* at each different moment until it gets to the end of the thread. After this the thread will continue indefinitely to be perceived simply as a stationary whole in a four-fold, without any three-fold moving along it and cutting it at successive points.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the observer's field of observation at every moment were confined to the contents of the (3,5)-fold in which the moving (4,5)-fold $w = ct$ cuts the stationary (4,5)-fold $u = w$ at that moment. In that case he would perceive a *single particle* (viz. the (0,5)-fold represented by the set of equations $u = w$, $w = ct$, $x = f(u)$, $y = g(u)$, $z = h(u)$) *moving about* in a three-fold. He would perceive *no* moving three-fold and *no* stationary thread. He would, in fact, be in precisely the position of the ordinary man in his normal everyday experiences.

This completes the formal exposition of the second stage of Mr. Dunne's "serial time." The first stage is, of course, simply Hinton's suggestion. Mr. Dunne admits that, for the purpose of explaining Precognition, there is no need to go beyond the stage which we have now reached. On other grounds, which we will not now consider, he thinks that the process must be carried on indefinitely, adding a further spatial dimension at each stage.

We shall confine our attention to the four-dimensional and the five-dimensional stages, and we shall refer to them respectively as "Stage I" and "Stage II." For many purposes the artificially simplified cases, represented in Figs. 1 and 4, are quite adequate representatives of Stages I and II respectively. They have the advantage that they can be illustrated by diagrams; since the first involves only two, and the second only three, dimensions.

(2) *Application of the Theory to Precognition.*— It is easy to see in outline how the theory just explained bears on the possibility of Precognition. For this purpose we can confine ourselves to the artificially simplified case illustrated in Fig. 4, where only three dimensions in all are introduced and the moving field of observation is supposed to be a plane which keeps at right angles to the Z-axis

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and travels along it with uniform velocity c . The figure is reproduced below, with the addition of a line $Y''P'O''$, which will be needed later in the argument.

We have to compare the experiences (a) of an observer whose field at any moment is confined to the contents of this *moving plane* at that moment, and (b) of an observer whose field at any moment is restricted to the contents at that moment of the *moving straight line* in which the moving plane intersects the stationary plane YOL . Let us call these observers "Observer II" and "Observer I" respectively.

At each moment Observer II perceives the *whole breadth* of the corrugated sheet. It is true that, at each different moment, he observes different linear sections across its length in the Z -direction. He fails to recognize this; for he knows nothing of the Z -dimension and therefore does not know that there is a sheet or that he is travelling along its length in the Z -dimension. But, since all the




FIG. 5.

sections which he perceives are parallel to each other and exactly similar, the whole spatial form of the sheet in the X and Y -dimensions will be apparent to him at every moment.

At each moment Observer I perceives only *one point* in the corrugated sheet. It will be a different point at each different moment, and it will always lie in the wavy line AP in which the plane YOL cuts the corrugated sheet. This observer knows nothing of the Z -dimension and nothing of the X -dimension. He regards the successive points which he observes as *successive positions of a single particle* which moves up and down the only axis which he recognizes, viz. the Y -axis. Thus Observer II perceives *at every moment* those corrugations which the field of Observer I *has intersected*, but is no longer intersecting, and those corrugations which the field of Observer I *will intersect*, but has not yet intersected. What Observer I perceives *successively as a series of events constituting the history of a moving particle* is perceived *continuously* by Observer II as an *unchanging wavy thread*.

Now, if Observer II ever concentrates his attention, so that it is confined to the contents of the moving straight line instead of

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ranging over the contents of the whole moving plane, he becomes identical with Observer I. Whenever he relaxes his attention again he again becomes Observer II. It will be useful henceforth, instead of talking of "Observer II" and "Observer I," to talk of "the Observer in the expanded state" and "the Observer in the contracted state."

Now, if the observer can, at certain moments, contract his attention to the contents of a single *vertical line* in the moving plane, he may not be obliged to contract it to the contents of *that particular line* $Y'O'$ in which the moving plane then intersects the stationary plane YOL. He might, instead, concentrate his attention at a certain moment on the contents of another vertical $Y''O''$ further along the X-axis than $Y'O'$. If he does this, he will then perceive the point P' , in which the line $Y''O''$ cuts the corrugated surface, as *an event in the history of a particle* and not as a section of a stationary thread.

Let us now make the following suppositions. (i) That, in normal waking life, the observer's attention is automatically confined at each moment to the contents of the moving line $Y'O'$ in which the moving plane is then intersecting the stationary plane YOL. (ii) That in sleep and certain other conditions this automatic constraint is removed and he passes into the expanded state. (iii) That, when he is in the expanded state, he may, from time to time, re-concentrate his attention so that it is confined to the contents of some line, such as $Y''O''$, other than the line $Y'O'$ in which the moving plane is then intersecting the stationary plane YOL. This line may be either further along the X-axis than $Y'O'$ or not so far along the X-axis as $Y'O'$.

Let us suppose that the observer passes into the expanded state a little while before the moment represented in Fig. 5. At the moment represented in Fig. 5, he concentrates his attention on the contents of the line $Y''O''$, which is further along the X-axis than $Y'O'$. Later on he wakes up, and henceforth his attention is automatically contracted at each moment to the contents of the line in which the moving plane then intersects the plane YOL. To illustrate the situation we will extract the corrugated sheet from Fig. 5, thus producing Fig. 6 below.

When the moving plane has got to a certain position, $A''B''$, in Fig. 6, its intersection with the fixed plane YOL intersects the corrugated sheet in a point R. R lies on the same corrugation as P' , the point on which the observer concentrated his attention when he was asleep and the moving plane had got only to $A'B'$. Since the observer is now awake, his attention is now automatically confined to the contents of the intersection between the moving plane and the fixed plane YOL. He therefore perceives the point R as the *present position of a moving particle*. Since R lies on the same corru-

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gation as P' , and the sheet is assumed to stretch uniformly in the Z -direction, the geometrical properties of the sheet round about R will be an exact reproduction of the geometrical properties of the sheet round about P' . Now, when successive intersections of the moving field with the corrugated sheet are perceived as successive events in the history of a particle, the position and motion which this particle will be perceived as having at any moment depend entirely on the geometrical properties of the corrugated sheet at the point then intersected and on the velocity of the moving field. Therefore the position and motion which the observer *perceives* the particle to have when his moving field gets to $A'''B'''$ are exactly like the position and motion which he *dreamed* the particle to have when his moving field had only reached $A'B'$. If he recorded his dream when he woke up, i.e. when his moving field had reached the intermediate position $A''B''$, he would certainly be inclined to say, when




FIG. 6.

his field reached the position $A'''B'''$, that he was now perceiving an event of which he had already dreamed.

It is evidently quite easy to extend this reasoning from the artificially simplified case of three dimensions to the real case of five dimensions. We have simply to make the following substitutions. (i) For the sheet, corrugated in the X and Y -dimensions and uniform in the Z -dimension, we substitute a (2,5)-fold, corrugated in the X , Y , Z , and U -dimensions and uniform in the W -dimension. The old sheet was of finite breadth in the X -dimension and of indefinite extent in the Z -dimension. The substituted (2,5)-fold is of finite breadth in the U -dimension and of indefinite extent in the W -dimension. The corrugations of the old sheet were of small extent in the Y -dimension as compared with the breadth of the sheet in the X -dimension. The corrugations of the substituted (2,5)-fold are of small extent in the X , Y , and Z -dimensions, as compared with its extent in the U -dimension. (ii) For the plane $z = ct$, moving with uniform velocity c along the Z -axis and keeping always at right angles to the latter, we substitute the moving (4,5)-fold whose equation at any moment t is $w = ct$. This moves along the W -axis

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with uniform velocity c , keeping always at right angles to the latter. For the stationary plane YOL, whose equation is $x = z$, we substitute the stationary (4,5)-fold whose equation is $u = w$. The argument then proceeds, *mutatis mutandis*, exactly in the same way as the argument in the artificially simplified three-dimensional case.

It is extremely important to notice that, on this theory of "Precognition," no event ever is "precognized" in the strict and literal sense. The dreamer who has a veridical precognitive dream *is not* acquainted in his dream with *that very same event* which later on will happen and fulfil his dream. In the dream he was acquainted with a certain point in the corrugated surface *as it then was*, viz. the then state of the point P'. When the dream is fulfilled he is acquainted with a *different* point in the corrugated surface *as it now is*, viz. the now state of the point R. The latter event is *identified* with the former because the two are precisely alike. And the two are precisely alike because the perceived points occupy corresponding positions on a sheet which is assumed to have remained rigid during the interval between the two experiences, and because this sheet is assumed to be uniform in the dimension along which the moving field is travelling. It is just because Mr. Dunne's theory of "Precognition" excludes precognition, in the strict and literal sense, that it can deal with the paradox that a "precognition" may cause the person who has it to take measures which will prevent the "precognized event" from happening. We must now turn to this aspect of the theory.

(3) *Action to Avoid the Fulfilment of a "Precognition."* Here, again, it is easy to see in outline how the theory must be applied. We must modify the assumption that the corrugated sheet is absolutely rigid and absolutely uniform in the dimension along which the field of observation is moving. We must suppose that the observer can act on the sheet at the place in it which his moving field now occupies, and can thus modify its structure in parts further ahead which the moving field has not yet reached. In order to explain this we will return to the artificially simplified three-dimensional case, illustrated in Figs. 5 and 6.

Let us suppose that the observer, who concentrated his attention on P' in Fig. 6 when his field had reached A'B' and he was still asleep, wakes up when his field gets to A''B''. Let us suppose that he then remembers his dream and takes it to be a precognition of a certain future position and motion of a particle. Suppose that, for some reason, he desires that the particle shall not have this position and motion in future. Now that he is awake his field is automatically contracted to the intersection of the moving plane with the stationary plane YOL in Fig. 5. Its content is therefore confined to the point Q of the corrugated sheet in Fig. 6. Suppose that he can act on the corrugated sheet at Q in such a way as to modify its geometrical

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structure instantaneously at every point whose Z-co-ordinate is greater than that of Q and whose X-co-ordinate is also greater than that of Q. Two consequences will follow. (a) The geometrical properties of the sheet at R will no longer be exactly like the geometrical properties of the sheet at P', as they would have been if he had not interfered with the sheet at Q. Therefore the position and motion which the observer perceives the particle to have when his moving field gets to A'''B''' are not (as they would have been if he had not interfered in consequence of his dream) exactly like those which he dreamed the particle to have when his field had only reached A'B'. As a consequence of his "precognitive dream" he has taken action which has prevented the "precognition" from being fulfilled. (b) As the interference with the sheet at Q has affected all points in the sheet whose Z and X-co-ordinates are greater respectively than the Z and X-co-ordinates of Q, it will have affected all the points in the line QR. Therefore the modification of R will not be perceived as a sudden isolated miracle when the moving field reaches R. It will be perceived as the consequence of a change which was deliberately initiated when the field had reached Q and which modifies all the subsequent events in the history of the particle.

As before, there is no difficulty in extending this reasoning from the artificially simplified three-dimensional case to the real case of five dimensions. The necessary substitutions have already been stated.

(4) *Concrete Interpretation of the Theory.*—I have now completed the purely formal exposition of the theory and its application to Precognition. The question remains whether it is a mere ingenious formal curiosity. Can we identify the corrugated (2,5)-fold, the stationary (4,5)-fold $u = \alpha$, and the moving (4,5)-fold $u = ct$, respectively, with any three entities of which we have empirical knowledge? I do not find Mr. Dunne's answer to this question at all clear. He seems to connect the corrugated (2,5)-fold, which he calls the "Substratum," with the observer's brain. He calls the stationary (4,5)-fold $u = \alpha$ the "Reagent"; but I have failed to discover or to understand what empirical object he proposes to identify with it. I am afraid that I can throw very little light on these vitally important questions, but there are certain things which seem worth saying.

(i) A brain is a very complex material system which, from the ordinary three-dimensional point of view, consists of an enormous number of material particles moving about in various ways and influencing each other's motions by occasional impact or continual action at a distance. From the five-dimensional point of view *each* particle is correlated with the whole of *one* of our corrugated (2,5)-

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folds, and each *different* particle is correlated with a *different* (2,5)-fold. Therefore a complete brain must be correlated with a whole *stack*, containing an enormous number of these (2,5)-folds touching each other at certain points (corresponding to impacts of the brain-particles) and separated at other points. Such a stack will be of no great thickness in the X, Y, and Z-dimensions; for when a brain is regarded as a persistent three-dimensional object, it is a comparatively small thing. The width of the stack in the U-dimension may be considerable, since it is proportional to the time for which the brain would be said to last by an observer who regarded it as a three-dimensional object with a variable history. The extension of the stack in the W-dimension would, for all we know, be indefinitely great. If we are to correlate Mr. Dunne's "Substratum" with the observer's brain, we must identify the Substratum with such a stack of (2,5)-folds, taken as a whole, and not with any one (2,5)-fold.

(ii) Even the suggestion of a stack of (2,5)-folds, such as we have just described, is an over-simplification of the actual facts about the brain. It would be adequate if a brain, from the three-dimensional point of view, were a system which consisted of the same particles throughout its whole history. But this is certainly not true. The brain is constantly, if slowly, breaking down into waste products which are ultimately excreted; and it is constantly, if slowly, being rebuilt from materials which were ultimately ingested in the form of food, water, and air. The sheet corresponding to each ultimate particle of the brain would, so far as we know, be extended indefinitely in the U-dimension as well as in the W-dimension. For when atoms are regarded as particles which persist and move about in a three-dimensional space, we know of no limit to the length of their history. We shall have to think of each stack by analogy to a finite length of cable made of numerous wires twisted together in the following way. Each individual wire is much longer than the cable. Each wire enters the cable at a certain point, becomes part of the cable for a certain segment of its length, and leaves the cable again at a certain other point. The segment of any individual wire which forms part of the cable is considerably shorter than the cable itself, though each individual wire as a whole is indefinitely longer than the cable itself. If we are to correlate Mr. Dunne's "Substratum" with the observer's brain, we must identify the Substratum with a stack of (2,5)-folds conceived by analogy with such a cable as has just been described.

(iii) An observer, whether he is in the waking or the sleeping state, is acquainted with *sensa*, images, and bodily feelings. He is not, *prima facie*, acquainted with the moving particles of his own brain. I think it is clear at the outset that Mr. Dunne takes the contents

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of the observer's field at any moment to be "presentations" (i.e. *sensa*, images, bodily feelings, etc.), and *not* to be that part of the Substratum which the field intersects at that moment. He assumes that there is a one-to-one correlation between the sensible, positional, and other qualities of the presentations in the observer's field at any moment, on the one hand, and the geometrical characteristics of that part of the Substratum which the field is then intersecting, on the other. But, although this distinction between the contents of the field at any moment and the part of the Substratum which the field intersects at that moment is definitely drawn at the beginning of the discussion, it seems to drop out of sight in the formal exposition of the theory. In Mr. Dunne's formal exposition, as in my modified reproduction of it, everything proceeds as if what the observer is acquainted with were *the Substratum itself*. Everything proceeds as if the observer, when in the expanded state, perceives sections of the Substratum itself as a set of stationary sinuous lines; and as if, when he is in the contracted state, he perceives certain points of the Substratum itself as a set of moving interacting particles. When we remember that this supposition is admittedly false, we begin to wonder whether the consequences developed from it in the formal exposition can be carried over to the presentations of our actual waking and sleeping experience.

(iv) I cannot think of any concrete interpretation which can plausibly be put on the "Reagent," i.e. the stationary (4,5)-fold $u \dots w$ which intersects the moving (4,5)-fold $w = ct$ in a moving (3,5)-fold to which the observer's field is automatically confined whenever he is in the contracted state. Mr. Dunne talks of it as "*coming between*" (his italics) "observer 2 and the substratum section . . . which is, somehow, affecting that observer 2." It looks as if he pictured the Substratum as the floor of a long, narrow room, and the Reagent as a long, thin strip of carpet stretched from one corner to the diagonally opposite corner of the room, leaving most of the floor bare. The field of the observer in the expanded state seems to be pictured as stretching right across the breadth of the room and moving down the length of it. So at every stage in the motion of the field the carpet comes between the field and one part of the floor, but the field is in direct contact with the floor where it extends beyond the edges of the strip of carpet on both sides of the latter. This, however, is mere mythology.

Perhaps it would be enough to make the following assumptions. (a) That those points of the Substratum which satisfy the equation $u = w$ have a peculiar property which does not belong to any other points of the Substratum. (b) That the various presentations which occupy the moving field at any moment are determined jointly by the velocity of the field along the W-axis and the properties of the

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points at which the field then intersects the Substratum. (c) That the peculiar property of those points of the Substratum which satisfy the equation $u = w$ imparts a peculiar quality to the presentations which are due to *them*, and thus makes these presentations stand out in any field from the rest of the presentations in that field. And (d) that the "contracted state" of the Observer just consists in his inability to turn his attention away from the presentations which are marked out by this peculiar quality and to attend to the contents of his field as a whole.

(5) *The Alleged Infinite Series*.—Mr. Dunne's doctrine on this point seems to be fairly summarized in the following four propositions. (i) Even if there had been no evidence for Precognition, the admitted facts about time make it necessary to start on the series whose first two stages we have described. (ii) It is then found, as an interesting and important collateral consequence, that at Stage II an explanation of Precognition emerges. (iii) If it is necessary to start on the series, it is impossible to stop anywhere in it. At each stage there is precisely the same need to introduce a further spatial dimension as there was at the stage before. (iv) This regress, though infinite, is harmless. Mr. Dunne never doubts the reality of time and change, and he talks cheerfully of "the Observer at infinity."

I can state quite briefly my own opinion about these four propositions. (i) I accept the third proposition. At the first stage motion of particles along the X, Y, and Z-axes is replaced by motion of the field of observation along a fourth spatial axis, U, at right angles to these three. At the second stage this motion along the U-axis is replaced by motion along a fifth spatial axis, W, at right angles to the previous four. Plainly, if it is *necessary* to start this process, there is no stage at which it is not equally necessary to continue it. (ii) I reject the fourth proposition. If this regress is involved in the notion of time, it is vicious, and the notion of time must be rejected as delusive. The "Observer at infinity" would be the *last* term of a series which, by hypothesis, *cannot have* a last term. Therefore the notion of "the Observer at infinity" is a self-contradictory notion and there can be no such observer. Yet, on Mr. Dunne's theory, unless there were such an observer, there would be no observer at all. (iii) I cannot find in *An Experiment with Time* any conclusive reason for Mr. Dunne's first proposition. The process starts, as we have seen, with Hinton's suggestion of replacing moving particles by stationary sinuous (1,4)-folds and a (3,4)-fold field of observation moving uniformly along a fourth spatial axis. This is an interesting and ingenious suggestion, and it has the positive merit of introducing a unity and simplicity into the phenomena of motion which is otherwise lacking. But I can see no trace of logical necessity about it. And, if there is no logical necessity to take the first step, there can

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be no logical necessity to take the second or any subsequent step in the series. The second step does not even have the merit of introducing additional unity and simplicity. If it is justifiable at all, it is justifiable *only* on the empirical ground that there are cases of Precognition and that they can be explained by taking the second step and not otherwise. So far as I know, there are no empirical grounds for taking a third step. In his later book, *The Serial Universe*, Mr. Dunne infers the necessity of an endless regress from the movement of "presentness" along the series of events in time. The regress to which this seems to lead is used by McTaggart as the basis of his argument against the reality of time; and, if it does lead to this regress, McTaggart's conclusion is the right one. (iv) I agree with Mr. Dunne's second proposition. At Stage II we do get the formal outline of a possible explanation of Precognition, though, as I have tried to show, it is not very easy to put a concrete interpretation on the various elements in the formal theory.

SUBSTANCE

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IN the *Metaphysics* (IV. 8), Aristotle examines the various meanings of *οὐσία*, and concludes that its proper and primary meaning is "that which has predicates and is not predicated of anything else." My aim in this paper is to accept this as an account of the notion of "substance," and to free it from confusion with other notions, and then to consider whether when it is thus freed any "problem of substance" remains. I shall illustrate from the classical treatments of the subject both the confusions and the development of a clearer view because it has seemed to me that exposition and criticism of those authorities sometimes show the same obscurities as the authorities themselves.

The first and most obvious confusion is that between substance and matter. Berkeley in his great polemics was attacking not the idea of substance but that of matter or "body." He was a firm believer in the reality of substances, but substances of one kind only—spirits. He himself is not always clear on this point and in several places¹ he attacks the idea of substance itself without realizing that his attack, if it succeeded, would undermine his own philosophy as much as it would that of his enemies, the "mathematicians." Not only Berkeley, but Leibniz also and more recently McTaggart have believed that the world consisted of substances with their qualities and relations, but that these substances were spiritual or immaterial.

The second confusion is that between being a substance and being independent of other things. Spinoza, for example, defined a substance as that which was independent of all else, "*causa sui*."² More often the qualification is held in a narrower form; whatever is a substance may depend on other things, but must be independent of the observer's mind. But there is no logical difficulty in believing that some substances depend for their qualities or even for their existence on the nature of other substances. This dependence would imperil their status as substances only if we identified the relation of cause and effect with that of substance and attribute. This number of *Philosophy* is not a predicate of me, though it owes some of its characteristics to my behaviour, and the fact that St. Paul's Cathedral was not *causa sui* need not make it an attribute of Sir Christopher Wren. This confusion is especially tempting when the dependence

¹ E.g. *Principles* I, 16 (*Works*, ed. Campbell Fraser, Oxford, 1901, I, p. 206). *Dialogue* I (*Works* I, p. 408), and see below, p. 197.

² *Ethics*, I, def. 3.

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in question is dependence on the human mind. When I look at the setting sun for a few seconds and then look away at a white wall I see a circular green patch. Now most people, even if they would consent to regard *Philosophy* or St. Paul's as a substance, would think it queer to call the green patch a substance. Yet if we are to follow Aristotle and maintain that anything is a substance which has qualities and relations and is not itself a quality or relation, then the "after-image" is certainly a substance. For it has at least two qualities, greenness and circularity, and it stands in relations to the self which perceives it and to the white background against which it is perceived. It is certainly itself neither a quality nor a relation. No doubt it would never have existed if I had not looked at the sun, and if I close my eyes it will change or vanish, and "there is nothing on the wall all the time," and for all these reasons the green patch would not be called a substance. For the same reasons Shakespeare's "pageant" was "insubstantial," and you would refuse the status of substance to the pink rats which infest text-books on perception, or to the palaces of last night's dream.

Now all this may appear a battle about words, but misuse of words may often blur real distinctions. Just as I found occasional confusion in Berkeley between "substance" and "body," so I have found some difficulties in discussion of perception directly due to a suppressed belief that sense-data must be attributes of that on which they depend. Here again we may illustrate from Berkeley. He would certainly have accepted my description of his philosophy as maintaining that the universe contained substances of one kind only. Yet he could not accept this without also holding that ideas are parts or states of the mind, as Descartes believed. On this view of the status of sense-data when I perceive an after-image my mind becomes green and circular. Berkeley, however, explicitly guards against this interpretation:

"*Hylas*: Explain to me now, O *Philonous*! how it is possible there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those expressions?

"*Philonous*: Look you, *Hylas*, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without by some being distinct from itself."¹

¹ *Dialogues III (Works, I, p. 470).*

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And Philonous adds: "Besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas, and the existence of these I do not deny." Our account of his philosophy was therefore inaccurate. He believed in substances of two kinds—minds and ideas; everything in the world either was a mind or depended on a mind for its nature and existence.

The third confusion I wish to consider is that between being a substance and being permanent or enduring. Hume, for instance, took himself to be attacking the notion of substance when he raised questions about the continued identity of a ship or a self through its different states or appearances. But like Berkeley he was not really attacking substance. He was accepting and defending substances of one kind and rejecting those of another. The substances he accepted he called ideas and impressions. With Berkeley he rejected matter. Against Berkeley, he rejected spirit. But his impressions have qualities, colour for example, and relations of temporal sequence to other impressions. They were not permanent but brief and fleeting. More recently Whitehead, in *The Concept of Nature*, claimed to be attacking the notion of substance as it has come down to us from Aristotle, when he was really attacking the notion of a permanent independent physical object as it has come to us from the Greek atomists. He really accepts and defends the Aristotelian conception of substance, and shows this clearly at the end of his discussion. "If we are to find substance anywhere we must find it in the events which are the ultimate substance of nature."¹ He, like Berkeley and Hume, believes that the Universe consists of substances, but he has his own special view about the kinds of substances there are and how far they are dependent on each other. Of all the discussions of substance which I have read, only those in the works of McTaggart and W. E. Johnson seem entirely free from the confusions indicated, and from others in which the concept is often involved. McTaggart points out that when substance is used strictly in this sense, then odd results follow: "A sneeze, a party at whist, the group of all red-haired Archdeacons, all are substances."² But such results as this are not unusual when accuracy is maintained, and its absence usually produces gaps and problems somewhere else. When you use "fish" accurately, then a whale is not a fish, and if you persist in calling chalk "cheese," then you will ultimately want another name for cheese. Therefore, when I ask about anything, "Is it a substance?" I mean, "Has it qualities and relations without being itself a quality or a relation?" I do not mean "Has it mass or inertia?" nor "Is it independent of the observer's mind?" nor "Is it permanent through change?"

Kant's treatment of the problem illustrates the points I have

¹ *The Concept of Nature*, p. 19.

² *The Nature of Existence*, II, vi (vol. i, p. 73).

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made above. He holds that substance is a category, a principle essential for the organization of our manifold data of experience into an intelligible order. In a special section of the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, the First Analogy, he gives a proof of his position. But both in the heading of that section and in the argument itself two of the three confusions discussed above may be found. The heading runs: "In all changes of phenomena substance is permanent and the quantum thereof in nature is neither diminished nor increased." The reference to a "quantum" here and again in the illustration during the argument (where the category is shown to be employed in the discovery of the weight of smoke by subtracting the weight of the ashes from the weight of the coal) both show the confusion between substance and matter, and the rest of the argument shows the confusion between being a substance and being permanent. Kant should have distinguished in his own terminology and according to his own definitions, between substance which is a "category," permanent substance which is a "schema," and "material substance" which is an "empirical concept." He should have argued that the notion of substance is essential for any judgment whatever, that the notion of permanence is essential for experience of change in time and that the concept of a material whose quantum is constant is no more than a temporary hypothesis of the physicist.

It may be thought that if greater accuracy in terminology is needed, "substance" should be used of the *permanent* features in our experiences. In this usage substances would form only a small class of those entities which have qualities and stand in relations. I have rejected this usage for two reasons. First, because the classic "source" for discussions of substance in English is Locke's *Essay* (II, xxiii), and the origin of all these problems is Aristotle's analysis (referred to above), and in neither place is there any reference to permanence. Secondly, if substance is used in the narrower sense to connote permanence, it is difficult to find a less misleading term for the wider sense. "Individual" or "particular" have been suggested. "Individual," however, in ordinary usage connotes human personality even more inevitably than substance connotes permanence. It is true that if I asked: "How many substances are there in the room?" I should probably receive as an answer a number which did not include the sneeze and the party at whist. But it is equally certain that if I asked: "How many individuals are there in the room?" I should be told a number which would not include the tallboy and the ottoman. "Particular," which is the more common alternative,¹ may mean "fully determinate." For instance, we speak of a particular shade or shape; the phrase "Particular reds" may as readily stand for the species of

¹ Russell: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1911, and Ramsey, *Mind*, N.S. vol. XXXV.

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red—vermilion, crimson, etc., as for the substances possessing the quality, the pillar-box and the revolutionary. Moreover, while “particular” indicates well enough the status of a thing in respect of its qualities, it is quite inappropriate in respect of its relations. Macbeth can be called a “particular” of ambition, but there is no reason for calling him “particular” in reference to his relations with Duncan or Macduff. Any attempt to justify this usage by treating relations as qualities or universals rest on a confusion between the relatedness (being the subject of) which is a universal, and the relatedness to Duncan which is as peculiar to Macbeth and therefore as “particular” as anything about him.

I intend therefore to retain this general usage of “substance” as meaning that which has qualities and stands in relations, but is not itself a quality or relation. When “substance” is thus used it is doubtful whether there is any “problem of substance.” The only discussion of such a problem which I have found in the philosophical classics is the controversy between Locke and Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, which, as it is not readily accessible, and has never been completely reprinted, I shall summarize.

Locke attempts in the *Essay on the Human Understanding* to give a complete analysis of human experience, and to trace all its constituents to their sources. He maintains that any idea I have, however complex, may be analysed into simple ideas, and that each simple idea is directly presented to the mind either in sensation or in introspection (which Locke calls “reflection”¹). The idea of substance causes him trouble. He says in describing its origin: “The mind takes notice that a number of simple ideas go constantly together, . . . which, being presumed to belong to one thing are called so united in one subject by one name, . . . because . . . not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do exist . . . which therefore we call substance.”² From this talk of repetition and custom it appears that Locke’s theory was that we observe a group of qualities, frequently repeated, and this gives rise to a habit of associating them together, and this finally to the idea that they belong to one thing—to the idea of substance. Stillingfleet insisted, on the contrary, that the idea of substance was required by logical necessity and implied by the idea of any single quality. “It is a Repugnancy to our first conceptions of things that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves, and therefore the Rational Idea of Substance is one of the first and most natural Ideas in our

¹ It is fundamentally important that “reflection” in Locke does not mean reasoning. It is a type of experience as immediate and direct as sight or hearing. It is by “reflection” that we are aware of anger, fear, and sorrow.

² *Essay*, II, vol. xxiii, p. 1.

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minds."¹ If we can recognize a logical necessity in the implication of substance with quality, then custom and repetition are irrelevant. We need no more repeat an experience of a quality to acquire an idea of substance than we need to repeat a geometrical proposition in order to understand its necessity. And conversely, if repetition and custom are essential for the formation of the idea, then no single experience taken by itself can give rise to it. It is fair to say that much of Locke's original chapter asserts the theory of logical necessity; "not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves," for instance. It is to this alternative that Stillingfleet finally drives him. He gives up custom and repetition, and agrees that one experience of a single quality will compel the mind to achieve the idea of substance. "As long as there is any simple idea or sensible quality left, . . . substance cannot be discarded, because all simple ideas, all sensible qualities carry with them a supposition of a substratum to exist in and of a substance wherein they inhere."² Here at any rate is a clear position, and Locke's reluctance to occupy it in the face of Stillingfleet's relentless and ineluctable criticism is due to the threat which it offers to his whole philosophy of experience. For the idea of substance appears inevitably as a simple idea, and yet one which is not derived from either of the two sources to which Locke attributed all simple ideas, sensation and introspection. Stillingfleet drives this point home. "I do not say we can have a clear idea of substance either by sensation or reflection, but from hence I argue that this is a very insufficient distribution of the Ideas necessary to reason. . . . If it (i.e. the Idea of substance) be grounded upon plain and evident Reason, then we must allow an Idea which comes not in by Sensation or Reflection."³ Locke makes a further attempt to evade this unwelcome conclusion. He tries to show that the idea of substance is a complex idea whose constituents can be derived from his two original sources. It is "made up of the general idea of something or being, with the relation of a support to accidents."⁴ This is doubly impossible. "Being" is as Locke admits common to all ideas, and if it is an idea no ideas are simple. And "a support" is not a relation; it is a term in a relation. So Locke's alternative explanation that substance is a relative idea or an idea of relation fails also. It rests on the ambiguity of the word "relation." "My relations" may be either the ways in which I am related to others, fraternity, avuncularity, or they may be those to whom I am related, my brothers and nieces. Substance, therefore, is neither a complex idea nor an idea of relation. It arises, as Stillingfleet insists, neither from compounding nor from comparing two ideas.

¹ *Vindication of the Trinity*, Ch. x, (Works, 1710, III, p. 504).

² Locke: *A Letter to the Bishop of Worcester* (Works, 1823, IV, p. 7).

³ Stillingfleet: *Works*, III, p. 504.

⁴ Locke: *A Letter to the Bishop of Worcester* (Works, 1823, IV, p. 19).

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but "from supposing one Idea from another."¹ It cannot be a complex idea, for the constituents would have to be qualities, and "I cannot understand how a Complex Idea of Accidents should make an Idea of Substance. . . . How could a complication of Simple Ideas which cannot subsist by themselves make an Idea of a substance which doth subsist by itself."² Having disposed of this last attempt, Stillingfleet, with some justice, asks whether he himself "deserves so much to be complained of for exposing the unreasonableness of laying the Foundation of all our certainty and Knowledge upon Simple Ideas which we receive by Sensation or Reflection."³

The result, then, of the controversy is that Locke is compelled to admit the need of an idea, which is implied by every idea of sensation or reflection, but is not itself an idea of sensation or reflection, and that the source of this idea is not custom or repetition but intelligible necessity. Groups of qualities need not be repeated that we should come to posit a substance to support them. Nor need qualities even be grouped together. A single quality imposes the necessity as clearly as does a group, whether occurring or recurring. Locke originally thought the repeated groupings were necessary because he did not distinguish between how we come to be aware of substance in general and how we come to our knowledge of particular substances. My idea of an orange may well be acquired by observing that certain qualities go constantly together, so that after several repetitions, when I observe the specific colour and texture I shall expect the specific taste which I have observed as their regular concomitant. When I ask, "What is that black thing?" I am asserting necessity as well as ignorance - the general idea of substance is as clearly implied in my question as in any answer to it. Locke's last remedy is to say that the general idea is obscure, confused, or unknown. "A philosopher that says that which supports accidents is something he-knows-not-what; and a countryman who says, the foundation of the church at Haarlem is supported by something he-knows-not-what; and a child that stands in the dark upon his mother's muff, and says he stands upon something he-knows-not-what; in this respect talk all three alike. But if the countryman knows that the foundation of the church at Haarlem is supported by a rock as the houses about Bristol are; or by gravel as the houses about London are; or by wooden piles as the houses in Amsterdam are; it is then plain that, having a clear and distinct idea of the thing that supports the church, he does not talk of this matter as a child, nor will he of the support of accidents, when he has a clearer and most distinct idea of it, than that it is barely something."⁴

¹ Stillingfleet: *Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter* (Works, III, p. 523).

² *Ibid.*, p. 524.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 528.

⁴ Locke: *A Letter to the Bishop of Worcester* (Works, 1823, IV, p. 10, and cf. IV, pp. 450-453).

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But the idea is really clear, distinct, and perfect. It is completely defined by Locke himself as "that which is a support for accidents and relations." What is unknown is, as we saw above, the determinate species of substance, rock, gravel, piles, muff. I may know quite clearly what "substance" means without knowing what song the Sirens sang or what supports the church at Haarlem. Locke, however, seems to be maintaining not only that this particular substance is unknown because I know of it no more than its relation to the church, but also that even if I knew all its qualities and relations I should still be no nearer to knowledge of the substance itself. He thinks of a substance as something lurking behind its qualities, and not revealed in them. He calls it the idea of "something I-know-not-what," without seeing that if he knew *what* it was he would know only a further quality or qualities. His mistake here is due to two of those confusions described above. He thinks he knows nothing of the "substance" of a piece of gold because he does not know those of its characteristics which are independent of perception, nor does he know "the minute constitution of its insensible parts." But the relational characteristics of an object are genuine characteristics of it, as we insisted above, and there is no reason to prefer microscopic to macroscopic qualities.

Criticism and self-criticism of Locke thus reveal substance as a category, an idea required as a correlate of the qualities given to sensation and introspection. I think this would be the orthodox theory even now, and that heterodoxy would depart from it by dispensing with the notion of substance altogether and identifying a thing with the group of its qualities, or with the law of their occurrence. Berkeley holds this theory with regard to physical objects. "If *substance* be taken in the vulgar sense for a combination of qualities such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like . . . this we cannot be accused of taking away; but if it be taken in the philosophic sense for the support of accidents or quantities without the mind, then I acknowledge that we take it away."¹ He claims to be retaining what the senses give us and what any man can observe for himself (the group of qualities) and discarding what is merely metaphysical mythology (the substratum). But once again the insertion of the words "without the mind" show that he is not certain whether he is attacking the idea of substance or the idea of an independent reality. The *Commonplace Book* is clearer. "Ask any man not tainted with their jargon what he means by corporeal substance. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and such like sensible qualities. These I retain. The philosophic *res quid nec quantum nec quale* whereof I have no idea I discard."² Hume agrees in the rejection of substance and the group substitute for it: "We have

¹ *Principles*, I, 37 (*Works*, I, p. 277).

² *Works*, I, p. 20.

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no idea of substance distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we talk or reason concerning it."¹

For a defence of the orthodox position, that of Stillingfleet and Kant, that the idea of substance is necessary and the group of qualities no adequate substitute for it, I would refer again to McTaggart's treatment.² But I shall not discuss this issue further, for I believe both orthodoxy and heterodoxy rest here on an error which they share. They both assume that qualities are directly and immediately given but that substance is not. But surely the datum of touch is not a quality without a substance, not coolness and roughness, but "something-cool-and-rough." When I look at a candle-flame I perceive not yellowness but something yellow. I find it difficult to devise arguments for anything so obvious, and I can do little more than illustrate and clarify the position I defend. When I continue to look at the flame and press one eyeball sideways, I see double. But what is it that I see double? not yellowness nor any other quality. There is still the same yellowness but now two "somethings" possessing it, and the "twoness" is given to sight as much as the yellowness. Again in the case of the after-image when I look away from the sun I do not see greenness and also see roundness, I see something-green-and-round. It is not an act of inference or intellect which puts the qualities together and attaches them to a substance. They are given together, and "together" here does not mean any sort of togetherness - not merely simultaneity or presence in the same field of view. Their perceived togetherness is that specific sort which is not further analysable - "belonging to the same substance." I see the greenness and I see the roundness, and I see that what is green is also round as certainly as I see anything whatever, and therefore I see that something is green. What is given to sight, therefore, is substance-with-qualities, and the problem of getting from qualities which are directly given to substance which is not is a mistaken problem altogether. The only recognition of this which I have been able to find in the philosophical classics is in the work of Leibniz. In the *New Essays*, commenting on the passages in Locke's *Essay* which were quoted above, he says: "The knowledge of the concrete always precedes that of the abstract - the hot thing rather than heat."³ And again, "It is rather the concretum as wise, warm, shining which arises in our mind than the abstractions or qualities as knowledge, heat, light, which are much more difficult to comprehend."⁴ Qualities without substance, far from being the

¹ *Treatise on Human Nature*, I, i, 6, (ed. Selby Bigge, Oxford, 1896, p. 10).

² *The Nature of Existence*, I, Ch. vi.

³ *New Essays*, II, xii, Trans. A. G. Langley (Open Court, 1910), p. 148.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, xxiii, Trans., p. 225.

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original data of experience, are apprehensible only after specific and difficult mental operations, if indeed they are separately apprehensible at all.

Why has not this obvious fact been recognized? I think the answer lies once again in those confusions exposed above. My claim is that when I am aware of the after-image, what I perceive is a round, green substance. But anyone hearing this will think it is a much greater claim than it is. They will say, "There is nothing there," as if I had asserted that I directly perceived a physical object independent of my own awareness. But I am asserting only that I am directly aware of the existence of an entity with two qualities, roundness and greenness; whether that same entity has also weight and permanence, whether it is completely enclosed in a continuous surface, whether its greenness or roundness are independent of my eye or brain or mind, all this I do not claim to apprehend directly. Sight certainly does not tell me whether this substance is a physical or material substance or not. The substance which is indubitably round and green may be a state of my mind as Descartes thought, or a physical object as Professor Alexander thinks, or a part of my brain as Russell thought, or something which is no part of mind or brain or matter but inhabits a space of its own as Professor Broad thinks. All that I claim is that the universe contains at that moment something both round and green, and that my awareness of that something with those qualities is direct and certain. The questions which interest philosophers are usually those further questions about the status of this entity, but they presuppose the notion of substance and the certainty that some substances with their qualities are directly apprehended. Another reason for the error common to Locke and his critics is no doubt the fact that while some substances can be directly given to sense--after-images, for instance--others cannot. A legal code, a soul, an electron cannot be seen or heard or tasted, and it is supposed that the existence of these substances is inferred from direct perception of their qualities. But it is not; it is inferred from direct awareness of other substances. For the qualities of these substances are as inaccessible to sensation as the substances themselves. You cannot see a legal code nor can you see its qualities justice and equity. You cannot smell a soul nor can you smell righteousness or salvation. You cannot hear an electron nor can you hear the quality of vibrating at 100,000 to the second.

I have been rejecting so far the view that qualities can be directly apprehended but substances cannot. The only alternative to the view I accept for which I can see any defence is the view that the datum of immediate apprehension is something within which the distinction between substance and quality is not apprehended, and that this

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distinction itself with both its correlative concepts requires an act of the intelligence. The "category" then would be not "substance," but "substance and quality." And the datum of sight would contain neither substances nor qualities, but the potentiality of both alike. This is the view of Bradley, and of James Ward. The reason why I reject it is that if the distinction between substance and quality requires an act of the intellect, then *a fortiori* the distinction between one quality and another cannot be directly apprehended, and an act of the intellect will be needed to distinguish between sweet and sour, or between yellow and rough. Bradley and Ward both adopt this conclusion. Bradley's "Feeling" and Ward's "Presentational Continuum" are devoid not only of the distinction between substance and quality, but of all distinctions whatever. But when the attempt to draw a line between mediacy and immediacy leaves to immediacy an apprehension devoid of all distinctions, I should rather conclude that the initial distinction is itself misleading or that it must be differently drawn in the first instance. For to be devoid of all distinctions, to have neither qualities nor relations, is surely not to be at all. Bradley should, therefore, have retraced his steps and taken one of two alternatives. He could have acquiesced in the conclusion I defend that some instances of substance-with-qualities are directly apprehended and some are not. Or he could have given up altogether the distinction between mediate and immediate apprehension, between intellect and feeling, between thought and sense, and held with Hegel that "There is no experience which is not just as much mediate as immediate."¹

I have said that some instances of substance-and-qualities are directly apprehended, but so far my examples have all been taken from the field of sensation. Are there others? I should hold that minds can be directly apprehended also, that here, too, I can be certain by direct inspection of the existence of a substance with more than one quality. Suppose I feel envious. In that case I do not infer that I am envious from some sense-datum of sight or hearing - it is an experience as direct as sight or hearing itself. But envy is not a simple datum. I may envy Jones because he can fly an aeroplane or understand Kant's *Kritik*. How much in this situation is inferred and dubious, and how much is directly apprehended? I infer that Jones can fly aeroplanes or understand Kant from some sets of noises he has made, and I may be wrong. But I do not infer that I believe he can fly, and I cannot be wrong about that. My believing is indubitable, though Jones's flying may be dubious. Again, it may be irrational to envy a man for such reasons, but the envying is indubitable, though its grounds are dubious. I am certain then of the existence of

¹ Hegel, *Logic*. Trans. Johnston and Struthers, i, 80, and cf. H. H. Joachim's Lecture, "Immediate Experience and Mediation" (Oxford, 1919).

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a believing and an envying. I am certain also of the existence of a wish to fly or to understand Kant. Such a wish may be as unreasonable as you please; its existence is all I claim to apprehend directly. But not only am I directly aware of a wishing and a believing and an envying, I am as directly aware that all these three characteristics qualify the same subject. As I was aware that what was green was also round, so here I am directly aware that what believes also wishes, for were it not so envy would be impossible. If Robinson wishes to fly, but does not believe Jones can, then Robinson will not envy Jones. If Smith believes Jones understands Kant, but has not the slightest wish to do so himself, Smith will not envy Jones. But my envy was directly apprehended, therefore so also must be the unity in one self of the wishing and believing which are its necessary conditions.

Once again, when I claim in such a case to be aware of the unity of a self, I am claiming very little. Whether the substance whose wishes and beliefs I directly apprehended has also a past and a future, whether it is brave or foolish or damned or immortal, all this I cannot directly observe. But as before, the minimum allowable for direct awareness is awareness of substance with qualities, not awareness of qualities alone.

The first "problem of substance," then, that of its origin in our experience, I have dealt with. The other that remains is that of the relation of substance to quality. As I pointed out above, Berkeley in an unguarded moment attacks the notion of substance in general on the ground that this relation is unintelligible. He says words like "substratum" or "supporting" accidents indicate a spatial relationship which cannot be intended as it would involve a regress, or they explain nothing.¹

In Plato's *Parmenides*² there is a similar attack on such terms as "shading" or "resembling," which may be used to describe the relation between substance and quality. To such arguments it is sometimes thought a sufficient answer to insist that the relation is a unique relation and that the use of spatial or quantitative metaphors to describe it is bound to be misleading. On this view, Plato's intention in the *Parmenides* was to insist that the relation is a real and important one, and to warn his readers that it is unique and unanalysable. The solution is to recognize the relation and coin a new name for it.

There may, however, be a more radical attack. Ramsey³ said he could find no difference in nature between terms like "Socrates" and terms like "wise." He attacked Aristotle's attempt to explain the distinction by referring to the distinction between subject and

¹ *Principles*, I, 16 (*Works*, I, p. 266), cf. *Works*, I, pp. 408-410.

² *Parmenides*, 131a-133b.

³ *Mind*, N.S., vol. xxxiv,

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predicate in the proposition by showing that either Socrates or wisdom may be the subject of a proposition. But this may still be met by holding that the distinction is a metaphysical ultimate and explanations through logic or grammar are as unhelpful as those through space or quantity.

It may, however, be urged that the *Parmenides* has a far deeper significance, that its regress arguments are not in the least escaped by coining new terms for unique relations.¹ For let us name the relation between Socrates and wisdom a relation of "instantiation." If Socrates is wise and Plato is wise, then each is related to wisdom by the relation of instantiation, and anything so related to a number of substances is a quality or universal. Wisdom then is a universal, and has as instances Socrates and Plato. Roundness is a universal, and has as instances the penny and the plate. Wisdom and roundness are both universals. They are therefore both instances of universality. But anything which has instances is a universal. Therefore universality is a universal. Therefore universality is an instance of universality. Now we have two alternatives. If in the last sentence the first "universality" is the name of a term different from that named by the second "universality," then we have an infinite regress and no explanation. If the two names are names for the same term, then we have a term related to itself by a relationship other than that of identity, which is certainly a paradoxical conclusion.

The same result may be reached by another route. Consider the unique relation—instantiation. It, like fatherhood or betweenness, is a relation. All three are therefore instances of relationality. Instantiation is therefore related to relationality by the relation we have named instantiation.

Here again the two "instantiations" in the last sentence indicate different terms or the same term. In the former case we have an infinite regress. In the latter we have a term related to another term by a relation which is one of the terms, which is a paradox. Of the two alternatives in each case, I should hold that the regress must be rejected and the paradox remain, but I agree that the situation is certainly perplexing and threatens the acceptance of the relation as metaphysically ultimate and satisfactory.

The only alleviating circumstances I can suggest are these. First, there are some parallels for the paradox. The relation between doctor and patient, and between barrister and client, are normally asymmetrical, like that between substance and quality. Yet a physician may heal himself and a lawyer appear for himself. Or, again, a man may love himself, know himself, or control himself, though it is true that from the earliest times these relationships also have been felt

¹ I owe the whole of the following working out of the regress argument to Mr. G. Ryle.

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to be paradoxical and philosophers have been driven to attempt to explain them by diremptions within the self (into a part which controls and a part which is controlled, etc.) explanations which only explain the situation by explaining it away.¹ For the "real self" is inevitably identified with one of the two parts, and the phenomenon is no longer one of self-love or self-control, but an ordinary instance of control of A by B or love of A by B, with the paradox now quite a different one that A and B should be housed in and express themselves through the same physical organism.

Moreover, if we ask what remedy is to be offered us by those who attack the substance-quality relation, difficulties arise for them too. They would maintain that our mistake lay in supposing a fact to be analysable into two elements, a substance and a quality, and a relation between them, whereas the fact is ultimate and unanalysable. But we still require an explanation of the possibility of using the same term "wise" in describing the two facts as "Socrates is wise" and "Plato is wise," or the same term "Socrates" in describing facts expressed by "Socrates is wise" and "Socrates is just." Russell would take the "class of facts" as ultimate and say these facts have a peculiar relation to each other, that of "particular-resemblance," which justifies our language.²

But if universals are rejected because they lead to a regress or a paradox and therefore no universals are real, the same conclusion must hold concerning classes. For the sentences containing the word "wise" describe facts which form a class. But classes also form a class. The class of all classes leads us again to a regress or a paradox, the paradox that while the relation between class and member is normally asymmetrical, the class of all classes is a member of itself. And we must accept the paradox or deny that there are any classes (of facts or of anything else). But if we accept the paradox here we might as well accept it over universals also.

Despite the difficulties, therefore, I am still inclined to maintain the validity of the notion of substance and quality which in this paper I set out to defend. To hold that the universe contains substances (in this wide sense) still seems to me to be a simple and an evident truth, but I hope that I have shown that it is not so simple as to have evaded confusion with many other problems, nor so evident as to have escaped question altogether.

¹ Cf. Plato, *Republic*, 430e, on self-control, and Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, IX, 8, 6, 10681, 28, on self-love.

² *Principia Mathematica* (Second Edition, vol. 1, Appendix in.

AN ADDITION TO THE CORRESPONDENCE OF SPINOZA

PROFESSOR A. WOLF

INTRODUCTION

THE Library of the Royal Society of London contains a large collection of manuscript material relating to Henry Oldenburg and his correspondents. Oldenburg was one of the two Secretaries of the Royal Society when it was founded in 1662. For many years he acted as intermediary between British and Continental philosophers and scientists. He also edited the early volumes of the Royal Society's *Philosophical Transactions*. His contacts were accordingly very extensive. Nearly all the seventeenth-century pioneers of science were among his correspondents. In his role of intermediary he was in the habit of sending extracts from some of his foreign letters to such of the Fellows of the Royal Society as were likely to be interested in them. To this practice we owe the survival of part of a letter from Spinoza which is published here, for the first time, in facsimile, in transcript and in translation. It occurs in a letter to Sir Robert Moray, dated October 7, 1665 (R.S. Library Reference, No. O.L. 17). Another part of the same letter from Spinoza, and published long ago, has survived in a similar way, namely, as an extract in a letter from Oldenburg to the Hon. Robert Boyle (see the writer's edition of *The Correspondence of Spinoza*, Letter XXX, pp. 205 f., and 418 f.). It is quite possible that other Spinoza fragments may yet come to light, if those working on seventeenth-century material will exercise some vigilance. I am indebted to Dr. J. Olsvanger for directing my attention to Oldenburg's letter to Sir Robert Moray, which Dr. Olsvanger came across while searching for material relating to Manasseh ben Israel, a letter from whom is actually contained in Oldenburg's Commonplace Book. Since November 1929, when I first saw the unpublished part of Spinoza's Letter XXX, I have searched from time to time for more, but in vain. It may therefore be as well to publish it without further delay.

It will be noted that, in his letter to Sir Robert Moray, Oldenburg does not mention Spinoza by name. There is, however, no doubt at all that the "odd Philosopher, living in Holland but no Hollander," was no other than Spinoza. The evidence on this point is quite

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conclusive. Oldenburg's letter is dated October 7, 1665, and the passage cited from the letter of the "odd Philosopher" answers the very questions which Oldenburg had asked in his letter sent to Spinoza in September 1665. In this letter Oldenburg complains that "Kircher's *Subterranean World* has not yet appeared in our English world," and asked, "What, I pray you, do your people think of the pendulum of Huygens, especially of that kind which is said to show the measure of time so exactly that it can be used for finding out longitudes at sea? Also what is happening about his Dioptries, and his Treatise on Motion, both of which I have been expecting for a long time already" (*The Correspondence of Spinoza*, pp. 203-5). These are the very points dealt with in the extract before us. Moreover, in his letter to Robert Boyle, which contains another extract from the same letter, Oldenburg states explicitly that the letter from which he quotes was written by Spinoza, and that he (Oldenburg) had quoted another part of it in a communication to Sir Robert Moray; and his brief indication of its subject-matter closely agrees with the contents of the fragment now published. This is what Oldenburg wrote to Boyle: "In the same letter to Sir Robert I took notice to him of what a certain odd philosopher (whom you know better than he, it being Signior Spinoza) hath very lately written to me concerning Mr. Huygens' transmigration into France, his pendulums and his progress in dioptries, etc." (*The Correspondence of Spinoza*, p. 418). The repetition of the epithet "odd Philosopher" is additional evidence. Moreover, Oldenburg's letter to Spinoza dated October 12, 1665 (see *The Correspondence of Spinoza*, Letter XXXI, pp. 206-9) is clearly a reply to the present fragment.

Even with the present fragment, Letter XXX is not yet complete. The facsimile shows that Oldenburg was on the point of quoting more, but crossed out the first word of the next sentence (*Sentio*), and stopped. However, so far as one can judge from Oldenburg's Letters XXIX and XXXI, it seems probable that comparatively little is missing from Spinoza's Letter XXX. Oldenburg's two Letters (XXIX and XXXI) also make it clear that the present fragment formed the first portion of Letter XXX, and was followed by the part already published.

With regard to the contents of the fragment published here, information relating to the men and matters referred to in it is contained partly in my edition of *The Correspondence of Spinoza* (1928) and partly in my *History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (1935), so that it is unnecessary to add anything here on that score.

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TRANSCRIPT OF LETTER FROM OLDENBURG TO SIR ROBERT MORAY

LONDON, *October 7, 1665.*

I should not have interrupted you so soon again, after my letter sent to you but two dayes since, if I had not been obliged to advertise you that I have at length sent the role, wherein Hevelius his Pro-dromus is contained, by a barge carrying things for his Highness, P. Rupert, the Bargeman Richard Mose, the Duke of York's con-fectioner in it. I have been so ambiguous about a conveniency of sending, that I have not known how to make the addresse; sometimes there hath been one, whereby it seemed better to make it to M. Boyle, then another, w[h]en [it] appeared more proper to make it to you.

I should have said nothing more at this time, but that just now there comes to my hands a letter from an odd Philosopher, that lives in Holland, but no Hollander, who having lately conversed with M. Hugen writes to me thus:

Kircheri Mundum Subterraneum apud Dn. Hugenium vidi, qui ejus pietatem laudat, non ingenium; nescio an quia de pendulis agit, deque iis concludit, ea minime inservire longitudinibus invenien-dis, quod sententia Hugenii prorsus adversatur. Scire cupis, quid Nostrates de Pendulis Hugenianis novis sentiunt. Nil certi adhuc possum ea de re tibi significare; hoc tamen scio, fabrum, qui solus jus habet ad ea fabricandum, ab opere plane cessare, quoniam ea vendere non potest: Nescio, an propter commercia interrupta, an vero quia nimis care ea venditat, nam 300 florenis Carolinis unum quodque aestimat. Idem Hugenius a me rogatus de sua dioptrica, deque alio circa Parheliis tractatu, respondit se in dioptricis quid adhuc quaerere quod simul ac invenit librum illum typis una cum tractatu de Parheliis mandaturum. Verum puto ego, eum in prae-sentiarum de Gallico suo itinere (in Galliam enim habitatum ire parat, simul ac parens redux factus fuerit) magis quam de ulla re alia cogitare. Quod vero in Dioptricis ait se quaerere, est, Num vitra in Telescopiis ordinare ita possit ut defectus unius, defectum alterius corrigit, atque ita efficere, ut omnes radii paralleli vitrum objectivum permeantes ad oculum perveniant tanquam si in puncto mathematico coissent: quod mihi adhuc videtur impossibile. Caeterum, in tota sua dioptrica, ut partim vidi, partim ab ipso, ni fallor, intellexi, non nisi de figuris sphaericis agit. Tractatum vero de motu, de quo etiam sciscitaris, frustra expectari puto. Nimis dudum factum est, ex quo jactare coepit, se regulas motus et naturae leges calculo longe aliter invenisse, quam a Cartesio tra-duntur, illasque Cartesii falsas fere omnes esse: Nec tamen huc usque ullum ea de re specimen edidit. Scio, quidem, me, ante annum circiter, ab eo audivisse, omnia quae ipse dudum circa motum calculo

**FACSIMILE OF OLDENBURG'S LETTER TO
SIR ROBERT MORAY**

[illegible][illegible]

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invenerat, post in Anglia experimentis comprobata reperisse: quod vix credo; judico autem, in regula motus, Cartesio sexta, eum et Cartesium plane errare.

This I thought necessary to transcribe, believing you would not be displeased to see these hints of severall particulars. But I doe not at all remember that Mons^r Hugens made here any experiments tending to assert any fundamentall Lawes of motion in opposition to those of M. Descartes: but if you remember any such thing, I must pray you, to putt me in mind of them, and you will oblige me. My humble service to M. Boyle with the communication of this extract. Adieu.

TRANSLATION OF THE SPINOZA FRAGMENT

I have seen Kircher's *Subterranean World* at the house of Mr. Huygens, who praises his piety, but not his ability. I do not know whether this is because he [Kircher] treats of pendulums and concludes that they are of very little use for determining longitudes, which is quite contrary to the view of Huygens. You want to know what our people think about the new pendulums of Huygens. I am not yet able to communicate anything definite about this matter. This, however, I do know, that the workman who alone has the right to manufacture them is giving up this work altogether, because he cannot sell them. I do not know whether this is due to the interruptions in our intercourse [with other countries], or because he is trying to sell them at too high a price, for he prices them at 300 Caroline florins each. The same Huygens, when I asked him about his *Dioptric* and his other treatise on Parheliions, replied that he was still investigating something in dioptrics, and that as soon as he discovers it he will send the book to the press together with the treatise on Parheliions. But for my part I think that his mind is at present more occupied with his French journey (for he is preparing to go to live in France as soon as his father is back) than with anything else. However, what he says he is investigating in dioptrics is, whether he can so arrange the glasses in Telescopes that the defect of one of them may correct the defect of the other, and so bring it about that all the parallel rays penetrating the object-glass may reach the eye as though they had converged in a mathematical point. This still seems to me impossible. For the rest, in his whole *Dioptric*, as I have partly seen, and partly, unless I am mistaken, gathered from him, he is treating of spherical figures only. As regards his treatise on motion, about which you also want to know, I think that it is idle to expect it. It is so long since he began to boast that he had discovered laws of motion and [other] laws of nature by calculations quite different from those given by

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Descartes, and that Descartes' laws are nearly all false; yet up to the present he has given no proof of this. I know, indeed, that about a year ago I heard from him that all that he had formerly discovered about motion by calculation he had subsequently found verified by experiments in England. This I scarcely believe. I think, moreover, that as regards the law of motion, which is given by Descartes as the sixth law, both he [Huygens] and Descartes are quite mistaken.

THE OBJECTIVE VALIDITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION.¹

EDWARD CONZE, Ph.D.

I. THE PROBLEM AND ITS JUSTIFICATION

THE present essay is intended as a contribution to the investigation of the relations between the theoretical and the practical life of man. It makes the attempt to show that our assumption or rejection of even the highest and most abstract law of thought and reality is based on and rooted in our practical attitude towards the world. It tries to show that even the principle of contradiction (P.C.) owes its validity or non-validity to decisions made by the practical and emotional part of man, and that the objective validity of the P.C. is not absolute, but that it is relative to the practical and emotional attitude you choose to assume.

First leaving on one side the question, what the P.C. exactly means and in which sense we speak of its "validity," we must show at the very outset of this essay in what sense the P.C. can be at all a subject-matter for discussion. How can the P.C. be a matter of any earnest discussion, since it is generally considered to be beyond all discussion? In what sense can it afford a problem, since it seems to be an indubitable and undeniable truth? But, on the other hand, whether the P.C. *can* be denied or not, it *has* been denied in the course of the history of human thinking. Aristotle, in his still unsurpassed and valid discussion of the P.C. in the third book of the *Metaphysics* maintains that practically *all* his predecessors *denied* the P.C. Later on we find that eminent thinkers like Nicholas of Cusa, Hegel, Bostrom, Bradley, and others in Europe, the Taoists in China, the Madhyamikas in India denied the validity of the P.C. in one way or another. Lévy-Bruhl made at least an attempt to show that the P.C. is not observed by "primitive" mentality. Svend Ranulf demonstrated the same for the Eleatic methods of thinking. How can these historical facts be reconciled with the assumption of logicians that the P.C. is beyond all doubt and dispute? Is it possible to account for these deviators from the P.C. with an impatient wave of the hand, assuming that these thinkers have been utterly wrong, unable to grasp the fundamental condition of all thinking about realities? Or how is this radical difference of opinion to be reconciled?

¹ Throughout this article for "principle of contradiction" the abbreviation "P.C." is used.

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Perhaps it may be useful in this dilemma to examine the reasons on which Aristotle and all his direct or indirect disciples based their claim that the P.C. must be considered as a principle standing high above all dispute.

First it has been said that the P.C. can neither be proved nor refuted because it is *self-evident*. A truth is considered to be self-evident if it is immediately, that is without the intervention of any proof or deduction, perceived by reason to be indubitably true and known by itself. It is not difficult to see that no mere psychic state of belief, be it as unshaken as it may, can be sufficient to assure us of the fact that we are in immediate touch with truth and reality as such. Unfortunately a wrong idea may be as self-evident as a true one. So many "self-evident" propositions have been shattered in the history of human thought that alleged "self-evidence" cannot be considered to be any ultimate guarantee of truth. Recourse to it cannot exclude the discussion of a problem. "Self-evidence" of a proposition can never exclude the possibility that a more satisfactory self-evident proposition about the same object may arise. Just the *substitution* of self-evident propositions for each other forms one of the main elements of the development of human thought.

More serious is the second contention: the P.C. cannot be proved or refuted, being the unspoken *condition* of all proof, in this sense, that if it is denied, all proof is denied. Even those who deny the P.C. confirm it by denying it, for they assume denial not to be the same as affirmation, else they would take no pains to deny it. This argumentation in fact excludes the possibility of a complete denial of the P.C. But it leaves open the possibility of *limiting the extent* of the validity of the P.C. It leaves open the possibility that *not all* objects may be on the same level as regards the P.C. Let us now call A the class of things for which the P.C. is valid and let us call B the class of things for which it is not valid. Then A may be *subordinated* to B. Under the assumption of different degrees of truth the lower degrees may observe the P.C., but not the higher. The P.C. would be the necessary condition of all arguments concerning A, but it would be abolished at the threshold of B, although leading to it. So for the German romantics (Novalis, Schlegel, etc.), for Schelling and Hegel the P.C. is observed only by the lower logic of the *Verstand*, whereas the higher logic of speculative reason rejects it. In a similar spirit, Nicholas of Cusa declared four hundred years earlier that the P.C. is the first principle *only* of the lower discursive reason, "limited by the contradictories," i.e. of the first step towards truth, but it has no validity for the higher, truer, and infinite faculty, for the "most simple and detached" faculty of the *docta ignorantia*, of the *intellectio videntium*. Besides, there exists another possibility: A and B can be *co-ordinated*; for one part of the world the

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P.C. may be valid, but not for another; human thought, which surveys them both, may then belong to that part for which the P.C. is valid.

The two lines of argument mentioned above attempted simply to exclude any discussion about the validity of the P.C. This is not the case with other more modern forms of argument, which regard the P.C. either as an outcome of the generalization of the data of *experience* or as the necessary condition of all fruitful *practical* behaviour. This nominalistic and pragmatistic "proof" of the P.C. can never exclude *a priori* the possibility that either new data of experience or that a new fruitful practical attitude may appear, which would exclude the P.C.

II. THE FORMULATION OF THE P.C.

The P.C. may be stated as the psychological fact that mind or consciousness, owing to their nature and constitution, *cannot* actually judge at the same time that a thing is, and that the same thing is not. But logical theory is not concerned with the question, if in fact the P.C. is thoroughly observed in actual thinking, or if there are exceptions to it. But the logician, in case he should find contradictions in the actual thinking-process, would point out that these are cases of wrong thinking, that they are instances of a thinking which is not quite clear and distinct, that they are cases in which reason has not been able to overcome the obstacles of irrational tendencies, etc. Logical theory assumes the P.C. to be not the principle of all judgment, but of all *true* judgment only.

But what reason can be given for this assumption? Why can we call true only reasoning processes which observe the P.C.? I can see only one satisfactory reason for this, namely that the P.C. is also the principle of the *objects* of judgment and reasoning. The P.C. is a principle of true judgment, because it is a principle of objects, of reality. The laws of reality are the fundamentals of the laws of the logical mind. We cannot *judge* that the same man is learned and is also not learned at the same time and in relation to the same group of facts, *because* in fact he is learned and cannot be not learned at the same time and in relation to the same group of facts. The P.C. may be a postulate, as Schiller has put it; but it is a postulate demanded by reality. Else it would be gratuitous and would not concern reality, would not help mind in its proper task, the reflection of reality.¹

Now, each general law and principle is always concerned only

¹ It is, of course, impossible to discuss here in full the very controversial relations between thinking and being. The assumption that being is at the basis of thinking, although I personally am inclined to deem it correct, need be accepted by the reader only as a convenient working hypothesis.

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with *one* feature or property common to a class of things. So also the P.C. is not immediately concerned with all the manifold aspects and qualities of things, i.e. their colour, shape, etc. Being the most general of all laws, covering everything, it must be concerned with a property which is common to everything, which is a common factor in all reality. But this is the property of being as being. We may apply to the P.C. the method of Baconian induction and ask for the reason of its validity. Then the reason for the P.C. must be wherever the P.C. is, must be nowhere where it is not, and must be present always in the degree in which the P.C. is fulfilled. Only being as being accomplishes these three conditions.

Being as being is the primary object of the P.C. So the ultimate statement of the P.C. would be: "Being is not and cannot be non-being"; or "contradictory being, i.e. being which is also non-being, is nothing." All the other formulations which can be given of the P.C., and which I need not enumerate and discuss here in detail, are secondary to, are special cases of this one, for all other "objects" obey the P.C. only because and in so far as they participate in this one identical property, in being. Thus the P.C. can be stated of *real things* and their *attributes*, and it is with this aspect of the P.C. that we are especially concerned in this article. But when we say, e.g.: "a 'thing' cannot at the same time be and not be," or "contradictory attributes exclude each other and cannot coincide in one and the same identical part of a 'thing,'" we apply the categories of being to "things." The same is true for the different ways in which we may state the P.C. for our *judgments* and *thoughts*. They all are valid, because logical thinking participates in and reflects "being." In the case of *human consciousness* it can be shown *in detail* that it observes the P.C. only as far as it assumes the categories of being.¹

To assume the P.C. to be a principle of general validity means to say that being is the *dominating idea* of all thinking. This statement, which is the starting-point of my further investigations, was first suggested to me by the admirable analysis Rosmini has given of the P.C. It means that being is present as an indispensable element in the interior of all objects of thought and is reflected in all logical judgment. Only the presence of and the implicit relation to the idea of being makes judgment and thinking possible. The data of sensation are transformed into thoughts only when touched by the idea of being. But what is "being"? We can give the definition of "being" only by pointing to its law (the P.C.) and to its *categories*. It may happen that another name is given to this complex of properties, which we called "being," e.g. the name of "spirit." It is essential for the P.C. only that the *categories* of being are an element of the dominating idea, be this called "being" or "spirit."

¹ See E. Conze, *Der Satz vom Widerspruch*, 1932, 4-77.

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III. THE CONCEPT OF BEING AND THE CONDITIONS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE P.C.

(1) *General Survey*

The fundamental property of being, as expressed in the P.C., is not an isolated one. It is connected with other properties, as with its conditions. We now must ask: which properties must "being" communicate to a thing that it may be subject to the P.C.? Which are the chief properties of being, i.e. the chief ontological conditions of the working of the P.C.?

First, as a matter of course, the contradictory attributes, in order to be really contradictory, and to annihilate each other, must have one and the same subject. They must not only be "somehow united," but the two properties must concern the *same* identical object, seen at the *same* time and in relation to the *same* part.

Secondly, being and the things which participate in being are *determinate*, i.e. they are different, they are distinguished from everything that is not themselves. To be determinate, to be different, to be separated from all other objects, to be itself and nothing else, these all are one and the same. For it is just by its definite characteristics that a thing is marked off and distinguished from all others. This excludes all *ambiguity* from the reality of things. Each object, at a certain time and in a certain relation has only one attribute and not more than one in one relation. Reality in itself is supposed to be unequivocal.

The P.C. cannot be applied to indeterminate objects, in so far as and in the respect in which they are indeterminate. In particular propositions, affirmation and negation are compatible with each other: "Some A are B; some A are non-B." These two judgments are not contradictory: both can be true. There is an element of indeterminateness in them, and that is in the word "some" (which either means "at least some" or "only some"). By abolishing this indeterminate element in "some," by saying: "All these some A are B" and "all these same some A are non-B," we obtain a real contradiction. The case is similar with the indefinite judgments. The P.C. is the law of things and judgments only in so far as they are determinate.

It is a condition of the P.C. that diversity cannot at the same time be unity, non-diversity. In our world everything suffers from a dearth of properties, it has not at its disposal an infinite wealth of attributes, it is excluded from a great amount of properties and qualities; in this world things are repelled from each other, they collide and they cannot penetrate each other indefinitely. This *finiteness* of things and their *hard exclusiveness* against each other is a condition of the P.C.

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Now the P.C. can be inadequate to express the fundamental law of reality either in the sense that it is *meaningless* in regard to this reality or in the sense that it is *violated* by this reality. The principle of contradiction becomes meaningless in regard to a reality if this does not show or contain the categories implied in contradiction, if there is no object to which the P.C. can be applied. The P.C. is violated by a reality, if contradictions do actually appear in it, if contradictory attributes actually coincide in one and the same thing.

A further distinction must be drawn: We may distinguish two aspects of reality, one initial, unsatisfactory, only "apparent" and untrue, the other final and true. Then the P.C. can be abolished for either one or the other. Kant, Herbart, Bostroem and Bradley abolish the P.C. in some sense or other for the initial world only. Heracleitism, Nicholas of Cusa, Hegel, etc., abolish it for the final and true world. It is only with the latter view that we are concerned here.

We first investigate the question, under which conditions the P.C. becomes *meaningless* for ultimate reality. We saw that the P.C. presupposes the existence of *identity* and of determinate and sharply defined *distinctions* in reality. Where one of these two is denied to be a character of ultimate reality, the P.C. does not express and render a characteristic of ultimate and real reality.

Now these two aspects of reality seem to be strongly guaranteed by the necessities of practical life. But the attitude of philosophers towards everyday practical life is very often a critical one: they do not accept the data of everyday experience as ultimate data: they try to go behind and beyond them. Most philosophy is concerned with a world which appears to the philosopher to be qualitatively different from and more real than the world of the average man in the street. The denial of the practical world may in some cases go so far as to imply even the P.C.-character of this world. It is with these cases that we are now concerned. We shall now consider first the case that the category of *identity* disappears from the real world, and secondly the case that the category of *distinction* disappears.

(2) *The P.C. is Meaningless in Reality*

(a) *Because there is no identity in the real world.* The insistence on the fact of change in the universe which goes so far as to exclude all elements of rest, stability, permanence, identity and being, from the image of the real world has been propounded in different times from different motives. We find it in the school of Heracleitus, in the doctrines of *Protagoras* and *Cratylos*. The humanistic system of Protagoras tends to exclude all definite and determinate properties

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from the reality of things in order to transfer them into man, into his sensations and aspirations. Recently *Bergson* developed a similar theory. It is common feature of both theories that stability, rest, etc., are considered as illusions created by the considerations and needs of an everyday practical life, which appears equally inferior to the aristocratic and esoteric haughtiness of an *Heracleitus*, as to the prophet of the rich, spiritual, irrational, and vigorously antimechanic *élan vital*.

In the case of *Heracleitism*, *Plato* and *Aristotle* have conclusively shown the destructive effect on the P.C. of any doctrine which interpretes movement as a mere becoming, as the absolute negative of rest, and as the only real feature and aspect of things:¹ Movement, conceived by *Heracleitism* as excluding all elements of being, is devoid of all identity and sameness. There is movement and becoming, but there is nothing which moves or is moved, or which becomes. There is a perpetual, uninterrupted, and complete flux, and nothing lasts or remains in it. Without interruption one change follows the other. There is no halting-point at which the P.C. might be applied. Nothing substantial outlasts the perpetual change of events. There is no identical nature, which unites several "states" or "aspects" of one "thing." Everything is in a perpetual flux, without a constant relation to one another, unconnected, incoherent like flame or fire, without cause, permanent order, or immobile law, without definite distinctions. It is just because for *Heracleitism* no lawful connection exists between events that it is distinguished from the modern dynamic theory of matter and from the Buddhist doctrine of universal impermanence and change; for these doctrines assume the persistence of a physical or moral law above the perpetual change. "Things" are for *Heracleitism* neither determinate nor determinable, because they do not even for a fraction of a moment persist in a definite identity, because everything loses its properties or qualities in the very moment in which it got them. Everything *is* and also *is not*. There is only a becoming which neither is nor is not. In fact, as *Plato* says, "there is neither anyone to know, nor anything to be known" in this world.

(b) *Because there are no distinctions in the real world.* The school of thought, which we may—somewhat inadequately—call the school of "*mystical pantheism*," tends to make the P.C. meaningless by abolishing the differences and distinctions in the real world.

The culminating point of all mystical experience is the state of *ecstasy*, of complete union with God, with the One. In mystical

¹ The following description of the relation of the *Heracleitean* world to the P.C. and its conditions is taken from *Plato's Theaetetus* and *Cratylus*, and from different passages of *Aristotle*, *Alexander of Aphrodisias*, and *Asclepius*. For the exact references, see E. Conze, *Der Satz vom Widerspruch*, 1932, n. 20.

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ecstasy one and only one idea, one and only one object fills the whole mind, binds all attention and is the whole of reality. *Mysticism* develops into *mystical pantheism* under the two conditions, namely, that the state of ecstasy is considered to give a true, the *only* true image of reality, and further that the one object of ecstasy is expressly stated to *include all* reality. If distinctions and oppositions are, although different in ordinary practical life, but one in the object of ecstasy, if a contact with true reality is attained only in ecstasy, and if the object of ecstasy comprehends all reality, then the unreality and vanity of the distinctions and opposites in the object of ecstasy renders also the P.C. meaningless. Mysticism shows a strong tendency towards mystical pantheism especially in the Indian Upanishads, in Chinese Taoism, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, in Mahometan Sufism, in German Metaphysics (Master Eckehart, Nicholas of Cusa, Jakob Boehme, Hamann, Hegel), and occasionally in England (e.g. Brook).

Generally mystical pantheists do not devote much attention to the consequences of their ideas on logical thinking, its categories and laws. As far as I know, the German cardinal *Nicholas of Cusa* has, at least in his *De docta ignorantia* and his other writings between 1440 and 1450, clearest of all elaborated this aspect of mystical pantheism. In his philosophy the infinite totality, the absolute infinite, the maximum *quo majus esse non potest* is the "dominating idea." There is only one true reality, the one infinite totality which has the fundamental property to comprehend everything. This conception affects the P.C. in a double sense:

On the one hand, the mystical pantheist can assume that in fact nothing except the One and infinite Absolute does exist. All differences are then absolutely reduced to nought. Since contradictions are not possible without differences, the P.C. is meaningless and inapplicable.

On the other hand, a more dynamic and somewhat complicated theory can be given, and was in fact given, by *Nicholas of Cusa*: Reality appears as a complete and undivided unity in the experience of *mystical ecstasy*. It is the attitude of *everyday practical life* which acknowledges the differences and divisions in reality. Now, man does not begin his conscious life with mystical experience, but, before he reaches it, he first has to go through the experience of everyday life. In the theory of Cusanus the everyday aspect of reality has not entirely vanished away even on the highest summit of truth; it is preserved, but seen and interpreted against the background of the reality of mystical experience. Cusanus does mention the differences, distinctions, and divisions. He first predicates them of the Absolute, and only after that he shows their unreality and vanity. Therefore in his philosophy the P.C. is *actually violated*.

It is violated first with respect to the one and absolute reality

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itself. For in the everyday world the incompatible attributes are distributed among different and mutually exclusive things and aspects. Now this difference between things has gone, they are all united in one reality and the contradictory attributes are all united in the one infinite reality. The totality is the one and identical subject of all contradictory, incompatible, and mutually exclusive attributes. As Cusanus has put it: "Since nothing is opposed to the Greatest, also the Smallest coincides with it." Cusanus explains that in this one totality distinctiveness is the same as indistinctiveness, plurality is the same as unity, identity is the same as diversity, particularity coincides with universality, posteriority and priority do not exclude each other, etc. The trend of the whole argument demands and the texts show clearly¹ that Cusanus, like the other mystical pantheists, does not maintain a mere *unity of opposites*, but an *identity of differences*, which is a *contradiction* in itself and of which the *identity of opposites* is a special case.

The logical mind will try to evade this conception by assuming that of mutually exclusive properties one is predicated in this, the other in another relation, that they are all attributes of the same thing, but of different and particular aspects of it. But this interpretation is excluded by the consideration that also the parts and the whole must coincide, must be the same in the totality. It is *one* totality; it has no proper parts; it is present as a *whole* and *undivided* in whatever we may consider as one of its "parts." Each predicate is without any restriction or limitation affirmed of the totality, and so is the attribute, which is different from and incompatible with it. For in the absolute totality there is one relation only for everything, the relation to the totality itself—since there is nothing outside it—and the relation to the totality wholly and undivided—since it has no parts.

There is a further aspect of the Absolute which excludes the P.C. Cusanus says: "Since the absolutely Greatest is really everything, which can be, and is so far removed from all opposition that the Smallest coincides with it, it is above affirmation and negation." But since the P.C. speaks of the relation between affirmative and negative judgments, it cannot be employed here.

The P.C. is also violated with respect to the world of the different things. For the unity and identity of things in the maximum devours and *annihilates* the differences they had in the ordinary world, but

¹ See E. Conze, *Der Satz vom Widerspruch*, 1932, 368-370. Robert Grenville (Lord Brook), *The Nature of Truth*, 1640, p. 100: "I fully conclude with Aristotle's Adversaries, Anaxagoras, Democritus, etc. That Contradictories may be simul and semel in the same Subject, same Instant, same Notion (not only in two distinct respects or notions, as one thing may be causa and effectum, Pater and Filius, respectu diversi; but even in the same respect, under one and the same Notion)."

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at the same time the differences are *maintained* and preserved in the maximum. So the differences *are* and they *are not*, first successively, but also in some sense simultaneously, since even on the stage of absolute truth a semblance of difference still clings and adheres to the identity of things in the Absolute.

(3) *The P.C. is Violated by the Dialectic Nature of Reality*

Thus there is an element of dialectics in the theory of Nicholas of Cusa, which later on was developed by *Hegel*. Various considerations and motives have formed Hegel's rejection of the P.C. We may distinguish *three* main currents which contributed to it: First it is often forgotten that Hegel was not only a great logician, but also a great mystic. It is from *mystical pantheism* that he takes the fundamental assumption of his Logic that all categories are attributes of the one Absolute, are "definitions of God." We have just discussed the consequences of this assumption for the P.C. But Hegel combined this idea of one all-comprehending totality with a certain form of *Heracleitism*. The Hegelian Absolute is in constant movement, and so is everything which forms a "part" or an "aspect" of it. But the movement of the Absolute is not the perpetual and lawless flux of Heracleitus. It is a change governed by definite laws. Hegel's Absolute develops through a long history. One of the fundamental laws of this historical movement is the law of *dialectics*. With this third element in Hegelianism, with the dialectic element, we shall deal in the following section.

Dialectics, as conceived by Hegel and his school, maintains a connection between movement and change on the one side, and contradiction on the other. At least two explanations of movement are possible: The one explains each movement and each change by the influence of some external cause which *pushes* a thing out of the state in which it is, out of a state in which it would rest and remain, unless an external cause acted upon it. But Hegel, without denying the effects of the exterior cause, attributes change and movement also to an interior cause. He sees all things against the background, and in some sense as parts of the perfect Absolute, and believes that a changing thing shows by the mere fact of its change and alteration that it was an unsatisfactory, incomplete, unfinished, imperfect reality. *In itself* the thing has a tendency to destroy *itself*, to move *itself*, to change *itself*, as a sign of its inherent imperfection. Everything thus contains its own negative, and is driven out of its state by this inherent contradiction. Contradiction is the impulse of movement, it is the actual power which drives it on. Contradiction is real; but it is impossible for reality to be content in contradiction and to remain in it. According to formal logic the contradiction is

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dissolved into zero, into the abstract nought. The "result" of a contradictory being is the not-being of this being. Also in Hegelian dialectics a thing cannot acquiesce in contradiction; but the contradictory thing or process is dissolved into the negation, not of everything, but of just this particular thing or process. The contradiction is solved by the thing moving out of its present state into another one. Movement and change are the solution of the contradiction.

It is not possible to discuss here the many problems connected with this conception. I will only illustrate it by one famous example, by the dialectic interpretation of *local movement*: Local movement can be accomplished only because a body is at the very same moment in one place and also in another place, because it is in one and the same place and also is not there. Local movement is the continual positing and the simultaneous solution of this contradiction. The body moves *because* it had come into a contradictory situation and wants to come out of it, out of a situation which makes incompatible demands upon it. *Because* the body cannot *be* at the same time at A and B, it *moves* from A to B.

This theory is of course open to many objections. But we are in the present essay not concerned with defending or refuting the theories which reject the objective validity of the P.C. Our only task is to expose them as clearly as possible and then show their emotional and practical basis, to which they owe their existence.

IV. THE PRACTICAL AND EMOTIONAL BASIS OF THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ABOUT THE P.C.

We now make the attempt to show that it was through entertaining certain types of practical and emotional attitude towards the world that the objective value of the P.C. was destroyed. At the basis of Heraclitism is a sad and melancholy feeling that all things instantaneously give way to fate and dissolution and nothing remains. Heraclitus himself was not as consistent in his theory of flux as some of his disciples; besides the irrational flux he acknowledged the assistance of a certain law, of a certain Logos, in the world. But the case of *Buddhism* shows that, whereas pessimism only *tends* to destroy the P.C., radical pessimism, i.e. *radical* negation of the practice of self-preservation, destroys it *in fact*: The doctrine of the "impermanence" of things, as expressed in the religious formula "all things are evanescent," is at the very root of Buddhism. Buddhist philosophers elaborated this idea. For *Uasubandhu*, e.g. things perish in the very same moment in which they come to existence, and it is important to note that they perish without any cause, but simply in consequence of their own constitution; in them, as we would say,

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affirmation and negation, being and non-being, coincide simultaneously and thus they perish instantaneously. This doctrine is clearly the theoretical counterpart of the annihilation of the world through the eightfold path. The *Madhyamika*-theory of the universal "emptiness" of things expresses the same intention: The Madhyamikas look at the universe from the standpoint of "absolute truth," i.e. from the standpoint of the Nirvana. Then things are "void" of all properties; all properties and categories can be affirmed and equally well denied of things, being inapplicable to a reality, which is without any plurality, properties, and differences. Things neither are, nor are not; nor have they being and non-being at once; nor have they not non-being and being at once. The wise clings not even in thought to any attribute, for this clinging will involve a desire and thus lead him astray. The same can be shown from the German pessimistic philosopher, Julius Bahnsen, a follower of Schopenhauer. He describes a world, as it appears and corresponds to a person who does not want to preserve, but who wants to annihilate himself. The person he has in view is so disgusted with life that he annihilates all he does. He simultaneously affirms and denies his self-preservation, he is interested at the same time in his own destruction and in his own preservation. This contradictory attitude of the tragical and radically pessimistic man is then projected into the outward reality according to the idea of Schopenhauer that the real essence of the world, the noumenal world, can be found only in the interior of man himself. So the volition of the utterly pessimistic man, turned as it is against itself, becomes the dominating idea of Bahnsen's philosophy. He says: "The metaphysical Ens is a Volition which has the only desire not to be a Volition." This volition is a never-ending contradiction in itself. It is rent and divided into two contradictory tendencies, and it is also the unity of these contradictory tendencies. It is an *ens volens idemque nolens*. All the contradictory acts of this tragic Volition are simultaneous, since, according to Schopenhauer's theory, there is no time in the noumenal world, and so everything is in the same absolute simultaneousness, succession appearing only in the phenomenal world. So radical pessimism destroys the objective validity of the P.C.

We likewise saw that the P.C. is destroyed, if man, as *Protagoras* did, gets the proud conviction that his sensory and sensuous activities are the measure of all things, of the things being that they are, and of the things not being that they are not. We further suggested the emotional background of *Bergson's* irrationalism. We still have to describe the practical and emotional attitude which is at the basis of *mystical pantheism*. We described the *object* of the mystical pantheist and its law. We must now say some words about the *subject* to whom the world presents itself in this manner and whose

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attitude produces the particular features of this world: Man has abolished all action, has become indifferent to the differences between things, after having felt that all earthly things are equally valueless as compared with the absolute Value, God. Man has destroyed, has annihilated the Ego and *all* his aspirations. As Chuang Tsu has said about the true aim and attitude of man: "To embrace all things equally, without preference, without favour, that is infinity: all things consider equally, what then is short, what then is long?" Where not one thing is preferred to another, where not one thing is valued higher than another, where all action and impulse have died away, there also the difference between the one and the other dies away; everything becomes one and undifferentiated for him who found rest. As Angelus Silesius has put it:

No man can ever know perfect felicity
Till Otherness be swallowed up in Unity.

If we further ask for the emotional and practical background of *dialectics*, we must not overlook the Christian element in *Hegel's* theory. He measures all things by the standard of the absolute, perfect, and infinite God. Some Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages, like Anselm of Canterbury, Petrus Damiani, and also Nicholas of Cusa were led by the same comparison of all things with God to the conclusion that the things of this world properly are more "not existing," than that they "are existing." All things were polluted by sin, and sin had made them vain and fragile. In the Hegelian theory not sin, but contradiction is the sign of the imperfection and finiteness of things, and by the contradiction in things each thing is more "not existing" than it "exists," or, more exactly, it exists and equally does not exist. Owing to the contradiction it contains, no thing has a full and complete reality, no thing can rest content in the state in which it is, all things "must go to their judgment."¹

Now, I think, we can draw the following conclusions as a result of our investigations: A phenomenal world, a world as it appears to us, consists of two factors: On the one hand, the "noumenal" world; on the other, a strong subjective factor. The image of our phenomenal world is largely influenced and formed by our emotions, aspirations, and interests. These in their turn are not the outcome of pure reasoning, but the result of our character and of the actual situation we occupy in the world of nature and society. We can speak of the objective validity of a law only in relation to one of the many phenomenal worlds, which, as long as we do not know the noumenal world, must

¹ I can deal here only with this one aspect of Hegelian dialectics. In a separate article I hope to discuss all the fundamental assumptions as to the ultimate nature of reality and as to the nature and task of man, which are implied in Hegelian dialectics.

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all be regarded as being of the same theoretical value. Now, we have shown that the question whether we consider the P.C. to be a law of objective validity or not depends on the question whether we decide for optimism or for pessimism, for quietism or for activism, whether we feel as sensuous or as rational beings, whether we decide for or against a mechanical control of the environment, whether we are inclined to experience ourselves as perfect or as imperfect, as complete or as incomplete beings, as creatures of a God or as masters of the world. But decision in all that does not depend primarily on rational and theoretical considerations, but on our practical outlook. It is also this practical outlook which ultimately decides whether we regard "Being"—as it was described above—as the dominating idea or whether we choose another dominating idea, as, for example, the Heracleitean flux, the mystic Absolute, etc. Certain types of practical attitude have been proved to destroy the P.C. in the world which corresponds to them. Practical decisions penetrate and influence the validity even of the most abstract law of thought. The P.C. is in fact not an absolute law, but relative to the practical attitude you choose to assume.

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PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY.

IN a posthumous book by F. Meli¹ there are joined two interesting studies in the history of philosophy. The first discusses the religious and political doctrines of Fausto Socino and their developments in the thought of the seventeenth century, and the second the rationalistic mentality of Spinoza. The two themes are essentially related, for in the religious rationalism of Socino the author recognizes one of the currents of thought that were to meet later in Spinoza's philosophy. The first essay has the merit of greater novelty, because Socinian studies have been neglected up to the present and only touched on indirectly, in their repercussions rather than in their origins. For Meli the historical importance of Fausto Socino lies in the fact that he draws from the religious experience of the Reformation a new conception of religion, clearly affirming the principle that Holy Scripture does not aim at conveying abstract knowledge, a scientific doctrine, but on the contrary, as Galileo confirmed, it aims at increasing in us justice, charity, and the moral sense. "Socino has a very lively sense of the morality of religion and of the religious aspect of morals. God reveals Himself to the pure in heart, and only in them does His word find an effective echo. Or, as Blondel says, with whose anti-intellectual intuitions Socino has much affinity, quiet and well-disposed souls can hearken profitably to a revelation from without. Dogma begins to lose its rigidity, and the intellectualistic interpretation of Holy Scripture disappears with it, before John Locke combats it, with greater clarity, in his essay on the interpretation of the Epistles of St. Paul."

This pragmatic motive of Socinian religious thought is assuredly very important, even for its historical repercussions. But by itself it does not explain why the name of Socino and the influence of his thought on the Western mind should be constantly claimed as the precursor of modern rationalism. Pragmatism and rationalism would seem at first sight to be incompatible with one another. On the contrary, in order to explain their agreement, another aspect, no less important, of Socinian thought must be brought into prominence, and that is that the pragmatic premise illustrated above forms the ground of a closely reasoned criticism of traditional Biblical interpretation in which Socinian rationalism can be developed in all its vigour. Thus we find a conjunction of opposite motives, analogous to what we meet in Spinoza's theologico-political tractate.

Meli's second essay belongs to the more recent type of Spinozan interpretation which seeks to replace the hypostatic view of "Nature" by a conception that is dynamic and in some measure spiritual. In examining the so-called parallelism of attributes Meli contends that its two terms, thought and objective existence, lie in the same plane. "The error of the critics," he says, "consists in having tried to consider in the same way thought in so far as it is identical with being and thought in so far as it is a reflection on itself. In the first case, thought is simply identical with being, in the second, thought recognizes identity and reproduces it within itself." In other words, thought

¹ F. MELI: *Spinoza e due antecedenti italiani dello spinozismo*, Firenze, Sansoni, 1934 (octavo, pp. 197).

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as *idea ideae*, as consciousness, eludes the parallelism, not finding a correspondence in the objective term, which can be said rather to represent the mental synthesis of the two subordinate parallel series. It is a just observation and has already been made by others, but the only legitimate conclusion that can be drawn from it is that the introduction of the concept of consciousness into the *Ethics* of Spinoza tends to crack the rigid substantialism of the beginning, and to upset the equilibrium in the economy of the attributes in favour of thought. The dynamism of Leibnitz will later make a breach through that crack. But Meli anticipates too much the history of ideas, assuming that Spinoza had already consciously realized what was only to be the fruit of a protracted working-over of his thought. Thus he not only excludes any ontological interpretation of substance, restricting its nature to the activity of its self-revelation and expression, but he comes finally to make a dialectic unity of the unity of the attributes transcending opposition and distinction.

In a short, compact volume, A. Corsano¹ re-examines the problem of the origins of the philosophy of G. B. Vico. This had already formed the subject of a monograph by Gentile, the aim of which was to determine the speculative position reached by Vico in his earliest writings, the *Orazioni inaugurali*. Corsano now returns to the same theme, attacking it, however, from a different point of view, that of the relations of Vico's thought with the cultural environment of Naples and the humanistic tradition. The result of his wide and deep researches is to discredit still further the old legend of Vico's total isolation in his historical setting, showing us with what hearty agreement and wide sympathies he participated in the agitated and eventful movement by which Neapolitan culture began to share in the new intellectual life of Europe. The idea of a linear development of his philosophical thought, sprouting spontaneously out of an antiquated and miscellaneous mass of humanistic learning, is now for the first time revealed as fallacious. Instead there is an obscure and silent labour of mental preparation, without a definite philosophical character, or with a character very different from that which will appear in Vico's more mature work. To begin with, Corsano presents to us a young illuministic Vico, a partisan of the new "libertine" ideas that had just reached Naples from beyond the Alps, and about to be involved in the heresy trials which raged against these literary movements towards the end of the seventeenth century. As if to expiate this youthful enthusiasm for illuminism, Vico took refuge later in the humanistic study of antiquity. From this vast and intensive labour of erudition there emerged gradually into light that habit of mind which had already been forming for some time, and took on a new direction from his humanistic studies and a stronger realistic and historical bent. This conjunction of new and old is of great importance for the understanding and disentangling of the strange medley with which Vico's thought presents us, ranging from audacious innovations to reactionary caution, from a "speculative ardour so unbounded that it does not shrink from any of the audacities of the most courageous spirits of the age," to "the attitude of *laudator temporis acti*, of defender, with an almost quixotic generosity, of an over-ripe and debilitated culture." The progress of Vico's thought consists essentially in the fusion of the two mental themes, and consequently in the elimination of everything in either of them that could not be assimilated by the other, the elimination of whatever was abstract in his early illuminism, and of whatever was extrinsic and ornamental in his humanistic culture. Corsano pays special attention to this second part of the process of simplification and sifting out by which Vico achieves the conquest of rhetorical and jesuitical humanism

¹ A. CORSANO: *Umanesimo e religione in G. B. Vico*. Bari, Laterza, 1935 (octavo, pp. 183).

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together with the establishment of another more intrinsic humanism, in which literature is no longer the framework but the actual material of the picture.

Another essay in the history of philosophy that deserves mention is that of A. Garosci on Jean Bodin.¹ Living in France, his native land, in the sixteenth century, while decisive experiments were being made towards religious and political unification, Bodin was able to draw valuable lessons from them, and his clear rationalistic mind has anticipated their epilogue. While the outcome of the struggles for the unity of the royal power still hung uncertain, he saw clearly what was the point at issue between the contending parties—the principle of absolute monarchic sovereignty. He became the vigorous champion of this principle, and drew up that programme of centralization of government that was later put into practice by the French monarchy of the seventeenth century. His *Six livres de la République*, published in 1577, have resemblances to the Florentine writings on politics, in so far as they recognize that all States owe their origin to force and violence, but they differ by emphasizing the separation between the problem of origins and that of the intrinsic justification of power. The authority of the State does not rest on force although it is derived from it, but on sovereignty, defined as "the absolute and perpetual power of a Republic," whose most striking external manifestation does not lie in the executive and judicial functions, but in the power of giving laws to all the subjects. This is a conception of public right which is distinct from the conventions of private right, like the law of contract: the one is consequent on him who has the sovereignty, and who can therefore put compulsion on all excepting himself; the other is a mutual convention, which implies reciprocal obligations.

However, in speaking of absolute sovereignty in the theory and practice of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one should guard against giving it that meaning of totality to which some more recent historical experiences have accustomed us. In the dawn of the modern age monarchy, however absolute it may claim to be, is in fact considerably limited, whether by antique and tenacious survivals of feudal autonomies, or by the claims of the new individualism (which finds its most striking expression in the idea of natural rights), or by the insufficient practice it has as yet in the power of its authority to penetrate into the web of society. The sense of these limits is very keen in Bodin, and Garosci, in the course of analysing his work, gives ample evidence on this point.

Another side of Bodin's publicist activity is concerned with the philosophy of religion, which is chiefly exemplified in the *Colloquium heptaphonum*. It is a dialogue, supposed to take place at Venice between the representatives of seven different religions, and it aims at showing how the differences of the seven religions that generate fratricidal conflicts derive from purely human and notitious factors, obscuring the profoundest sense of religion which is common to all men. The idea of a similar natural religion is widely diffused among the European writers of the sixteenth century. The task of gathering together the differential characteristics in Bodin's conception has been admirably carried through by Garosci, who has shown that, while to the other thinkers of the Renaissance natural religion has an immanentist and pantheistic character, in Bodin it has a strongly marked Hebraic bent. Bodin came of converted Hebrew (*amarano*) stock, and kept alive in his heart the worship of a transcendent God, and the God of his natural religion is the actual God of the Hebrews, but the conception has passed through the filter of a philosophy that has

¹ A. GAROSCI: *Jean Bodin: Politica e diritto nel Rinascimento francese*. Milano, Cortina 1934 (octavo, pp. 329).

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deprived it of its personal and anthropomorphic attributes. This also serves to explain Bodin's particular antipathy for the dogmas of the Trinity, the incarnation and the redemption.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by CONSTANCE M. ALLEN.)

PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA.

IN U.S.S.R. dialectical materialism is still the only subject discussed by writers on philosophy. Philosophical publications during the last year include Lenin's *Philosophical Note-books*; *Dialectical Materialism and the Theory of Balance*, by Selektor; *Marx's Philosophical Development*, by Lipendin; *A Course of Dialectical Materialism*, by Markuse; *Dialectical Materialism and Social Democracy*, by Rudash; *The Idealistic Dialectic of Hegel and the Materialist Dialectic of Marx*, by L. Axelrod. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Marx's death the Communist Academy Institute of Philosophy has published a *Symposium* containing papers on materialistic dialectics, on the relation of Marxism-Leninism to culture and natural science, and discussion of those papers. A number of small textbooks on dialectical materialism, or *Diamat* as it is called for short, are issued for university schools not only in Russian but also in some of the languages spoken in the Soviet Union. The only philosophical publications on other subjects are a booklet by Bogdanov, a professor of mathematics, on *Actual Infinity*, with reference to Zeno, Newton, and Cantor; D. Zuev-Insarov's *Handwriting and Character*; a translation of Kuno Fischer's *Hegel* and of Giordano Bruno's *Della Causa, Principio ed Uno*.

The revival of interest in the Hegelian philosophy after the publication of Engels's *Dialectics of Nature* in 1925 held a hope that Soviet writers might outgrow their materialism and develop some new line of thought. For the last few years, however, they have done nothing but repeat over and over again the stale arguments used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and even Stalin! The reason for this state of things is obvious to anyone who understands the conditions of life in U.S.S.R.: but this does not help to make Soviet philosophical writings more interesting. The utter absence of independent thought, and constant appeals to the authority of Lenin & Co., makes them weary reading.

Lenin's *Philosophical Note-books*, a volume of 472 pages in fine red binding, contains synopses that Lenin wrote of philosophical books he had read, and his comments upon them. Most of the space is devoted to Hegel's *Philosophy of History* and to his dialectical method, of which Lenin thought very highly. Other parts of Hegel's teaching do not seem to have made much impression on Lenin's mind; thus, he takes Hegel to be defending materialism whenever Hegel speaks of objectivity. The *Note-books* have no philosophical value whatever but throw some light on Lenin's personality. Apparently the least reference to God made him lose his temper. Thus Hegel remarks apropos of Epicurus that his system is lacking in the conception of a world-purpose, of the wisdom of the Creator; Lenin copies out the remark and writes in the margin, "Sorry for God, are you? You idealist scum!"

Soviet Russia did not send any delegates to the Congress of Philosophy in Prague last September. An article about the Congress appeared in the magazine *Under the Banner of Marxism* (Nos. 5 and 6). The author, Z. Kalandar says that modern bourgeois philosophy is suffering from "atomization, disruption,

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and general decay." The Congress has shown, he thinks, that the only concern of the "scared, rotten, and impudent bourgeoisie" is "to leave the world unchanged." It is, of course, only natural that Soviet philosophers should have kept away from such a congress.

All who want to know what dialectical materialism is ought to read an excellent little book by Professor Lossky on the subject, just published in Paris. Unfortunately, it is so far only available in Russian and in Czech translation. Lossky begins by an examination of mechanistic materialism, which is sharply contrasted by Soviet writers with dialectical materialism, and then goes on to discuss Hegel's dialectical method, so essential to the latter theory. He criticizes Hegel's conception of the identity of opposites, pointing out that *unity* is not the same thing as *identity* and that the law of contradiction is in no way cancelled by the real process of change. Passing on to a detailed examination of dialectical materialism, he shows that it is full of self-contradictions which are supposed to be a legitimate result of the dialectical method. Matter is endowed with qualities utterly inconsistent with the original meaning of the term; "motion" is taken to mean every conceivable kind of creative activity and development. Matter is declared to be "all that is" (see Bykhovsky, *Ocherk filosofii dialecticheskogo materializma*); "it is extremely rich in content and has a multitude of forms. It does not receive its qualities from spirit but can itself create spirit as well as all other qualities" (see Yegorshin, *Yestestvoznaniye, filosofiya i marxizm*). Lenin speaks of it as a "creative force, endowed with a power akin to sensation."

Why this god-like, all-embracing entity should be called matter remains a mystery, but evidently Soviet writers have to be materialists at all costs. Both the "dialectical" and the "mechanistic" materialists insist that all being is spatial and temporal in character; both hold that knowledge arises through the impact of material particles upon our sense-organs; both deny freedom and are strict determinists.

Lossky has made a careful study of dialectical materialism and his account of it is lucid and straightforward. He scrupulously points out every element of truth that he can find in it, and his fair-mindedness makes the book particularly valuable.

An interesting work has been published in Prague by the German Society for Slavonic Research and the Slavonic Institute, *Hegel bei den Slaven* (494 pp.), under the editorship of Tchizhevsky, who contributes an article of 250 pages on *Hegel in Russland*. Hegel's influence was very strong in Slavonic countries and particularly in Russia. Tchizhevsky points out that Russian thinkers have been very much alive to the *concrete* character of Hegel's thought. He proves this by reference to I. Ilyin's famous book on Hegel and to the works of Losev, Lossky, Frank, and Florovsky. All these writers maintain that Hegel's method is one of intellectual intuition and that questions raised by him are of vital importance for the further development of philosophical thought. This is well brought out in Florovsky's article, *The Crisis of German Idealism, in Orient and Occident*.

Two new books by Berdyaev have been published in Paris, *Ya i mir objektov* (*The Self and the World of Objects*) and *Sudba cheloveka v sovremennom mire* (*The Fate of Man in the Modern World*). In the first, "an essay in the philosophy of solitude and of communion," as Berdyaev calls it, it is argued that the isolation of human beings from one another brought about by their egocentrism dooms them to solitude which can only be overcome "on the spiritual plane, in mystical experience where all is in me and I am in all." The natural man tries to escape from his solitude through knowledge, but all he can know is an impersonal and lifeless world of objects with which there can be no

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communion. His fellow-creatures, in so far as they too are regarded by him as objects, form a society which tends to crush the individual and is inevitably in conflict with his inner spiritual life. The only way out is to rise to a higher plane and discover, through mystical knowledge, not mere objects but other personalities with whom the self can enter into living communion. In so far as man recognizes his own self as a person he cannot be reduced to the level of a mere organ of the social whole.

In the course of the book Berdyaev says many brilliant and profound things, and his defence of personal freedom against all forms of social tyranny is admirable; but some of the problems he is struggling with are of his own making. There is nothing in the nature of cognitive activity to confine it to the apprehension of "lifeless objects," nor is there any difference in kind between sensuous and mystical knowledge, since both rest upon a direct perception of the reality before us. Epistemology is not Berdyaev's strong point; he is at his best in dealing with questions of practical philosophy. His second book, *The Fate of Man in the Modern World*, short as it is, is an excellent analysis of the impasse to which mankind has come in this "de-humanized and de-Christianized" age. The conception of the inherent value of human personality is fast disappearing; a plaything of irrational forces and instincts, man is valued merely as part of a social whole, as a member of a certain class or race. After drawing a gloomy but very convincing picture of modern civilization, Berdyaev shows that the only hope for mankind is Christianity, which alone stands for the value and dignity of personality, for freedom, brotherhood, and social justice.

NATALIE DUBDINGTON.

NEW BOOKS

Nature, Man, and God: being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the Academical Years 1932-1933 and 1933-1934. By WILLIAM TEMPLE, Archbishop of York. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1934. Pp. xxxii + 530. Price 18s.)

Archbishops are, in these days, men so constantly kept busy in the discharge of their ecclesiastical functions that we may welcome in the simultaneous achievements of the present distinguished occupants of the Sees of Canterbury and York on the Indian Joint Committee and in the Gifford Lecturer's chair at Glasgow respectively a fresh confirmation of the truth that it is not those who have most to do who find it hardest to do more. In the volume before us, with its comprehensive title, Dr. Temple has made a contribution of very great interest and importance to the literature of philosophical theology. As he observes, since Lord Gifford founded his lectureships "a great change has come over men's habit of thought concerning the distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion." Gifford Lecturers are less shy than they were formerly wont to be of paying attention to the latter. They can, as Dr. Temple puts it, "frankly and fully" acknowledge "that there neither is, nor can be, any element in human experience which may claim exemption from examination at the bar of reason" and conform to the founder's injunction against *reliance upon* "any supposed exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation," while finding it impossible to avoid (as, apparently, Lord Gifford would have had them do) any *reference to* such. Recognizing that Natural Theology has always—though sometimes without a clear consciousness of the fact—presupposed the religious experience embodied in historical religions, they must, if they would be, as the founder desired, "under no restraint" in discussing the "origin, nature, and truth" of "man's conception of God," consider the part which may be played in the formation of that conception by such a revelation as the historical religions profess to convey. But, if Natural Religion seems now less easy to discriminate from Revealed than it seemed to Lord Gifford, on the other hand believers in Revealed Religion are more ready than they were, for the most part, in his day to agree that, to quote Dr. Temple's words, the message of revelation has not "the inerrancy of a divinely dictated oracle," but reaches us in a mode which "perpetually calls for private judgment" to estimate not only the scientific or historical value of statements contained in an "inspired" narrative, but "the claim on their allegiance of any particular recorded direction." For Dr. Temple, at any rate, who neither, with Karl Barth, repudiates Natural Theology nor makes the clean cut between it and Revealed Theology which is characteristic of Thomism, there can be no hesitation in affording a generous welcome to all intimations of God, from whatever source immediately derived, as, although unequally mixed with that human error from perversion whereby none is guaranteed to be immune, are yet alike in their ultimate origin divine.

This attitude of our author's is consonant with a general sympathy with the "British idealists" of the last generation, which is expressed in his dedication of his book to Edward Caird and in his frequent resort to words of Bernard Bosanquet as affording the best available statement of views which

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he himself holds. But his disagreements with Bosanquet are at least as marked as his agreements. The latter are illustrated by the place which he assigns to Logic, to their "neglect or inadequate comprehension" of which he (I think rightly) attributes "the failure of many psychologists to do justice to Religion"; by his almost contemptuous rejection of the denial of all value to motives lower than the highest by "a certain kind of moral idealist"; and by his readiness—which induces him even to disown the label of "Idealism," and to describe his own position as "dialectical realism," "closely akin to the dialectical materialism of Marx, Engels, and Lenin"—to insist on "the intimate unity of spirit and matter" and to find in the material universe as conceived by evolutionary natural science not the consequent, effect, expression, or instrument, but (to use a phrase which is indeed Dr. Temple's and not Bosanquet's) the sacrament of spirit.

But in the strongly personalistic turn of his thought, and in the high value which he sets on history, Dr. Temple's position is at the opposite pole to Bosanquet's.

In his second lecture Dr. Temple deals with a "tension between Philosophy and Religion" which he holds to be, since each claims as its sphere "the entire field of human experience," and, since both "have a rightful place in life," not only inevitable, but good. Bosanquet would not perhaps have said "No" to this, nor would he have been prepared to deny that "the heart of Religion is not an opinion about God such as Philosophy might reach as its conclusion—it is a personal relationship with God." But then he would have inferred that the God with whom the religious man feels himself to enjoy a personal relationship cannot be, in the eyes of the philosopher, more than an appearance—even if perhaps the least inadequate appearance—of the Supreme Reality. Here he would have parted company with Dr. Temple, who tells us, in one of the striking phrases which he has the gift of coining, that "the primary assurances of Religion are the ultimate questions of Philosophy": for, as I am myself convinced, and as I take Dr. Temple to hold (though he does not in this book expressly discuss the question), it is a "primary assurance" of Religion that the object of worship is no less than Supreme Reality.

These lectures afford so many opportunities for discussion that, if this notice is to be kept within reasonable limits, only a few of these can now be taken; and, in *Philosophy*, topics of general philosophical interest are more suitable for comment than those specially concerned with the characteristic doctrines of Christianity. I will not dwell upon Dr. Temple's epistemology. He himself deprecates an exclusively epistemological approach to metaphysics, such as he considers to have been too common among modern philosophers, as the cause of their failure to construct a theory of experience which does justice to elements of our experience other than cognition; and he would probably not be surprised to learn that his examination of the problems usually associated with the theory of knowledge is not the part of his work which strikes the reader as the most thoroughly worked out. On the other hand, those acquainted with his earlier writings will be prepared to find him at his best when concerned with the metaphysical interpretation of our moral and aesthetic experience: and they will not be disappointed in their expectation.

Of aesthetic experience indeed, although we frequently become aware of the influence exerted by it upon Dr. Temple's thought, comparatively little is here expressly said; and we are referred to the fuller treatment of the subject in *Mens Creatrix*. In one place Beauty seems to be in effect defined as the discovery by Mind in the activity of contemplation of itself or its principle

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in its object. Surely no one could learn from this what Beauty was, apart from acquaintance with it in a particular instance. But perhaps Dr. Temple would admit this; the formula is not given as a definition of Beauty, but as distinguishing the "actualization of Value" where Beauty is the value actualized from the cases in which this value is Truth or Goodness.

Turning to moral experience, it is satisfactory to find Dr. Temple decidedly regarding as "misplaced" any "eager interest on the part of theologians in the supposed discovery of indeterminacy at the basis of the physical world." Freedom, he lays it down, is "not absence of determination; it is spiritual determination as distinct from mechanical or even organic determination. It is determination by what seems good."

Of no problem in this sphere is Dr. Temple's treatment of more interest than of that of the relation between moral evil and finitude; and here his agreement and disagreement with Bosanquet are alike significant. Bosanquet would not, I think, have hesitated to affirm that moral evil is a *necessary* consequence of finitude; Dr. Temple hesitates, but is ready to allow that it is a practically inevitable consequence. The difference may appear trivial; but I do not think it either unreal or unimportant, although Dr. Temple does not himself insist upon it, and even adopts without reserve, as expressive of his own contention, a characteristic passage from *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, in which Bosanquet, using the phraseology of Christian theology, lays it down that "for a Christianity which has the courage of its opinions the idea of victory involves the idea of the Fall" so "that the scheme of salvation, involving finiteness and sin," is "essential to the nature of God and the perfection of the universe." Dr. Temple's own words are that the Fall was not "utterly necessary," but "too probable not to happen," so that "sin falls within the divine purpose." The crucifixion of Christ, he tells us, was "for a moment the worst of all manifestations of evil; but throughout the ages it is the best of all manifestations of good." "The future," he adds, "does not merely disclose in the past something which was always there, but causes the past, while retaining its own nature, actually to be, in its organic union with its consequence, something which in isolation it neither is nor was." Nor does he shrink from saying that "a sinful world redeemed by" the crucifixion "is better than a world that had never sinned."

Despite the importance attached by Dr. Temple to history, and especially to the history of philosophy, — of which (in a sentence which is, at first sight, difficult to reconcile with his support elsewhere of Bosanquet's view of logic, to which I have already referred) he speaks as "the discipline required to perform the function traditionally assigned to logic" — it is in his observations on the history of philosophy that his touch is least sure and his arguments least convincing. He sometimes gives the impression of being content to criticize thinkers and schools of thought on the basis of a somewhat superficial acquaintance with their tenets and their background and with too implicit a reliance on certain traditional interpretations of their teaching. Aristotle's doctrine of the "First Mover," for example, is surely misunderstood when the initiation of movement by the object of desire is taken as equivalent to its initiation by a purposive mind. (St. Thomas, by the way, was fully alive to the difficulty, for a Christian theism appealing to the authority of Aristotle, which is involved in the difference between the two.) The third lecture, entitled "The Cartesian Faux-Pas," is probably the least happily conceived section of the book before us. No doubt in the reaction from mediaeval scholasticism an unduly subjectivist trend was introduced into modern philosophy; and, on the other hand, one is glad to find Dr. Temple

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decidedly repudiating the reactionary view sometimes defended by the supporters of "neo-scholasticism" (and, I venture to think, too much encouraged by M. Gilson in his Gifford Lectures), according to which all post-Reformation philosophy is a divagation from the right path, except so far as it has been engaged in recovering some precious fragments from the ruins of the mediaeval synthesis. But, in his treatment of Descartes, our author fails to do justice to the philosophical importance of his theism. It is not enough to allow that he was personally sincere in his religious professions (has Dr. Temple, by the way, remembered the pilgrimage to Loretto?). What is missing is an appreciation of the fact that, though no doubt he was not primarily a man of religion in the sense in which Anselm (whose "ontological argument" he reviewed) was so, it would be far truer to say of him (as of the philosophers that followed him down to the time of Kant) that he too easily assumed that the concept of God to which his reasonings led him was to be interpreted in the light of Christian tradition than that he was content to construct that concept "for our purpose, not for His." What is said in the next chapter of Malebranche and the omission of any clear reference to the Cartesian Occasionalism confirm the general impression of a certain lack of thoroughness in Dr. Temple's treatment of this whole subject. Again, when we read of Kant's having in mind "the somewhat deistic object of contemporary Lutheran faith and worship" one feels that Dr. Temple has forgotten the existence of Pietism (in which Kant was brought up) and has not asked himself whether the object of much nominally Anglican "faith and worship" in the eighteenth century was not just as "deistic" as that of Lutheran.

But it would be to attach a disproportionate importance to historical matter which is, after all, only incidental to the main theme of the book to allow dissatisfaction with this to impair our gratitude for the wealth of original and penetrating thought which is offered to the readers of these remarkable lectures. I have already referred to the author's talent for framing phrases which stick in the memory; and I cannot refrain from quoting one in which, dealing with certain accounts of the emergence of Mind, Dr. Temple observes: "To suppose that a physiological organism becomes conscious only because its own evolution has brought it to a certain stage of complexity would be like supposing that the mechanical robot at a street corner will automatically turn into a policeman if the traffic is sufficiently congested."

I have noted a misprint, on p. 24, of "co-called" for "so-called"; and may be allowed to call the attention of the Archbishop to the fact that St. Bernard's authorship of the hymn quoted on p. 43 and the interpretation given on p. 157 to certain famous lines of Wordsworth are alike doubtful. But these are *minima*.

C. C. J. WEBB.

Magistri Eckardi Opera Latina Auspiciis Instituti Sanctae Sabinae ad Codicum fidem edita: 1. Super Oratione Dominica. Edidit Raymundus Klibansky. (Lipsiae, in aedibus Felicis Meiner. 1934. 1 pp. xvii + 17. Price RM. 250; subscription price RM. 180.)

This is the first *fasciculus* to appear of a critical edition of the Latin works of the great German Dominican, Master Eckhart, to be produced by the Dominican Institute of St. Sabina under the joint editorship of Fr. Gabriel Théry of Paris and Dr. Raymond Klibansky, formerly of Heidelberg and

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now honorary lecturer in King's College, London. It contains Eckhart's treatise on the Lord's Prayer, probably a work of the author's youth. The text is based on a manuscript which was owned by Nicholas of Cusa, enriched with marginal notes from his hand, and bequeathed by him to the library of the Hospital of his patron saint at his native place, to which it still belongs. Another manuscript, from the same collection, to which it was left by a friend of the philosophic cardinal, has also been used. When Dr. Klibansky's services were enlisted by the Dominicans in the preparation of their edition of Eckhart, he was already engaged on a critical edition of Nicholas of Cusa's own works, the first two *fasciculi* of which appeared in 1932.

To the treatise now before us Dr. Klibansky has prefixed a Latin introduction, in which he notices the interest taken in the fragments of Eckhart's vernacular writings by German philosophers of the nineteenth century from Hegel (whose attention was called to them by Franz Baader) to Schopenhauer; and the subsequent discovery of the Latin works (which, after the condemnation in 1329 of certain views of the writer, were rarely transcribed, and, since the time of Nicholas of Cusa, had been wholly neglected) by the Dominican scholar Denifle, who has been succeeded in the study of them by Fr. Théry of the same Order. Our editor has also subjoined to the text on each page an *apparatus criticus*, a very full account of his author's sources, and a collection of *testimonia*, drawn chiefly from other writings of Eckhart himself.

There is little in this brief and early tract which is characteristic of Eckhart's peculiar opinions beyond the assertion (in which he departs from the teaching of his *Ordensbruder* St. Thomas, that nothing temporal should be made the subject of prayer to God, since temporal things are to be reckoned as *nothing*). It is even affirmed in this connexion (though the statement is hardly borne out by the subsequent exposition of the petition for daily bread: that nothing of the kind is to be found in the Lord's Prayer itself.

Dr. Klibansky is to be congratulated on the admirable learning and scholarship displayed in the execution of his task. I would venture on three small criticisms only. On p. 12 must we not, to make sense, read *cum his* for *in his*? On p. 14 I do not understand the words *panem non salsam non deligatis*, and would hazard the conjecture that we should read *panem non salsam, u-bis non deligatis*. The editor's own censure on p. ix of the scribe of the MS. he is following suggests that he might well have dropped out *u-bis* before *non*. Lastly, on p. 17, in the passage which is quoted in the note from Eckhart's commentary on *Wisd m*, I should prefer not to read *nam*, with Dr. Klibansky, but to keep *nam*; especially as the exposition of a clause in the Lord's Prayer which is here referred to is not to be found in what he himself calls his "special treatise" on that prayer.

It will be a satisfaction to English scholars who read this book to note the acknowledgment made by the editor in his preface of the help afforded to him in the production of this valuable contribution to our knowledge of a great mediæval thinker, under circumstances of peculiar difficulty which he does not specify but which may easily be guessed, by the Council of Academic Assistance and other learned bodies in this country. The suggestion has, I understand, been made that the publication of a first instalment of this edition of Eckhart has been hurried on in order to anticipate the appearance of another. The present *fasciculus* is, however, too obviously the fruit of long and patient study to lend the least support to any such imputation.

C. C. J. WEBB.

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The "Parmenides" of Plato. Translated with Introduction and Appendices by
A. E. TAYLOR. (London: Oxford Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford.
1934. Pp. vi + 161. Price 7s. 6d.)

Professor Taylor has once more placed all students of Plato and of Greek Philosophy in general in his debt by this small but profoundly important volume. We are grateful for a translation of a difficult dialogue—the first, I believe, since Jowett, who is never wholly satisfactory—by a master of Platonic language and thought, and for the helpful footnotes in which it is elucidated. We are grateful, too, for the studies of special points in the Appendices on the work of Zeno, the historical situation assumed in the *Parmenides*, Aristotle and the *Parmenides*, the connection between the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus*, the neo-Platonic interpretation of the *Parmenides*, and the appropriate Bibliography. But for the general reader I think the most valuable part of the work will be the Introduction, in which the view of the significance of the dialogue, suggested by Burnet and worked out more fully by Professor Taylor himself, is lucidly and definitively expounded.

It used to be commonly supposed that the criticisms of the Theory of Form put forward in the first part of the *Parmenides* were very likely originated by Plato himself, and were in any case regarded by him as extremely serious and on some points decisive. They were taken so seriously by him that he modified his theory substantially, and in the second part of the dialogue he indicated the lines on which he proposed to modify it. No commentator, however, succeeded in producing a really satisfactory exegesis of the details of the very peculiar argument in the second part on these lines. And there was an equally complete failure to produce any convincing evidence from the later dialogues of modification in the main lines of the theory which could be plausibly assigned to the effect of the criticisms in the *Parmenides*.

There were obvious grounds, then, for demanding an alternative explanation. And this Professor Taylor's account supplies. Briefly put, it is this:—The criticisms in the first part came most probably from Megarian sources. They were not regarded as in the least convincing by Plato, nor, indeed, are they. He answered them, so far as they needed an answer, in the second part, by showing that the Megarian methods of argument, which are there imitated, could be turned with equally devastating effect on their own fundamental doctrine, inherited by them from the Eleatics, that reality is one. The criticisms are thus not answered directly; they could not be without starting from the same assumptions as those on which they were based; and it was just these assumptions which Plato would have contested. But they are answered even more effectively by showing that the whole method of argument by which they were reached was fundamentally unsound, and led to self-contradictory conclusions. The dialogue, then, appears in its true place, not in any sense as marking a turning-point in Plato's thought, but as an incidental reply to certain arguments that had been put forward in criticism.

This, to me, seems far more consonant with the most plausible view that we can form of the kind of purpose Plato thought could be served by published dialogues than the older theory. And, on all grounds, I am now entirely convinced that Professor Taylor's interpretation is in its essential points the correct one. Let those who need persuading read his clear and convincing account in this work, and then compare it with the very unconvincing attempts that have been made in the past to work out an alternative view. I hope, too, that those who have gone so far will go on to read the translation of the dialogue, and then to study the Appendices, particularly perhaps the account of Zeno's work and the Appendix on the relations of the *Timaeus*

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and *Parmenides*, in which they will find the most lucid explanation with which I am acquainted of what Plato meant by identifying the forms with numbers.

G. C. FIELD.

Philosophical Studies, by J. MCT. ELLIS McTAGGART, Litt.D., LL.D., F.B.A.,
Edited by S. V. Keeling, D. ès L. (London: Edward Arnold & Co.
1934. Pp. 292. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

Dr. Keeling, inspired by a sense of the value of McTaggart's philosophy and also no doubt by personal loyalty to one of his teachers, has collected a number of McTaggart's essays and occasional papers into a conveniently compact form. Apart from the ninth essay, which is a summary of a course of lectures which McTaggart used to deliver at Cambridge to those interested in philosophy, they have, completely or in part, appeared elsewhere; and they are, it is needless to say, distinguished in style and matter. Though one may with pardonable caution hesitate to assert as much as Cambridge naturally and excusably may be prepared to claim on his behalf, yet it must be admitted that those who had contact with such an able, clear, vigorous, and rigorous thinker have enjoyed a unique privilege.

The editor himself, in addition to informative footnotes, succeeds in giving an effective summary of McTaggart's views contained in these essays and helps the reader to an understanding of his author by a comparison, which is naturally on the side of McTaggart, of the standpoint of the latter with that of Russell. Such an introduction, combined with the fact that the essential matter of these essays has been incorporated into the elaborate and final philosophic system published in two volumes under the title of *The Nature of Existence*, would seem to leave the reviewer little to do but to recommend the volume to the philosophically minded public.

It is true that these essays have a biographical interest: not that they reveal to us the philosophy of McTaggart in its development, for in his case there seems to have been no such process. His philosophical position, as Dr. Keeling points out, remains fundamentally the same from his first essay, written in 1893, on "The Further Determination of the Absolute" (number ten in the present volume) to his last on "Ontological Idealism" (number eleven), published in *Contemporary British Philosophy* (Vol. I). What a difference is to be found lies in some of the arguments by which he seeks to establish his philosophical position, in his increasing independence of the influence of Bradley, and in the elaboration of his system without the help, at any rate obtrusive use, of the Hegelian Dialectic: all differences which serve to make his completed work a model of achievement and, whether capable of withstanding criticism or not, an inspiration to youthful philosophical aspirants. Nevertheless, while this absence of development may in some quarters be regarded as the mark of the true philosopher, gifted from the start with the pure philosophic vision of the nature of existence, there may be excuse for wondering whether the life-long consistency of McTaggart to an early vision or doctrine does not betoken a mental attitude closed against many diverse considerations and whether his achievement in system is not due to a deliberate search for arguments in support of an *idée fixe*.

The utility of metaphysics, according to McTaggart, lies not in the guidance it gives in life but in the comfort it can give us, provided it can give a certain kind of answer to certain supremely important questions. If the truth of a certain doctrine were to add enormously to the value of our lives and its

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falsity were to do the opposite, then a belief that it is true will make us happy, and a belief that it is false will make us miserable. Now, such a doctrine, certain things being admitted to be valuable, is that "all the evil of the future and the past are surpassed infinitely in value by the good which lies at the end of time." McTaggart's philosophy is an attempt to provide reasons for believing that this doctrine is metaphysically true. It is the note on which his final system ends and it is the note which recurs in many of the present essays, so that there is justification for regarding it as expressive of his dominant interest.

He considers it essential to the establishment of this doctrine that time be shown to be unreal; and he formulates a highly original and ingenious argument for the unreality of time. The main contention is that what is contradictory cannot be real, but time is contradictory, for time must be at least a series of *past, present, and future*, anything in time must have these three characteristics, and these three are incompatible. The argument is subtle, but does not produce conviction. That "an event can never cease to be an event" is at least one proposition which plays a part in sustaining his argument, but, though accepted by him without question, assumes a good deal about time. Since time is unreal, causation must be interpreted without involving time or making time a basis for the validity of the notion, as does Kant's critical argument which at most is a valid argument *ad hominem*, say, against Hume. In a chapter on the meaning of causality, he defends, without seeking to establish the validity of, the view that causation is a relation of implication between existent substances; and in the final summary of his position the idea of causation as a relation of intrinsic determination between the occurrence of existing qualities leads on to the formulation of McTaggart's important principle of Determining Correspondence.

He himself calls his final and completed system an *Ontological Idealism*, according to which all that exists is spiritual. As an Idealism it involves the conception of selves and of substances. The latter term is used by him in a very uncommon way, for it applies to such things as a sneeze and a class or group. A knowledge of at least one self is defended on the basis of an immediate awareness; if the *I* can be known at all, this is the only way in which it can be known, and if it cannot be known in this way, we are not justified in asserting any proposition in which the term *I* occurs. As philosophy in his opinion is concerned with the *ultimate* nature of reality and as his conclusion is that this nature consists of selves, there is the curious feature, common to philosophies of this type, that the universe is ordinarily apprehended in a guise so very different from what it really is. McTaggart, to his credit, makes a serious effort to explain this curiosity: making use of the term *misperception*, he seeks to give an explanation analogous to explanations of erroneous perception in ordinary experience. But the two cases are very different; in the one case, the misperception of a colour or shape is explained in terms of a colour or shape; in the other, an eternal or timeless order is perceived as an order in time, and the latter has to be explained in terms of the former.

B. M. LAING.

Philosophical Studies. By A. E. TAYLOR. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1934. Pp. vii + 422. Price 15s.)

This is a welcome reprint of papers and articles which have issued from the pen of Professor Taylor during the last twenty years. They have all, with

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one exception, been published before. But the various periodicals in which they appeared are not always easily accessible, so that it is a great advantage to have them thus brought together. For, though they differ in the degree to which they will appeal to the philosophical public, they are all of great interest and value, and display to the full those brilliant powers of exposition which we have come to expect from the author.

The first paper, the only one which has not appeared in print before, is an account of what we know of Aeschines of Sphettus. It is an admirably clear summary, and there is little in it which could be disputed, except, possibly, a slight over-emphasis on the resemblances between Aeschines and Plato in their account of Socrates, and under-emphasis on their differences. The next four deal with various points in Greek Philosophy; the titles sufficiently indicate their subject-matter—"Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates," "Forms and Numbers," "The Philosophy of Proclus," "The Analysis of *ἐπιστήμη* in Plato's Seventh Epistle." These, dealing as they do with detailed problems, and obscure and difficult problems at that, will be of interest mainly to the specialist. For him they are of first-class importance. But it must be added that on some of these subjects the discussion has been carried, sometimes by Professor Taylor himself, a little beyond the point at which it is left here.

The next four essays deal with modern philosophers, and from their subject and their breadth of treatment of it would naturally have a wider popular appeal than the preceding papers. They include two public lectures on St. Thomas Aquinas and Francis Bacon, which seem to me to represent the high-water mark of luminous exposition and well-balanced judgment, and articles on "Some Features of Butler's Ethics" and "David Hume and the Miraculous." The last mentioned is a brilliant and decisive piece of destructive criticism. I am pleased to see that at the end of it Professor Taylor confesses to "a haunting doubt," in which I fully share, "whether Hume was really a great philosopher or only a 'very clever man.'"

The book concludes with two papers on more general questions, one on "Knowing and Believing," and one on "Is Goodness a Quality?" This last originally appeared as the final paper in a symposium, and to some slight extent loses in effectiveness when read in isolation from its predecessors. But both papers are of great interest and importance, and form a fitting conclusion to the volume.

G. C. FIELD.

Government by the Principle of Moral Justice. By C. LAMBEK. Translated from the Danish by Agnete Kortsen. (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard; London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1934. 1 pp. 66. Price 4s. 6d. net.)

There is, apparently, in Denmark a "League of Moral Justice," the aim of which is to expound the principles of moral justice and to apply them in practice by means of a political programme. The philosophical foundations of the movement are set forth in a series of writings by Severin Christensen, Axel Dam, and C. Lambek; and the book now under review forms part of the series. The English of the translation reads well, the faults being comparatively few and unimportant.

As to the subject-matter, the author holds that all stable social organization is based ultimately on moral principles; and morality is essentially the voluntary acceptance by the individual of a regulated life, for only through regulation can life be both rich and coherent. Because our interests do not all flow from some single ultimate end, the individual can gain the coherent life only by the co-ordination of his many interests under the guidance of reason.

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As individuals live in society, this rational control must also extend to the relations between individuals; but (says our author) it is wrong to suppose that social morality demands the subordination of the individual to society. Society is a collection of individuals, and all social rights and duties take their significance from the claims and needs of individuals. A owes duties to B because B possesses certain rights, and B's "rights" are certain liberties to follow his interests and to do what he wills with his own. The corollary to B's possession of rights is that he should recognize equivalent rights for A; and "social morality" is the rational attempt to apportion, as nearly as possible, equal rights to all.

It follows, from this account of moral justice, that A never has a duty to *promote* B's interests, or to take any *positive* steps to secure B's rights. His duty is confined to refraining from interfering with B's exercise of his rights. It follows, further, that any loss or hardship suffered by B cannot create any duty for A unless A has been the cause of B's loss or hardship. Hence, to take "social welfare" or "the greatest good of all" (phrases which imply an unconditional duty to promote the interests of our fellows) as the moral criterion is simply nonsense.

Under the guidance of this principle, the author lays down certain canons for social organization; and, as may be anticipated, the liberty of the individual and the preference of private over joint property are strenuously advocated.

The author's general ethical doctrine will be rejected by many. But even those who sympathize with it may feel that his practical application of it is inappropriate. Even if duty is *primarily* of a negative character—the duty of non-interference, rather than the duty of positively promoting the good of our fellows—surely this principle can be applied by itself alone only in a society the economic life of which is so simple that each person tends for himself. Once we introduce the principle of division of labour, duties immediately acquire a positive character; and, as the interdependence of individuals becomes more and more complex, and as society acquires something of an organic character, the content of moral duty increasingly requires as its general aim "the greatest good of all."

Because the importance of this principle of the division of labour is not sufficiently recognized, the author (I am inclined to think) starts with an unduly simplified conception of society, and he applies a principle which is appropriate only to this simple state in order to settle problems which cannot possibly arise except in a complexly organized society. As a result his political programme is rather arbitrarily and, indeed, confusedly constructed.

On page 66, e.g., he condemns the "compulsory conscription of troops" (even for purposes of defence, presumably) as an encroachment on personal liberty, and, on the same page, takes it for granted that loss caused by an enemy invasion ought to be shared by all, and not merely to be borne by those whose property is devastated. Why is a compulsory levy on personal service wrong, and a compulsory levy on goods right?

Again, while, in his opinion, the State should be the guardian of roads, the financial system and the sanitary system, it should not act as guardian for the upbringing and education of children—full authority and responsibility in these matters being assigned to parents.

Few economists and political theorists, I imagine, would agree with his view (unless I misunderstand him) that income-tax and "succession" duties are rather iniquitous confiscations.

The intention of this book—to review social institutions and practices in the light of moral principles—is admirable. Our criticism is that the author has not brought all the relevant principles to bear upon the problems discussed,

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and that his practical conclusions are therefore not very well-founded. The discussion of the general principles of morals in the first four chapters, however, is much more penetrating and suggestive.

W. D. LAMONT.

A Common Faith. By JOHN DEWEY, Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, in Columbia University. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1934. Pp. 87. Price \$1.50; 7s. net.)

This little book embodies the eleventh series of the Terry Lectures at Yale on "Religion in the Light of Science and Philosophy." In it, Professor Dewey, famous as a reformer in the fields of Education and Philosophy, employs his wide-ranging and practical mind upon the vital task of clarifying the present confusion of civilized man about Religion. Readers will differ as to the degree of his success, but they will agree as to the great value of the attempt he has made in this illuminating little volume.

One leading conviction sustains the argument. There is potential in man a religious attitude towards life—a natural capacity for faith—which can so enrich life and advance human well-being, that if through misunderstanding or other causes it is suppressed, then human life as a whole is adversely affected and remains a poor and stunted thing.

It is to disentangle this precious factor from its supernaturalistic associations, which—however intelligible when considered historically—are to-day a hindrance to it; to lead it to find a valid object for its faith; and to encourage it to claim the wide field now awaiting it through the vast expansion of human interests in modern times—it is to do these things that Professor Dewey writes the three chapters of this book: I. Religion versus the Religious; II. Faith and its Object; III. The Human Abode of the Religious Function.

The quality of attitude which is called religious is found when the self is directed to ends sufficiently inclusive to unify it, whether those ends be the ends of morality, of art, of science, or of good citizenship. Faith, of which so much is made in Christianity, is needed here also. "For all endeavour for the better is moved by faith in what is possible, not by adherence to the actual." And its Object—the only possible one, Professor Dewey thinks, in the light of modern research—is not a supernatural Being or beings, but those "inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices."

To these ideal ends, considered as arising naturally out of experience and acting creatively within it, Professor Dewey is willing to give the name of "God." Though the use of this word may be misleading, he thinks it may perform the service of keeping alive a "natural piety" in which both supernaturalism and aggressive atheism are alike deficient, and it may protect man from a sense of isolation and despair or defiance.

In his concluding chapter Professor Dewey surveys the social situation of Religion to-day. Through the enormous expansion of non-religious interests traditional churches have been gradually crowded into an ever-narrowing corner, and this shift in the "social centre of gravity" from a condition when Religion and Society were coterminous is "the greatest change that has occurred in religion in all history." Both Catholic and Protestant views as to the cause and cure of this dualism of secular and sacred are rejected, and the supernaturalism (which includes all forms of Theism) which they advocate necessarily produces in the modern world the very division they are trying

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to heal. A natural religious idealism, on the other hand, can make itself felt throughout the whole social life of man, for it would accept "the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying, and expanding the heritage of values we have received," and this provides the elements for a religious faith, unconfined to sect, class, or race, which "has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind."

Liberal theologians, at any rate, will agree with much that Professor Dewey contends for, but while they are themselves critics of certain ideas of the supernatural they will think that in rejecting every form of Theism he has thrown out the baby with the bath. Surely it is not true that "all that an Existence (of God) can add (to ideals) is force to establish, to punish, and to reward" (p. 44), since the mode of God's action belongs, according to most Theists, to another order, namely, that of rational persuasion. And is it quite as certain, as Professor Dewey thinks, that all forms of religion in which there is a reference to a Being transcending the world even though immanent in it, distract human energy? At any rate, a unification of the self, an enhancement of its power, and a deepened sympathy with all human concerns, is claimed by those—and they are many even to-day—whose experience is strongly controlled by such an idea. However that may be, Professor Dewey would welcome all who shared his Common Faith, even if they went beyond it, and, much as he criticizes the churches, he is willing to assign them a function—provided they become socially minded—in the regeneration of society.

The questions on which debate will be aroused by this book are always important living issues in modern life—a fact which shows the value of Professor Dewey's book as a stimulus to thought.

A. E. ELDER.

Reason. A Philosophical Essay with Historical Illustrations. By THOMAS WHITTAKER. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1934. Pp. 217. Price 10s. 6d.)

In this volume the distinguished author of *The Neo-Platonists* has gathered together contributions to philosophy which he has made over a period of more than twenty-five years. They comprise (in order of date) the account of the philosophies of Comte and Mill and Schopenhauer written for the series *Philosophies Ancient and Modern* in 1908 and 1909 respectively; the article on "Reason" from the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (1918); and the discussions on "Vico's New Science of Humanity," contributed to three numbers of *Mind* in 1926, and on "Transcendence in Spinoza," which appeared in the same journal in 1929. These are prefaced by a shorter Introduction in which the author links together the discourses which follow and expresses his own philosophical *confessio fidei*. Hegel is right to place "conscious philosophizing beyond religious faith as the way in which man disinterestedly contemplates the universe." "If a final philosophy shall come, we may look forward to it as destined to be in the future more unquestionably the queen of the sciences than theology ever succeeded in being in the Middle Ages. This, however, must be entirely by free consent, not by a cunning or violent bending of the will to the purposes either of a select few or of a dominant many." Many who remain uneasy at the royal prerogatives assigned to philosophy will emphatically endorse this last sentence, while dissenting (perhaps) from the severe criticism of medieval thinkers which it may be held to imply.

Readers of philosophical literature will welcome the opportunity given

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here to read Dr. Whittaker's shorter writings in a single compendious volume. By the same token, as they have all been published before, some a generation ago, comment seems here not to be called for. I shall content myself with a very brief, though a very grateful, notice.

The essay on "Reason" is placed first of the reprinted papers, and the remaining chapters are, according to the sub-title of the book, "illustrations" of it. They are in fact both more and less than this. The reader is not, I think, left with the impression that a single thesis has been illuminated by a succession of "illustrations." But that is because the author has not presented the thinkers under review from a single (over-simplified) standpoint. His fairness and breadth of sympathy is indeed proved by his appreciative treatment of philosophers as diverse and as mutually incompatible as Comte, Schopenhauer, and Spinoza. In his opening pages he has something to say of the characteristics of English philosophy; these chapters are a good example of that un-doctrinaire and comprehending sympathy which is perhaps specially a quality of English philosophical criticism at its most humane.

If one of the discussions may be selected for separate mention, let it be the last, in which Dr. Whittaker, writing of Spinoza, repudiates the view, so popular in certain quarters abroad, that the chief significance and dominant note in Spinoza's system is to be found in its determined naturalism. The parallels he here adduces between some of Spinoza's utterances and some culled from Bruno and Neo-Platonism are of particular interest.

But (if it is not ungrateful to close on a more carping note) I do not think justice can be done to either Comte or Mill if they are run, as here, in double harness. And Dr. Whittaker's estimate of Schopenhauer strikes one as altogether too generous. But it is the kindly English way to admire wrong-headedness if only it is uncompromising enough.

J. W. HARVEY.

The Behaviour of Animals: An Introduction to its Study. By E. S. RUSSELL, O.B.E., D.Sc., F.L.S. (London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1934. Pp. viii + 184. Price 10s. 6d.)

No science in its inception was ever so richly endowed with subject-matter as was animal psychology, and no endowment could have proved more cumbersome to deal with or more inhibitory to the proper arrangement of an organized branch of knowledge. A wealth of information about the ways of animals, a ready general interest shown by almost everybody in the subject, and an almost inevitable anthropomorphic bias of most observations and interpretations, have always acted as a hindrance to the steady, orderly, and unified growth of a system of scientific generalizations derived from controlled observation and experiment. As a result there is no one science of animal psychology. The more unscientific methods of the naturalist still obtrude themselves into the subject, and laboratory workers still occasionally react to anthropomorphic intrusions by simple mechanistic theories incapable of justification. It is not surprising, therefore, that the subject is open to criticism on many fronts.

Dr. Russell's new book is a more searching and a far more responsible indictment than animal psychology usually receives. The terms of his condemnation will become clearer if his proposals for its improvement are first considered. What he in effect says is: (a) Animal psychology should be abandoned by those trained in the experimental study of behaviour, and handed over to zoologists; (b) all animal activity is linked together within

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a single life-cycle, so that the real "directive" meaning of each individual act of animal behaviour can be defined only in relation to the needs it fulfils within that life-cycle; and (c) rather than continue as we have done by "causal-analytical" laboratory investigation (to use his term for the usually accepted method of scientific investigation), we should use the "direct" method of straightforward observation, preferably in natural surroundings, and develop a science of "broad facts" encompassing everything from ecology to perceptual analysis.

The first of these proposals is praiseworthy in its aim to bring animal psychology closer to zoology. It has, however, to be remembered that zoologists and students of animal behaviour are both highly trained in a variety of specialized but separate techniques. It is no more possible for an average scientific worker to perform research in both these fields than it would be for one man to develop physiology and atomic physics adequately and at the same time. Something that each has to say is relevant to the science of animal behaviour, but as a rule it takes two people to say the two things.

Admitting, however, that animal psychology reaches into both the zoological and the animal behaviour laboratories, and realizing the difficulty of one man being in both places at once, there have still to be considered Dr. Russell's criticisms of present methods in the study of animal behaviour, and his proposal to replace them by a new direct organismal approach.

In Dr. Russell's opinion, the study of animal behaviour has fallen on evil days, because it is sharply divided between the "physiologists"—his general term for experimentalists who study the behaviour of animals by experimental laboratory methods, and who attempt to frame their conclusions in the exact language of experimental science—and the "psychologists," who observe the "natural" behaviour of intact animals, mostly in normal surroundings, and who describe what they see in simple, plain language—interpreting as they go along, and as they see fit. Dr. Russell attributes this regrettable dichotomy to the Cartesian view of the dualism of mind and matter, a view to which he does not hold. His argument implies that the "physiologists" investigate animals as "matter," and the "psychologists" investigate them as "mind." Since he disapproves of the application of mechanistic "causal-analytical" methods in the study of animal behaviour, it also suggests that the student who uses these methods necessarily does so in conscious or unconscious, but in either case in misguided, acceptance of the philosophy of Descartes. This is a fair deduction from Dr. Russell's views, but it is a conclusion that is highly questionable. There is only one way of performing acceptable scientific work in biology—by patient observation of situations whose constituent parts are capable of isolation and control, if need be by experiment; and there is only one way of expressing the results of scientific observation—by the use of non-ambiguous "objective" terms which have precise meaning, and if possible by reducing scientific conclusions to generalizations (laws or formulae) of value for purposes of prediction. Animal psychology has been judged in the past, and will continue to be judged, not on the basis of the merits or demerits of classical materialism, but on the basis of its acceptance of this scientific method, and this is a fact which no philosophy, whether mechanistic or vitalistic, can assail.

In his other attacks on the "causal-analytical" approach to the study of animal behaviour, Dr. Russell freely lays himself open to counter-attack. For example, he is quite unjustified in his wholesale condemnation, without proper examination, of what he calls "the mechanistic reflex theory." The more radical mechanists probably err in the extent to which they push their

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facts, but in spite of their mistakes there is a large body of data regarding the "reflex" in behaviour, and a superstructure of theory, which are quite irrefutable. Dr. Russell also misrepresents what is the generally recognized scientific approach to studies of animal behaviour. Thus, he contends that "the mechanistic method . . . regards behaviour as being directly determined by the physical and chemical stimuli impinging upon the sense organs of the animal. It excludes the possibility that the animal exhibits directive activity in relation to its needs, and that it responds to its own perceptual field." This is a wholly unfair and incorrect statement of any mechanistic view of animal behaviour, however radical, and the force of its condemnation by Dr. Russell hardly equals that with which it would be greeted by any serious and responsible mechanist.¹ Not only does "mechanistic" animal psychology recognize the existence of "needs" in animals (e.g. sex, hunger, etc.); it has devoted considerable trouble to defining them, to discovering how they influence overt behaviour, to measuring their relative strengths, and where possible to elucidating their physiological backgrounds. To-day, the study of what are called animal "drives" forms no small part of animal psychology. From the point of view of the mechanistic approach, animals are unquestionably recognized as living creatures whose activities are directed or driven along specific channels by specific bodily processes. "Reflex theory" only enters into the picture when attempts are made to explain the constantly changing environmental adjustment of an animal in answer to these drives.

Unfortunately for what conviction Dr. Russell's criticisms of modern experimental animal psychology might otherwise carry, his own "direct" and "organismal" methods seem no different in principle from the very methods he discredits. What he proposes is simple objective observation of animal activity in its totality. "Let us think of behaviour," he writes, "as one of the forms of response shown by the organism as a whole." If the mechanistic student of animal behaviour has never taken the trouble to voice these sentiments, there has never been anything in his attitude which has suggested that either direct observation or the proposition that animals are organized systems is a concept to which exception should be taken. But Dr. Russell styles his suggestions a new "organismal" approach to the study of behaviour, affirming his points of view as "organismal" or "holistic." It is here that there seems to be a serious discrepancy between what he declares to be his philosophy and what he regards as the new "method" this philosophy stimulates. In place of the usual "causal-analytical" approach, his advice is to begin with the "whole" and work down to the "parts," and not to work up from the "parts" to the "whole." This method, however, is precisely the "causal-analytical" method that is employed, not only in experimental biology generally, but also in the most mechanistic developments of experimental studies of animal behaviour. In biological science, the "whole," as something comprising integrated "parts," is given, and its behaviour has first to be described, before investigation of its integrated parts can properly begin. The problem is not to build up "wholes" out of "parts," but to find "parts" in "wholes." For example, the modern concept of the reflex, so far as gross behaviour is concerned, did not come into being through abstract theorizing. It came by study of animals.

On the other hand, the philosophies of holism and its near relative, or double, emergent evolution, owe their primary inspiration to the fact that the gross phenomena of direct experience (e.g. animate and inanimate existents) cannot be reconstructed by the recombination of hypostasized

¹ See, for example, C. L. Hull, *Psychological Review*, 1930, 37, p. 242.

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scientific isolates (e.g. electrons and reflexes). Those who, like Dr. Russell, criticize scientific method because the results of scientific analysis do not correspond with what is seen in immediate experience, misconceive the usual direction and intention of scientific investigation. Mechanistic students of comparative psychology have never pretended to do more than try to provide exact descriptions of animal behaviour, and, if possible, to uncover principles—or mechanisms—from which the various phenomena of animal behaviour can in turn be deduced. This method hardly bears any relation to the philosophy of holism—but it is the method by which Dr. Russell himself has made several distinguished contributions to animal psychology.

The optimism of Dr. Russell's belief "that we can get a very long way in the study of the behaviour of animals by the use of the simple objective method (simple direct observation) combined with simple experiment," may well be admired, even if it cannot be shared. But only surprise can be felt at his opinion that "it should be possible to determine by direct observation, preferably of animals in their natural surroundings, exactly to what they do respond." The whole experience of animal psychology has proved the fallacy of this expectation. Even the attempt to discover if an animal has colour-vision, a problem which at first sight appears very simple, is fraught with pitfalls for the unwary. An animal that appears to be responding to the colour of an object may in fact be responding to its brightness, to its shape, or even to some unsuspected element in the background. Attempts to short-cut proper scientific investigation of the perceptual world of animals cannot fail to lead back to blatant anecdotalism.

In spite of the contradictions in Dr. Russell's book, there is much of value to be learned from it. But the contradictions are by no means few. Mechanism as a philosophy is severely assailed, but descriptions of animal behaviour framed in the extremest mechanistic terms are quoted with approval. Simple experiment only is advised, but the conclusions of most elaborate experimental investigations are adduced to drive home one point after another. The value of the book lies essentially in the fact that it draws attention to a sphere of animal psychology—namely, the behaviour patterns which make up the whole life-cycle—which tends to be forgotten in the press of laboratory investigation. Its value would have been much greater if Dr. Russell had made his plea for the study of behaviour by the methods of the naturalist without attempting to strengthen his arguments by an attack on the methods of experimental animal psychology.

S. ZUCKERMAN.

Value and Reality in Bradley's Philosophy. By TORGVY T. SEGERSTEDT.
(Lund: A. B. Gleerupska Univ-Bokhandeln. 1934. Pp. iv + 264.
Price 5 Kr.)

This book is another sign of the growing interest in English philosophy on the Continent. What is peculiar about it is that it is addressed to English readers in their own language by a continental writer with a particularly wide knowledge of the English literature upon the subject with which it deals, and comes, therefore, as a particularly welcome gift. This circumstance seems to bar meticulous criticism of linguistic details or of what printers call the "format" of the book. Such criticism as would otherwise be permissible only illustrates the extreme difficulty, under present circumstances, of producing books in the language of one country through the printing-press of another. Leaving the external form and coming to the matter of Dr. Segerstedt's book, readers of Bradley are familiar with the regrettable absence in

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all he wrote of any treatment of the idea of value at all comparable in fullness with that which we have in *Appearance and Reality* of the idea of reality. It has also frequently been noticed that, in what he does say of it in his later book, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, he seems, in emphasizing *satisfaction* as the criterion, to have departed from the position of the earlier work, where the emphasis was on the logical principles of inclusiveness and consistency; and that to the extent of suggesting to some of his critics a wholesale capitulation to Pragmatism. The aim of the author is to try to carry the hints that Bradley has given of his views on the subject a step further, and to show in more detail how it is possible to unite the two criteria without compromise to his Absolutism. His book is divided into four parts, headed respectively "The Idea of Reality," "The Idea of Value," "Valuation and Value," "The Judgment of Value." In the course of his argument, most of the chief problems that face the student of Bradley are touched upon: the status of the idea of perfection as, like that of reality, the presupposition of all qualitative determination rather than itself a quality; the relativity of truth and error, good and evil; the identification of reality with experience. But they are all subordinated to the main object of the book, which is to show that, while the idea of "satisfaction" is the bridge by which Bradley passes from the idea of reality to that of value, it is no excrescence from his system, but the extension to concrete experience of the same principle as that which underlies abstract thought in the field of theory. It would exceed my limits to give his argument even in outline. I will merely say that I do not remember having met with a clearer statement of main issue on the whole subject than that contained in the last three or four pages of the book, under the heading of the relation between Completeness and Perfection; or with a clearer statement of the line in which the solution is to be found than that contained in the sentence on p. 250: "It is the aspect of experience, reality as feeling, which has compelled us to pass over from completeness to perfectness." There are naturally not a few points on which questions might be raised as the true interpretation of so difficult a writer. But any disagreement with the author I have felt on particular points does not affect my conviction that this book ought to occupy a high place in the growing library of Bradleyan literature.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Morals and Politics: Theories of Their Relation from Hobbes and Spinoza to Marx and Bosanquet. By E. F. CARRITT, Fellow of University College, Oxford. (London: Oxford Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. 216. Price 6s. net.)

The interest of Mr. Carritt's book is not to be measured by its modest dimensions. It is an attempt to apply to politics the doctrine of the ultimateness of the idea of right, which has recently found favour in Oxford, and which he has himself expounded from the side of ethics in his *Theory of Morals*. As the object of the latter was to show that rightness of action is a quality not further analysable, so his object here is to show that all attempts to explain "the recognition of political obligations in terms of something else lead to confusion, self-contradiction, and the evident misdirection of facts which we cannot doubt." Whether we accept or reject this view of the idea of right, we must agree that it is of importance that it should be worked out in detail as a basis both of the criticism of other views and of constructive theory. Only so will either its friends or its critics be able to judge it (as in

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the end all philosophical doctrines must be judged) by their fruits in harmonizing the facts of experience and in guiding to broad-minded practice. Mr. Carritt has shown himself well equipped by his wide reading, philosophical acumen, and literary style for the former part of this task. In connection with the two longest critical sections, those on Kant and Hegel, his references to their less known works and particularly to their views on the philosophy of history, seem to me particularly valuable. One can only all the more regret that he has left so little space (barely 30 pages) for the constructive part, and that even in what he there gives there should be so little that bears directly on the great political issues that are at present distracting the world. We may perhaps hope that, as he seems to hint, he has more in reserve upon this for a future occasion.

Meantime, what he has done leaves a reviewer free to confine himself to the philosophical problems that are raised. I have left myself space for only a word or two upon the main one: that of the ultimateness of the idea of right and the interpretation put by the writer on the views of those who have denied it. It may very well be that he is entirely right in refusing to accept what he conceives of as the one alternative to his own view, while he is entirely wrong in so conceiving it. I believe that this is precisely the case. I believe that he is on strong ground in rejecting the view that the ground of moral and political obligation can be stated in terms of expediency, desire for profit or advantage, individual satisfaction or interest in the ordinary acceptance of any of these terms. Right and obligation are the words we use to indicate the claim of something higher and more imperative than anything that is commonly meant by them. The question from the time of Socrates has been wherein this something consists. And the answer of at least one line of thought to which the greatest of the ancients and very great modern philosophers (though doubtless with some ambiguity in their phraseology) have in the main adhered, is that it consists in a form of human life in which the ideal values, inadequately summarized as truth, beauty, and goodness dominate individual and communal thought, feeling, and action. Until it is clearly realized that it is this, and not any surrender to the happiness theory, that is offered as a principle of reconciliation in the age-long controversy between utilitarians and rectarians (to invent a much needed term), all historical criticism must result in what Mr. Carritt calls "confusion, self-contradiction, and the evident misdirection of facts." But I am loth to end this review on a note of controversy, and I select a sentence which might be made the basis of agreement. "I think," writes Mr. Carritt (p. 186), "that my responsibility or duty to a State can always be fully stated in terms of responsibility or duty to other men and their claim or right against me, the ruler having as such no special claim." I could accept this in two conditions, first that "other" should be interpreted as not excluding the existence of a deeper bond of unity in the light of which the otherness is a superficial appearance, and secondly that "men" be interpreted to mean not merely members of the genus "wie es steht und geht," but bearers of souls that are still in the making and can find no real happiness or satisfaction in anything short of their full inheritance of soulship. I have left untouched two questions of which Mr. Carritt has a good deal to say: that of the value of the national State and that of the existence of a general will. But I believe that when these questions are approached from the point of view above indicated, even the theories, in the chastisement of which Mr. Carritt's whips are turned into scorpions, assume a far less sinister aspect than that which he attributes to them.

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Philosophers Speak for Themselves. Guides and Readings for Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy. By T. V. SMITH. (U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press. Great Britain and Ireland: Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. xxiv + 800. Price 21s.)

The plan of this book—to present a general conspectus of ancient philosophy, by means of statements of the philosophers themselves rather than through modern interpretations, is worthy of commendation, and the extracts will encourage students to go further in making acquaintance with the originals. The choice of selections involves a difficult problem of proportion as regards both the space allotted to each thinker and the illustration of different aspects of their thought. The solution, of course, depends largely on the standpoint of the editor as interpreter and teacher. This is indicated in some degree in the admirable and disarming "Friendly Preface." The following observations on the result take into account the colossal nature of the enterprise. It is assumed that though the work is not intended for advanced students in ancient philosophy, it does aim at presenting the principal and most influential conceptions of the philosophers surveyed.

The extracts from fragments of the pre-Socratics are, on the whole, representative. Although we miss illustrations of one or two important theories, as, for instance, Democritus' view of sense-perception, which might have been substituted for some of the ethical sayings, our questioning is met by the explanation in the Preface referring to the adequacy of Dr. Nahm's *Selections from Early Greek Philosophers*. Coming to Socrates, peculiar difficulties arise on account of the opposite interpretations of the significance of the Platonic Socrates prevailing to-day. Yet since Socrates' account in Plato's *Phaedo* of the development of his philosophy is given as truly Socratic, there should surely have been added some passages from the earlier Platonic Dialogues, illustrative of his methods of treating definition, and the universal. The statements also of Aristotle about the contributions we owe to Socrates seem more demanded in the Socratic than in the Aristotelian material, where they can be found in Aristotle's survey of his predecessors. Aristotle is not even referred to in the introductory paragraph as one of the sources for our understanding of Socrates' thought. The whole of Plato's *Apology of Socrates* is appropriately included as a portrait of the man and his mission, but that of Xenophon is less essential.

In spite of Professor Smith's regrets (Preface) for his abbreviations of Plato, we could not expect more than two hundred and eighty-five pages devoted to Plato in comparison with one hundred and seven for Aristotle—too great a disproportion. But serious questions of proportion arise within the Plato section. The reason for the very slight representation of the *Republic*, easily available elsewhere (see Preface) may be accepted. But the inclusion of the greater part of Plato's Seventh Epistle, as "Apologia pro Vita Sua" (with the important exception of the paragraph on philosophic method which is summarized) and of almost the whole of *Laws X* in illustration of Plato's later views on the necessity of elaborate religious observance to the stability of the State, as well as all the *Symposium*, must be questioned. The artistic genius of Plato might be illustrated in a smaller compass, whilst the doctrine of spiritual love in philosophy is found in perfection in Diotima's speech alone. Almost the whole of the *Philebus*, the metaphysical difficulty of which is well known, is given. Some of this is valuable illustration of Plato's later metaphysical and logical standpoint, as well as of his ethical ideal for the individual. But all this material might have been abridged to make room for passages of outstanding importance from the *Sophist*. Of the logical

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development of Plato's later period there are hardly any illustrations. The changes in the Theory of Forms are in part suggested by the selections from the *Parmenides*, and the extracts from the *Theaetetus* are important for theory of knowledge. But there are no selections from the *Timaeus* to throw light on Plato's doctrine of the world-soul and of space, nor any evidence (except in notes on Book I of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*) of Plato's relations to Pythagorean mathematical ideas. The inclusion of the great myths presents the Platonic theory of soul at least from the exoteric standpoint.

The gaps in the philosophy of Aristotle are still more striking. The Preface, indeed, gives reasons for omitting his logic as "of least interest and importance for the elementary student and the general reader." Yet if these readers are to "sense his main problems and his manner of treating them," it seems essential to admit illustrations of the leading principles of his method, in addition to the "Four Causes" (illustrated from the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* I). The doctrine of the Categories (Prior Analytics and *Metaphysics*) does not appear at all, nor the problem of knowledge of the individual and the universal (Posterior Analytics and *Metaphysics*). For the doctrine of Substance, *Metaphysics* VII is more essential than VIII (which is given), whilst the principle of the "Potential and the Actual" barely appears except as culminating in the "First Mover" (*Metaphysics* XI (XII?) 7). Psychology is not represented, since there is no passage from *De Anima*. Of the *Ethics* the whole of Books I and X are given, and the chapters on the principle of the "Mean" in II. But a very imperfect notion of Aristotle's ethical position is afforded without reference to his treatment at least of the voluntary and the involuntary, the portrait of the great citizen as high-souled man, and the principle of practical wisdom. From the *Politics* we have only the chapter on education. It may be urged that more space might have been allotted to Aristotle at the price of some reduction in the Post-Aristotelian selections. As regards Epicureanism, the *Epistle to Pythocles* on Meteorology might have been omitted. The other two *Epistles* on Human Life and on the Physical System are important. But since the physical doctrine of Epicurus is so closely followed by Lucretius, the inclusion in the Roman part of the whole of Book I, *De Rerum Natura*, is probably due to its poetic qualities rather than its philosophic contribution, and gives disproportionate space to the later Atomist theory (thirty-seven pages with Epicurus). Also on the assumption that philosophy itself rather than the historic interest is the main subject, Cicero's treatment of the Athenian schools is not of first-rate importance, nor Polybius on the Roman constitution. It might be added that the appendix on Scholastic philosophy seems outside the essential scope of the work, especially since selections from the originals are not given, except in the case of the ontological argument of Anselm.

Fifteen pages only are allowed to Greek Stoicism, but this is compensated for in the Roman part. The space given to the Academic Sceptics might be reduced as well as that taken by Roman Stoicism (forty-three pages). And in another edition I should plead for more than fourteen pages for Plotinus, the last representative of the great Greek tradition.

It is an interesting innovation to include amongst illustrations of the spirit of ancient philosophy passages from the New Testament. It must be questioned, however, whether any just expression of the mind of Jesus prior to all accretions of theological dogma can be presented in the "Sermon on the Mount" alone. The slightest attempt to abstract a philosophy of Jesus from the narrative of the first three Gospels, apart from the record of His life, ought, it seems, to include the Parables. For the philosophy of St. Paul we are given two speeches from the Acts and chapters from the Galatians. There are a few extracts from the fourth Gospel and selections from Origen's refuta-

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tion of Celsus, and the *Confessions of St. Augustine*, as illustrations of early Christian philosophy.

The translations, with some important exceptions, are taken from the Loeb classical library. It is unfortunate that MacKenna's translation has not been used for the selections from Plotinus. Readers who have grown up with the "Authorized Version" of the Bible will suffer from the style of the Chicago "Good speed" translation of the New Testament.

The Introductions to the various philosophers contain some brilliant *aperçus*, and their smart and epigrammatic character, if somewhat journalistic, is no doubt adopted with understanding of the kind of appeal most stimulating to the students for whom the book is primarily intended. It does, however, tend to the slurring over of some subtle distinctions of Greek thought as in the characterization of the *φύσις* or *ἀρχή* of the Milesian thinkers as "world-substance."

It is difficult to say whether those accustomed to the austerer manner of European scholars will find a useful torpedo-shock in such phrases as the following:

"Xenophanes we have remarked as an apostle of some all-overishness as deity."

"The Lyceum goes progressively eclectic."

"The Big Three of Classical Philosophy."

"Jesus' emphasis on the human soul as beggaring in value all human exchange."

"The sacrifice of Christ—a guarantee that the good would at last get the goods."

Augustine "blaming the fall of Rome on Paganism."

Augustine "plays down human initiative and creativeness, and plays up the omnipotence of God."

"Paul founded the Church as a far-flung and actually going concern."

H. D. OAKELEY.

Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. By ALFRED KORZYBSKI. (Lancaster, Penn., and New York: The International Non-aristotelian Library Publishing Company, 1933. Pp. xx + 798. Price, Single copies \$7.00, with "Educational Discount" \$5.50 (post paid).)

This is a very difficult book to review. The author himself, commenting on the numerous and complicated problems which are involved, states that they cannot be solved except by a general study of Mathematics, Mathematical Foundations, History of Mathematics, Logic, Psychology, Anthropology, Psychiatry, Linguistics, Colloid Chemistry, and Neurology, and the book comes to us with an impressive array of appreciations contributed by workers in almost all these fields. The present reviewer cannot pretend to this encyclopaedic knowledge; he feels competent only to review those portions of this work which trespass on the domains of Mathematics, Mathematical Physics, and Mathematical Logic; and he cannot repress a feeling of dismay at the somewhat disappointing cable sent to the author by Bertrand Russell. Lord Russell, who is undoubtedly one of the most eminent authorities on the subject of the logical foundations of Mathematics, has contented himself with this message to the author: "Your work is impressive and your erudition extraordinary. Have not had time for a thorough reading, but think well on part reading. Undoubtedly your theories demand serious consideration."

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The second difficulty which confronts the reader of this volume, which runs to nearly 800 pages, is the lack of any orderly or systematic development of the subject from first principles. The very first chapter contains technical terms, such as the frequently employed term "elementalistic," which do not receive either there or anywhere else in the book satisfactory definition. In these circumstances it is extremely difficult to do justice to the author of this work. Many of the learned authorities whose appreciations are quoted on the dust cover appear to have found themselves in the same difficulty. Their appreciations are mainly expressions of pious hope that further development of the ideas and methods of Korzybski will lead to revolutionary advances in all fields of human knowledge. It may very well be that there are important, valuable and fruitful ideas concealed in this work, but it is a tremendous task to unearth them. The general impression which one gathers is that the author believes himself to be in possession of a new fundamental principle and that he hopes that the application of this principle to every field of modern Science will result in enormous progress and clarification. For my part I do not profess to understand the general principle, nor have I met anyone who has perused the book and has been able to apprehend its basic idea.

The author's investigations enter the field of Mathematics at several points throughout the book. The whole of Part VIII is professedly devoted to the Structure of Mathematics. In fact, it consists of an elementary introduction to the calculus and to analytical geometry, and although I have read this section carefully I cannot see that it throws any light whatever upon the fundamental non-Aristotelian principle introduced by Korzybski. There are other mathematical references in Part IV dealing with the notion of infinity and infinitesimals, but these do little more than provide elementary introductions to these well-known problems. The essence of the author's contribution to Mathematics seems to be in Part V, which is entitled "On the Non-aristotelian Language called Mathematics."

As I understand the matter, the author approaches this problem from the following standpoint. He notes that as a matter of history Newtonian Dynamics has been replaced by the non-Newtonian Dynamics of Einstein's Theory of Relativity; that Euclidean Geometry has been replaced by the non-Euclidean Geometry of Riemann; and that in Mathematics it is even suggested that Aristotelian Logic has been replaced in the works of Brouwer by a non-Aristotelian Logic which denies the principle of the excluded middle. Inspired by these revolutionary changes in Dynamics, Geometry, and Logic, the author desires to make a still more fundamental change in our intellectual outlook. Einstein has attempted to abolish the concept of simultaneity; the non-Euclidean geometers have dispensed with the famous parallel postulate; it is alleged that Brouwer has abandoned the law of the excluded middle, and now Korzybski wishes to abandon the principle of identity and then to erect a new non-Aristotelian Logic and to apply it to particular branches of Science.

It is difficult to determine what Korzybski means by this denial of the principle of identity. It seems from some passages in his work that all that is meant is the denial of any identity between the objects spoken about and the words with which we speak about the object. But obviously this distinction is far too trivial to form the basis of a large and impressive system such as that which Korzybski hopes to develop. The author relies hopefully upon the work of the Intuitionist School of mathematicians of whom the leading exponents are Brouwer and Weyl, but it seems that there is here a fundamental misunderstanding. It is commonly said, even by professional mathematicians who should know better, that the work of Brouwer and Weyl is essentially the

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denial of the excluded middle as applied to mathematical entities. This view is completely false, and its falsity vitiates some of the most important arguments advanced by Korzybski.

The work of the Intuitionist School of Mathematicians has recently been made easily available to all English students in the work of Max Black "On the Nature of Mathematics." From the admirable summary made by Black it is evident that the essential feature of the Intuitionist School is their insistence on the fact that mathematical entities are things constructed by the mathematician, and that their denial of the third law of Logic is only apparent.

The actual results obtained by the application of Korzybski's non-Aristotelian system to the foundations of Mathematics are disappointingly slight. The author himself has relegated to the future the discussion of most of the important problems. Almost the only result obtained in this book is the semantic definition of number in terms of unique and specific symmetrical or asymmetrical relations, together with the semantic definition of Mathematics which may be stated as follows: "Mathematics consists of limited linguistic schemes of multi-ordered relations capable of exact treatment at a given date." This seems to be the sum total of the non-elementalistic contribution to Mathematics. The present reviewer has the greatest respect for the industry and the erudition displayed by the author of this most learned work, and it is with extreme regret that he has to confess that he has failed to perceive the significance and the importance of the new principle here introduced.

G. TEMPLE.

Russian Sociology: A Contribution to the History of Sociological Thought and Theory. By JULIUS F. HECKER, Ph.D. With a Foreword by SIDNEY WEBB, P.C., LL.B. (London: Chapman & Hall. 1934. Pp. xvi + 313. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This book, written with care and erudition, is a demonstration that the Russian mind has given itself to the study of the theory of society for over a century. The cause of this, as Dr. Hecker says, was, very largely, Russia's social discontents. We, however, in our bourgeois way, have lived through a period of vast social and political changes without having had our intellectuals attracted towards the contemplation of political theory to an extent at all comparable to what our great-grandfathers or their grandfathers experienced. The fact, then, that practical fermentations are not necessarily accompanied by intellectual fermentation is a reason for commending the persistent study of sociological theory in Russia—or would be, were theorizing a commendable exercise. Russian sociological literature, in its considerable bulk, is not at all negligible in comparison with the sociology of other countries.

Indeed, Mr. Hecker has to give an account of so many divergent views that his readers' attention is decidedly hampered. He has attempted, it is true, to mitigate this inevitable difficulty by classifying his authors as Russo-phils, Slavo-phils, Westernists, etc., and by indicating their relations to the political vicissitudes of their country. Nevertheless, he undertakes to summarize the views of at least twenty-seven authors, each of them receiving at least a few pages, and some an entire chapter. Between them, they tackled a prodigious number of problems; and if Mr. Hecker's readers have a memory at all comparable to mine, they will find that his book imposes a considerable strain upon that faculty.

From certain incidental remarks, it is plain that Mr. Hecker's sympathies are with the present U.S.S.R. "Anti-Marxian errors" (p. 296) are not to

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his liking. If a sociologist neglects the verities of historical materialists, he is said to produce a series of "pitiful ifs" (p. 224). Since, however, Dr. Hecker appears to maintain that "ideologies" should not be, and cannot be (p. 225) impartial, it may not be entirely clear why he rebukes Solokin, say, for his lack of impartiality. And I cannot think that Dr. Hecker is impartial in his use of dyslogistic adjectives like "brutal" and "doctrinaire."

In the main, however, Dr. Hecker, so far from being a propagandist in this particular book, is not at all anxious to point a moral (except with respect to the correlation between political experience and political theory). He does not merely seem to be detached, but really is so. He does not attempt to show, for example, that the "Marxo-Leninist" theory of society is a great rock amid the shifting sands of other theories. On the contrary, Marxo-Leninism takes its place, in this book, among the other theories, and the account of it is succeeded, in Dr. Hecker's exposition, by accounts of other views which assert very damaging criticisms of Marxo-Leninism. In short, the book is in no sense a primer for communists; and Dr. Hecker is studiously moderate (e.g. p. 299) in the claim he rightly makes for the importance of Russian sociological theory.

JOHN LAIRD.

The World and God. The Scholastic Approach to Theism. By the Rev. HUBERT S. BOX, B.D., Ph.D. With a Preface by the Rev. M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., M.A., Master of Campion Hall, Oxford. (London: S.P.C.K., New York: Macmillan Co. 1934. Pp. xii + 208. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

In January last I called the attention of readers of *PHILOSOPHY* to Dr. R. L. Patterson's book, *The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas*, as evidence that St. Thomas had come to be accepted by English students of philosophy "as one of the world's great thinkers, the importance of whose contribution to philosophical speculation no longer needs to be defended against a tradition of anti-scholastic and anti-theological prejudice, but may be taken for granted, and its value criticized with the same combined respect and freedom as we are accustomed to see used in regard to Plato or Aristotle, Descartes or Kant." Dr. Box's *The World and God* suggests that my remark was premature. Neither Father D'Arcy's preface with its (surely) unnecessary anticipation of surprise that an Anglican clergyman "should show such an acquaintance with what has often been thought to be exclusively Catholic," nor the body of the book itself, exhibits such an attitude as interested me in Dr. Patterson's work. There is no serious criticism in Dr. Box's essay, and little attempt to understand the grounds of those divergences from the position of St. Thomas which he has occasion to mention. He accepts without discussion the "clear-cut distinction between philosophy and theology" which he attributes to the schoolmen in general; a distinction which, although no doubt (as Professor Gilson has shown) it facilitated at the time the free pursuit of philosophical inquiry, was, I venture to think, on the whole rather prejudicial than otherwise to theology, and led, almost inevitably, to the position of the seventeenth-century deists. Like many of those who take this "clear-cut distinction" as axiomatic, Dr. Box does less than justice to the genius of St. Anselm.

Dr. Box's knowledge of the history of philosophy is not always adequate. He says, somewhat oddly, that "certain mediaeval philosophers" took a particular view, and then that "the schoolmen" taught the opposite; but he may here perhaps have been misled by M. de Wulf, who tends, inconveniently enough, to confine the term "scholastic" to those mediaeval

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thinkers whose conclusions conform to his canon of orthodoxy. In repeating old complaints of the attitude of the schoolmen toward natural science, Dr. Box ignores recent study of the contribution of later mediaeval thought to the scientific movement of the sixteenth century. He has much to say of Kant, but his remarks do not suggest an intimate knowledge of that philosopher, with whose *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* he shows no acquaintance, even when dealing with aspects of Kant's thought which cannot be rightly judged without reference to it. A greater familiarity with them would perhaps have made him less ready to call Kant's arguments "ridiculous." One might be inclined, again, to doubt, after reading the chapters on "Value" and "the Ontological Argument," whether Dr. Box has ever heard of Plato. It is curious—though this is, of course, but a small point—that, almost immediately after citing a very similar speculation of M. Bergson's, he refers to Leibniz's view of God's relation to the monads without any mention of "fulguration."

On the whole, while I feel no doubt that the account contained in this book of the Thomist arguments for theism was rightly judged sufficient to entitle the writer to the degree as a thesis for which it was composed, the philosophical student of St. Thomas will not find it of any great assistance towards the understanding of his system or of its place in the history of thought.

C. C. J. WEBB.

Science and Monism. By W. P. D. WIGHTMAN, M.Sc., Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1934. Pp. 416. Price 15s.)

This is the first volume in the new History of Science Library, edited by Professor Wolf. Dr. Wightman writes clearly, and manages to bring together a great mass of material over a very wide field without throwing any strain on his reader, skillfully using history as a means of forwarding philosophical analysis of conceptions.

The book falls into four parts. In Part I the general history of philosophical monism from early Greek times up to the second half of the nineteenth century is rapidly reviewed, stress being laid on the systems of Spinoza and Leibniz, who between them receive about one-half of the space devoted to this part. Dr. Wightman believes that the monism of Spinoza is the pattern of all future monism, and finds value in Leibniz as completing the philosophy of Spinoza, especially in regard to the interrelations of the concepts of natural science.

In Part II the story is taken up from the point of view of the endeavours mainly of physicists and biologists from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century to bring into a single system the apparent diversity of natural forces. It culminates in a chapter devoted to the monism of Haeckel, whose failure Dr. Wightman finds illuminating.

In Parts III (dealing with the data and concepts of natural science) and IV (dealing with monistic tendencies in the twentieth century) the writer endeavours to bring out the modern tendencies with regard to the questions of the validity of the concepts and methods of science, and of the possibility of bringing matter, life, and mind into a monistic scheme. In all this he finds his main inspiration in the writings of Professor Whitehead, whose work he looks on as having a marked similarity with that of Spinoza; but he quotes and uses most of the prominent books of to-day which deal with his topics. His book should serve as a useful guide to anyone anxious to get into touch with the modern literature dealing with the concepts of science from a philosophical point of view.

L. J. RUSSELL.

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Books received also:—

- J. W. DUNNE. *An Experiment with Time* (Third edition). London: Faber & Faber Ltd. 1934. Pp. 288. 5s.
- R. P. PHILLIPS, D.D., M.A. *Modern Thomistic Philosophy. An Explanation for Students*. Vol. I. *The Philosophy of Nature*. London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne Ltd. 1934. Pp. xiv + 346. 9s.
- W. BERNARD, Ph.D. *The Philosophy of Spinoza and Brunner*. New York: Spinoza Institute of America Inc. 1934. Pp. 239. Cloth \$2.50; paper \$1.50.
- J. NEEDHAM, Sc.D. *A History of Embryology*. Cambridge, at the University Press. 1934. Pp. xviii + 274. 15s.
- A. C. PEGIS, Ph.D. *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*. Toronto: St. Michael's College. 1934. Pp. 213. \$2.50.
- C. M. CAMPBELL. *Human Personality and the Environment*. London and New York: The Macmillan Co. 1934. Pp. x + 252. 12s. 6d.
- A. J. HOPKINS. *Alchemy: Child of Greek Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. x + 262. 17s. 6d.
- S. E. LANG. *The Story of Philosophy in Verse. A Handbook for Amateurs*. Toronto: The Macmillan Co. 1934. Pp. vii + 101. \$2.
- MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, D.Litt. *Buddhism: Its Birth and Dispersal* (Revised edition). London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd. 1934. Pp. 256. 2s. 6d.
- G. H. TURNBULL (Compiler). *The Essence of Plotinus. Extracts from the Six Enneads and Porphyry's Life of Plotinus*. Based on the translation by S. Mackenna. (Foreword by The Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D.). New York and London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. xx + 303. \$2.50; 10s. 6d.
- S. C. N. RAO SARODE. *You and I. A Soliloquy, or a Philosophical Monologue*. Obtainable from the author, 8 The Mall, Lahore. Pp. 17.
- E. MORGAN, D.D. *Tao the Great Luminant. Essays from Huai Nan Tzu*. With Introductory Articles, Notes, Analyses. (Foreword by J. C. Ferguson, Ph.D.). London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xiv + 287. 10s.
- M. GINSBERG, M.A., D.Litt. *Sociology*. London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd. 1934. Pp. 255. 2s. 6d.
- E. LINDSAY. *Losing Religion to Find It*. London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 1935. Pp. xii + 270. 6s.
- W. V. O. QUINE, Ph.D. *A System of Logistic*. (Foreword by A. N. Whitehead.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. xi + 204. \$4.50. 20s.
- E. T. BELL. *The Search for Truth*. London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. x + 279. 7s. 6d.
- C. E. M. JOAD. *Return to Philosophy. Being a Defence of Reason; an Affirmation of Values; and a Plea for Philosophy*. London: Faber & Faber Ltd. 1935. Pp. 279. 7s. 6d.
- A. MANSBRIDGE, C.H., LL.D. *John Stuart Mill and Charles Gore*. (Epilogue by The Archbishop of York.) London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 1935. Pp. xv + 90. 3s. 6d.
- H. BERGSON (Trans. by R. A. Audra and C. Brereton.) *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1935. Pp. viii + 278. 10s.
- R. CARNAP. *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*. (Psyche Miniatures Series.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. 100. 2s. 6d.
- H. GIGON, Ph.D. *Ethics of Peace and War*. (Foreword by Lord Howard of Penrith.) London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne Ltd. Pp. xii + 68. 2s.

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- G. H. MEAD. *Mind, Self, and Society. From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist.* (Ed., with Introduction by C. W. Morris). U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1935. Pp. xxxviii + 401. 22s. 6d.
- J. S. HALDANE, C.H., M.D., F.R.S. *The Philosophy of a Biologist.* Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. 1935. Pp. xii + 155. 6s.
- N. FIALKO. *Passivity and Rationalization.* New York: J. Lowell Pratt. 1935. Pp. 214. \$2.50.
- F. M. CORNFORD. *Plato's Theory of Knowledge.* (The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato.) (International Library of Psychology and Philosophy.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. 336. 15s.
- THE RT. HON. SIR HERBERT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., M.P. *Practical Ethics.* London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd. 1935. Pp. 256. 2s. 6d.
- SIR A. EDDINGTON, D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S. *New Pathways in Science.* London: Cambridge University Press. 1935. Pp. x + 333. 10s. 6d.
- SIR W. MITCHELL, K.C.M.G. *The Quality of Life* (Annual Philosophical Lecture, H. Hertz Trust, 1934.) London: Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. 36. 2s.
- R. VERRIER. *Roberty: Le Positivisme Russe et la Fondation de la Sociologie.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. 233. Frs. 18.
- M. BLONDEL, *La Pensée.* Tome II. *Les Responsabilités de la Pensée et la Possibilité de son Achèvement.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. 558. Frs. 60.
- D. DRAGHICESCO. *Vérité et Révélation.* Tome II. *Vers une Nouvelle Idée de Dieu.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. 493-1050. Frs. 40.
- I. LÉVY-BRUHL. *La Mythologie Primitive. Le Monde Mythique des Australiens et des Papous.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1935. Pp. xlvii + 335. Frs. 40.
- R. DESCARTES. *Lettres sur la Morale. Correspondence avec la Princess Elisabeth, Chanut et la Reine Christine.* Texte revu et présenté par J. Chevalier. Paris: Boivin et Cie. Pp. xxviii + 333. Frs. 30.
- P. FAURÉ-FREMIET. *Pensée et Re-création.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. xii + 131. Frs. 12.
- K. POPPER. *Logik der Forschung zur Erkenntnistheorie der Modernen Naturwissenschaft.* Wien: Julius Springer. 1935. Pp. vi + 248. RM. 13.50.
- R. METZ. *Die Philosophischen Stromungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien.* Erster band. Leipzig: Felix Meiner. 1935. Pp. xv + 442. RM. 15 and RM. 18.
- H. REICHENBACH. *Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre.* Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V. 1935. Pp. ix + 451. Brosch: 11.50 H.fl. Leinen: 13.50 H.fl.
- F. ORESTANO. *Verità Dimostrata. Saggi di Filosofia Critica.* Napoli: Rondinella Alfredo. 1934. Pp. 221. L.15.
- A. COVOTTI. *I Presocratici.* Napoli: Rondinella Alfredo. 1934. Pp. 325. L.30.
- Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi Fasc. XII. Questiones Supra Librum de Causis Nunc Primum Edidit Robert Steele, Collaborante, F. M. Delorme, O.F.M. Accedit Liber de Causis a R. Steele denuo recognitus.* Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xxiv + 194. 17s. 6d.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

MY DEAR EDITOR,

In Professor G. C. Field's review of my *Platonic Legend*, in the January *Philosophy*, there appears, as the first of his illustrations of "Professor Fite's methods," the following:

He is determined not to admit that Plato in the *Republic* really contemplated the possibility of any one born in the industrial class being promoted to the ranks of the guardians, or vice versa. Though it is clearly asserted in the myth of the gold, silver, iron, and brass races, he argues that that, being a myth, is obviously not meant to be true.

Permit me then to state the facts. All that I have to say about this "parable of the metals" is contained within a single section (§ 5) of three pages. Nowhere is it even suggested that because Plato puts his meaning into the form of a pleasant tale, the tale is intended to deceive. What I do say—say very plainly, and not merely "argue"—is that Plato himself tells us that the tale is intended to deceive—and this I say in the following passage on page 29, which the reviewer has ignored:

This "parable of the metals," as Jowett calls it, is very commonly cited as conclusive evidence that the underlying motive of the *Republic* is democratic justice. Plato himself is careful to inform us (414b), in tones frankly cynical, that it is only one of his many pious lies, pious fictions, "opportune falsehoods" (*mechanē tōn pseudōn en deonti gignomenōn*) [the passage should include a second *tōn* after *pseudōn*]¹—the opportune falsehood being defined by Professor Shorey in a footnote to his translation as an "ingenious device employed by a superior intelligence to circumvent necessity or play providence with the vulgar."

WARNER FITE.

PRINCETON, N.J.,
U.S.A.

February 9, 1935.

REPLY

MY DEAR EDITOR,

I am far from clear what Professor Fite's exact grounds of complaint are. I have re-read the relevant passages in his book and my own review, and I cannot see that I have misrepresented his argument in any important respect. Of course, a summary cannot be the same thing as the full text, but I could hardly be expected to quote several pages of the book in a review.

I cannot see that Professor Fite's present letter strengthens his position in any way. His statement that "Plato himself tells us that the tale is intended to deceive" seems to me a most misleading half-truth. I should have thought it fairly obvious that here, as elsewhere in his use of myth, Plato regarded the literal details as fiction but the general principles of conduct that they suggested as absolutely true. If there is even a possibility of this view being right, it is plain that it is absolutely unwarranted to infer from Plato's general description of the myth as untrue that he meant to deceive people on the specific point of the possibility of promotion from one class to another.

G. C. FIELD.

UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL,
February 28, 1935.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

MY DEAR EDITOR,

In the January number of *Philosophy* there appears a review of Haserot's *Essays* by L. Susan Stebbing. We wish to take exception to this review on particular and general grounds. Irrespective of the fact that Haserot's book may or may not be an important contribution to philosophy (although we believe it is), we think that nothing is gained and a good deal lost by the kind of carping criticism which singles out subsidiary points and deliberately overlooks the main argument. Professor Stebbing criticizes some of the terms in which Mr. Haserot expresses his philosophy, but of the philosophy itself she says nothing. Implicit in this review is the affectation of a lack of comprehension, which is at once supercilious and pedantic. Surely Professor Stebbing knows the meaning of the term "reference." If such terms must all be exactly defined, there would be an infinite regress of definition.

The important point at issue, however, is not this particular review but the unfortunately common practice of passing over intention and criticizing execution. If execution must be technically perfect before intention can be understood, then there never would be any lasting philosophy. The writings of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Locke, *et al.*, contain many undefined terms, contradictions, and vagaries; yet the importance of their work has succeeded in transcending these peccancies. Unfortunately for the readers of *Philosophy* who have not seen Mr. Haserot's book, they will be unable to form any judgment about the work as a whole because from Professor Stebbing's review they will have learned nothing of it.

Very truly yours,

JAMES FEIBLEMAN.

JULIUS W. FRIEND.

305 BARONNE STREET,
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA,
January 28, 1935.

REPLY

MY DEAR EDITOR,

Thank you for sending me the letter of Mr. Feibleman and Mr. Friend concerning my review of Mr. Haserot's *Essays on the Logic of Being*.

It is well that reviewers should sometimes themselves be reviewed in order to correct the not uncommon misapprehension that a person, by the mere fact of becoming a reviewer, is an infallible guide to the merits or demerits of the book reviewed. Mr. Feibleman and Mr. Friend wish to make both a general and a particular complaint about my review of Mr. Haserot's book. With regard to the general complaint, I agree that 'carping criticism' is not helpful, but I cannot admit that my criticism was carping nor that I singled out 'subsidiary points' or overlooked the main argument. I hold strongly that the first duty of a reviewer is to give the readers sufficient indication of what the book is about to enable them to decide whether or not the book is likely to be of interest to them. To do this ought not to be beyond the competence of anyone who undertakes the review. I submit that both in what I said and from the quotations I gave I provided ample indication as to what the reader might expect from Mr. Haserot's book. When, however, the reviewer passes to an evaluation of the book's merits, the comments made must result from a personal standpoint. Hence it is important to bear in mind the fallibility of the reviewer.

I came to the reading of Mr. Haserot's book with great enthusiasm. I happen to be much interested in the theory of communication, and I was eager to learn what I could. I was disappointed. Mr. Feibleman and Mr. Friend are mistaken in attributing to me an 'affectation of a lack of comprehension.' The remarks immediately following this charge suggest that they have not at all understood what I tried to say. I must admit that I am not at all clear when I myself use the word "reference" in the context "the reference of language." In my review I stressed the difficulty of giving a clear account of *reference*: I meant exactly what I said. It was surely reasonable to complain of Mr. Haserot's failure even to see that there was a difficulty -- a failure shared by Mr. Feibleman and Mr. Friend. But in Mr. Haserot's case this

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failure is serious, seeing that his account of *truth* depends upon *meaning*, and his account of *meaning* depends upon the notion of *reference*. I gave quotations to show that this is so, and I must ask the reader to consult my review on this point.

I do not think that a book is worthless unless it is "technically perfect," and I hope that I shall continue to learn from 'the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Locke, *et al.*' I am surprised that anything in my review should have given an impression to the contrary.

I am,

Yours faithfully,

L. SUSAN STEBBING.

BEDFORD COLLEGE,

February 28, 1935.

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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INSTITUTE NOTES

DURING the past term Professor W. G. de Burgh has delivered a very interesting course of lectures on "Humanism and Value," and at the moment of going to press the Rt. Hon. The Earl of Listowel is beginning a course of lectures on "The Fundamental Problems of Aesthetics."

Members are asked to take notice that the course of lectures entitled "The Impacts of Reality Upon Mind," announced for the Summer Term, has been postponed until a subsequent Session.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

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- (1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented—Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology. These lectures are free to members.

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- (2) Issues a quarterly philosophical Journal (free to members).
- (3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.
- (4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.
- (5) Encourages research in Philosophy.
- (6) There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Northumberland and Durham, and Sheffield.

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THE PRESENT NEED OF A PHILOSOPHY

(LETTER TO THE EDITOR)

MY DEAR EDITOR,

The interest which this subject has aroused, and the high and vivid quality of the letters which it has evoked show how difficult it is for philosophers to eradicate from their minds the traditional notion that philosophy ought to be of some use, that it ought somehow to apply. In spite of the admonitions of the logical positivists who, proclaiming that the business of philosophy is the clarification of thought, insist that it can throw no light upon the nature of things, and receive with a shocked horror the suggestion that it can assist in the business of living, in spite of the concentration of our fascinated attention upon the surgical operation which the philosophical analysts are performing upon common-sense sentences, many of us still, it seems, nourish somewhere at the back of our philosophical consciousnesses the presumption that philosophy, too, should make its contribution to the understanding and appeasement of our times, and that, with the world going from bad to worse, a clear duty falls upon contemporary philosophers to show what that contribution is. The facts that there is no more agreement among us as to its nature than there is upon any other philosophical issue, and that the mere avowal of a practical obligation which philosophy lays upon its students conveys in the present rarefied atmosphere of logical abstraction a suggestion of indefinable but, nevertheless, quite unmistakable crudity, do not, it seems, avail to rid us of the uncomfortable presumption that the times are crooked and that it is incumbent upon philosophy to do something towards their straightening.

I think that we are right to entertain this presumption and do

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well to allow ourselves to be made uncomfortable by it. Unless I thought that philosophy had some contribution to make to the answering of such questions as "What sort of universe is this in which we are living?" and "How ought we to live in it?" I, for one, should have no interest in philosophy. I believe that many philosophers are in similar case. In spite of the scantiness of the light which philosophy has hitherto succeeded in throwing upon the mystery of human existence, in spite of the meagreness of the rules which it has succeeded in drawing up for the right conduct of life, we are, we feel convinced, not knocking at a door irrevocably closed when, in difficult times such as the present, we look to it for leading and guidance. It is in this conviction that I venture to make the two following observations.

First, as regards non-philosophers! I believe that the distinguishing characteristic of people to-day is their lack of a sense of values, a lack by which they are manifestly incommoded. Relativism and subjectivism are in the air. They are the distinctive acids of modern thought, and they have eaten into the structure of values in which most men have traditionally believed with such effect that by many the conclusion that no one thing is better or truer or more beautiful than another is taken for granted. The characteristic assertion of the modern world is that the human mind does not recognize value; it manufactures it, dignifying its own likes and dislikes with objective worth and projecting its tastes upon the empty canvas of a valueless universe. Things, then, are not approved because they are good; they are good because they are approved.

There are, I think, two main reasons for this current attitude. The first is the domination of the thought of the generation which has just reached maturity by an instinctive Materialism. Most of us have grown up in an age whose concepts have been formed, almost automatically as it were, by physical science. Now for physical science the criterion of reality is visibility and tangibility. The sort of thing that is real is, we instinctively assume, the sort of thing we can see and touch. Hence values, which cannot be seen or touched, tend to be dismissed as figments of a human mind, which is itself only a camouflaged version of the human brain. Thus two apples are real because they can be touched, but the number two is not; pictures are beautiful because they can be seen, but there is no value, Beauty. If Materialism dominates the unconscious background of the mind of this generation, Relativism occupies its foreground. The god of the intelligent young is Aldous Huxley—a friend, who recently conducted an unofficial census of the books in the rooms of a number of undergraduates, found that the novels and essays of Aldous Huxley were the highest common factor of contemporary undergraduate taste—and Huxley has said: "A

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similar conjuring trick . . . draws the Good and the Beautiful out of the seething hotchpotch of diverse human tastes and sensibilities and interests, deduces Justice from our actual inequalities, and absolute Truth from the necessary . . . relativities of daily life. It is by an exactly similar process that children invent imaginary play-things to amuse their solitudes, and transform a dull, uninteresting piece of wood into a horse, a ship, a railway train—what you will." The conclusion of this line of thought is obvious; Huxley shall state it for us: "No psychological experience is 'truer,' so far as we are concerned, than any other. . . . Science is no 'truer' than common sense or lunacy, than art or religion. . . . For, even if one should correspond more closely to things in themselves as perceived by some hypothetical non-human being, it would be impossible for us to discover which it was."

Now all this is very disturbing to the mind. It means, for one thing, that there is no standard of value except the satisfaction of one's tastes; and it means also that of one's tastes no one is more worth while than another. As I write, there comes into my mind the picture of a Greats student with headphones over his ears reading Kant. I asked him what he was listening to, improbably suspecting a B.B.C. commentary on Kant. He said that he was listening to jazz music relayed by a dance band. I asked him whether the one activity did not interfere with the other, the jazz with the Kant, and suggested that he was putting the higher at the mercy of the lower. He replied that the words "higher" and "lower" were meaningless, since no one activity could be "higher" than another. The only relevant question was whether it produced more satisfaction. He had not, he said, as yet had enough experience to tell whether philosophy was more or less productive of satisfaction than jazz; he was engaged in trying to find out.

A real figure, but allegorical, I trust, rather than typical! For the practical consequences of value repudiation are only too often unfortunate. In the sphere of conduct, men and women are left to make up their minds on merits in regard to every difficult decision and every moral issue with no standard beyond their own estimate of the respective pleasures likely to attend alternative courses of action to guide them. In the sphere of belief, they are left with a universe which contains nothing but the physical facts which science investigates and the minds which psychology explores. Such a universe provides the basis neither for a code nor for a creed. Now most people, especially young people, have a need to believe, and are unable for long to tolerate an agnosticism which offers no legitimate basis for their moral aspirations, puts their ideals into cold storage and consigns their spiritual natures to a condition of suspended animation. A vacuum is abhorrent no less

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in thought than in Nature. Is it matter for surprise that dictators rush in where philosophers fear to tread, offer as a substitute for morality the generation enthusiasm and supply the place of rational belief by converting conjectures into dogmas?

"The Present Need of a Philosophy" is, therefore, a need to re-establish the objectivity of values. In a sense, no doubt, this is also the task of religion. But, while the recipe for producing religious faith is not known, or, if it was once known, has been forgotten, the objective character of value can, I believe, be rationally demonstrated. It is, I conceive, the business of philosophers who share this belief to give a helping hand to a generation which, so far as its beliefs are concerned, has lost its way in a maze of conflicting theories, and so far as concerns its conduct, is left rudderless in the sea of its conflicting desires, by continuously applying their dialectical skill to the task of demonstration.

Secondly, for those of us who follow philosophy as a means of livelihood or a pursuit of leisure, there is a special service which, as I believe, philosophy may perform in relation to the needs and stresses of our times. It is, I believe, a fact that many of those who are normally engaged in research or creative work find it difficult to-day to pursue their ordinary avocations. Nor are their difficulties merely economic. Over many of the sensitive-minded men and women of this generation hangs the menace of a great fear; the fear of the destruction by war of such civilization as we have achieved. Because of it their minds are unable to escape from their preoccupations of the political scene. Even if their preoccupation cannot prevent or delay for the fraction of a second the catastrophe, they cannot withdraw their fascinated gaze from the spectacle of its slow approach. Physics and psycho-analysis, literature and art, the novel of the year, the latest experiment in poetry, So-and-so's "show" of paintings, such and such a performance of a symphony, these, which used to be the main staples of conversation in circles which in the long run form the taste and set the standards of the community, are now neglected for discussions of rearmament and dictatorship.

And, inevitably, first-rate literary and artistic production falters or ceases altogether. How can a man think, let alone dream, when the hills and valleys are filled with the echoes of marching feet? How can he command the serenity to conceive or the patience to create beautiful things, when he contemplates the prospect of those whom he loves being slowly asphyxiated by gas and the fruits of his effort being scattered with the ashes of the civilization which gave it birth? The creative artist demands a quiet background, if he is to produce his best work; he also requires an audience whose release from the more primitive preoccupations of the soldier, the

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savage, and the gangster, enables them to turn their attention to the products of the spirit. He demands, in fact, a civilized environment, alert, interested, reasonably secure. Under the stresses and fears of our time such an environment is fast vanishing from the Europe of to-day, and, as a result, the interest of civilized people in the art and literature of their times shows a corresponding decline.

But, while men can no longer create, while they find it hard even to appreciate with serene minds, they can still pursue philosophy. Ever since Socrates philosophized on the threshold of death, philosophy has solaced men in times of misfortune. In philosophy men who are agitated can find peace, men who are wretched resignation, men who are afraid courage. The charge against philosophy that it makes us absent-minded is not wholly to be deplored. For to withdraw the mind from the things of this world is not in itself a good or an evil. It is an evil, if the things from which we are withdrawn are mainly good, a good if they are mainly evil.

Sincerely,

C. E. M. JOAD.

4, EAST HEATH ROAD,
HAMPSTEAD.

May 1935.

THE DUALISM OF MIND AND MATTER

PROFESSOR JOHN MACMURRAY

ONE of the most deeply engrained habits of the modern world is the habit of thinking in terms of a contrast, and indeed of an opposition, between something we call Mind and something we call Matter. This habit is obviously not confined to philosophy. It is built into the structure of our languages and of our ways of behaviour. It conditions our religious and moral attitudes, as well as our reflective thought in science and philosophy. It is not surprising, therefore, that much of modern European Philosophy has consisted in an effort to overcome the dualism to which this habit gives rise when we try to clarify and systematize our knowledge of Reality. This essay on the subject is an essay in scepticism. It will tend to the conclusion that the dualistic habit of thought is a bad habit; that it is, in fact, the formulation of an illusion. It does not attempt to prove this. It only asks a question, and seeks to examine such answers as seem likely to be given. The question is this: "What rational justification is there for accepting the dualism of Mind and Matter as a metaphysical hypothesis which deserves consideration?" If the habit of contrasting Mind and Matter is a bad habit, it will, of course, require a psychological explanation, and the attempt to explain it will be a study in the pathology of the modern consciousness. But it will have no *reason*, and if the attempt to discover a reason for it proves fruitless, that will in itself strongly suggest that the subject is one for psychological rather than for logical investigation. When a philosophical position commands wide acceptance and universal attention, and yet cannot be shown to have any rational justification, it is almost certain that it has a deep-seated source of an irrational kind. There can be no reason for believing an illusion, but there must be a reason why it is actually believed.

Of the philosophical works which have been published in recent years none has impressed me more than Professor Lovejoy's book called *The Revolt Against Dualism*. It is an elaborate and systematic examination of the dualistic *motif* in modern philosophy from Descartes to the present time. Whatever may be thought of the particular analysis which Professor Lovejoy gives, he at least succeeds in revealing that the problem of dualism lies at the basis of all modern philosophy, and that all modern philosophies are efforts to overcome the dualism. Professor Lovejoy's conclusion

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is that none of these attempts (though some of the more recent ones, which rest upon the Theory of Relativity, are very subtle) have succeeded in escaping the dualism, and that, therefore, we must give up the revolt and accept dualism as inevitable. I mention this conclusion not in order to discuss its validity but in order to make quite clear the question which I am asking. It is not Professor Lovejoy's question, though it is very difficult to avoid confusing the two. I am willing to grant that all modern philosophy is dualistic and that all the attempts to overcome this dualism have failed. But I should give a very different account of the reasons for the failure. I should maintain that any philosophy which starts by contrasting Mind and Matter must necessarily fail to resolve the dualism which its starting-point involves. I ask, therefore, why any philosophy should start from this contrast. Is there any real necessity for thinking in terms of a dualism between Mind and Matter?

It may seem strange at first sight to say that the dualism of Mind and Matter is characteristic of all modern philosophy. With the qualified exception of the philosophy of Descartes, all the outstanding philosophical systems of modern times have been either monistic or pluralistic. Berkeley's philosophy, with its thoroughgoing denial of matter, is certainly not dualistic. It holds that the only reality is mind and its activities, so that everything is mental. But I had no intention to deny that most modern philosophical systems are monistic in their conclusion as well as in their intention. What I wished to assert was that these monisms are all *in terms* of the dualism of Mind and Matter. They start from the hypothesis of a *prima facie* contrast between the mental and the material, and reach their conclusion by unifying, in some way or other, the two sides of the dualism which they take as *prima facie* given. These philosophies could never arise except on the basis of dualism. The dualism forms the primary hypothesis which they set out to examine. They discover, by critical analysis, that this dualism raises insuperable difficulties which force them to attempt its resolution. The final denial of dualism is still the result of thinking in terms of dualism. Berkeley's philosophy, for example, is obviously founded, in this sense, on the dualism of Mind and Matter. Without that distinction it could never get started. Berkeley begins by examining the idea of a two-substance world and goes on to show that all the things which we usually put in the basket labelled "Material Substance" should really be put in the basket labelled "Mental Substance." In the structure of his thought there are still two classes, mental and material. But one of the classes turns out to be a null class. All the actual things in the world go into the mental class. When Berkeley says that everything is idea, the meaning of his statement depends upon the contrast that we draw

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between *ideas*, which are mental, and *things*, which are material. If Berkeley and his readers were not equally thinking in terms of a significant distinction between mind and matter, Berkeley's conclusion would itself carry no meaning at all. Thus apart from the dualistic habit of thought Berkeley's philosophy would never have come into existence, and could not be understood if it had. The same is true of all the classical modern philosophies. Even in their rejection of dualism they depend upon dualistic thinking. My question is this: "Is there any rational justification for thinking dualistically?"

Our question, then, is not whether Reality is ultimately dualistic, but whether there is a *prima facie* case for suggesting that it may be; whether, that is to say, our common knowledge of the world suggests that a systematic attempt to understand it might naturally start by distinguishing two classes of things which seem at first sight to have nothing in common. Further investigation might then either confirm the dualism and so reach a dualistic conclusion or it might discover a way of resolving the dualism. But neither of these types of conclusion would arise unless there was a *prima facie* case for starting with a dualistic classification. Now a dualism, in the philosophical sense, is a metaphysical classification, a schema for dividing everything without exception into two sorts of things that have nothing in common, and which, therefore, exclude one another in their essential nature. If we consider that Reality may possibly be dualistic, we are considering the possibility that everything in Reality is either of one kind or of another, and that these two kinds have nothing in common and must be defined as mutually exclusive. If, for example, the dualism we are considering is the Mind-Matter dualism, then we are considering the possibility that everything in the Universe is either mental or material, and that nothing is both. We are considering that whatever is mental has none of the characteristics that belong to material things, and that nothing that is material possesses any of the characteristics that belong to mental things. A metaphysical dualism is, thus, both ultimate and absolute.

The history of modern philosophy shows that there is a deeply-rooted tendency in our minds to classify the constituents of Reality in this way. It also shows that such a dualistic classification raises great difficulties for the philosopher. It may be, of course, that no philosopher has yet hit upon the way to surmount those difficulties, and that we ought to go on making the attempt in the hope that we may finally be successful. But it may also be that the difficulties are of our own making, and that they really arise from the fact that the dualistic classification is merely an irrational tendency which we should attempt to overcome. It is between

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these two possibilities that we have to make our choice. That is why it is necessary to ask what are the *prima facie* grounds for starting out with the hypothesis that Reality divides without remainder into what is mental and what is material.

Let us first appeal directly to common sense, that is to say, to our ordinary unphilosophical outlook upon the world. The question that we shall then ask ourselves is: "What kinds of things are there in the world as we know it which seem to be fundamentally different?" And the answer to that question would provide us with a natural *prima facie* classification of Reality. We shall begin (shall we not?) by distinguishing animate from inanimate things. This difference between things that are alive and things that are not alive is *prima facie* the obvious one. Whether it is ultimate or not is a different question, but not one with which we are now concerned. We shall then distinguish human beings, like ourselves, from both these classes. The main difficulty that we are likely to find will be in deciding whether to distinguish plant life from animal life. But on the whole we shall decide that this is really a subdivision of the class of animate but non-human things. It might be possible to argue for a different natural classification, but hardly without sophistication. The division of the contents of the world into inorganic, organic, and personal seems at least to be a universal one and to correspond to what we can discover about the development of the human being in childhood. One thing is quite certain. We should never dream of dividing the things that we know into material things and mental things. It requires, at least, a high degree of sophisticated reflection to arrive at that classification. It is obviously not a natural classification of the contents of the world in comparison with the division into inanimate, animate, and rational or personal. This brings to light the first *prima facie* difficulty of the Mind-Matter dualism. It is difficult to find in it any place for living things that have no minds. If the world consists exclusively of mental things and material things, where do cabbages come in?

There is one quite simple consideration that reinforces this natural threefold classification against the dualism of Mind and Matter. Suppose that in spite of its unnaturalness, there is some deeper reason for classifying real things as either material or mental. We should expect that the systematic effort to investigate the nature of the world would result in the development of two separate lines of inquiry. We should expect to find the results of the investigation grouping themselves into two sciences or two groups of sciences, one having material things as its field of research and the other mental things. We should expect to find a set of physical sciences concerned with the investigation of matter and a set of

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psychological sciences concerned with the investigation of mind. Actually this was the expectation entertained by philosophers and scientists at the beginning of the scientific period under the influence of the dualistic habit of thought. Persistent efforts were made to develop two sciences concerned respectively with Mind and Matter. But the attempt has proved unavailing. The necessities of scientific development have forced another classification upon us, in spite of our prejudice in favour of dualism. We find ourselves with a set of physical sciences which are concerned with material phenomena. We find a set of sciences dealing with the phenomena of life, quite distinct from the physical sciences, but not concerned with mind at all. Finally, we find a special set of sciences, still rather unsure of themselves, which are concerned with psychological phenomena. In other words, the development of science reflects the natural threefold classification of reality and not the dualistic one, in spite of the fact that the dualistic tendency has exercised a continuous pressure upon the development of scientific investigation.

At first sight we might be inclined to draw the conclusion that the dualism of Mind and Matter was not exhaustive, and that what is required is the introduction of a third division into the classification. Instead of the twofold division into Matter and Mind, we might adopt a threefold division into Mind, Life, and Matter. Then we should look upon physical science as the science of Matter. Biological science as the science of Life, and Psychological science as the science of Mind. To do this would be to miss the point. Biology is not the science of Life, and Psychology is not the science of Mind in the sense that Physics is the science of Matter. Biology does not study Life in distinction from Matter. It studies the behaviour of living things, and living things are certainly material objects in some sense. Indeed, many biologists are of the opinion (wrongly, I believe), that as time goes on the biological sciences will become a special branch of physical science. As for Psychology, it is a commonplace of its history that it failed completely to develop so long as it was conceived as a science of Mind and that it has only achieved its recent qualified successes by deliberately abandoning this attempt and becoming a science of the behaviour of conscious beings and in particular of human beings. The importance of this lies in the fact that whatever a human being in the psychological sense may be, he is certainly not a mental constituent of Reality. In some sense he is just as much a material object as a brick or a penny whistle. Thus the appeal to common sense draws blank. The natural outlook upon the world provides us with no *prima facie* ground for classifying the constituents of reality into mental and material. Indeed, it suggests a different classification which is incompatible with the dualism.

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I imagine that anyone who is at all familiar with modern philosophy might be inclined to retort that everyone knows that the grounds for the Mind-Matter dualism arise in another field altogether, and that I have been deliberately wasting time. Before turning to consider the field in which the ground for the dualism is supposed to lie, I should like to justify my appeal to common sense. If the dualism of Mind and Matter is to have a real *prima facie* basis, the field which we have been considering is the field in which it *ought* to arise. If it does not arise naturally from the straightforward attempt to classify the kinds of things—the specifically different natures—to be found in the world, then that is in itself evidence that there is something wrong with it. For any metaphysical dualism offers itself as a classification, exhaustive and ultimate of the constituents of Reality. If experience shows that it is not possible to organize the detailed investigation of Reality on the basis of this classification, that is strong empirical evidence that the classification is a bad one. Philosophy, like any other systematic inquiry, must start with a classification; and since there is no other way of making a preliminary classification than by an appeal to the obvious and noticeable distinctions in the field of study, philosophy ought to start from the natural classification which common sense provides, especially when that classification is reinforced by the grouping of the sciences which are concerned with the investigation of special parts of the same general field. Indeed, the field to which we must now turn and in which the supposed grounds for the dualism are to be found, is itself the product of the dualistic tendency and presupposes it.

The centre of this field is determined by the perfectly natural and legitimate question, "What am I?" For some reason or other, traditional philosophy does not like to ask this question in its natural form. It prefers to ask, "What is the Self?" This is not, in fact, the same question. It is quite possibly a meaningless question. It is quite certain that I exist, that there is *me*. It is equally certain I submit, that there is *you*. But is there such a thing at all as *the Self*? If there is, it must be something which is as much me as it is you, and therefore, I should have thought, it can be neither you nor me. So I prefer to stick to the natural question, "What am I?" Of course it is mainly in connexion with the Theory of Knowledge that the suggestion of the dualism of Mind and Matter has arisen. But that question is really only a part of the wider question, "What am I?" and it is worth our while to consider the wider question first before coming to that aspect of it which is concerned with our knowledge. Perhaps we can agree in general that the idea of dualism only arises when we consider our own nature. When we contrast Mind and Matter, we are primarily thinking about certain

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characteristics which belong to ourselves and to beings like ourselves, and which we are inclined to deny to other things in the world, even to animals. Thus it is only in reference to persons that the dualism arises at all, and persons form a relatively small class of objects in the world as we know it. That in itself suggests that the dualism is not really a metaphysical one but rather a personal one. It is a distinction within one of the natural classes into which common sense divides the constituents of Reality. But let us put this aside, and ask ourselves what it is about persons that suggests a dualism of Mind and Matter? In the first place, they are material objects, at least they have all the characteristics which we usually associate with material objects. They have size and shape and weight and so forth. Incidentally, we should notice that they have all the characteristics of animate things as well. They grow and they reproduce their species. Even within the special class of persons our natural threefold classification insists on reappearing. But they have certain special characteristics which set them in a class apart. They have special ways of behaviour which do not seem to be covered by our ordinary conceptions of what material objects or living creatures are. We need not trouble ourselves at the moment to define or even to enumerate these special characteristics. We need only notice that people cannot be understood or investigated in the same way and through the same conceptions as material objects or even as living organisms, without leaving out something that is of the essence of their nature. Or, to put it more simply and more fundamentally, we cannot deal with people in the way in which we can deal with other things, without frustrating our own efforts and failing in our intentions. But in all this there is no suggestion of a dualism of Mind and Matter.

Indeed, the dualism would never suggest itself but for one fact, that we ourselves, who are carrying on the investigation, belong to this class of things, and that our knowledge of ourselves is very different from our knowledge of other people like ourselves. I know myself from inside, as it were, while I know other people only from outside. I know myself as a set of activities and energies to which I give the general name of consciousness. But I also know myself from outside in the same way as I know you, though not so well. It is worth while to remember that our external knowledge of ourselves is not so complete or satisfactory as our external knowledge of other people. But there is enough of it, perhaps, to enable it to act as a kind of middle term between our knowledge of ourselves and of them. It suggests to us that other people know themselves as we know ourselves, from inside, and that they know us as we know them, from outside. I do not wish to endorse this as an account of how we come to know other persons as persons, but it is certainly

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a natural account and true so far as it goes. It indicates, however, how we come to think of ourselves in a dual way, as known from outside and from inside, or to put it in terms of the dualism, from the mental side and from the material side. Here, then, for the first time we come across a fact that seems to suggest a dualism between Mind and Matter so far as persons are concerned. It is not, I believe, the real root of the dualistic illusion, because the formulation of it as a distinction between mental and material aspects, presupposes that we have already adopted the Mind-Matter dualism as a basis of our classification. But we may let that pass for the moment.

Now, if we admit that this suggests a dualism, we must notice that it is not the metaphysical dualism of Mind and Matter. It could only lead us to credit the class of things that we call persons with a dual nature. At most it would suggest that persons consist of a body and a mind, and that these two constituents, as we experience them, are radically different and mutually exclusive. It may be psychologically natural to read this dualism into the nature of Reality as a whole. To do so would be a form of anthropomorphism, for it would consist in projecting what we take to be a characteristic of human beings into the field of objective Reality. The tendency to anthropomorphism, however, does not constitute a good reason for accepting the dualism of Mind and Matter as a metaphysical classification.

But is there any ground for thinking that the double way in which we are aware of ourselves suggests a dualism of mind and body as the proper analysis of persons? It arises only for each of us in one particular case, our own. If we were to forget ourselves and to think only of our experience of other people, we should conclude that they were living beings with certain special peculiarities of behaviour. There would be no *prima facie* suggestion that what we know when we know another person is some combination of a body and a mind. In other words, unless we had already accepted the dualistic classification of persons, we should never use it to interpret our experience of other persons. The dualism of body and mind could only arise through a reflection upon the two ways in which I am aware of myself, through external perception and through introspection. In this case, it is suggested that we are aware of our bodies in external perception and of our minds in introspection.

But are we? Let us examine the inference that is involved. The premiss which we take from our experience is the proposition, "I know myself both from outside and from inside." The conclusion is that "I know my mind and I know my body." It is surely impossible to infer the second from the first. The first implies that

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one and the same entity is known in two different ways. The second implies that two different entities are known in one and the same way. The transition is obviously illogical. If introspection is myself knowing a mind, and the external perception is myself knowing a body, then I can be neither the body nor the mind, nor *a fortiori* the two together. If I can properly say that I have a body and also that I have a mind, what is it that has them? If I am a mind, then that mind might perhaps have a body; and if I am a body then possibly that body might have a mind. But I cannot both be a body and have a body, nor can I be a mind and have a mind. Surely if it is true that I know myself in two distinct ways—and that seems incontrovertible—then I cannot consist of a mind and a body which are mutually exclusive. I can properly generalize my experience by saying that it is a characteristic of persons that that have the capacity of knowing themselves in two different ways. To introduce a Mind-Body dualism is to deny this. Therefore, this fact provides no logical grounds even for a dualism of mind and body.

I should like, in this connexion, to draw your attention to a fundamental difference between the dualism of mind and body and the dualism of Mind and Matter. When we distinguish between our minds and our bodies, we are thinking of our bodies not as material objects but as animal organisms. We are contrasting our rational with our animal nature. By body in this antithesis, we do not mean what the physicist means when he says "all bodies gravitate," but when we use the Mind-Matter dualism this is precisely what we mean by "matter." Thus if we came to the conclusion that the Mind-Body dualism was a proper one, that would afford no logical ground for the Mind-Matter dualism. We could not logically pass from the one to the other. If we refer back to the natural threefold division of the constituents of the world into material objects, living beings, and persons, we can see that the Mind-Matter dualism arises, though illegitimately, through a contrast between the first and the third which omits the second, while the Mind-Body dualism arises, though again improperly, from the contrast of the second and third, which omits the first. That is why Descartes, for example, who started from the Mind-Matter dualism, was forced to consider all living beings, with the exception of persons, as automata.

We must now turn to the field in which the dualism of Mind and Matter has been most discussed in modern philosophy—the field of the Theory of Knowledge. If we reject, for philosophical purposes, our natural tendency to limit our thinking to the objective field of what we experience, leaving our experiencing of it out of account, and try to think of the total fact of ourselves experiencing the

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world, we have to take a new distinction into account. We have to distinguish between that which knows and that which is known, between the subject and the object. The logical dualism of subject and object describes the fundamental form of any cognitional experience whatever. In any case of knowing, there must be a subject—that which knows, and an object—that which is known. Logically, subject and object are correlative terms which exclude one another. By definition, the subject is that in any instance of knowing which is not the object; and the object is that which is not the subject. Now, in actual fact, it is we who know, and, therefore, it is natural to identify ourselves with the subject in experience. But also we use the term "mind" as a generic term for that which knows, and, therefore, we tend to identify the subject with mind and so ourselves with instances of mind. This is, in fact, the normal way in which the dualism of Mind and Matter appears in modern philosophical discussions. "I am a thinking being," says Descartes, "that is to say, a knower. Mind, in general, is that which knows. Therefore, I am a mind." In other words, the term "subject," "mind," and "self," or "ego," or "I" are all in different references definable as "that which knows." And as soon as mind is identified with the subject it is natural, where the dualistic tendency is already in operation, to identify matter with the object. It is natural, I say, although it is completely illogical. The connexion is purely an association of ideas. If we are operating with a distinction between Mind and Matter and also with a distinction between subject and object, and if there is in the field which we are investigating a ground for identifying the subject with mind, there will be a psychological tendency to identify the object with matter. Thus there is a psychological explanation ready to our hand for the association of the logical dualism of subject and object with the metaphysical dualism of Mind and Matter.

There is, however, no logical justification for this association. In the first place, a logical dualism is formal. A metaphysical dualism is not. A metaphysical distinction is a distinction *in the object*. It is part of the analysis of what is known, and has nothing therefore to do with a logical distinction between what knows and what is known. What knows from a metaphysical point of view is part of what is known, and is, therefore, considered as object. If there is a reason for identifying the subject with mind, there is absolutely none for identifying the object with matter. Indeed, the association at once denies the possibility of metaphysics or even of psychology. For, unless mind can be the object in a case of knowing, there can obviously be no knowledge of mind, and if mind is a constituent of reality, there can then be no knowledge of Reality. But the identification of the object with matter is palpably grotesque, since

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no one who makes it ever means (as he ought to mean) that the only objects of knowledge are material ones. The dualism of Mind and Matter is, indeed, the belief that the world which we know—that is to say, the world as object—consists of two kinds of objects, mental and material. To identify the object with matter implies, therefore, that the dualism of Mind and Matter is false, and logically must lead to a pure materialism in metaphysics. Any philosophy, therefore, which confuses the subject-object distinction with the Mind-Matter distinction, is inherently materialistic, however ideal may be the terminology in which it is expressed. The two distinctions have, in fact, no point of contact, and, therefore, the logical distinction between subject and object can never provide any reason for a belief in the dualism of Mind and Matter. Unless we already had the Mind-Matter dualism in our thoughts, the association of the two would never be set up. This in itself indicates that the source of the dualism of Mind and Matter cannot lie in the logical field.

There is another feature of the logical distinction which is, I believe, not usually appreciated, but which is very important for modern philosophy. It is that the distinction between subject and object, however essential it may be for logic, cannot be made the starting-point of any philosophical inquiry into the nature of Reality, because it cannot legitimately be generalized. When I begin to reflect upon my experience, I quite naturally draw a distinction between myself experiencing and what I experience. I have no objection to that distinction. It is quite a proper one. But it is a different distinction for each one of us. If I draw it, it puts me on one side of the line and everything else on the other. If you draw it, it puts you on one side of the line and everything else, including me, on the other. Each person is both subject and object; subject for himself and object for every other subject. If I try to use this distinction between myself and what I experience as the basis of a metaphysical construction (as Descartes did, for example) I imply that I am the only subject and that all other persons are parts of the object-world. I am, in the world, that which knows. Everybody else is part of what is known. I am, in fact, unwittingly committed to solipsism. Solipsism is the philosophical correlative of egoism or individualism. It corresponds to the practical attitude which says "I am the only agent. The rest of the world is material for the service of my selfhood." All individualist philosophy—that is to say, practically all modern philosophy—does illegitimately generalize the subject in order to escape the dilemma of solipsism. It does so by assuming that there are a large number of different "I's," yet that all of them, in some mystical sense, are really the same "I" repeated at different points in space and time. That is why it

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is driven to talk of *the* Ego or *the* Self or *the* Mind or, in another connexion, *the* Will. For, if the different subjects were really different, they would all have to be credited with different objects, and there would be no common world or Universe for them to discuss or to belong to. But because of its starting-point such philosophy can only produce a pluralism of solipsisms,—a plurality of unrelated worlds—which is of course a blank absurdity. This point is so fundamental that it is difficult even to express it or to become aware of it, since we are all individualists with minds shaped by an individualistic tradition. But it shows itself in the fact that our modern philosophy completely ignores the second person. It is full of Ego and Meum, but it knows nothing of Tu and Tuum. Yet the terms "I" and "You" are strictly correlative, and their correlation is the proper truth in the familiar statement that human nature is essentially social. The "I" in isolation is non-existent. The real unit of rational experience on the subject side is not "I" but "I and You," in mutual relation.

The logical distinction, then, between Subject and Object affords no ground for accepting or even considering a metaphysical dualism of Mind and Matter. To argue that since I am a subject aware of objects, therefore what I am aware of must be divided into material entities and mental entities, is a palpable *non sequitur* of the crudest kind. Is there, then, any other field in which we can hope to discover a *prima facie* ground for entertaining the idea of a dualism of mental and material? There is only one other direction, so far as I can see, in which we may look. It is the distinction between things and images. But before examining this distinction, which comes nearer to suggesting a dualism than any of the others, I should like to dispose of a purely verbal confusion that might tend to blur the argument at this point. All persons have certain capacities, such as thinking, remembering, perceiving, imagining, deciding, and so on, which we are accustomed to describe as *mental* capacities. I can see no objection to this use of the term *mental* so long as we do not read the Mind-Matter dualism into it. We should do this if we implied by the term "mental capacities" that these were the powers of an entity called a "mind." The issue may become clearer if we compare an analogous case. We speak in a similar way of the "vital" functions of organisms. They have such vital capacities as assimilating food and reproducing themselves. But no one imagines that this suggests that "vital functions" means functions of something called "life," which is somehow dualistically conjoined with the bodies of organisms. Why, then, should anyone think that the phrase "mental capacities" means capacities of something called a mind. Surely only because they already have the dualism of Mind and Matter, or rather of Mind and Body in their thinking. This is indeed

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characteristic of most arguments advanced in favour of the dualism as well as of a great number (such as Berkeley's) which are raised against it. They are themselves consequences of dualistic thought, and can therefore neither support the dualism nor refute it. They presuppose it.

But the distinction of things and images, or, more satisfactorily, of things that exist and things that are imagined, is on a different footing. In some sense we must admit that there are hosts of things which, as we say, exist only in idea, or are purely imaginary. If, then, we are to begin our philosophical task with a classification of all that there is, must we not start with the distinction between two classes of objects, one class which exists independently and one which exists only "in the mind"? And is not this distinction logically prior to what we called the "natural" classification of things into inanimate, animate, and personal, since that is a classification which refers only to the things which exist independently? Surely here we have at least a *prima facie* case for the dualism of Mind and Matter?

I do not think that it provides even a *prima facie* suggestion of the dualism. The reason why it seems to do so is that we are apt to state the distinction, as I have just done, in terms which are the product of the dualism. If we talk of objects which exist in the mind and objects which exist independently of the mind, we are obviously assuming the existence of the mind as an entity and therefore we have assumed the dualism. Any conclusion in favour of the dualism which we draw from this premiss will inevitably be circular and fallacious. We must first state the distinction in a form which does not assume the dualism. And this is not merely possible, it is the natural way to state it. For common sense the distinction is one between imaginary things and real things. The unicorn, for example, is an imaginary animal, while the horse is a real animal. In this form the distinction offers no *prima facie* ground for dualism; indeed it implies the opposite. For the dualism is a classification of Reality into its real components, while the distinction between real and imaginary things excludes the latter from Reality and implies that they do not exist in Reality and cannot therefore be constituents of it.

But we cannot leave the matter here, because someone will at once object that imaginary objects are part of our experience and that we cannot therefore merely ignore them in a philosophical account of the nature of things. That is of course true, and we must agree that a philosophy which took no account of the imagination and its activities would be ridiculous. But the question is only whether the facts necessitate a dualistic interpretation from the beginning. Now there is one peculiar difficulty which will arise if we answer this question in the affirmative. If we divide

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the whole of what we experience into imaginary entities and real entities, and insist that this implies a dualism of Mind and Matter, on which side of the dualism will mind fall? Is my mind an "imaginary" or a "real" entity? If we answer that it is not an imaginary entity we shall have to conclude that every actual mind is a material entity; and that makes nonsense of the dualism. If we reply that mind is an imaginary entity—and that is in my opinion the proper answer—then we must assume that I imagine it, and that I am not an imaginary entity, but a real one; and therefore, in terms of the dualism, that I am a material entity.

Now, common sense maintains that *we produce* the objects of our imagination, and that therefore they depend on us for their existence. Their existence *is* their being imagined. But there is a stream of philosophical tradition which establishes another type of dualism by an implicit denial of this dependence of what is imagined on the person who imagines it. Why, it may be asked, should the objects we imagine (or to use an old phrase of Plato's, who is the main source of this thought), the objects we can only see with the eye of the soul, be more dependent upon us for their existence than the objects we perceive with our bodily senses? This may be taken in either of two ways. We may answer either that what we perceive and what we imagine are equally dependent upon us, or that both are equally independent. The first gives us the Platonic metaphysic with its dualism of two worlds, both independent of the persons who apprehend them; the second gives us modern Idealism in which both real objects and imaginary objects are considered to be equally mind-dependent. But the idealist solution presupposes the Mind-Matter dualism and so does not concern us now; while the Platonic dualism can find no place for the person who both perceives and imagines. He cannot be properly assigned to either of the two worlds and can only be included in the classification at all by the *tour de force* of supposing that he belongs to both at once. To suppose this is to suppose that the same entity is at once real and imaginary.

We must return, then, to our proper question, whether the distinction between real and imaginary objects provides a *prima facie* case for the dualism of Mind and Matter. Since it is a *prima facie* case that we are seeking, we must accept the *prima facie* dependence of imagined objects upon the person who imagines them. Now this provides a *prima facie* case against the dualism, unless we are prepared to make the ridiculous assumption that "I depend upon the activities of my own mind for my existence." The objects which I imagine, so far as they are imaginary objects, and not real objects apprehended through imagination, are functions of my imagining and dependent upon me. I myself am a real object, not an imaginary one, whether I am aware of myself from without or from within.

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I recall here this dual self-awareness in order to emphasize the point that in introspection it is *myself* that is apprehended. If, therefore, I am aware through introspection of images or "objects of imagination," I am aware of them as dependent on me, as modifications of my own real nature. These images and ideas, then, if they are in any sense constituent parts of reality, can only be so because they are constituent parts of me. They can be elements in Reality only because I am an element in reality, and not in their own right. I can only contrast them with the rest of Reality by contrasting myself with the rest of Reality. The question about the nature of images is thus part of the question about the nature of persons, and it falls within the natural classification of Reality into inanimate things, living organisms, and persons. It follows that the distinction between things and images cannot provide a *prima facie* case in favour of a dualism of Mind and Matter. At the most it can be construed, and, illegitimately construed, in terms of the dualism, if the dualism has already been presupposed.

The effort to construe the distinction between imaginary entities and real entities as a dualism of Mind and Matter has a very curious corollary which may well form the conclusion of this essay. If by "my mind" I mean the complex of entities which are revealed by introspection, in contrast to the objects which are revealed by the bodily senses, then "my mind" must be a complex imaginary object. Now the characteristic of any imaginary object or mental entity lies in the fact that its "esse" is "imaginari." It exists, that is to say, only in and through the activity which apprehends it. If, then, I cease to think or imagine "my mind," it ceases to exist. If we all were to cease thinking that there is such a thing as mind, there would cease to be such a thing as mind. If, on the other hand, I mean by "my mind" my activities of thinking and perceiving and imagining and so on, if I mean, that is to say, "me thinking," then I am a real entity possessed of these capacities, and there is no need to suppose that I must have a mind in order to possess them. For common sense at least, the "I" that thinks—certainly the "you" that thinks—is an object that can be seen and heard and handled.

I cannot claim that this search for a reason for entertaining the dualism of Mind and Matter is exhaustive. There may be a field which has been overlooked. But it seems to me to reveal such egregious implications of that dualism as to justify a highly sceptical attitude, and to suggest the effort to describe the nature of Reality without assuming a dualistic classification as the proper starting-point of any new philosophical construction. The proper supplement of this essay would be an explanation of how the dualistic illusion arises. Such an inquiry, however, falls within the province of the psychologist rather than of the philosopher.

GREAT THINKERS

(V) AQUINAS

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FROM the third century we pass to the thirteenth, from a century in which Europe is still pagan to a century in which Christianity has been so long established there that its paganism is wellnigh forgotten, from a century in which it is ruled by a Roman emperor to one in which ecclesiastically it is still ruled by Rome, but the empire has passed from the Roman to the Teuton.

In the interval until we reach the twelfth century Christendom has produced strangely few thinkers of a philosophical turn of mind. Augustine in the late fourth and early fifth century, Boethius in the late fifth and early sixth, John Scotus Erigena in ninth century are the only outstanding names, until we get to Anselm, Abelard, Gilbert de la Porrée, William of Conches, the Victorines Hugh and Richard, and John of Salisbury. This outburst of Christian thinking in the twelfth century was marked by much originality, but did not last long. By the middle of the century all its leaders were dead with the exception of Richard of St. Victor and John of Salisbury. In its attempt to recover Jerusalem from the Moslem Christendom had already exhausted itself. The warlike spirit of the returning crusaders, the long struggle between Empire and Papacy and between the Emperor and vassal states and republican cities, the wealth of the higher clergy and its attendant abuses conjoined to make the latter half of the century a period of decadence.

The old century closed with a prophet, Joachim of Flores, who inspired Europe with the hope of a new and more spiritual era shortly to begin. The new century opens with a distinguished Pope, Innocent III, who does much to restore papal prestige, to encourage learning, to correct abuses, and to suppress heresy, notably the Albigensian heresy, which at that time was so widespread that he could "exterminate" it only by appeal to the secular arm. To the imperial throne there succeeds an Emperor, notorious for pagan pomp and laxity of morals but eager to reform the Church, Frederick II. With their headquarters at Lyons, the Waldenses, like the Albigenses, whose headquarters were at Toulouse, were sending forth itinerant preachers into Southern France and Northern Italy, denouncing riches, criticizing indulgences, and preaching pacifism. In Paris Amalric of Bène, the friend of Philip Augustus

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and tutor to his son, was teaching a pantheism in which the theory of John Scotus Erigena was combined with the doctrine that in the new epoch, foretold by Joachim, the Holy Ghost would become incarnate in all men. After Amalric's death his doctrines were condemned in 1209 and his body exhumed and reburied in unconsecrated ground. By the same Parisian Council that condemned Amalric the reading of Aristotle's *Natural Philosophy* was forbidden under pain of excommunication. Already the works of Aristotle were being eagerly studied in the universities, but thus far only in translations from the Arabic and in Moslem commentaries. They were suspect on that account, and in 1215 the Legate, Robert of Courçon, confirmed the ruling of the Archbishop of Sens, which was further confirmed by Gregory IX in 1231 until such time as new translations could be prepared. Meanwhile two new religious Orders had come into being. The Friars Minor, founded by St. Francis of Assisi, were approved by Innocent III in 1209. The Order of Preachers, founded by St. Dominic, was approved in 1216 by Honorius III.

In the very heart of this Europe a few years later, in 1225 or 1226, a third son was born to the Count of Aquino, the Emperor's cousin, in a castle which stood midway between Naples and Rome. At the age of five he was sent to the Benedictine monastery of Monte Casino, where he remained until the monks were expelled by the soldiers of an excommunicated emperor, on whose side his elder brothers were fighting. Thomas was then sent to Naples, the favourite city of the Emperor, who had recently founded there a university. In it the Dominicans were already established, and it was under them that Thomas studied until his eighteenth year, when he decided himself to join the Order, to the regret of his mother, who had hoped through papal influence to obtain for him the Abbacy of Monte Casino. In order to escape his irate family the young Dominican was hurried to Rome and thence set out for Paris, but was intercepted by his brothers and imprisoned in his ancestral home. Every inducement was employed, even that of a harlot, to dissuade Thomas from his purpose, but in vain. After some two years of confinement he escaped, and, after an interview with the Pope, travelled on foot with John the Teuton, the general of his Order, to Paris and thence on to Cologne, where Albert, the greatest light of the Dominicans, was then lecturing. The facts themselves testify to the esteem in which the new recruit was already held. Of him his Order expected great things.

During the thirty years that remained to him Thomas Aquinas more than fulfilled these expectations. He lectured continually in Paris both on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard and on the text of Aristotle. In almost all the great controversies of the day he played

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a leading part. His Order relied much on his experience in the organization of its studies, and he was frequently called upon to make long journeys to attend chapters or to visit the Curia in Rome. He was consulted by three successive Popes and was on his way to the Council of Lyons when death overtook him in 1274. Despite these activities, the works that come from his pen are so numerous and so long that they occupy in the Vives edition thirty quarto volumes. He wrote lengthy commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, on two of Boethius's works, on the Divine Names of the pseudo-Dionysius, on the treatise *De Causis*, which he recognizes as substantially identical with a work of Proclus, and on almost every one of the works of Aristotle. He wrote two *Summas*, a *Summa contra Gentiles*, and in later life the *Summa Theologica*. He also compiled several long treatises and a considerable number of shorter ones on various theological and philosophical topics. He is no less at home in discussing the ethics of trading, the theory of kingship, the nature of angels, and the beliefs of Islam and of the Greeks than he is in discussing the power of God, essence and existence, the problem of evil, the nature of truth, the function of the human intellect, the eternity of the world, or the hypostatic union of the incarnate Word. He is as familiar with the theories of Avicenna and Averroes, of Maimonides and Avicbron, as he is with those of Augustine or Aristotle himself. Of him Professor A. E. Taylor has rightly said that he did not merely revive Aristotle and follow him blindly. "What he effected for the first time in history since the expiry of Neo-platonic learning in the sixth century was a magnificent and original synthesis of past philosophical thought. He took his materials freely from the whole record of the classic past, so far as it lay open to him, and what he constructed out of them was no chaotic eclecticism, but a coherent system, welded into a unity by the presence throughout its details of a few great ruling principles won by permanent hard thinking and held with the clearest consciousness of their implications" (Art. on "St. Thomas as a Philosopher" in *St. Thomas Aquinas*; Blackwell, 1925).

The main problem which confronted Christian thinkers in the thirteenth century was the attitude which they were to adopt toward the philosophy of Aristotle, the knowledge of which in its entirety was for the first time being disseminated in Western Europe. In the accepted theological textbook of the day, Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, there is but one reference to Aristotle, who is mentioned as having taught that the world is eternal and has a triple origin, not a single one in God. When his physical and metaphysical treatises were translated into Latin, they were regarded by ecclesiastical authorities with grave suspicion, for they were reputed to contain and actually had given rise to many theories incompatible with the

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Christian faith. William of Auvergne, who was Bishop of Paris from 1228 to 1249, scoffs at the idea of pure spirits who have to turn the heavens round in order to attain the love of God, and regards the Aristotelian theory of two intelligences, one active and the other passive, as mere fiction. Alexander of Hales and John de la Rochelle, his Franciscan contemporaries, while ascribing to abstraction our knowledge of this world, maintain that the human intellect faces two ways, and that its knowledge of necessary truth is derived by way of illumination from the First Truth, which is God. The Franciscan school at Oxford, though insisting much on the importance of experiment and observation, holds that illumination is essential if we are to know anything beyond this world, and to this source Roger Bacon ascribes the wisdom not only of Christian but also of pagan philosophers.

The most carefully reasoned defence of this, the Augustinian position, comes from the pen of St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas's contemporary and friend. Of this world, which is transient and ever changing, there can be no exact knowledge. Knowledge, if it is to be certain, immutable, and exact, presupposes communion with the eternal realm of truth itself. Knowledge proper is neither of this world nor is it derived from this world. Terms, propositions, and inferences alike in the moral, the metaphysical, and the mathematical order, presuppose, not indeed the vision of God nor yet the vision of the eternal nature of things as they are ordered in the divine mind, but at least the operation of these eternal natures on our own minds as regulative and motive principles. Relative to created things it is not merely as exemplars that eternal natures function; they function also as cognitive principles relative to human knowledge. The theory of abstraction will account for the *genera* and *species* under which we classify natural objects, but it will not account for judgments of value or for the formation of ideals, whether they be moral ideals or ideals of beauty or those ideally perfect figures which are the object of mathematics, for such ideals are never realized adequately by any natural object.

Though for Aristotle's natural philosophy Bonaventure has the greatest respect, he is severely critical both of his metaphysic and of his theory of knowledge. He complains that for the Platonic ideas, which are basic alike to the theory of created being and to the theory of human knowing, Aristotle has nought but contempt. From his list of causes he, Aristotle, omits the exemplary cause, which is the Augustinian equivalent of the Platonic idea, and is thence led to deny that God knows anything beyond Himself, and so to repudiate both divine foreknowledge and divine providence, and in its place to substitute either chance or blind necessity, which in turn does away with the possibility of human merit and divine

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punishment and reward. His theory of an eternal world conjoined with his theory of intelligence implies either that there are an infinity of souls or that the soul is corruptible or that it migrates from body to body or that there is but one intelligence common to all men. The First Mover, whose existence Aristotle proves, is not that divine Being whom Christians worship, who is the ground of all truth, and is present to every human soul.

Such was the attitude which the majority of Christian professors and theologians, both regular and secular, adopted towards Aristotle at the time when Aquinas began to lecture in Paris in 1251. Aquinas, on the other hand, is already a convinced Aristotelian. Upon the traditional doctrines of the schools, summarized in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, he puts an Aristotelian interpretation wherever possible, and in the light of Aristotelian doctrine seeks to determine points in dispute. In his *de Ente et Essentia* he explains in an Aristotelian sense the relation of being and of essence to the *genera* and *species* under which we classify them. In his *de Principiis Naturae* he accounts for the behaviour of natural bodies in terms of Aristotle's four causes—material formal, efficient, and final. In the *de Potentia* he connects up this doctrine with that of divine creation and conservation. In the *de Veritate* he discusses the nature of truth, the extent of God's knowledge, the function of ideas in the divine mind, providence, predestination, the nature of angelic knowledge, of human knowledge, and of prophecy.

An "idea" for Aquinas is the form which, in the intention of a purposive agent, a thing is to reproduce. Since God is the creator of a world, there must be ideas in the divine mind, and since creatures are manifold these ideas must be many, and must comprise not only *genera* and *species* but individuals. Such ideas are "exemplars"; but they are not, properly speaking, causes. They are the finite ways in which God sees that His essence can be copied by creatures; it is not the ideas, but He, who produces creatures. They are *principia generationis* relative to creatures and *principia cognitionis* relative to God, since it is in them that He knows the creatures in which they are reproduced; but they are not "subsistent" ideas, nor substances, nor yet do they constitute a fifth type of cause. As Aristotle said rightly, of causes there are but four.

Thus far St. Thomas keeps closely to the Augustinian tradition, though he interprets it in an Aristotelian sense. It is in his theory of knowledge that he breaks with it, yet with caution, for he still uses Augustinian terminology though to its terms he assigns a new meaning which in some respects is the negation of Augustinian theory. Not only in his earlier works, but in his later works also, he speaks of first principles in the order of knowledge as "innate," of their being "impressed" upon our minds by God, as also is the

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natural law, and of our beholding the nature of the soul "in inviolable truth." But, though the words are those of Augustine, the doctrine which underlies them is that of Aristotle. For Augustine all that pertains to the realm of nature is phenomenal and transient; in it there is nothing stable, so that of it we can make no true judgments, but can only apply to it standards and values from which it ever falls short, standards and values of which we have cognizance, not through sense perception, but in so far as we share in eternal laws and ideals ever present to God. This standpoint is that of Plato, as St. Thomas points out; Aristotle's way was different. For him there is something stable in the objects of sense; they are substances of which the essences endure amid phenomenal change: of their proper objects each sense forms true judgments; and, above sense, there is an intellectual power which judges of truth "not by means of intelligibles which exist outside it, but by the light of the active intellect which makes things intelligible" (*de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 10). It is this intellectual power that is impressed on man's mind by God and is innate—nothing else, for at the outset intelligence is a *tabula rasa*. First principles are innate only in the sense that it is by this innate intellectual power that we abstract their constituent terms from the objects of sense-perception, recognize the necessary connections that hold between them, and, having done so, form habits of thought in which they function as axiomatic principles and constitute the basis of all scientific reasoning. When this reasoning obeys the laws which intelligence has thus formulated, we contemplate inviolable truth, but we do not contemplate it in the mind of God, nor yet in a realm apart. Though it may be analogous to what exists before the mind of God, in itself it is but the product of our own thinking, which is primarily of essences that exist in this world and secondarily of the powers involved in the apprehension of them.

The "light" which in Augustinian theory comes from God, in Thomist theory is transferred to man's intelligence, in the activity of which God concurs as he does in all natural activities, but not in a special way as the Augustinians maintained. It is in the light of his own intelligence that man beholds the nature of created things, simple things at first, whence he passes to the recognition of their implications. Nor, in spite of opinions to the contrary, does St. Thomas make any distinction here between moral principles and speculative principles. It is with respect to their objects that they differ. Moral principles are concerned with goodness and speculative principles with being. Both goodness and being, however, are to be found in the created world, so that there is no need to look elsewhere for the source of those primitive notions which lie at the root of either moral or speculative laws. To the contention of

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Augustine that, since the wicked recognize a moral law which they fail to obey, they cannot derive such knowledge from their own nature or habits of mind, but must derive it direct from the "book of light" which is eternal truth, St. Thomas answers that "first principles of action are perceived, just as are the first principles of the speculative sciences, by the light of the active intellect" (*De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 10, ad. 9). This light is a "participated light" in that we receive it from God. It is, however, a created light, not a divine light, and exists within and proceeds from our own minds. Hence it is not the moral law itself that is implanted within us, any more than the axioms of geometry are implanted within us. What is implanted within us is the power to formulate such laws and axioms, given the requisite sense-data and the requisite knowledge of human nature and human society.

Successfully to have defended so revolutionary a theory of knowledge, entailing as it does the discarding of the traditional Augustinian position in regard to the source of human certainty and the origin of human science, was in itself no small accomplishment in view of the issues at stake and the authorities that, both in the universities and in episcopal sees, were ranged against it. It is not on this solely, however, or even mainly, that Aquinas's reputation depends. His claim to fame rests not upon his brilliant interpretation and ingenious defence of the Aristotelian position, but upon the fact that he saw its bearing on Christian doctrine, realized that if adopted it would mean the rewriting of the whole of Christian theology, and in his two *Summas* successfully carried out this gigantic task.

The later and larger *Summa* is primarily a theological treatise, written ostensibly for beginners, though in fact it covers the whole theological field. The earlier *Summa contra Gentiles*, on the other hand, is addressed to the whole world, to the infidel, the Moslem, the Christian, the heretic, and the Jew; and contains a defence of Christian doctrine based primarily on the principles of Aristotelian philosophy. The limits which this philosophy imposes upon the scope of human knowledge St. Thomas frankly accepts. If "knowledge begins with sense-perception," it follows that "the human intellect can understand what is not itself an object of sense-perception only in so far as it can acquire such knowledge with the aid of sense-perception" (1, c. 2). The essences of perceptible things, such as stones and triangles, the human intellect is capable of apprehending, but of God, who is imperceptible, it can know only *that* He is, not *what* He is. That intelligible world which Plato affirmed but Aristotle repudiated, still exists for Aquinas in the divine mind, but of it man has no immediate cognizance. Hence for the Christian there are two realms of truth, one accessible to human reason, the other transcending it and knowable only in so

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far as it has been divinely revealed. The position of the twelfth century is thus reversed. Philosophy and dogmatic theology are assigned to separate compartments. Faith and reason, though not incompatible, are none the less divorced.

From an Aristotelian standpoint the traditional proofs of God's existence also have to be revised. We can no longer appeal, with Augustine, to the realm of eternal ideas, since to human minds these are inaccessible. Neither can we, with Anselm, argue from the nature of God to His existence, since of His nature we have no immediate knowledge. There is but one legitimate way of proving God's existence—by appeal to the character of the perceptible world, which does exist, with a view to discovering its nature and implications.

To this task St. Thomas devotes the first Book of the *Contra Gentiles*. If it can be shown, as he thinks Aristotle has shown, that (a) no motion is purely spontaneous and (b) that in the order of movers an infinite regress is impossible, the existence of motion implies ultimately the existence of a first immovable Mover. This Mover Aquinas identifies with God, and then proceeds to the deduction of other attributes. Immutability implies immutability, he argues, and so not only eternal existence, but also that God is such that He can in no wise *undergo* change; and again that He must be simple, not composite, since, if composite, change would be possible. Seeing that changelessness and eternal existence are ascribed by Aristotle to the heavens, and St. Thomas holds that it is impossible to disprove this except by appeal to faith, the proof that God is incorporeal presents some difficulty. St. Thomas argues therefore to incorporeality from simplicity, since this excludes the possibility of there being parts in God which would exist if He were indeed a body. Simplicity also implies, St. Thomas urges, the negation of any real distinction between essence and existence or between God and the attributes we ascribe to Him. Wherefore, since God is identical with being, He must possess being in its plenitude, and so be all-perfect, and, if all-perfect, must be the highest good.

From perfection St. Thomas deduces yet other attributes. Unlike Richard of St. Victor, who from the perfection of God infers a plurality of persons on the ground that if goodness is to be perfect it must be shared, Aquinas holds that perfection implies unity, since, if there be many of whom each is all-perfect, there will be no ground for distinguishing one from the other. From perfection he deduces also infinitude and intelligence, which, if infinite, must embrace the knowledge at once of self and of all possible beings. The eternal ideas of Augustine are thus re-established as the realm in which God contemplates all the ways in which His infinite nature can be finitely reproduced.

It remains only to find a ground for affirming volition of God

and Aristotle's First Mover will have been converted by Aristotelian logic into the Creator in whom Christians believe. This ground St. Thomas finds in intelligence which, recognizing that the object which it contemplates is good, deems it also to be desirable, and so evokes the will for it to be. Nor does will rest there. In willing itself, it wills also all that intelligence embraces, and so wills what is other than itself; but with itself as the end, the highest good that the universe is somehow to attain. Creatures are a means to this end. Wherefore, since there are a variety of ways in which the end can be attained, there is scope for election, and the actual world emerges as the product of free choice.

In the Second Book St. Thomas argues from the position thus established to the nature of the creatures which the universe must contain if the creation of it is to manifest the source whence it proceeds. Since in the order of being God pre-exists all else, it must be out of nothing that creatures are produced, and so to produce things will be the peculiar attribute of God. The creatures of God, therefore, must be other than God; but it does not necessarily follow that they cannot be eternal. The most we can do there is to refute the arguments which purport to prove them to be eternal, which St. Thomas proceeds to do. He then discusses the various grounds that have been alleged for the diversity of creatures; and concludes that diversity is not due to chance, nor to diversity of matter, nor to the intervention of other causes, nor to merit, but to the express intention of God who wills His creatures to be as perfect as it is possible for each of them to be.

The created world, if not a best possible world at the outset, must at least be capable of becoming a best possible world if it is to realize its end. It must contain, therefore, a hierarchy of being, St. Thomas argues, so that it may manifest the perfection of its Creator in all possible ways and degrees. Within it there must be pure intelligences as well as intelligences united to bodies, not indeed in Plato's way but in Aristotle's—as the forms of the bodies which they animate. There must also be in man not only a potential intellect capable of knowing, but also an active intellect which, operating on the data of perception, enables man to acquire knowledge. Though the soul which contains these intellects becomes one substance with the body as soon as the latter has reached an appropriate stage of development, it will not perish with the body, but is immortal. So too *a fortiori* are pure intelligences which, since they are not united to bodies, must each be of a different species ordered in angelic hierarchy.

The Third Book deals with creatures from the standpoint of their end. After discussing the nature of final causes, the position of evil in the scheme of things, the different ways in which things seek and attain their ends, and the relation of the heavens to intellectual

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substances, St. Thomas proceeds to establish his main point, which is that for intellectual substances, inclusive of man, their natural end is the understanding of God; whence it follows that man's ultimate happiness will consist in the contemplation of God. He then argues that in this life we cannot understand intellectual substances of a higher order than our own, nor yet our own except by inference from its activities, nor yet *a fortiori* the essence of God. In this life, therefore, man's ultimate happiness can never be attained, nor can it be attained by man's natural powers. In order to see God, there is required an influx of divine light, which will make man a participant of that eternal life from which otherwise he is cut off, and so will satisfy all his desires, which otherwise must remain to some extent without fulfilment. Aquinas has transferred the "illumination" of the Augustinian to the supernatural order.

There follows a discussion of providence, of its relation to natural causes, to events that are not necessary but contingent, to free-will and chance; of the way in which providence uses intellectual creatures (angels and men) in the governance of other creatures, and celestial bodies in the governance of all inferior forms of body; of its connection with prayer, with the course of natural events, and with miracles, magicians, and demons. Then the author discusses how law, worship, marriage, the counsels, poverty, sin, punishment, rewards, and finally grace, fit into the general scheme of things as already set forth.

In the erection of this vast superstructure upon the basis of perceptual knowledge it is to reason, and reason alone, that Aquinas appeals. Only in the Fourth Book, where there is question of specifically Christian beliefs, such as belief in the Trinity and Incarnation, the Sacraments, and the Resurrection, does he rely, and that explicitly, on the revelation made by Christ and on the teaching of the Church. That the perceptual origin which he ascribes to all natural human knowledge to a certain extent vitiates the conclusiveness of the arguments adduced the author frankly confesses in the Introduction to his Fourth Book, and both there and elsewhere alleges that it is in order to confirm and supplement natural knowledge that revelation has been vouchsafed. Whether his arguments are valid or whether his superstructure will stand on so feeble a basis it is impossible here to inquire. In the following century a new school of Christian thought denied this, alleging that, though it is under concepts that we think of things, we do not by this means discern the nature of things. Descartes was of the same opinion, but, be that as it may, there is in the whole history of human thought no thinker who surpasses St. Thomas in constructive genius, or whose system, once it has been constructed, hangs so well together.

NATIONALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL IDEAL

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"NATION" and "nationalism" are not easily defined; mainly, perhaps, because these words, as popularly used, do not have precise meanings. A nation may mean: (1) A people living under a common government,—as when we speak of British or French "nationals"; or (2) A people with a common racial inheritance—the Jews; or (3) A people, inhabiting a certain tract of the earth's surface, with generally common sentiments and habits of thinking, though possibly of mixed race, and part of a wider political society—the English, as distinguished from the Scottish, or Irish, nation.

As clarity of thought requires that we should use our terms with an unambiguous meaning, I may be permitted to confine the use of the term "nation" to this third sense. The main question to be discussed in this paper is whether the nation-state, as we know it to-day, must be accepted as a permanent factor in social organization—whether all political theory and practical politics must simply take for granted the existence of national sovereign states; the theory and the art of politics being confined to questions about the internal organization, and external relations, of these permanent units. To discuss such an issue, and to ask whether it is possible to give nations a place in a political order very different from the present, obviously demands that we use the word "nation" to mean a community which may be, but is not necessarily, a sovereign state. It is hardly necessary to define what I mean by "sovereignty," as that, I trust, will become clear as we proceed.

I have little—if anything—original to say. I wish, simply, to focus attention on certain problems which are agitating many reflective minds at the present day; for the answers we give to these questions are vitally important for the future.

In our day we find two apparently conflicting ideas claiming the allegiance of mankind—the idea of nationalism, and the idea of internationalism. We have, on the one hand, Germany, Italy, Japan, Ireland, and India exhibiting a vigorous national consciousness. We have, on the other hand, the existence of the League of Nations, the recent entry of Russia to the League, and the increasing tendency in the U.S.A. towards abandoning the traditional policy of isolation. We have the tendency to think of the national life as frustrated and incomplete if it lacks the attribute of state sovereignty; and we have

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an equally influential body of opinion which regards the nation-state as owing allegiance to a system of law and order above and beyond itself. Is the conflict between these two tendencies merely apparent, or is it real? If one is right, must the other be wrong?

From one point of view there is a fairly simple and straightforward answer to this question. The nationalist and the internationalist sentiments are not opposed. They are, indeed, complementary expressions of the one social ideal—the ideal of an international democracy. Within any particular state, the process by which a democracy displaces an oligarchy or tyranny has, necessarily, two aspects. On the one hand, the claim of each individual to self-determination, as against the arbitrary power of any other individual, is asserted and vindicated. But it can be vindicated only by extensive common control, and by the submission of each and all to rules of law. Similarly—with regard to nations—if the relations of Britain and India are matters on which the British Government claims to speak the final word, then India has not secured that degree of national equality and self-determination which is a fundamental condition of that democracy of nations for which the international ideal stands. To a very real extent every intense nationalist movement at the present day is an assertion, rather than a denial, of those moral principles on which a healthy internationalist sentiment must be founded. Or, if it is too much to say that the outstanding nationalist movements now assert these principles, it is, at least, true that they have begun by expressing them.

But the more we recognize the compatibility of the nationalist and the internationalist sentiments, the more important does it become that we should clearly apprehend the ethical principle of which these two sentiments are, in some respects, complementary aspects. There is grave danger in assuming that everything about the nationalist temper is sound; and there is an equally grave danger in accepting what, at first sight, appears to be a perfectly innocent and legitimate assumption—the assumption that the proper relations between nations can be understood by our regarding them as completely analogous to the moral relations between individuals. We have, ourselves, made use of this analogy, illustrating the two complementary aspects of an "international democracy" by considering the rights and the obligations of the individual in a democratic state. But this analogy must not be pressed too far. The motive power in the development towards democratic institutions is the conception of the individual as the "source of all values," and of his welfare as the end for which all social institutions exist. I shall deal with this subject more fully below. At the moment, I only wish to indicate what will happen if we unduly press the analogy between the individual and the nation or nation-state. Regarding the nation-

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state as "the individual writ large," we shall be led to the mistaken view that the nation-state (and not the individual) is the source of all values, attributing to it a kind of personality, and not only measuring all other institutions by their capacity to contribute to its welfare, but also looking on individuals as living only in and for its life, and acquiring their value from what they contribute to its welfare and strength. We shall think of the nation-state as the "permanent unit," as that which is to be taken absolutely for granted in all our political theorizing and practical statesmanship. And such a view of the nation-state, or any other form of state, is contrary, not only to any defensible principle of ethics, but also to the development of any efficient international co-operation for human welfare.

I shall now state, briefly, what is to be the main contention of this paper. I contend that to regard the nation-state as the permanent or ultimate unit of political organization is a false and mischievous view. So far as any form of nationalism maintains, or implies, that the national life lacks an essential attribute if it lacks the powers of a sovereign state, then that form of nationalism, I am prepared to say, exhibits a retrograde mentality.

The rest of this article will be an explanation and elaboration of this view.

As men increase their mastery over the forces of nature, the range of their activities widens; and, as the range of activity widens, there is a natural tendency towards increasing intimacy and co-operation between peoples in different parts of the world. This tendency is cribbed and distorted, though it cannot be entirely frustrated, in a world order where completely independent, or sovereign, authority is claimed and exercised by separate nation-states; and the interference with the tendency to internationalization effectively limits economic and cultural progress.

How this interference occurs will become most clear if we consider the effects exercised on each other by economic and political interests. We are familiar with the old saw that "trade follows the flag." Equally important is the fact that the flag tends to follow trade. To take one example:—owners of capital participate in an Egyptian loan; and, that the interest of the bond-holders may be secured, Egypt ultimately becomes virtually subject to the British Government. In the absence of counteracting influences, economic relations tend to become more and more extensive; and, at the same time, they tend to drag political relations in their train. The counteracting influences are most negligible, and the above noted tendencies are, therefore, most clearly operative, where a commercially enterprising nation-state is dealing with backward or undeveloped countries. For such countries the history of their contact with the

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outer civilized world follows a fairly uniform course: discovery, exploration, intensification of commercial relations, and, finally, incorporation as part of an "empire."

This process of political incorporation is effectively checked, however, where the economic relations are between two sovereign states of approximately equal strength and social development. The natural tendency to political unification is, in the nature of the case, prohibited and inhibited; and, inevitably, the development of economic intimacy is also stunted. Each state wishes to preserve its sovereign independence, and to secure itself against external domination. Its independence is always in jeopardy if the state lacks self-sufficiency. It will, therefore, discourage the tendency to international division of labour, if that international specialization would lead to the neglect of industries necessary to its self-sufficiency. And, quite apart from any fear of active aggression on the part of its neighbours, each state has the responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. It must, if possible, prevent the disappearance of home industries on account of successful foreign competition. And, with this end in view, it checks the movements of industry and commerce by the weapons of tariffs, subsidies, etc.

Thus, while the natural tendency in economic relations is towards greater and greater internationalization, yet, where there are firmly established sovereign nation-states, the political tendency is towards self-sufficiency; and because the economic and the political interests are each trying to drag the other into acceptance of its own boundaries, the present political world-order makes for a ceaseless tug-of-war between the economic and the political interests.

Now, the existence of this tension or conflict means that we must make up our minds to a choice between two things: (1) The preservation of national state-sovereignty, or (2) A higher standard of life for all men, including our own countrymen. No doubt many of us would like both of these things. That the second is desirable, no decent person would deny; and the preachers of nationalism and imperialism in Britain are at least interested in the welfare of their own fellow-countrymen. But they dislike the idea of "foreigners having the right to tell us how we ought to behave, and to poke their noses into our affairs." They want, in a word, complete sovereign authority to be vested in the national will, as well as a greatly increased standard of living for our nationals. My contention is that they cannot have both. Of course, I do not mean that *no* advance in the standard of living conditions is possible within the existing political world-order. New discoveries, improved technique in production and distribution, and the use of neglected natural resources may do a great deal. I mean, simply, that, at any given time, the total benefit which it is possible to derive from these things

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cannot be appropriated under the conditions which are involved in the existing political world-order.

Why this should be so becomes clear on a little reflection. If we could picture a country cut off from all contact with the rest of the world, and ruled by a central government, there political and economic relations would have the same boundaries. We can see how, in principle, such a country would be able to deal effectively with many of our vexing problems. Extremes of poverty and wealth, the unwholesome conditions under which so many workers are compelled to live, the miseries of unemployment owing to restrictions of trade—for these there is no real necessity or moral justification. We know what immensely beneficial effects were wrought, in the way of overcoming similar evils, when mediaeval restrictions on industry and commerce were first given up, and later replaced by judicious social legislation and the expenditure of public money on education, sanitation, etc. History seems to show that, while there is a wrong way, there is also a right way of controlling the economic life of a community. The point of importance is that this control must be exercised, or must at least be supervised, by a central government. There are immense possibilities in the matter of controlling industry and commerce for the general welfare, once a central political authority extends over the whole range of persons who have economic relations with each other.

But, in the political conditions of the contemporary world, the people of Britain, of France, of Germany, or of Japan have no constitutional method of controlling the conditions under which the others are to produce and distribute their goods; and, consequently, no single people can properly control even its own industry and commerce for the general benefit. It would be very satisfactory if we could shorten working hours, and raise the standard of living, for the workers in certain of our industries. But, as changes in this direction would influence cost of production, any attempt to improve the standard might result in our losing our foreign markets, owing to the competition of cheap goods from other countries; and the last state of affairs would be worse than the first. It is perfectly possible that, from the point of view of world economics, it does not really "pay" for us to produce the goods in question. But what will happen if we cease to compete? If industries move from one area to another *within* the same state, there is a corporate responsibility to ease, and, as far as possible, prevent any hardship to the inhabitants of the district from which the industry has moved. But these obligations do not hold as between the members of different states. The Japanese will not be taxed for the purpose of starting new profitable industries in Switzerland, if Japan captures the market for the watch-making industry.

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It is difficult for a layman to discuss economic issues without committing himself to indefensible judgments; but I do not suppose any present-day economist of repute would challenge the general position I have taken up. My view is this: While, under the existing political system, improvements in the standard of living may well continue, the possibilities of improvement can never be given full effect, so long as the free commerce of nations is hampered by considerations of self-sufficiency; and it is obvious that these hampering restrictions are necessarily involved in any world-system which assigns sovereign powers to a number of independent nation-states.

Now, why should we consider it out of the question that the nation-state should disappear in favour of some more inclusive form of political organization? Nation-states are of comparatively recent growth. As increasing intimacy and commerce between communities have demanded, earlier independent political units have gradually become incorporated in larger wholes. Why should this process stop at the point we have now reached? What valid reason can we give for asserting that no further advance is desirable, or even possible? By what standard do we judge the *desirability* of remaining where we are or advancing to some form of international polity, except the standard of expediency? And how do we judge of the *possibility* of such an ultimate goal, except by the attempt to interpret present experience in the light of the past? It is true that "history does not repeat itself"; but it is also true that "like causes produce like effects"; and it is my view that the days of the nation-state are numbered.

No doubt the anticipation of an international polity will be described by some as a Utopian dream; but we can hardly be expected to answer such criticisms, until they descend from the woolly clouds of dogmatism to earth, and formulate specific reasons as to why any such anticipation must be unrealizable. There are, however, some criticisms of a more definite character with which we ought to deal, and I shall now discuss one objection which may present itself to the reflective mind.

The whole of the preceding argument, it may be said, concentrates on economic questions. But, even if the argument for an international polity were, so far, sound, does it not leave out of account interests which are far more important than are the conditions of material welfare? There is no such thing as a merely "economic man," the critic may continue; and, if we attempt to break down all group and national boundaries, and stir universal humanity into one indiscriminate mess, are we not destroying the conditions on which all the richness and loyalties of life are founded? Is it not a valid criticism of Plato's ideal state that, in his attempt to secure loyalty

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to the state by abolishing the family, and in his attempt to prevent the misuse of property by abolishing private property, he was blind to the fact that you cannot make men more enthusiastic about a wider community by merely abolishing the narrower, nor can you increase their care of the public interest by denying them the opportunity of having any interests of their own? And is not this criticism even more applicable when we are trying to whip up enthusiasm, not for a small Greek city state, but for a supra-national political world-order?

In answer to all this, I may begin by agreeing that this criticism points to a real danger against which the advocates of internationalism must guard their practical policy. But it should be remembered that much of Plato's unsatisfactoriness is due to his conception of the state as "the individual writ large." There is some truth in the common idea that, for Plato, the state, rather than the individual, is the object of ultimate value. I have held, on the contrary, that the state has no intrinsic value. Its value is instrumental. The same holds good with respect to any international polity. Institutions of all kinds, national or supra-national, are valuable and legitimate seats of authority only so far as they are necessary for conserving and enriching the interests of individuals. I do not suggest that families, local communities, and nations should be dissolved, in favour of some universal human herd containing within itself no diversity of interest or local culture. I am only arguing that, in the interest of national, local, and, ultimately, of individual development, certain powers, now exercised by nation-states in their severality, should be pooled and centralized in a more universal authority, because it is no longer possible for those powers to remain so localized, and efficiently serve the purposes of humanity. The fact that central governments often find that the interests of a people can be more effectively dealt with by the decentralization of certain functions of government, does not in any way detract from the argument that there are certain powers which ought to be centralized.

But the objection may be pressed that, whatever the intention, yet, in actual fact, local diversities, and what we may call local cultures, tend to disappear with the extension of the range of political authority. Government's hatred of diversity is no less intense than nature's abhorrence of a vacuum; and the picturesque and traditional have but a forlorn champion in romance, when pitted against the power of the sword and the lure of gold.

Now, we cannot deny that governments have sometimes, by barbarous methods, succeeded in stamping out the native language, religion, or custom of relatively small communities over which they have extended their rule; but, in relation to this point, two things must be borne in mind. In the first place, not everything in religion

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and custom is beneficial to the local community or to humanity at large. Obvious examples are the practice of human sacrifice, or a caste system such as obtains in India. In the second place, there is a difference between the wise and the foolish, the legitimate and the illegitimate use of political authority. The argument for a supra-national authority is founded on the ethical principle that individuals, not institutions, are of primary worth; and there is no reason at all why a wider political authority should be less capable than is a narrower authority of using this ethical principle for measuring the value of different cultures and institutions to different peoples. Indeed, it is arguable that the wider the authority, the more chance legitimate variations have of being safeguarded. With all its faults, the Versailles Treaty has tried to secure the protection of minority rights which national governments are prone to disregard.

Further, it would be ridiculous to suppose that, when local diversities disappear, this always happens against the will of the peoples concerned. It is probably true that the most powerful factor influencing such changes is the belief of the local community itself that its own interest dictates the abandonment of its old traditions and habits. This holds specially, e.g. with regard to language. In his *Memories*, published a few years ago, the Archbishop of Wales relates: "When I was a boy, I heard a Welsh lecture in a Methodist Chapel given to an audience of working people, chiefly farmers and farm servants, by a brilliant lecturer, Dr. Kilsby Jones. He finished his lecture on 'Famous Welshmen' with this sentence, 'Boys, if you want to succeed in the world, learn English. Remember, Welsh is a barley-bread language.'" No doubt the disappearance of local peculiarities involves loss as well as gain. But the losses and gains have to be estimated, not from the point of view of the sentimental nationalist whose bread and butter—with a fair allowance of jam—are secure, nor from the point of view of the tourist who is intrigued by what is "cute," "quaint," or "picturesque," but from the point of view of the toiling population. Certainly uniformity is not an end in itself. But neither is diversity. The test of the value of all local custom and usage is this: Does it, rather than something different, most conduce to the real welfare of the individuals concerned? And, as inertia is a characteristic of men and of societies, any abandonment of traditional usage is a *prima facie* (though, of course, it cannot be a conclusive) argument against its value.

In any case, it is disastrous to try and keep a culture alive and healthy by isolating the community from external influences. The deadening effects of such a policy are amply revealed in those institutional religions which try to preserve their original modes of thought and practice by insulating them from the outer world of

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ideas. Restriction of the free intercourse of ideas is as ruinous to cultural development as tariff walls are to material prosperity. While the seed-bed and the seed of any culture are the land and the people, influences from abroad are as the air and sunlight without which that seed cannot reveal its potentialities. And if the establishment of an international polity tended to promote the free movement of ideas, and the free criticism of tradition, it would be the friend rather than the enemy of a richer national life.

This, it may be objected, is all very plausible—until we cease from abstract argumentation, and turn to face hard realities. Is it not true that there is something about a nation which marks it off from every other form of community? And is there not something unique about the nation-state, giving it a status in the world which we interfere with only at the cost of irreplaceable loss?

I cannot agree that this is so. Indeed, I should say that it is precisely this view, rather than the one I have been pressing, which refuses to face the facts of history and the meaning of the modern situation. Accept clearly and frankly the principle that value resides ultimately in individual persons; then put the question, posed with such salutary effect by the reformers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "What is the utility to mankind of this or that particular law or institution?" and we shall be in a fairer way to judge of the merits and defects, the potentialities and the limitations of the nation-state. It is, I think, a fair observation to say that, if not all, at least many of those who insist that the nation-state is "the permanent unit" in the political world-order, have not squarely faced this question of the "utility" of the state, and, consciously or unconsciously, adopt the attitude that to ask such a question amounts to bad form or treason. Such an attitude clearly implies the ascription of intrinsic, and not merely instrumental, value to the nation-state—as though it possessed some kind of "personality" distinct from, or inclusive of, the individual personalities of men and women. Such an idea distorts, not only our conception of the real international possibilities, but also our view of the relation of states to their own "nationals."

According to the main stream of historical ethical thought, personality is to be respected as an "end-in-itself"; for, when we reflect upon the notion of personality, we seem to find several things implied in it. In the first place, an individual or person is "organic" in character. It has an internal unity, the particular organs taking their character and value from the part they are fitted to play in maintaining its life as a whole. Or—when we think in psychological, rather than in physiological, terms—the will of a person is thought of as central and undivided. In the second place, and turning our attention to its external relations, we think of a person as a member

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(not as a mere organ or part) of a community. It is only by the most far-fetched metaphors that we can speak of two individual wills as fused or united in a higher or more inclusive will. And to treat any individual as though he did not possess a will of his own, distinct from yours, is to repudiate the whole basis of moral relationships.

Now, suppose we transfer this conception of "personality" to the nation or nation-state. What follows? The conclusion that the nation or nation-state is of intrinsic value; that individual persons are its organs, deriving their value from their contribution to its life and strength; and that its "will" can never rightly be merged in a more inclusive "will." One of the main implications of the "state personality" theory, therefore, is the denial of intrinsic value to individuals. That is to say, we cannot attribute personality—with all that personality implies—to the state, without taking the further step of denying to individuals the value and the rights of persons. It is surely a serious theoretical inconsistency in this conception of the state, that it starts with the assumption of certain attributes as inhering in individual persons; supposes, next, that the state is a more inclusive person; concludes that the state must, therefore, possess the attributes inherent in individual personality; and, in this very conclusion, implies that individuals do not in fact possess those attributes. It may disturb only philosophers if theoretical inconsistency is all that can be urged against the doctrine of state personality. But the practical consequences of such a doctrine touch the life of the plain man, as he may sometimes learn to his cost. Stated simply, the main practical implication is that, if "reasons of state" so demand, the question of justice to individuals is of no importance. It is highly significant that those British philosophers who, in our own day, have most strongly asserted the theory of state-personality, have as stoutly denied intrinsic value (and even individuality) to the "finite individual"; and, in their earlier writings at least,¹ indulged in rather perverse criticisms of the conception of "universal humanity." To F. H. Bradley and B. Bosanquet the "finite individual" is merely a fragment of something greater; and the notion that this "self" is, in any real sense, a centre of value, is due simply to our bad metaphysics and "irreligious moralism." No doubt there were special influences operating in Britain when these two philosophers' characteristic ethical and political ideas were formed—the intense study of Greek philosophy, the domestication of German Idealism, the resurrection of the imperialist mentality—but to explain is not to justify; and probably their chief permanent contribution to ethical and political philosophy is that they show,

¹ See Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, Essays V and VI; and compare the Introduction to the latest edition of Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State*.

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clearly enough, what happens when we take the doctrine of state personality as more than a questionably useful fiction.

Taking our stand on the ethical principle that *value* resides ultimately in the individual, and political *authority* in whatever institution best conserves the interests of all mankind, what place do we assign to the nation? Clearly it is not the natural seat of political authority, except at a certain stage in the course of human history. The appropriate seat of authority naturally expands as non-political relations become more extensive and intimate. It is true that, so long as the nation-state is the most comprehensive governmental organ, it must be accorded a special degree of loyalty. But this is because it is the greatest guarantee of an orderly system of rights which we have, so far, attained. Its claim on our loyalty rests on the contribution it professes to make, and does make, towards human welfare. But this gives no valid reason for attributing to the nation-state a sanctity out of relation to its function and utility. As soon as it claims this sanctity, and obstructs the progress towards any more inclusive organization, to that extent it forfeits the right to our loyalty, for to that extent it is on the side of disorder. The more the enlightened moral consciousness faces up to the real issues of the modern world-situation, the more will it be driven to demand the transference of the final control of legislation, judicial and coercive power, to a supra-national authority. The progress towards this goal will, of necessity, be slow and tortuous; but we are already on the way. While the present constitution of the League of Nations does not fit it for the exercise of sovereign powers, yet the more we are willing to work its existing machinery, the more will it gradually transform its own character, by gathering to itself the power of making enforceable decisions.

CAN PRESENT HUMAN MOTIVES WORK A PLANNED SOCIETY?¹

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THE title I first chose for my remarks was "The Socialization of the Hedonic Impulse," but I concluded that I had better indicate my real objective rather than the process of getting to it.

The social organism may be conveniently viewed as consisting of two parts on different planes, one the contractual, legal, and habitual relations between human beings and their work, akin to the parts of a machine, and the other the force that makes the machine work, the motives, physical and mental limitations and reactions, akin to the motive power. If the design of a machine is radically altered it does not follow that the old fuel and transmission of power will be either adequate or appropriate. We are to examine human behaviour in the economic field as it actually is, or has been in our experience, and to conjecture how far it will be the same or modifiable in a social organization different from past models, and how far the new models may create new aptitudes and reactions not now necessary or developed. To put it more bluntly, whether a planned society can be worked by the existing bundle of elements in human behaviour, or whether it will demand other, and, if so, really possible, elements.

Nassau Senior gave as the first of four general propositions on which Political Economy rests "that every man desires to obtain additional wealth with as little sacrifice as possible." It took an intelligible form in the schoolboy's definition, "Political economy teaches you how to get the most you can with the minimum honest effort." It accounts for the mental confusion of the small daughter of the Professor who lectured on *Economic History*: "Does that mean that you teach as little history as possible for as much money as possible?" We can all think of particular exceptions to the general principle, of course, but the question is whether any exception is a sufficiently high common factor of human motive in the mass to lend itself to generalization. The much abused "economic man" is obviously an abstraction, for few men act on economic motives only, or even on rational motives only, but it is a useful abstraction in the economic field which possesses greater value or truth in that field than any alternatives that may be assumed. The student is always

¹ An address to the British Institute of Philosophy given at University College on March 19, 1935, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede in the Chair.

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warned that before he reintroduces the derivatives of the abstraction back into complex reality, and makes any statement of general force, he must reclothe the abstraction with the discarded elements of behaviour and qualify his dicta. That is one reason why no *simple* statement in economics is ever precisely true. It is also a reason why Ruskinian diatribe about "life being wealth" and so on, is rather irrelevant *in the economic study itself*. The introduction of moral and ethical implication at some stages in the argument is inappropriate and confusing; at others necessary and completing. Catch-phrases such as "Production for use and not for profit," however comprehensible from an ethical point of view, conceal, not very effectively, much confusion of economic thought, which only disappears on a careful analysis or definition of the words "use" and "profit." Similar cloudy implications rest in such words as "service" and "needs."

A first essential is to decide whether we shall use "profit" in its economic sense, as a differential surplus, which must really exist all the time whatever the form of economic society, so long as the factors of production are unequal in their productivity, and whatever name we may give to it. There is a common price of all supply—even in a communism that has no open price its place is taken by a marginal cost—which yields that part of the supply having any advantages over the other parts, a surplus. The advantages may be in location of raw materials relative to manufacture, or of both to the point of convenient use; in efficiency of labour management or machinery; in some elements of luck. The determining limit is at a margin where wages of capital and management and interest just meet and just evoke that supply in continuity. The superior advantage of a unit gives it a profit. A continual struggle is going on not so much between the different factors as between competing units in the same factor, to search out positions of this advantage and secure this surplus. Human behaviour in reaction to the search for this particular "profit" is a different study from that which follows a normal reward or profit necessary to evoke and maintain normal effort, which is found at the margin where the other profit is non-existent.

There is very little permanence about this economic profit unless there is a monopoly or franchise. In a competitive régime profits shift from one unit to another in a surprising way. The time curve of high and low profits in the aggregate may be of a certain type and be stable, but the position of individual businesses on that curve is continually changing. This has received important statistical verification in the researches of Professor Secrist.

We are familiar with the conditions under which a greater reward, i.e. a higher price, stimulates a greater supply, and a less reward brings about a smaller supply, inasmuch as in the short period,

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at any rate, owing to the principle of diminishing utility in the satisfaction of people's wants, the greater supply cannot command a continually higher price. There is a balancing mechanism brought about through price which is at the very foundation of economic life, and is the final deciding factor of the way in which men's efforts are distributed between alternative walks of life. There are sometimes exceptions to this general rule of a temporary or particular character, e.g. a very large output may be deliberately marketed, not in response to a higher price, but with a specifically lower price—foreseeing that the increase in supply itself would enable a lower unit cost to be secured, the producer is exploring the *social demand curve* to find the new position of equilibrium for a large quantity at a lower price. Again, whereas a falling price ordinarily checks supply, in such a case as American farm produce it had the reverse effect. If the farm were heavily mortgaged its charges had to be met and the owner argued that, at the low price, he must sell substantially more in order to make up the fixed charge upon him, so that low prices positively brought about even larger increases of supply than high prices would have done. But these are merely backwashes of the very general principle of the regulation by price.

First of all, we have to consider the motives and reactions to stimuli as they at present exist—to analyse them in order that we can pick out which of them could be translated unchanged into some new sphere, which of them would have to be completely altered, and which would have to be developed to a degree that would make them almost different in kind.

Dealing first with the fund of capital that is required in any form of society which is to have a good standard of life and to take advantage of new scientific inventions, we find that, in general, the satisfaction of future wants at any moment is less valuable than the satisfaction of the same wants to-day. The discounting process of time represents an abstinence which requires an economic price to secure. The payment of interest in some sense is a reward of abstinence, at any rate, in the case of moderate incomes, and in any world in which there is a measure of equalization of resources, the principle is of far greater importance than in the nineteenth century, where we were able to rely upon the massing of capital funds out of wealthy resources—where the word "abstinence" had much less meaning. In so far as future enjoyment is discounted against the present, "waiting," requires a reward. The price of waiting is interest and the quantity of waiting may generally be increased in the same way as a supply of any other economic product if that price rises. Interest is also necessary in addition to the pure interest of waiting, in respect of the risk of waiting and the possibility of never enjoying at all. The motives for saving are not quite the same over the whole

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field. Riskless waiting, which is what we generally mean by thrift, may be first of all undertaken against being *worse off* in future, in which case, by insurance, a *low rate* of interest on the principle of accumulation demands more saving and not less. Or the saving may be undertaken in order to be *better off*. If this is for a specific purpose, to a specific sum, then the lower the interest the more the saving. But if saving is a merely general desire, then the high rate of interest as its price may increase saving. A high rate of interest certainly is important for directing saving into highly profitable but rather risky ventures.

A further motive is that of moral thrift—in an ordered life the feeling that it is wrong to spend up to the hilt; and, again, saving may be like a dividend reserve, equalizing good and bad times.

There are certain conditions under which saved money may be very plentiful, and so much more than the suitable openings for it that the price is inoperative as a control. The automatic savings coming up now through the various agencies for thrift may very easily represent a surplus during the period when business confidence is not great. The element of risk will always require a loading from the individual saver and the price element is a controlling factor. Socially, there may be much collective individual loss, but much pioneer gain. Industrially it is no good money being cheap unless it is also cheap *in the field of risks*. We will defer for the moment our examination of how much of this will survive in a different society.

Passing to the motives affecting the wage-earner; apart from the differential higher return that is normally expected for greater skill and responsibility, it is generally suggested that an increase in earnings will also increase effort and willingness to produce, i.e. the higher price creates a larger supply. Conversely, that a lower return reduces the amount of effort forthcoming, but, on the other hand, that more people can be employed at the lower wages. To these generalizations there are numerous exceptions; in so far as they are true, they are true only for movements at a particular time and not for changes which are absolute over long periods. It would be ridiculous to say that because men are now paid four times as much as they were a hundred years ago, they are willing to work four times as hard. Generalization also ignores the fact that the higher and lower returns, respectively, may have physical consequences as distinct from psychological, and that the higher yield from a higher return may come from better health and physical capacity rather than from psychological willingness to do more. From a broad point of view, the best test is perhaps that of a relation between wage and effort as found in piece rates, but the quantitative connection between the two is never exact. If wages are well above subsistence level, a fixed addition is certainly not correlated to an increase of effort.

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Often a standard amount per week is looked for, and if, by a change of rates, it can be got with fewer hours, then leisure is preferred, or slackness may set in and Monday is a bad day. This has been verified again and again. In the present state of average psychology, a rise in *real* wages is of less importance than money wages, and a rise in real wage may be quite inoperative in securing increased production. A *fall* in money wage is quicker to work than a fall in real wage and also may lead to disputes and stoppages. As I have said, the absolute rate of real wage is not very material, whether we judge it by comparisons over periods of time, or country by country. It is the comparative rate in a man's own trade over short periods or compared with the adjoining trades that has psychological value in effort. Perhaps quite as important is the appearance of a disparity in large payments going to the other factors of production, and a wage that may be consistent with contentment and maximum effort at one period, may mean merely discontent and slacking if there is the appearance of large profit going in other directions. Economic psychology is by no means uniform throughout the world. I remember being told when we were discussing in 1924 in the Dawes Commission whether the German Railways should be a Government concern or under private management, that the uniform denoting Government service was worth a definite differential in money. There are, no doubt, in all ranks, elements of prestige which may in themselves act in the same way as an increment or decrement of money. There is a marked increase in the extent to which pride of success and of craftsmanship are operative beyond the monetary incentive to produce good and plentiful work. There is, too, the pride of institution, particularly if it can be put competitively, and, just as the members of a family may quarrel amongst themselves, but will stand together like a rock if it is a question of contest with another family, so the different factors in a single business may pull away from each other if the issue is a domestic one. They can be made to play up for the honour of the company or the concern if there is a rival institution. My own Commercial Department have done their best to bring into operation this factor of friendly rivalry within their own vast area, by giving quotas to separate districts and setting the districts against each other like football teams in a League Table. Over a certain area of the wage-earning class there is an element of ambition which leads to a desire to excel and rise out of the ranks, but this is not assisted in the main by Trade Union ideas; nor is it very operative after a few years. My own observation leads me to the view that there is enough of it to bring out a number of leaders, but not enough to increase the mass output on a large scale, of all workers taken together.

When we come to the salaried class, the larger salaries are desired

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not always so much to secure a larger output, or even a higher quality within the same range of work, but to satisfy a natural desire for emulation; secondly, as a mark of success in life; and third, to institute some reasonable comparison with private business. We may compare the security and the dignity of Civil Service, thus reconciling the holders to salaries considerably below what might be necessary in ordinary business life. The officials are, in fact, rarely required to produce a profit result. Those important classes in an ordinary capitalist régime, who are risking their own capital with their own management, produce many trials, a large number of failures, and a few successes. If one reviews the early commercial history of artificial silk, or of flying, or of the zip-fastener, and sees the extent to which risks were taken and capital invested on evidence and calculations which would not satisfy any rigid tests, one is driven to ask whether any Committee would be willing to risk public money for which it would be answerable on a similar basis. Committees are always ready to decide, when conditions are proved and when comparisons can be made to indicate the possibility of success, but they must inevitably play for safety, particularly as, by the nature of the case, the successes will tend to be far fewer than the failures. The one who plays for safety can get a reputation for wisdom because his successes exceed his failures, but even so, his absolute number of successes may be fewer than that of another person who, while having a majority of failures, attempts more. A committee responsible for public money might, perhaps, be prepared to do the same if they were given a fund specifically for trying out inventions and new ideas, but without any questions being asked and only subject to an audited probity. The truth is that in the field of invention and innovation the motives are mainly non-commercial—the joy of the game, the lottery of success throw up amid countless casualties those intrinsic successes which are invaluable to the next rank of less enterprising entrepreneurs. When the risks are proved and output is steady it becomes the subject of successful communal exploitation.

How much of social progress is due to these various elements is not strictly determinable. We need to have knowledge on a more definite and scientific basis about the strength of desire and the extent to which it prevails, to do a workmanlike and efficient piece of work; of man's ability to sacrifice for a principle, for an institution or for a person, and of his craving for recognition by others. It has often been held that the classical school of economists minimized these factors. Exactly how powerful are they at the present time? or to what extent can they be cultivated and made the mainsprings of action? We want an examination of the actual cases similar to that which William James carried through in his *Varieties of Religious*

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Experience. It is true that most of his examples were rather of the abnormal type, and that while they may prove inductively beyond all scientific dispute that the factor of religious experience is a reality and a great power where it occurs in the right type of individual, they do not tell a great deal about the strength of this force in the average man or mass of men taken together. In the same way, the examination of particular instances of altruistic economic life might be deceptive if we took it as representing what the man in the street was prepared to do.

Says one writer, "the trend of society is to emphasize the acquisitive qualities. Money is necessary not only for survival, but for power and, in a large part, for public respect as well. The motives of working for the sake of the work, for altruism and for non-financial recognition find themselves swimming against the swift-flowing stream of financial pressure." Certainly the incentives of captains of industry—the men whose minds and powers we should rely upon for progress in a new state of affairs—can be reduced to economic terms in the majority of cases. We are bound to say that any evidence of non-economic incentive that is obvious in business to-day cannot be taken as final, if we try to estimate the possible strength of a non-economic motive in a different environment.

It was said of Ford: "He is an instrument of society and he can serve society only as he manages his enterprise so as to turn over to the public an increasingly better product and an ever-decreasing price and, at the same time, to pay all those who have a hand an ever-increasing wage based upon the work they do." In this way and in this way alone can a manufacturer justify his existence.

Harriman said: "I never cared for money except as power for work. What I most enjoy is the power of creation." It may thus very well be said that power and not profit is the primary fascination.

If a similar place can be found for this incentive in a new state of affairs, there may be no great change in their output. The leader of a wholesale Co-operative Society, getting only £400 a year, remarked: "I enjoy the respect of my colleagues, and I possess great power. These things satisfy me." The question has been put: "Do not able men demand such high salaries and monetary rewards under capitalism in large part because they feel the chief rewards under capitalism are but money? In this country we have a much greater spirit of public service than in many countries abroad. If you were to tell an American that a man is prepared to spend much time and effort in certain activities *for its own sake*, you would simply not be believed. Here we find that to do a thing for a small sum or for nothing may, in itself, be a distinction and a subject of pride. Service on committees, on the judicial bench, service by ministers, by missionaries, by scientists, all who have a sense of "calling" may

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be far more on the non-economic plane than general economic activity. It is interesting to look at the motives of great scientists: Faraday, although connected for some time with commerce, and getting an increasing income, came to the conclusion that he had to make a choice and he put it deliberately aside. But then he was very exceptional. Even the honourable non-economic rewards given by his peers did not influence him. When he was offered the Presidency of the Royal Society, he said: "If I accepted I would not answer for the integrity of my intellect for a single year." We should not have many Faradays, even in a translated sphere.

The work of Clerk Maxwell and Darwin and Wallace of an altruistic kind cannot be divorced from the fact that they enjoyed private incomes. The simplicity of Pasteur and perhaps of Metchnikoff, and Huxley's long fight to work along scientific lines without reference to monetary rewards, are important cases for study. On the other hand, Agassiz was not really swayed by any desire to benefit mankind or posterity. Vanity, even to the point of lack of scruple, was his clearly marked motive, and Sir Humphry Davy's life does not show him as actuated by motives of the most excellent order. There were those like Kelvin, Edison, Perkins, Parsons, and Van Siemens who made money freely with their scientific discoveries, and cannot really be invoked to prove the point we have at issue. More interesting, perhaps, is the case of Newton, who ceased to be really creative and productive after he secured safety and salary in his office at the Mint.

Professor Paul Douglas, after examining the biographical material, gave an analysis of the non-economic incentives as follows: (1) A desire to benefit humanity; (2) Fascination or joy of the work itself; (3) Desire to project one's own personality into the work; (4) Desire to be esteemed by one's fellows in the same field; (5) A desire for the esteem and approval of the general public; (6) A craving for notoriety; (7) A desire for power over man and over things.

Before assuming that there can be a considerable transfer of the important work that is done gratuitously to-day into a different sphere, one must remember that much of it may be done by those who have a sufficient competence in other ways. They might not be so willing to work for non-economic rewards if they had not this background. Moreover, where the large percentage of all service is given for a cash reward, there is a distinction in giving public service for no reward at all. It cannot be said that in a field in which there is *no* specific monetary reward at all this same distinction would remain, and where everyone is actually or compulsorily altruistic the general level of work so performed may be far lower than where altruism derives its hedonic satisfactions from its comparative rarity.

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McCurdy says that the phrase "every man has his price" is intended to be cynical. Yet it is a proof of existing altruism. It shows that some considerable margin of compulsion or attraction is necessary before a man will sacrifice either loyalty or conscience. Much depends on how greatly the group action can seize the imagination, for a group formation can certainly increase loyalties, as we can see in every society or association to which we belong. In a large number of cases they exact a higher standard of conduct than the individual life alone would render. McCurdy says "the group that cannot exact sacrifices from its members is moribund if not already disintegrated." Not every group is of this order. "The best example of a selfishly motivated group is that of the shareholders in a large company who retain their shares so long as dividends are forthcoming. But among even these are apt to be directors who develop pride in the business as such and complicate their operations with loyalties."

The principles that are at work dominating economic society and inherent in men's physical and psychological make-up, include that of diminishing utility, in which case an increasing supply can only be taken off at a less price, or additional increments are worth less to the user than the preceding ones. It is inherent that we should seek the highest marginal satisfaction and that for this purpose the principle of substitution is constantly at work. I do not see how we can expect to override this in any society, but I do see that it makes planning *outside the area of the stability of large numbers extremely precarious*. Wages may not be wholly determined by marginal productivity, but it is so commanding an element in their true level that this also is a factor to be reckoned with, and I have not yet seen any scheme for a planned society which gives the technique for working it out. The individual to-day, in the present economic society outside Russia, has two great choices: first, whether he shall spend or save; and when he spends whether he shall buy home or foreign goods; and, when he saves, whether he shall invest or take risks. His second great choice is in the occupation to be followed; the training for it, where he shall reside, and the changes that he may care to make. Now in so far as these individual choices work themselves out into a massive stable result in the aggregate, the planner can take the results for granted and project them into the future, so that the individuals within the aggregate will still retain freedom, but unless there is the compelling element of a change of price, i.e. of interest, of wage, of rent, and transport, etc., to check changes in a mass movement, I do not see how these chief items of individual liberty can possibly be retained intact in a planned society. A denial of liberty in these respects must have some influence upon human motive—exactly how much we cannot say. Just as it used to be said, with Ireland in mind, that some

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people would rather be badly governed by themselves than well governed by others, so even where one can postulate a higher individual reward through planning, it might very well so react upon the individual that he would not give the service necessary to create the higher reward.

The first requirement of a planned society is to compute the probable demands in each direction, but unless this is computed on some price either actual or notional, the term "probable demand" is meaningless, and it would be best to speak, perhaps, of a computation of a demand schedule at different prices. The planner must then also construct a supply curve showing the quantities that will be forthcoming at a given level of costs. Once again, a monetary economy seems necessary with all that this connotes. On the whole, planning may be said to eliminate private capital, though it has not universally done so in set terms. But the elimination of private capital and the substitution therefor of planned capital, which is to be a deduction from total production, does not absolve the planners from the necessity for a notional rate of interest, and for some quantitative test as to the *optimum* points of production to which to apply their capital.

I have not so far seen any successful attempts to avoid the usual market price test. Let us suppose that the consumer is prepared to give up the equivalent of x hours of his labour to procure the product x hours of somebody else's. If there is a change in his tastes and he will only give x hours minus 1 for one hour's labour, then there is over-supply and price must come down. But if the consumers are keen and will give x plus 1 hours, then the price ought to go up and, in consequence, supply should increase. But a plan states how much capital is going into the production and also how much labour and, therefore, the entry of labour into the industry is controlled, and I imagine that wages must also be controlled if they are not to be so sensitive as to keep the numbers down. So long, therefore, as people can give effect to a slackened or increased desire for any product, or so long indeed as nature itself varies the supply, and it can only be accommodated by changes in demand, I find it very difficult to secure a satisfactory plan. In the second place, the consumers' choice may be affected in the endeavour to make rational the necessary international trade and thus not to upset the plan. Supposing that hats are to come from Paris which are preferable to the British. They must either be kept out and the consumers' choice affected, or if they come in the plan is upset. Fashion and obsolescence are put into strait-jackets. I understand that the crocodile leather and snakeskin shoes of the lady visitors in Moscow have caused more flutters in the breasts of the Russian girls than that distinction would in our minds actually deserve.

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In the third place, as I have already said, invention and risk under a planned scheme have to be dealt with by committees subject to political attack. They must be judged by results. The question is how soon? and are these results to be collective or individual? Will one good success be a complete answer to three failures? Modern competitive enterprise, with all its disadvantages, constantly seeking novelty, does get us forward in one way or another. It is a question whether, in the long run, the attitude of mind which is more bent upon establishing stability and standardization will not keep back economic development. Certainly all human motives of management, as we know them now, will want to justify the plan, and this may tend to mean more to them than would breaking the plan and so giving the greater ultimate advantage. On the assumption that the consumers maintain a good freedom of directing their purchasing power, can the managers compete by advertisements and other blandishments? The increasing real wage of the average wage-earner is at the present moment enlarging the scope for expenditure upon travel by bus or train. This is greatly sought and competed for, not merely amongst the different agencies for travel, but as against other ways of spending the money, and probably as severe a competitor for money spent in evening excursions as any other, would be the campaign for spreading the habit of beer drinking. How, under a planned society, will these rival attractions for increasing purchasing power be resolved?

There is not much actual experience of motive and reaction in a fully planned society to which we can turn, but Professor Brutzkus has quite recently made some considered declarations for Russia. He notes there has been a great decline in *quality* to keep up statistics of production.

"The system has a most unfavourable effect on the intensity of the work. The Soviet Government seeks to base the division upon the hours worked, and the efficiency and the quality of the work done, hoping in this way to increase the intensity and quality of labour. . . . The confusion existing in the organization of labour naturally has a very unfavourable effect upon the intensity of the labour. . . ."

"It proved much more difficult to transfer the methods of mechanized agriculture to Russian soil than the Soviet Government had imagined. The tractors did not work so efficiently. . . ."

"Specific achievement of the planned economy was the fact that it compelled a poor nation to make great savings. Anything of the sort would have been impossible in a market economy. Also that the savings were directed into production goods. . . ."

"At the heart of every enterprise, however modest, there must stand a *politically* trustworthy man—a Communist. Under the

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Communist planned economy, the economic system is managed, not by experts but by laymen, and that is one important reason for the failure of the system."

Professor Halm claims that the Socialist economy foregoes the stimulus to good service which lies in the capitalistic connection between economic calculation and income.

"Those who advocate economic planning are at this point in the position of having to count upon a change of the general attitude towards economic life, without being able to evince any presumption of its reliability or any reason why it should come about at all."

A decline in individual responsibility means an inevitable expansion of the central auditing apparatus.

Finally, I do not think the answer to the question put depends to a major extent upon moral values or ethical betterments.

(1) Man is so constituted that he cannot help the diminishing sense of satisfaction received from successive increments of enjoyment. This will stand in any environment, and it leads to the ceaseless, silent principle of substitution. This leads to the phenomena of price tests as correctives of over- and under-supply. How price and interest are to be measured in a planned society is still unsolved from an economic point of view.

(2) I do not think it can be said positively that output *cannot* be secured in the mass without the forces of fear, self-interest, and self-preservation, or without being responsive to degrees of reward. But the probabilities of other incentives working as well, with less than the educative environment of some generations, is pretty small. The physical laws of fatigue and human interest are *prima facie* against the idea that an extra hour's work can be dissociated from a differential stimulus. This leads, with the physical facts about capital goods, to a supply curve of costs, also inescapable. This again means that the planner has a double task on both sides rather against human nature.

(3) I do not despair of the spearhead of progress and invention being thrust, in a planned society, into unconquered knowledge. But the communal control of it in capital application will be less wasteful of capital. It will also be less advantageous in the net balance of gain in a given space of time.

(4) I think a community isolated from world economy must be lower in its economic standard. How to relate the planned community to an unplanned world, without introducing such elements into the plan as to rob it of its planned character, has never yet been worked out. How to plan a world economy without destroying nationalism, is beyond examination.

(5) From (2) must follow the existence of differential surpluses or units, in either state of society. The economic aim of the planner

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should be to reduce these; the political temptation will be to maintain and appropriate them for other ends.

My provisional answer is, therefore, over a major part of the field, "No"; over a certain smaller but important part, possibly "Yes," and over yet a balance of the area probably "Yes." But I have only exposed a part of the mechanism to view, and more attention ought to be devoted to the psychology of the plannees alongside of elaborate study of plans and planners.

LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND THEOLOGY¹

H. H. PRICE, M.A.

THE subject of this paper is the relation of Logical Positivism to Theology. By "Logical Positivism" I mean the doctrine originated by Dr. Wittgenstein and expounded more at length by Professors Carnap, Schlick, and other members of the Viennese Circle (Wiener Kreis) in the periodical called *Erkenntnis*. The clearest account of it in English is that given by Mr. R. B. Braithwaite in the volume called *Cambridge University Studies*.

Logical Positivism is what would commonly be described as a theory of knowledge, though I do not suppose its originators would like that description. But it differs from all other theories of knowledge in its starting-point. It starts not from a consideration of our cognitive acts, nor of their immediate objects, but from a consideration of *language*, and primarily from an examination of sentences. Its primary question is, under what conditions is a sentence used significantly; or, under what conditions can one be said to know the meaning of a sentence? The central tenet of Logical Positivism is its answer to this question. The answer is: *One knows the meaning of a sentence when one knows the method of its verification*: that is, when one knows what kind of experiences, whether perceptual or introspective, would render it true or false. When I am puzzled as to the meaning of a sentence, I am to ask myself: "What sort of sense data or introspective data should I have to be acquainted with, in order to decide whether that sentence is true or false?"

Let me give some examples. First I will take the sentence "There is a penny stamp on the mantelpiece." I know what this means (though I don't know whether it is true) because I know how I should have to set about verifying it if I wanted to. I should have to sense such and such a series of kinaesthetic and visual sensa, and then I should have to sense a number of members of a family of sensa whose standard figure is rectangular in shape and whose standard colour is red. So, too, if I say "There is a church with two spires in Oxford." I know what this means (though I believe it to be false), since I know that the method of verifying or refuting it is to walk round all the churches in Oxford and notice whether any of them has two spires: which again reduces to sensing such and such a series of sensa. Likewise I know what is

¹ A paper read at University College, Aberystwyth, and at Exeter College, Oxford, in May 1934.

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meant by the sentence "I want my tea." I have only to introspect in order to discover whether it is true or false. It is, of course, not necessary that one should actually be able to carry out the verification; it is enough if one can see how it would be possible. Thus the sentence "there are mountains on the other side of the moon" is a significant sentence, because we do know what kind of experiences we should have to have in order to verify it or refute it, namely those of moving towards the moon and then going round to the other side. It does not matter that owing to the imperfection of our scientific technique we cannot at present obtain those experiences.

Now let us consider, by way of contrast, such sentences as the following: "There is a lion outside the door which ceases to exist as soon as one looks for it"; "the planets are moved round in their courses by invisible spirits"; "Smith knows German very well, although he never either speaks it or reads it or writes it, or answers appropriately when Germans speak to him." These sentences are unverifiable. There is no method of either verifying or refuting them whether by sense or by introspection. Therefore, say the Logical Positivists, those sentences are meaningless. Of course, grammatically they resemble sentences which do have meanings. Moreover, the several words of which each is made up do mean something (in that sense of "mean" which is appropriate to single words); but the sentence as a whole has no meaning. Such sentences are technically called *nonsense* by the Logical Positivists. I want to make it quite clear that this is a technical usage. In ordinary speech we often (though not always) use the word "nonsense" in a much wider sense. We often say that Mr. A. is talking nonsense when we only mean that what he says is obviously false; sometimes again we mean that he has made two statements which contradict each other. But I want to insist that what Logical Positivism calls nonsense is *not even false*. (Since Logical Positivism came in, it has become rather a compliment to say of someone that his remarks are false.) Nor is the nonsensical, in this usage, to be identified with the contradictory. Contradiction is a relation which exists between two statements, such that if one is true the other must be false (for instance, between "this is a circle," and "this is square"). It follows of course that each of the two statements must mean something. And a sentence which involves a contradiction such as "this circle is square" should be called absurd rather than nonsensical.

Thus statements which can be verified or refuted in experience make sense, and those which cannot be make nonsense. But what of the statements of Logic and Mathematics? Surely they neither need empirical verification nor can they receive it? To this the Logical Positivists answer that they are *tautologies*, which I think is equivalent to calling them *analytic*. Thus they are not statements in the

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ordinary sense of the word "statement," and so they form no exception to the "Principle of Verifiability." And if any other statements are produced, outside of Logic and Mathematics, which claim to be self-evident, we shall be told that either they are tautologies or they are empirical generalisations.

From this fundamental principle as to the meaningfulness of statements, some very queer conclusions have been drawn. I shall briefly mention three of them:

1. It is deduced that statements about *the material world* are entirely reducible to statements about *sensa actual and possible*; in other words, that the view called Phenomenalism is true. For if anyone says that material objects are something other than groups of *sensa actual and possible*, we cannot conceivably verify or refute his statements, and they must therefore be nonsense.

2. But further, and much more paradoxically, the Logical Positivists hold that statements about *other human minds* are reducible to statements about the behaviour of certain human bodies (and especially about the sort of behaviour which we call speech): it follows that they, too, are eventually reducible to statements about *sensa*. This does not, of course, apply to my statements about myself. When I say, for instance that *I* am angry, I mean that I am in a certain psychical state, with which I am directly acquainted in introspection. But when I say that Smith is angry, I cannot mean that *he* is in a similar psychical state, or in any psychical state at all. For I cannot be acquainted with any psychical state except my own: I cannot sense them, I cannot introspect them, and sensing and introspecting are the only forms of acquaintance. To talk about psychical states other than my own is therefore to talk nonsense. But obviously I do mean *something* when I say that Smith is angry. What, then, can I mean except that his body is uttering noises, his fists are clenched, his brows frown, and further perhaps that his limbs will probably soon be in a state of violent movement? Similarly when I refer to Smith's cognitive acts. If I say that he sees the motor-car, I don't mean that he senses a visual *sensum* and believes that it belongs to such and such a *group* of *sensa* collectively constituting a motor-car. I mean only that his retina is being stimulated by such and such light-rays, and that his body is responding to those stimuli, say, by jumping on to the pavement. And if I say he is *thinking* so and so, I mean that either his body is uttering certain noises which are to me significant, e.g. the noises "the rain has stopped"; or else that his speech-organs are moving in such a way that these noises *would* be produced if the movements were larger. This, of course, is the celebrated, or notorious, combination of Solipsism and Behaviourism which is, perhaps, the best-known tenet of the Logical Positivists.

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3. It is further held that *statements about the past* are really reducible to statements about present images and the like (if it is a case of memory), or else to statements about records and documents (if it is a case of history.) For it is maintained that nothing can be experienced except the present. Thus, unless I am really talking about present images or present records, my sentences about the past will be nonsense.

These consequences, especially the second and third, are so queer that they seem to cast grave doubt upon the original doctrine, I mean upon the Principle of Verifiability, plausible as that appeared at first sight. With regard to the third (that concerned with statements about the past), I think that Logical Positivism has entangled itself in unnecessary difficulties by unduly restricting the sphere of experience or acquaintance. It does seem to me that I am *acquainted* with some past events, though not with very many. If so, some of my statements about the past could be verified by actually inspecting the past events to which they refer. I cannot think why it should be supposed that the only entities with which we are acquainted are those which exist simultaneously with the act of acquaintance. Such a supposition, I believe, only seems plausible because of a confusion between the two senses of the term "present." What I am acquainted with must be *present to my consciousness*. This indeed is a tautology. But it does not follow that it need also be present in the sense of *existing at the present moment*. What is *present* to a certain act of consciousness need not be *contemporary with it*.

With regard to other human minds, the Logical Positivist doctrine of Solipsism plus Behaviourism seems to me extremely difficult to believe. Indeed, it seems to me quite clear that I do *not* mean by "another human mind" an organism which behaves in certain ways. But still, I do not think the doctrine is entirely mistaken. On the contrary, it contains a very important point which some other theories leave out; its error is, that it contains nothing else. That point is simply this, that we can only conceive of other human minds *by description* (to use Mr. Russell's phrase), and the description by means of which we conceive of them always has reference to some thing or some event *in the material world*: whereas when we conceive of our own mind this is not so. By "I" I mean a certain mind or self with which, or with the states of which, I am directly acquainted in introspection or in self-consciousness. But by "you" I do *not* mean a mind with which, or with some states of which, I am directly acquainted. When I address another man as "you," what I mean is "the mind which animates this body that I am looking at, and which expresses itself by means of these significant noises which I hear." And unless I think of this body or those noises, I do not know what I mean by "you," and am relapsing into nonsense. But of course

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this situation, which we might call the *vocative situation*, is not the only one in which we make statements about other minds, though I think it is the primary one. We can also conceive of another mind by means of other descriptions: for instance, we can conceive of it as the mind which wrote such and such significant marks on paper, or which caused such and such a building to come into existence, or painted such and such a picture, or, in general, performed such and such an action. Such minds, we think, do or did animate bodies, though we have not actually perceived those bodies. But so far as I can see, we could even conceive of a mind which did not have a body at all. For instance, we could still conceive of it as the mind which caused me to hear such and such significant noises, or caused such and such perceptible rearrangement of matter; we could even conceive of it as the mind which telepathically caused me to entertain such and such thoughts (say, which gave me premonitions of future events, or gave me the solution of a problem which I could not solve for myself).

None the less, the reference to experience still remains, even in these last cases. The phrase "another mind" does always mean "the mind which stands in such and such a relation to A," where A is something which we are acquainted with, or which we experience; whether it be a visual or tactual sensum manifesting a certain organism, or a visual or tactual appearance of some other piece of matter like a house or picture: or a set of audible and significant sounds, or a set of visible marks: or, lastly, some introspectible event in myself, as in the case of the premonition. Unless there is *some* such reference to the experienceable when I talk about another mind, I do not know what I am talking about, and am talking nonsense. This will indeed be seen at once when somebody asks me "*Which* mind do you mean?" For that question can only be answered by mentioning some *experienceable* entity, and almost always it has to be answered by mentioning some entity in the material world, some perceptible organism, some perceptible words written or spoken, or some perceptible product of constructive or destructive activity; and, unless we can give some answer of this sort, we are convicted of not knowing what we mean.

If what I have said is correct—and I have only been stating the merest commonplaces—the Logical Positivists are by no means completely mistaken in the account they give of statements about other human minds. Statements about other human minds, if they are to be sense, will always contain a reference to something which is experienceable, and nearly always to something experienceable by sensation. And this is not an accidental feature of such statements: it is essential to them. If we remove from them this reference to the experienceable, this element of experiential verifiability or refut-

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ability, they lose all definiteness, and can no longer even be called false. But it does not follow, nor (I think) is it true, that the *whole* of what we mean in such statements is experientially verifiable, even though part of what we mean, and an essential part, is thus verifiable. When I talk about another mind, I am not merely asserting that such and such a body could be seen, or such and such words could be heard; I am also asserting that there is an entity standing in such and such relations (usually causal) to this body or these words or whatever they are, and that this entity has psychical characteristics in the literal, not the Behaviouristic sense—for instance, that it is aware of things as I am, that it has feelings and desires the same in kind as those which I am aware of by introspection in myself. And *this* part of what I mean is not verifiable or refutable by experience, at least not if we understand by “verifiable” what the Logical Positivists understand by it. For this part of my statement does not assert, as the other part does, that there exists something which I do or could know by direct acquaintance.

Yet in a looser and more popular sense of the word “verify” even this part of my statement does assert something verifiable. For in ordinary life we often say that we have verified something when we have discovered *evidence* sufficient to make it probable. For instance, we say that we have verified Jones’s statement that he was in college before midnight by taking the testimony of the college porter, who says he saw him come in: but of course the porter may have had a hallucination, or he may have mistaken someone else for Jones, or he may even be lying, so that all we have got is *evidence* for Jones’s assertion. Now in the looser sense of “verify,” we do have to know how to verify our statement about another mind. I do have to know what sort of experienceable events would be *evidence* for that other mind’s existence, and what others would be evidence against it. Roughly speaking, what is required is that these experienceable events should be of a purposive or teleological kind, i.e. should be the sort of events which I should bring about myself in the course of fulfilling some purpose of my own. (That another organism should have the same sort of shape and size as my own is a point of very minor importance; hence the ineffectiveness of the old analogical argument for the existence of other minds—an argument which the Logical Positivists quite rightly reject.)

A further point in favour of the Logical Positivists is this. Not only do I have to conceive of another mind as *related* to certain events experienced or experienceable by me: the *intrinsic qualities* which I conceive it to have must also be qualities which I have myself experienced in my own introspection. If I profess to attribute to it other qualities than these, I do not know what I am talking about, and my statements are so far nonsensical. This, then, is a very good

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sense in which my statements about other minds "cannot transcend experience." Not only does the evidence for them have to be experiential evidence: that which the evidence is evidence for has itself to be something the same in kind as things which I have experienced in introspection.

To sum up this discussion as to statements about other minds: the principle that knowing the meaning of a statement is knowing the method of its experiential verification seems to break down when applied to statements about other minds; or rather, it gives an incomplete analysis of what we mean, if to verify (or refute) a statement means to experience something which makes it *certain* that the statement is true (or false). If "verify" be understood thus, it is only a part of what we mean by such statements which can be verified, though an essential part, which some other theories overlook. But if "verify" be taken in a wider sense, if verifying a statement means experiencing something which makes it *certain or probable* that the statement is true, then the Principle of Verifiability is both true and important, and applies perfectly to statements about other minds. For such statements, I have argued, are always complex. Part of what I am stating is something such that assignable experiences could make its truth or falsity *certain*; the other part is something such that these same experiences could make its truth or falsity *probable* though not certain. And the Logical Positivists are right in maintaining that if I am talking sense when I make my statement, I must know what sort of experiences they would be.

I will deal more briefly with statements about the past and about material objects. It seems to me that we can approach the Logical Positivist doctrine about them in just the same sort of way. *Part* of what I mean when I make a statement about the past is, that I can now experience, that is be acquainted with, a small number of events in my own past history. But again this is not the whole of what I mean. For I am also asserting that there are such and such past states of affairs which these now-experienceable data would be evidence for. Here, too, if "verifying" a statement means being acquainted with something which makes it *certain or probable* that the statement is true, we can say that knowing the meaning of a statement about the past is knowing what experiences would verify it. But if "verifying" has the narrower sense of having experiences which make the statement *certain*, then the Principle of Verifiability is false: for then it will apply to only a part of what we mean in statements about the past, not to the whole.

Much the same can be said as to statements about material objects. Even if we accept the Phenomenalist view that a material object is a family of sensa actual and obtainable (and I am not sure that we should, for I suspect that though the family of sensa is part,

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and an essential part, of the material object, it is not the whole), even so no statement about a material object could ever be verified if the word "verify" be taken in the narrower sense. For we cannot say that a family of *sensa* contains any finite number of members, even at one single moment: to take only the visual members, there is no finite number of directions nor of distances from which they could exist. But a family of *sensa*, at least the sort of family which could plausibly be identified with a material object, contains other sorts of members besides visual ones, and moreover it endures through a long period of time. Thus no conceivable experience nor series of experiences could verify the existence of a family of *sensa*, if verifying means making it *certain* that the family exists. We can conceive of a series of experiences which would make it *probable*, e.g. walking nearer to the thing, walking round to the back of it, touching it, and so on: and we can conceive of a series of experiences which would increase that probability without limit. But we cannot do more. Thus here again, if "verify" be taken in the narrow sense, the Principle of Verifiability only tells us *part* of what we mean by our statements about material objects (though here again an essential part, and a part which some theories overlook). Here again, then, "verify" must have its wider sense of making *certain* or *probable*, if the Principle is to hold good.

What are we to conclude from this discussion of Logical Positivism? Let us ignore, as irrelevant for our purpose, the curious doctrine that self-evident propositions, including those of Logic and Mathematics, are tautologies. Let us likewise ignore those universal propositions which are established by induction; for as to the right analysis of these the Logical Positivists themselves are not (I think) agreed. Let us confine ourselves to those statements which profess to state *particular matters of fact*, that is, singular propositions, including existential ones. I wish to suggest that, provided the word "verify" be taken in its wider sense, the Logical Positivists have given, if not an absolutely complete account of statements of this sort, at least an account which is correct as far as it goes. To know the meaning of such a statement must certainly *include* knowing what sort of entities we must be acquainted with in order to verify it: and it is not clear that it must include anything more. I will go further. It seems to me that their view, if put negatively, is perfectly correct, and even obvious. If we do *not* know what sort of entities we must be acquainted with in order to verify a given statement, then it seems to me obvious that we are *not* talking sense when we utter the statement. And even if the word "verify" be taken in the narrower sense (of knowing what experiences would make the truth of our statement certain), *part* of what we are stating

¹ "S professes to state F" = S is true if F is the case.

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must still be called verifiable: for part of what we are stating is that we are or could be acquainted with such or such introspectible or sensible data, and unless we know what sort of data they would have to be, and how to set about getting them, we are talking nonsense.

If this be granted, I think it follows that many statements which various people have thought very important, and which have made a great noise in the world, are really nonsensical—that is, are not really statements at all, and are not even false. In the rest of this paper I wish to consider how far this consequence touches *theological* statements, by which I mean all statements made by religious persons in their religious capacity, not just statements made by professional theologians.

Now it is certainly natural to assume that theological statements are *not* verifiable, nor of course refutable, by experience. It is true that a certain number of religious persons would dispute this assumption, and perhaps we may reconsider it later. But it is a very plausible assumption to make, and I think it is one which is very widely accepted at the present time. In any case, it is instructive to consider what follows if we do make it. The first thing that follows is, of course, that *all theological statements are nonsense*; for instance, that it is neither true nor false to say that there is a God, or that He orders the course of events for our benefit, or for the benefit of persons who are morally good, or whatever the religious man would say. I stress the fact that it is not even false to say such things. The denials of the Atheist are just as nonsensical as the affirmations of the Theists. Not only so: the Agnostic's assertion of ignorance is nonsensical too. To say that we do not know, or have not sufficient evidence to be sure, whether God exists or not, implies that the *question* about which we are concerned is itself sense. But this it cannot be, if both the affirmative and the negative answers to it would be nonsensical. It is as if one said "I am not sure whether blue is more identical than music or not" (to take an example from a Logical Positivist writer). You cannot be uncertain whether God exists or not, if there is no such question.

But if theological statements are not sense, if they are not statements except in their grammatical form, can we say what they are? The obvious answer, and the one actually given (I think) by the Logical Positivists, is that they are just *expressions of emotion*. It is not meant, of course, that they *state* the emotional attitude of the speaker (in the way that "I am angry" states my emotional attitude): they merely *express* it in the way that an ejaculation or exclamation would. What exactly is meant by "expressing" when it is thus distinguished from stating, is not easy to say. On the one hand, an utterance which expresses an emotion provides, as it were,

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an *outlet* or relief or safety-valve for the emotion. We express our anger by a swear-word, and then we feel better. On the other hand, the hearer or reader can *infer* from our utterance what sort of emotional state we are in, although we have not stated what it is. I do not think that this is a complete account of what "expressing" is, but I cannot at the moment see what exactly would be added to make it so, and perhaps it will suffice for our purpose. The main thing is to make quite clear the distinction between expressing and stating.

Let us consider this suggestion that theological statements are merely expressions of emotion and see how far it will take us. First we may note that it is not nearly so shocking to the religious man as it sounds at first. He may indeed object when he is told that his favourite utterances are nonsense, but that (it may be suggested) is mostly prejudice, and he will soon get over it. At the price of that small concession he gains in return this enormous advantage, that those utterances cannot possibly be refuted by anyone, and that he on his side can cease from the laborious and disappointing task of trying to prove them. No conceivable historical or scientific or philosophical discovery can disprove them, nor even cast doubt upon them; for they are not the sort of things to which the notions of proof or disproof, of favourable or unfavourable evidence, have any application. There can be no dispute between Religion and Science, for there is nothing to dispute about. Moreover (though perhaps this conclusion will be less welcome to some), there can be no dispute between one religion and another, for instance between Christianity and Mohammedanism, or between two varieties of Christianity. One party has one sort of emotional attitude, another has a slightly different one; or possibly the emotional attitude is the same, though the words which give expression to it are different, just as one man expresses his joy by dancing, another by merely smiling. In any case, there is nothing to dispute about.

We may add that this view of Religion is sometimes held by religious people themselves. There is, for instance, the saying *pectus facit theologum*. And we often hear that Religion *transcends the intellect*, which, perhaps, is only a rhetorical way of saying what the Logical Positivists say: rhetorical; because the word "transcend" is just an emotive word designed to secure the hearers' approval, the meaning being simply that Religion is *non-intellectual*. One might also mention the doctrine of Retschl (with which, however, I must confess myself ill acquainted). When he maintained that the judgments of the religious consciousness are not judgments of fact, but value-judgments, was he not approaching very close to the view that they are not judgments at all, but expressions of an emotional attitude? I do not know whether Otto's theology of the Numinous points in

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the same direction: but I think that some theologians have interpreted it as if it did. Others again have suggested that Religion resembles Art more than it resembles either Science or Philosophy: and I think that those who say this would also say that Art is concerned with the expression of emotion—whether rightly or wrongly we need not at the moment inquire.

However, we have not yet fully worked out this view that theological statements are expressive of emotional attitudes. For first we must observe that an emotional attitude is always *directed upon* something, or (in Brentano's language) has an *intentional* character. For instance, we cannot be afraid without being afraid of something, nor angry without being angry with someone, and when we are surprised we must have something to be surprised at. The something or someone towards which our emotion is directed is usually called the *object* of it. But if we speak so, we must remember that the object of an emotion can be something fictitious or imaginary. It is the *object* of our emotion, but it is not necessarily *an object* in that non-relative sense of the word in which "object" means a real entity. Thus a child can be afraid of the Bogy Man, and one might feel distressed at an event which never happened; for instance, at some fictitious misfortune of a mendacious beggar. Another way of putting the point is to say that any emotion has as a constituent—not as a mere accompaniment—a cognitive act of some sort, whether it be an act of knowing, or believing, or taking for granted, or questioning (as in anxiety) or barely of entertaining the thought that so and so is the case, and whether the *cognitum* is true or false.

What, then, is the object of the religious man's emotion, the emotion expressed in such statements as "God is good," or the like? It cannot be that God is the object, though that is what both Theistic and Atheistic thinkers would say. The Atheists would say, of course, that He is a fictitious object, like the Bogy Man (in other words, that the statement "God exists" is false) but they would agree with the Theists that the religious emotion is directed upon this object, as the child's fear is directed upon the Bogy Man. But this cannot be right, according to the view that we are working out. Statements about fictitious characters, such as Mr. Pickwick or the Bogy Man, are presumably false;¹ but they are not nonsensical, otherwise they could not be false. But statements about God *are* nonsensical. God is not even a fictitious character, and as we have seen, the Atheist's position is just as nonsensical as the Theist's.

But if God is not the object upon which the religious man's emotion is directed, what can that object be? The obvious answer

¹ I take it that such statements are always complex, as Mr. Russell holds. "The Bogy Man is black" = "there is a being of such and such a description; there is only one such being; and he is black."

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is that they are directed upon "the World" or upon "Life as a whole." "Religion is not a system of doctrines but an attitude towards Life" is a very familiar statement. But this must be made clearer. What is meant by the phrase "an attitude towards Life"? Obviously "Life" here is not the name of a substance, like "Socrates"; nor yet is it a description like "the tallest man in this room." And there is the same difficulty about "the World" and "the Universe." Strictly speaking, there is no such entity as Life, or the World, or the Universe: though statements into which these terms enter often make sense, and some of them are true. When we speak of an attitude towards Life, I think we just mean an attitude towards *any experienceable entity, no matter what, which is of interest to any human being*. When we speak of "the Universe," we mean something still wider. We are really talking (if we are talking sense) about *any entity no matter which*. But I suspect that many statements about the Universe are nonsensical, and don't mean anything.

Now it seems to me that there is much truth in this suggestion as to the object of religious emotion. An emotion which is not directed upon some one specific experienceable entity or class of entities, but upon *any* entity you please, no matter what—a *cosmic* or *completely generalised* emotion, as we might call it—does seem to be *ipso facto* religious. For instance, optimism and pessimism, which are respectively attitudes of hopefulness and despairfulness towards any experienceable entity no matter what, can fairly be called religious attitudes. And again, the attitude of aesthetic joy and admiration which some enviable people have towards no matter what experienceable entity is naturally called religious: likewise that attitude of *ἀρραφία* or indifference towards no matter what experience which some have preached and a few have practised.

I have spoken all along of emotional attitudes. But this may suggest something narrower than I really mean. Perhaps it would be better to say just "attitudes." For that condition of mind which I am describing manifests itself not only in emotions, but also in other ways. Obviously it manifests itself in *speech*, for one thing; these manifestations of it are indeed the main topic of our discussion. But also in other forms of behaviour: for instance, in *ceremonies* and *rituals*, from the simplest to the most complicated. This manifestation of the religious attitude is indeed very closely akin to its manifestation in speech, I mean in those "nonsensical" statements which we are discussing (and of course most ritual includes a certain amount of speech or equivalent dumb-show). For ritual behaviour is mainly or primarily *expressive*. The main point of it is to give utterance or outlet, to provide a safety-valve, for an inward state of tension, which would otherwise, as it were, choke us (I am sorry to speak so vaguely, but I hope you may see the kind of

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thing that is meant). Of course, ritual may also have what we may call an economic purpose—to make the crops grow, or to ensure our safety in the next world, or to remove uncomfortable feelings of guilt; and this is the feature which anthropologists chiefly lay stress on. But I incline to think that it is very often secondary; and that a good deal of ritual behaviour, for instance most Christian ritual, has no economic element in it at all, but is purely expressive. We may further note that at any rate one type of religious person would say that ceremonies and rituals express his religious attitude better than words can do: which seems to be an admission that when he *does* use words he is not using them in the ordinary way. So far as it goes, this admission supports the Logical Positivist view that his statements, when he does make statements, are nonsensical. For who would imagine that an ordinary statement—a perceptual or scientific or historical statement—could be “better” expressed by ritual than by words?

But further, our religious attitude may, of course, manifest itself by still other types of behaviour: for instance, by doing a charitable act, or burning a heretic (that is one whose linguistic or ceremonial expressions differ from our own), or voting against Disestablishment, or going to Africa as a missionary.

Nor is this all. The religious attitude is also manifested in what we may call an *intellectual* way, in the formation of beliefs and disbeliefs. I do not, of course, mean beliefs or disbeliefs about God or the gods or about other unverifiable entities. For on the view which we are discussing there cannot be such beliefs or disbeliefs: just as I cannot believe, to take a previous example, that “blue is more identical than music,” nor disbelieve it: for I cannot even entertain the thought of its being so. The sort of beliefs and disbeliefs that I am referring to are certain ones about *ordinary* objects and events, experienceable objects and events whose existence is verifiable. It is characteristic of the religious man to have what the Logical Positivists call in their technical language *rules*, that is rules for forming beliefs, and particularly for forming expectations about the future. (So far as I know, they do not themselves use their doctrine of rules for the analysis of religion, but rather for the analysis of scientific generalizations. But I think it does apply to Religion, more plausibly perhaps than to Science.)

Thus one of the Christian's characteristic “rules” is to believe that any event which happens to him is ultimately for his benefit, though on the face of it it may appear indifferent or even harmful. When a man says that he believes in Providence, it is precisely this rule that he is expressing. “I believe in Providence” will mean “It is my rule to expect with regard to every event which happens to me that it will be for my ultimate benefit, whether there is empirical evidence

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for this expectation or not, and even if there is empirical evidence against it." There are various ways in which such a rule might work itself out. For instance, if the pious man suffers some great misfortune, he regards it as a lesson. If something which he prays for actually happens, it is an encouragement, perhaps a reward for past merit. If it does not, it is a trial, and so will work out for his good. I think that a great part of what is called *faith* consists in the having such rules, and particularly in the sticking to them when experience inclines us to abandon them.

It is, however, very important to note that a rule cannot be *disproved*, nor yet verified. The statement that *I have got* such and such a rule, say that I am a believer in Providence, can, of course, be verified or refuted, by introspection or by observing my actions. But the form of words which expresses the *content of the rule* is not a statement at all. It is just the expression of an intention or policy as to the forming of expectations. And a policy is not the sort of thing which can be called true or false. It cannot be disproved; it can only be abandoned. This is not perhaps obvious, because the policy here under discussion is not a policy of behaviour, but a policy of forming a certain kind of expectations. And this or that particular expectation *can* be disproved or verified; for instance the expectation that the rain which we prayed for will actually fall to-morrow. None the less, the rule itself cannot be disproved, but only the particular expectations to which it gives rise. If I have a long run of falsified expectations, it may be as silly as you please for me to stick to that particular rule, and I might be very much wiser if I adopted another quite different one in future. But my rule is not disproved, because it is not the sort of thing which can be either true or false.

Thus the "attitude towards life" which theological statements are held on this view to express is something much more complex than it seemed at first sight. It is something which manifests itself (*a*) in emotions, (*b*) in ritual, (*c*) in ordinary practical behaviour, and (*d*) in the rules according to which one forms one's expectations. However, all these manifestations of it are of course concerned with ordinary experienceable things and events. It is to them exclusively that the emotions are directed, it is with them that the behaviour and the rules for forming expectations are concerned; in short, they form the *object* of the religious attitude. What is queer about it is not its object (as most people would suppose) but its nature.

Let us now consider whether this account of theological statements is adequate. As I have said, some types of religious person will be well satisfied with it, since it puts them beyond the reach of refutation and absolves them from the labour of defending their

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position by argument. And it does, I think, give a fairly adequate account of such non-theistic religions as Hinayana Buddhism and Confucianism, and of at least some forms of Pantheism. (It is well to remind ourselves that there *are* non-theistic religions.) But is it adequate to Theism of any kind? A Theist would surely tell us that the attitude expressed in *his* theological statements is not solely an attitude towards "Life," that is towards any experienceable event you please, though it does include this; it is also, he would say, an attitude towards God. He would say, indeed, that the attitude towards God was primary, and the attitude towards Life derivative: he would say, for instance, that he feels towards God the emotions of reverence and trust. And this, of course, involves that he *believes* various propositions about God. For those particular emotions only occur when their object is believed to exist. Indeed, a Theist who did not believe that God existed would be a very curious phenomenon.

Yet on the philosophical view which we are discussing it is, of course, impossible to *believe* that God exists. The statement that God exists is nonsensical, and whatever it may express, it cannot possibly express belief in the existence of its grammatical subject: no more than "virtue is blue" can express a belief about virtue. That which is nonsensical cannot possibly be believed. (We are, of course, still assuming that no statement about God can be experientially verified or refuted.) Thus when a man says he believes that God exists, he cannot possibly mean what he says. Yet it is a curious circumstance that people do insist on saying such things. And it is not only the naïve religious man who says them. Learned and self-conscious theologians, well accustomed to reflect on the meaning of what they say, and even eminent philosophers, have written many thousands of pages assigning or refusing to assign predicates to God, exactly as if He were an ordinary object of belief (like the planet Neptune or the Emperor Diocletian) or even an object of knowledge. It is difficult to think that they did not in the least know what they were talking about and that none of the things they said were even false. Theology may not really be a science, but how can it even pretend to be one if the view which we are discussing is correct? Would anyone even pretend to set up a science whose chief object was to prove that blue is more identical than music, or that in some other universe than this there is an imperceptible chimera? It is possible, but it does not seem very likely. And it is well to remember that these considerations apply not to Theism only but to any sort of *metaphysics* in that sense of the word in which metaphysics is distinguished from Logic and Theory of Knowledge: that is to Metaphysics defined as *the attempt to prove or disprove existential propositions which can neither be verified nor refuted*

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*by perceptual or introspective experience.*¹ Can we hold that no metaphysician has ever even known what he was talking about? If we did, we might appeal to the authority of Kant, whose theory of knowledge in this respect as in others is strikingly similar to the one which we are discussing. But even so, the suggestion is a surprising one.

However, we must not suppose that the resources of Logical Positivism are yet exhausted. Let us consider the statement that God exists a little more closely. I am going to assume that existence is not an attribute or characteristic (though grammatically it appears to be) and that "A exists" means "A-ness has an instance, or something is A-ish." So "God exists" means "God-ness or Divinity has an instance, or something is divine" (a Monotheist will add, only one thing). But *divine* is a complex predicate. Let us assume that it is equivalent to "omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect." We may now consider these predicates in order and see what a Logical Positivist would say about them.

Now would it be sense to say that X is omniscient? Could such a statement be experientially verified? Clearly it could not. For however much X turned out to know, we could not be certain that he knew everything. It might, however, be sense to say that there was no discoverable limit to his knowledge—discoverable, that is, by human beings. And very likely this is what people mean by "omniscience." So, too, with omnipotence and moral perfection. Though these as they stand will be nonsense predicates, yet it might still be sense to say that there is no discoverable limit to X's power (i.e. to the number and variety of the changes which he can bring about in entities accessible to human perception or introspection); and likewise that there was no discoverable limit to his moral excellence. I have said that these statements about X might make sense. But they will not really make sense as they stand. For though the predicates are now genuine predicates, X is not a genuine subject. It is, as it were, a blank (a "variable") which needs to be filled in by some proper name or descriptive phrase, if our statements are to make sense. For instance, it is sense to say that there is no discoverable limit to the power of the head-porter of Exeter College, or to the moral excellence of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. These statements make sense because we can discover by experience whether they are true or false. But what happens when we use these phrases in an *existential* statement—when we say "powerfulness with no discoverable limit has an instance," or "something (add if you like 'only one thing') possesses power with no discoverable limit"? The answer is, our statement can still make sense, but only on one condition: namely that the instance or the something is capable of being

¹ This definition was suggested to me by Mr. Gilbert Ryle.

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discovered by perception or introspection; in short, by experience. But if it is insisted that that which possesses these "divine" predicates is not experientially discoverable, then the statement that there is something which possesses them must be nonsensical, according to Logical Positivism. Thus we return to our original position that the statement "God exists" is nonsensical, and cannot therefore state anything which could be either believed or disbelieved.

But though we return to it, we can now qualify it in an important way. Our analysis of the statement has shown that its component statements, "something has knowledge without discoverable limits," etc., although they are nonsensical, are yet each of them *closely analogous to statements which do make sense*. Now this does enable us to give at least a partial solution of our problem (which was, how can people obstinately insist that they believe that God exists, if that statement is nonsensical?). A man could believe that some human being or animal now alive, or some historical character, possessed power, knowledge, and moral excellence without discoverable limit; such statements could at least be false. And he might write many volumes attempting to prove them, and drawing numerous conclusions from them. Thus he *could* believe a statement which is in part, and in its most interesting part, exactly like the statement that God exists. In other words, the predicate "Divine" is not a nonsense predicate,¹ like "more identical than music": it is a predicate which *can* occur in propositions which make sense, though doubtless they are false.

To complete the solution, we have merely to add that there can be not only beliefs about things statable, but also beliefs about statements themselves. It is possible to believe *that a statement makes sense*, though one cannot *see* for oneself that it does: and of course this belief, like any other, might be false. This is my own position with regard to most statements in mathematics and many statements in the empirical sciences. Consider, for instance, the statement that π is a *transcendental number*. I cannot myself believe nor disbelieve this: for I do not know what the statement means, having no idea what a transcendental number is. But I can and do believe that the statement does mean something, that mathematicians know what it means, and even that they can prove it. And I have good though not conclusive evidence for my belief: for I *can* understand some mathematical statements, and I can verify for myself that many mathematicians are intelligent and careful men. We may add that a more unreflective attitude than this is possible and indeed frequent, where we do not even believe something upon evidence, but just assume it without question, without asking whether there is evidence

¹ By a "nonsense predicate" I mean a predicate such that any statement in which it occurs must be nonsensical.

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for it or not. And we can be in this attitude in regard to statements, as in regard to other things. Thus I might just assume without question that the statement π is a *transcendental number* makes sense.

Now it is obvious at once that both these attitudes towards statements, and especially the second, are common among religious persons: and they are particularly common where the statements are themselves theological. Thus a pious but uneducated Christian would assume without question that the statement "God is both transcendent and immanent" makes sense, and that theologians can understand it; though he would not himself profess to know what it means, and therefore, in strictness of language, cannot be said to believe that which the statement states. Now might not this be true of all Theists, and not merely of naïve and unsophisticated ones? If so, when they say they believe propositions about God, they really are believing something. But their belief, it may be suggested, is not really about God at all; it is about certain statements or sentences. And what they believe about them is that they make sense. Now this is something which can be believed: it is something which can at least be false. For the existence of these sentences or statements, these collocations of noises or black marks, is, of course, experientially verifiable. And to say of them that they make sense is not nonsensical, though it may be false. Moreover, there would be some *prima facie* evidence for the belief that they make sense, even though the belief be false; and it would therefore be natural to hold it. For as we have seen, the component statements into which the statement "God exists" may be analysed, though they do not themselves make sense, nevertheless do closely resemble statements which do. To say that X has power, knowledge, and goodness without discoverable limit does make sense, provided that X is some entity whose existence can be verified in experience. And it is therefore natural to suppose that it still makes sense when X is some other entity whose existence is not thus verifiable: natural, but mistaken, for really the removal of the reference to experience makes the whole statement nonsensical.

To conclude: if the doctrine of Logical Positivism with regard to the pre-conditions of meaningfulness be accepted, there is no escaping the consequence that theological statements are nonsensical; that is that they are not even false, but are merely expressive of an attitude in the way we have described--provided that we assume, as we have been doing throughout the discussion, that they are *not* capable of being verified or refuted in experience. But what if we abandoned this assumption? If we did abandon it, then theological statements would not be nonsensical after all, though, of course, they would now run the risk of being false. And certainly many religious people would say that the Logical Positivists, like many other philosophers (Hume and Kant for instance) have fallen into error by taking too

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narrow a view of experience, confining it as they do to ordinary perceptual and introspective experiences, and to the scientific and historical judgments based upon these. It will be said that there is also such a thing as religious experience, and that by this, though by this alone, theological statements *can* be verified or refuted.

This is a suggestion which, for my own part, I am prepared to treat with great respect. And it seems to me that if we hold any sort of empiricist theory of knowledge (of which Logical Positivism is one variety) we have to choose between this suggestion and the purely "attitudinarian" theory of religion which I have sketched above. But what exactly is meant by the phrase "religious experience"? An adequate discussion of this question would require another paper as long as this one. Here I will only say that the phrase seems to me to be radically ambiguous. On the one hand, it may stand for an experience wholly different from ordinary sensing and introspecting, an experience in which one is acquainted with an entity (or entities) different in kind from anything sensible or introspectible. This I think is better called *mystical* experience. On the other hand, it stands quite as frequently for an experience of such things as miracles, providential intervention, "guidances," answers to prayer and the like. (When apologists appeal to "the evidence of Christian experience through the ages" it is experience of *this* sort that they usually mean.) Now the occurrence of the events thus described is established, if at all, by ordinary perceptual or introspective evidence. And *in themselves* they are events of the ordinary kind, such as a recovery from a disease, or the occurring of a thought to someone's mind. What is not ordinary about them, it is supposed, is their *causation*, their manner of origination.

I wish to suggest that mystical experience, though it may be used to support religion in general, cannot be used to support any particular form of religion, as against any other. It is just as frequently met with in the non-theistic religions of the East as in the theistic religions of the West. And it is just as easily interpreted in non-theistic terms as in theistic—perhaps, indeed, *more* easily. If we wish to defend Theism in particular, we must appeal to religious experience in the second sense of the word. That is to say, we must try to show that in ordinary perception and introspection we meet with events which give evidence of the existence and activities of a non-human intelligence: evidence similar in kind to that which each of us uses to justify his belief in the existence and activities of other human intelligences like himself.¹ But whether there really are such events, and whether (if there are) the intelligence whose existence they give evidence of has the characteristics which Theists would wish to attribute to God, I do not know.

¹ This is the line of argument followed by Mr. Malcolm Grant in his ingenious and stimulating book *A New Theory of God and Survival*.

PLEASURE AND CONATION

ARTHUR T. SHILLINGLAW

THERE is no subject to which the writers of ethical textbooks have devoted more attention than that of the relations between pleasure and desire, and yet it is surprising how little agreement their efforts have produced in philosophical circles. This failure seems to me to be chiefly due to the fact that the question is only one among the many problems of conation, and can only be discussed in that context. In consequence, there remains a very wide gap between what psychologists have to say about the analysis of conation and what ethical writers have to say about the problems of moral psychology.¹ My object in writing this article is to help to bring this deplorable state of affairs to an end by expounding a theory of the relations between pleasure and desire, which is based upon a careful analysis of the facts of conation.

Pleasure and desire are only two among the many factors which enter into conative situations. Until some agreement has been reached as to what these other factors are and as to how they are, or are not, commonly related to each other in conative processes, theories about pleasure and desire must necessarily be abstract and provisional. For example, it is by no means impossible *a priori* that they should never be directly related to each other, but only mediately through such terms as instructive wants or propensities. Again, it is a mere assumption that there must be any one relation which invariably holds between them. At the root of all these false simplifications, there seems to lie an unwillingness to keep before one the obvious fact that conation is a process, not a state, and that its factors and their relations may undergo considerable modifications from moment to moment.

A process may be described as a series of temporally adjoined terms, standing in direct causal relations to each other. Now the nature of a process can best be seen by analysing the various phases through which it passes, and I see no reason to believe that conations are an exception to this rule. I shall therefore begin by taking a typical (and perhaps trivial) example of a well-developed conative process, and examining the various phases through which it passes.

Five minutes ago, while I was sitting writing at this desk, I

¹ How wide this gap is, and how deplorable its consequences are, can be seen from a careful reading of the first two chapters of Mr. Joseph's *Some Problems in Ethics*.

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began quite suddenly to feel thirsty, and knowing that there was a glass of water on the table opposite, it naturally occurred to me that I might stop writing and relieve my thirst. After a few moments' hesitation I decided to do so, despite the fact that this entailed an interruption of my work. I then crossed over to the table and drank the water. When my thirst had been relieved, I went back to my desk and resumed working.

I think that, without distortion of the facts, we can distinguish four phases in this process.

(1) *Appetitive Phase*.—It is obvious that in this case at least desire did not form the starting-point of the conation; the explicit desire to drink the glass of water must rather be regarded as the culmination of the preliminary phase through which the process passed. A careful analysis of this phase will disclose at least three distinct factors. (a) In the first place, there is the fact which I might have described at the time by the words "I am thirsty now." This is neither a perception nor a desire, though it is more akin to the latter than to the former. Such experiences can best be described as *Wants*, and in what follows I shall employ the word in this rather special sense. (b) Secondly, there is my awareness of the fact that I was sitting at this desk and that there was a glass of water on the table opposite. This factor is common not only to all conative processes, but to every conative situation however short. I shall call it the *Awareness of the Present Situation*. (c) Finally, there is the actual desire or impulse to drink water, which was in this case an outcome of the other two experiences. Desires, unlike *wants*, do admit of analysis, since they contain both a subjective and an objective factor. On the subjective side, there was my aversion from the present state of affairs and my appetite towards another one. But appetite and aversion cannot in fact exist in isolation from their objects. The word "object" is misleading, for as Dr. Broad has pointed out (*Five Types of Ethical Theory*, p. 67), appetitions and aversions are directed not at things, but at changing or preserving of the states of things. Strictly speaking, I did not desire the glass of water; I desired *that I should drink the water in the glass*. To avoid confusion, I think it is best to call what is expressed by this last clause the *Objective* of the Desire or Impulse.

As regards the relations between appetitions, wants, and our awarenesses, I think we can lay it down that the occurrence of the first is in most cases jointly determined by the other two. It is in virtue of this principle that we are able to predict other people's behaviour. The relations between the other two are not so simple; sometimes a want is aroused by a perception, sometimes *vice versa*.

(2) *Deliberative Phase*.—In the case I have been considering, appetite or aversion did not immediately give rise to action.

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There was an intermediate phase, during which I considered such questions as how I could gratify my desire to drink the water, and whether it would seriously inconvenience me to do so. So far as I can see, the word *deliberation* is generally used to indicate these two rather different processes, i.e., consideration of the means whereby a desire can be fulfilled and reflection as to which among a class of alternative desires is to be realized.

The distinction which is commonly made between desires and impulses seems to me to turn wholly on the fact that in impulsive conative processes the deliberative phase is completely absent, since appetition passes over into action without any thought being given to alternatives or to the question of means. Similarly, the distinction between desires and intentions turns upon the fact that after the deliberative phase is over, the desire has become a cause of action, not merely a possible ground. If a desire persists throughout the deliberative phase, it *ipso facto* becomes an intention.

(3) *Active Phase*.—After I had decided to fulfil my desire and had called to mind the appropriate means, the conative process entered upon a new phase, viz., that of action. Psychologically, the chief peculiarity of this stage is that from now onwards the alternatives, even though they may persist in consciousness, are no longer entertained as grounds for immediate action. From now onwards we are committed.

(4) *Passive Phase*.—Once action had taken place, my desire to drink the water was realized, and therefore came to an end. This is what I shall call the *Fulfilment of Desire*. We must, however, note that desires may be terminated not only by their fulfilment, but by the realization that fulfilment is either impossible or inexpedient. Closely connected with this fact, there is another experience, which many philosophers have failed to distinguish from fulfilment. Not only did I fulfil my desire when I drank the water, but by doing so I removed the want which originally gave rise to my desire. This experience is what Stout calls *Satisfaction*, but for various reasons I think it would be more suitable to give it the name *Satiation*.

Very often the fulfilment of a desire does not bring Satiation, and when this is the case, the conation generally persists, the original desire being replaced by another. E.g., had my thirst not been satisfied by drinking the glass of water I might very well have gone to the trouble of finding some more exciting beverage. Strictly speaking, Satiation never occurs except as the last event in a conative process; though there are many conative processes which do not terminate in this way, since its conditions are not always realizable at the moment.

There are three points which I wish to stress in this connection.

(a) Firstly, the fact that the fulfilment of a desire does not always

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lead to the removal of a particular want proves conclusively that wanting and desiring are two quite different things. So far as I can see, our wants are pure experiences and not directed at *Objectives*, though each may be dispositionally connected with courses of action which lead to the realization of objectives of some general kind. (b) Secondly, we must be careful to avoid confusing the satiation of a want with the pleasure which invariably accompanies such an experience. If they were really identical, the intensity of the want relieved would be exactly equal to the pleasure experienced. This is not, however, the case—*e.g.*, a diabetic gets little pleasure from drinking, though his want is presumably very intense. (c) Thirdly, from what I have said, it does appear that wants play the part of predisposing conditions in regard to our conative processes. Now, recent psychologists profess to have shown that the ultimate wants or predispositions present in human beings are relatively few and simple. They have also pointed out that such tendencies are generally associated with structural and functional peculiarities, in virtue of which certain acts specially adapted to satisfying them are performed from their first appearance with marked facility. To such a combination of tendencies and capacities they have given the name *Instinct*. Now that the dust of controversy has settled, I think we can see quite plainly that there is no necessary principle in virtue of which each ultimate want should be associated with some such mechanism; so that the importance of recent investigations is due rather to the discovery of the former than to the analysis of the latter. If MacDougall is right in maintaining that there is an innate tendency to submissiveness, he is surely wrong in calling it an instinct, for there is no special capacity with which it is associated.

Before passing on to consider the chief point at issue, there is one further aspect of conative processes with which I must deal, viz., hedonic tone. As regards the first phase, I think we can say that it is only in rare cases that it is pleasant. It is, of course, a truism that desire is not always painful, but in my case at least pleasure never arises until I begin to think about such things as the certainty with which my desire can be fulfilled, or the pleasantness of the activity involved in doing so. And, as I have pointed out, such considerations belong to the second, and not to the first phase. Deliberation itself may be either pleasant or painful, though in most cases it is more nearly neutral than is commonly supposed. One of its most peculiar characteristics is that its hedonic tone is largely determined by the anticipated pleasantness or painfulness which will follow upon the fulfilment of a desire. It was this fact which made it possible for the Hedonists to confuse the pleasantness of X with the pleasantness of the thought of X.

In the final phase of conation, the variations in hedonic tone are

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more marked. The fulfilment of a desire is no doubt accompanied by pleasure in most cases, but I am inclined to think that this pleasure is a self-conscious one, due to the knowledge that we have achieved what we set out to do. Satiation, on the other hand, is in itself a pleasant experience, even where it is not accompanied by fulfilment; and the painfulness of its opposite ("dissatiation") seems only to be intensified by our success in achieving the immediate aim.

I have now completed my preliminary analysis of conative processes. What I have said must necessarily appear unduly simplified, for it is only in very exceptional cases that an act is motivated by only one instinctive want, and in every developed human being satiation is dependent upon conditions much more complex than those I have described. Nevertheless, I think that the schematic analysis I have given is a good deal more complete than those which are to be found in the writings of psychologists, and can readily be applied to more complicated cases than the one I have dealt with. It only remains for me to apply it to the solution of a familiar, but none the less difficult, problem of psychology.

The two questions which I wish to discuss are these:—

- (1) Is it possible to desire pleasure alone?
- (2) If so, can we ever desire anything other than pleasure?

Neither of these questions is wholly free from ambiguity, and, in particular, there are two sources of confusion which must be cleared up at the very outset. The word *pleasure*, like *colour*, may be used either as a general name, denoting one of a class of particulars, or it may be used as an abstract name, denoting a quality or characteristic. Neither of these usages would exactly express what is meant here. I shall interpret the proposition, "Smith is desiring pleasure" to mean "Smith is desiring a certain experience X, which he believes would have the characteristic of pleasantness, and if Smith did not believe this, his desire for X would be less strong than it in fact is." With this definition, it is not difficult to explain what is meant by the desire for pleasure alone. If Smith desires X for its pleasantness alone, his desire for X will not, and cannot, survive his belief that X would be pleasant.

There is another ambiguity which must be dealt with here. There are two different ways in which we may be said to desire things, i.e., as means and as ends. Unless we restrict the question to the second of these senses, there will really be no question to discuss: for pleasantness is a resultant characteristic which cannot be directly produced, so that unless we desire the means it is logically impossible that we should fulfil a desire for pleasure. In that sense, therefore, it would be impossible that we should desire pleasure alone. But in the present inquiry I intend to confine myself to the question whether it is possible to desire pleasure alone as an end.

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(1) Many of the refutations of Hedonism, Ethical as well as Psychological, rest upon giving a negative answer to the question we have formulated above. The arguments upon which this denial have been based may be divided into two classes. To the first class belong those which maintain quite simply that since there is no ultimate or instructive want whose object is pleasure, there can be no desire which is directed to this end. The premise is in this case true; for, as Butler said, the particular propensities have for their object their own satisfaction, not the pleasure of their possessors.¹ But this premise will not in itself prove that there can be no desire for pleasure, since wanting and desiring are, on any careful analysis, two quite different states, whose ends may be as distinct as night from day. I do not therefore feel inclined to attach much importance to this objection.

The second class of argument adds another premise to the above one. It is asserted that while wanting and desiring are quite distinct, they are so connected that the object of desire must stand in some special logical relationship to the object of the want which occasions it. So far as I can see, this special logical relation is commonly thought to be either that of determinate to determinable or of means to end. On the former view, a want is to be regarded as a vague longing for an indeterminate object which becomes or gives rise to a definite and explicit desire for a particular object, in accordance with the ordinary processes of psychical causation. It is therefore argued that, since there is no want whose satiation consists in pleasurable experience, there can be no desire directed to the having of a particular pleasurable experience. But we have already seen that desires are directed to their own fulfilment, just as wants tend towards their own satiation, and these two things are logically quite distinct. Whereas, if this theory were right, fulfilment would curtail satiation, in the same way as the fact that this has the determinate quality of scarlet entails that it has the determinable quality of redness. For this reason I think we may reject the first alternative.

The other form of the argument is as follows. Every desire is directed to the means of "satiating" the want which occasioned it. There is no instinctive want whose satiation is a causal consequence of pleasurable feeling. Therefore there can be no desire whose objective is the production of pleasurable feeling.

This argument is much more plausible than the former one, since it seems generally to be true that our desires are directed at bringing about states of affairs which do in fact lead to satiation. This is particularly true in the case of high-developed instincts, where the

¹ It should of course be noted that on my view the connection between a want and its "object" is not a strictly logical one, since wants are immediate experiences.

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determinateness of the end to which desire is directed is only equalled by its peculiar fittingness to produce a state of affairs which will "sate" the want. Let us therefore admit that originally this relation does hold between a want and a desire on their first appearance. Is there any good reason to suppose that it will continue to hold after the process of conditioning has started?

The most important law which governs the relations between mental wants is that of Association or the Revival of Contexts. This law applies to desires as well as to purely cognitive states. The chicken that first experienced an appetite to eat any red object on the ground soon comes to feel aversion towards such objects if it finds one of them very unpalatable. This is due to the fact that the "dissatiation" attending the fulfilment of appetite brings about an aversion from the object. When a similar object appears later, the revival of the context of the previous experience brings back the aversion. This instance is not incompatible with the theory we are examining, but it points to others which are. The history of most fetishes would provide suitable examples. In such cases the fulfilment of a desire has at some early stage been accompanied by intense satiation. The experience has in all, or most, cases been accompanied by the presence of some accidental and irrelevant feature, e.g., the chiming of a grandfather clock. Now in the course of time the subject may transfer his desire from the real cause of his satiation to the clock itself, and may experience an acute desire to possess a similar one when the original want is revived. It is idle to pretend that the possession of the clock will fully satisfy his instinctive want; he has become the victim of a misplaced or dislocated conative impulse. In this case, therefore, the desire has ceased to have as its objective an appropriate means of satiating a want, so that even when the desire is fulfilled the want will not be satiated.

On these grounds I think we may safely reject the arguments which have been put forward to prove that we cannot desire pleasure. There is another ingenious theory, however, which admits that we can desire pleasure, but denies that we can ever desire it alone. It may be summarized in the following two propositions:—

(a) There is no primary desire whose objective is the attainment of pleasurable feeling, but there are secondary desires which are directed to the fulfilment of their associated primary desires.

(b) Pleasure is the fulfilment of a secondary desire of this nature.

The advocates of this theory point out that very often my desire to produce a certain state of affairs is accompanied by the desire that my desire for that state of affairs should be fulfilled. However paradoxical this may sound, I have no doubt that their contention is so far right. Part at least of what is commonly called the desire

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for success is simply the desire that one should succeed in fulfilling one's desires. The existence of secondary desires of this sort may easily be verified by taking an example where the primary desire is weak and the secondary desire very strong. My desire to play push-pin could under no circumstances be very strong, but if I were to find that it was very difficult to play that curious game, I think that I would probably devote a great deal of energy to acquiring the art. Now, the most plausible explanation of this fact is surely that though my desire to play push-pin is slight, my desire not to be frustrated when I tried to do so is really quite strong. So I think that we are forced to admit that secondary desires are by no means uncommon or unimportant.

The second proposition is hardly so well established. There is little doubt that the fulfilment of a secondary desire is usually accompanied by pleasure, or its non-fulfilment by displeasure; but such facts fail to prove that pleasure and the fulfilment of a secondary desire are one and the same thing.

(1) In the first place, the characteristic of pleasantness does not seem to me to be analysable; it is to all appearances as unanalysable as redness or any other such quality. Yet if this theory were correct, pleasantness would be a very complex thing indeed, containing both a secondary desire and its realized objective. Of course it is strictly impossible to prove that anything is unanalysable, but I think it must be admitted that in this case the evidence is distinctly unfavourable.

(2) The above difficulty might, of course, be met by conceding that "pleasant" does not literally mean "being the fulfilment of a secondary desire," but that the first characteristic is nothing more than a necessary consequent of the second. But here again there are serious difficulties. What is there common to secondary and not to primary desires, in virtue of which the fulfilment of the former is invariably pleasant while the fulfilment of the latter is not? The only answer that I can think of with the slightest pretence to plausibility is that secondary desires are self-conscious and that pleasure is from its very nature an experience of which only a self-conscious being is capable. Is such a view defensible?

(3) This brings me to a third and, to my mind, insuperable difficulty. The desire to fulfil a desire is what we might call a self-conscious experience, i.e., it is impossible to entertain the secondary desire without being introspectively aware of the primary one. If that is so, I cannot experience pleasure unless I am at the same time introspecting. Hence on this theory it would appear that almost all the judgments we make concerning our past hedonic experiences are false. When Jones declares in the club-house that he did definitely enjoy his last round of golf, his statement cannot literally be true

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unless he divided his attention on the links between the playing of his shots and the introspecting of his mental states. Of course, such judgments might really be conditional, i.e., if Jones had introspected at the time he would have had pleasant experiences. But I think it is clear that Jones at any rate did not attach this meaning to his assertion.

(4) Finally, there is the difficulty of dealing with what are called the sensory pleasures. To account for them, the advocates of this theory must either postulate an indefinite number of unconscious desires directed to the having of certain types of sensation, or they must maintain that the pleasantness of sensations is utterly different from the pleasantness of conative experiences; and both these hypotheses are, to say the least, improbable.

Hence I have no hesitation in pronouncing this ingenious theory to be almost certainly false.

It still remains for me to show how it is possible for us to desire pleasure, for in the absence of any sound theoretical objection the evidence of introspection would then be far too strong to be disregarded. To do so I shall once again fall back upon the Laws of Association.

In the first place, I would submit that pleasure and the satiation of want are more frequently associated than pleasure and any particular desire, on account of the fact that the fulfilment of desire does not always bring pleasure, while satiation does. Now, where the means of satiation are varied, it is obvious that pleasure will be *much* more commonly associated with satiation than with the fulfilment of any particular desire. Thus, if there are ten different ways in which I can satiate my thirst, the want will become more strongly associated with the thought of the pleasure consequent upon quenching it than with the thought of drinking a glass of water. To suppose otherwise would be to complicate the laws of mental process in a way quite unjustified by the facts. As a corollary, we should expect that where the means of satiation chosen are unvarying, the original association between means and end would be left unimpaired. This is exactly what we find when we examine the facts. A miser invariably gratifies his instinct of acquisitiveness in one way, and it is notorious that he does not desire pleasure but money. On the other hand, in those classes of society where the means of gratification are widely varied, the percentage of hedonists is very high. This is only what we should have expected, since in their case pleasure is more frequently associated with satiation than any other circumstance.

My theory is therefore amply verified by the facts, but it still remains for me to consider a very important objection. If it is true, it might be urged, that desire and the means of satisfying the fundamental wants of human nature are liable to become so patently

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dissociated, will it not follow that cases will arise in which these wants will cease to be satiated, so that life will become intolerable? This objection does have some force, but it ignores one important fact. If the object of desire and the satiation of its want are not related as means to end, but as effect to cause, the hedonist must be as careful to bring about the means of satisfaction as anyone else; otherwise, he will be deprived of the pleasure he is seeking. Desire is always accompanied by the thought of the means whereby it can be fulfilled. In his case, one of the means is the bringing about of those situations, which would have fulfilled his desire, had it still been directed at the means of satisfaction. On the other hand, I think we must admit that the means will tend not to be so adequately realized, when they are desired only in this secondary and indirect manner. It is for this reason that many cases do arise in which instructive wants are left in a state of chronic dissatisfaction—a condition to which I think the name “neurasthenia” is given.

My conclusion is therefore that, while there may be no instinctive want whose proper object is pleasurable feeling and no original desires which are hedonistic, the laws of psychology both permit and explain the development of the desire for pleasure.

(2) I am now in a position to deal very briefly with the popular error that it is impossible to desire anything but pleasure. If my previous remarks have been to the point, there should be no difficulty in exposing the erroneous character of this conception. For, in the first place, we found on direct analysis that in one particular case the objection of a desire was not the pleasantness of an experience, but the bringing about of a certain psycho-physical situation, viz., the drinking of a glass of water. Such pleasure as was experienced was no more than an indirect result of this state of affairs. So far as I can see, the doctrine of psychological hedonists could never have been made to appear even plausible, unless they had failed to distinguish fulfilment from satiation and satiation from the pleasure consequent upon it.¹ In the second place, we also found reason to suppose that there is no instructive want whose end is pleasure. If there had been, we might have expected this want to be associated with a mechanism for the discharge of certain secretions into the blood-stream, which would produce an intoxication of delirium; whereas the instinctive mechanisms we know of exist solely for the performance of acts, whose ends are both contingent and external. Finally, we may press the biological objection further

¹ Psychological Egoism—the doctrine that we only ultimately desire future states of our own minds—clearly rests on a confusion of satiation with the objective of desire. The former is always purely mental; the latter almost invariably a psycho-physical state of affairs.

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and maintain that, the constitution of human nature being what it is, the successful functioning of any such desire would have intensified such a tendency, and that the greater the intensity it acquired, the less efficient would its possessors become. It is therefore questionable whether such a race could ever have been evolved, and if it had been it would certainly not have survived. For these reasons I think the doctrine that every desire is a desire for pleasure of some sort cannot be regarded as a serious contribution either to psychology or ethics.

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR BROAD'S EXAMINATION OF McTAGGART'S PHILOSOPHY¹

S. V. KEELING, D.-és-L.

IN his Preface Dr. Broad anticipates that two sorts of censure might be passed on his subjection of McTaggart to criticism. Some may say: "You know perfectly well" (*sic*) that any system of constructive metaphysics by deduction from self-evident truths "*must* be moonshine", so why waste your time? Others may think it "barely decent" for "the executor of the man to become the executioner of the system". Dr. Broad is rightly unperturbed by either kind of objector. To the former he is "certainly not prepared to make such great concessions". "Absolutism is the philosophical expression of an aspect of reality which has profoundly impressed some of the greatest thinkers in all parts of the world and at all periods of human history. If (they) all talked what appears, when literally interpreted, to be nonsense, it is surely a most significant fact that men of such high intelligence and of such different races and traditions should independently have talked such very similar nonsense. To me, for one, this fact strongly suggests that there is a genuine and important aspect of reality, which is either ineffable, or, if not, is extremely hard to express coherently in language which was, no doubt, constructed to deal with other aspects of the universe." To objectors of the latter kind he answers that were McTaggart now living he would prefer to have his philosophy criticized by "at least one reasonably competent professional colleague" rather than see the product of all his efforts go by default—though we may think this an over-gloomy and perhaps over-hasty view of the alternative. Dr. Broad had reviewed Vol. I of the *Nature of Existence for Mind*; he had read and prepared for publication with extreme care the MS. of Vol. II after McTaggart's death, and on these and other grounds was obviously intimate with his subject's mind and work. So that Dr. Broad, in his turn, should not wish *his* special knowledge, the product of much labour too, "to go by default", but should have chosen to utilize it in composing a course of lectures on McTaggart's philosophy at Cambridge and then place that material before the unprivileged outer world in the form of the present book, is surely to be accounted pure gain.

Of the examiner's intended fairness there can be no question, but the few readers who are "at home" in McTaggart's volumes may vary in opinion about Dr. Broad's sympathy with his subject. For my own part, I confess to some amusement at seeing how swiftly and low the mighty may fall at Cambridge, especially when no longer physically Fellows. And even were one to suppose the fall occurred only in Dr. Broad's imagination, one would still be curious to know the cause of that imagination. For barely six years ago he declared McTaggart "a thinker of the very first rank" comparable with Spinoza, Hegel and the greatest. His *Nature of Existence* was "a work of genius", placing its author "in the front rank of the great historical

¹ *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. I.* By C. D. BROAD, Litt.D., F.B.A. (Cambridge University Press, 1933. 1p. iv + 460. 21s. net.).

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philosophers". His writing was "pellucidly clear", ranking him "with the masters of English philosophical prose"—no meagre meed of praise! Now the scene is one of dust and ashes. To notice only those of Dr. Broad's discussions which relate to the more important of McTaggart's principles and arguments, I find some twenty instances in which the refutations close with such rhetorical full-stops as "a mass of verbal inconsistencies", "verbal moonshine", "extremely obscure", "particularly silly confusion", "all this apparent nonsense", "verbal tangles", "very confused and confusing", "completely trivial and much ado about nothing". Is this all by way of emphasizing McTaggart's "crystalline clearness" and his "lawyer-like determination to make every clause completely watertight"?

We should keep it steadily before our minds throughout that this examination takes place in a strangely constituted court. Only the prosecuting counsel is present, the defendant is not represented. True, Dr. Broad is a generous as well as an able counsel for the prosecution. He will state a case on behalf of the defence in the way he thinks the defence would have put it, and he scorns to profit from a slip. But it is hardly to be expected that he would see the defendant's case with the same force as he sees his own.

There are three things ostensibly being tried in this examination—McTaggart's conclusions, his supporting arguments and the applicability of his method; perhaps, though not declaredly, also the very possibility of philosophy in the sense in which the greatest thinkers have understood it. In these circumstances, we shall not be surprised if the defendant's fortunes seem to stagger on somewhat haltingly at times, and where there is no one to rule whether or how questions should be put, I, as a mere eavesdropper, decide that at the least a very large allowance must be made when returning the verdict. With this in mind, I shall give a brief account of Dr. Broad's principal contentions, with occasional comments on them, and mention in conclusion some of the reflections my readings of this work have prompted. The contents, which are conveniently arranged into five "books", consist of (i) "restatements", sometimes very lengthy ones, of what McTaggart maintained, (ii) critical discussion of his conclusions and of his arguments for them, (iii) a number of "independent discussions" of topics treated under (i) or (ii) or topics connected with them. My space here is too limited to be able to refer to the last, or to relate except in truncated form what I take to be the main points of (i) and (ii).

(1) *Preliminary Considerations.*—Bk. I opens with an exposition of the most general character of McTaggart's method, and of its more obvious differences from the methods adopted by Kant and Hegel. The remaining four chapters expound and criticize McTaggart's views on existence and reality, and on the question whether there is anything both real and non-existent. He regards (a) 'real' and 'existent' to be names of indefinable qualities, and (b) qualities to be, some real and non-existent, others both real and existent (e.g. Wisdom is a real quality, Socrates's wisdom an existent one).—Broad considers the view that reality is a generic quality to be "quite certainly false", but in lieu of alleging a reason for the certainty, he substitutes for McTaggart's quality of being real a certain "property" found convenient in modern formal logic, so allowing "there is the characteristic of having instances". In what sense there "is" this characteristic we are not told, but presumably it will be other than that of "having instances". I suspect there is more to the question of the connexion between reality and existence than Broad's discussion takes into account: I do not know how that "more" should be expressed, if McTaggart's expression of it is unclear and objectionable.

Broad also finds "quite untenable" McTaggart's distinction between

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'the wisdom of Socrates' and 'wisdom', on the ground that the wisdom of Socrates might have characterized innumerable other men, and so differs from wisdom only as wisdom differs from any determinate degree of wisdom. He therefore decides that McTaggart's distinction is an epistemological, and not an ontological one. (*Is there nothing but a certain determinate degree of the characteristic in reference? I cannot believe it.*)

In order to prove there are no non-existent characteristics, McTaggart introduced the principle that the parts of whatever is existent are themselves existent, hence, e.g. the characteristic 'non-phoenixhood' exists, though there are no phoenixes.—If, Broad argues plausibly, 'non-P' names a complex attribute of which P is a part, then presumably there is another part of which 'non' is the name.—This is certainly unpalatable. But if we suppose with Broad that 'X is not a phoenix' expresses "a negative fact", will there not still have to be some entity which 'non' expresses, and so the difficulty remain?

Other entities which have also been held real but not existent are possibilities and propositions. Broad finds McTaggart's treatment of the former "unduly negative", and this seems to me true. McTaggart does, however, assert their existence, though he denies it to propositions. With these conclusions Broad agrees "in the main", but thinks that McTaggart misunderstood what was meant by those who held propositions to exist. Here too Broad seems right: propositions were not held to be required for judgments to *correspond* with. But I fail to see why (in discussing McTaggart's answer to supporters of the proposition) Broad should 'boggle' at McTaggart's distinction between what a belief *professes* to correspond with, and what it *really* corresponds with. Surely there is a plain sense in which every belief "professes" or purports to be about something or some things, whether or not it is also really about them? It seems unnecessarily contentious to object that "beliefs do not literally profess to *do* anything"—nobody supposes that beliefs profess to '*do*', but that they profess to '*be about*'. Broad has no objection to writing that "an argument *professes* to be about" (p. 367) and that "a phrase *claims* by its linguistic form to be an exclusive description" (p. 289), why then does he demur at "propositions" professing to be about something?—So, though McTaggart probably misunderstood the grounds on which those who believed in propositions did so, his main point is undisturbed, viz.—there is no reason to believe there are such entities.

(2) *Characteristics and Particulars.*—In Bk. II, Broad brings together McTaggart's conclusions about characteristics and substances. Division of the former into qualities and relations, and into simple, compound and complex is discussed fully in ch. vii, and in ch. viii the notions of substance and of the plurality of substances are considered. A searching examination of two principles, the "Dissimilarity of the Diverse" and that of "Sufficient Descriptions", which depend on certain views about characteristics and substances, brings the Book to a close. Broad's criticisms here relate to matters so vital to McTaggart's system, that the utmost care must be exercised in reaching a decision about the soundness of these criticisms. I mention here only four of the points Broad examines in ch. v, viz. (i) whether qualities can be replaced by relations, (ii) whether a term can be related to itself, (iii) the generation of qualities by relationships, (iv) McTaggart's use of the phrase 'the nature of' a term.

(i) Complaining that McTaggart dismisses this possibility "almost without discussion", Broad denies that it is either self-evident or demonstrable that exact likeness consists in, or depends on, the possession of a common quality. He offers the irrelevant suggestion that "it is certain" that *recognition* of

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likenesses and unlikenesses precedes *recognition* of common qualities, but does not discuss whether recognition of likenesses and unlikenesses does not presuppose prior *cognition* of common qualities. He decides that it is not "an altogether unreasonable view" that common qualities are "convenient fictions" resorted to for economy of expression.—I find the whole discussion on pp. 88–9 unconvincing and strained. Even had there been an echo of doubt in my mind, I still should be surer that what are commonly supposed qualities are not relations than I should be sure of the argument Broad gives in this place. There seems as good, and the same kind of, evidence for the existence of qualities as for relations, and Broad's argument against qualities seems to me just as dubious as Bradley's argument against relations which, according to Broad, "would disgrace a child or a savage" (p. 85).

(ii) Broad points out that there are two types of relation that McTaggart held to relate certain terms to themselves, e.g. certain symmetrical relations, as identity, and certain non-symmetrical ones, e.g. contempt, respect. Each case is considered separately. McTaggart had pointed out that when a term stands in a relation to itself, that term "has a certain aspect of duality", which shows up in language, one name or descriptive phrase occurring twice in the sentence. This "aspect of duality" seems unobjectionable to Broad when the relation in question is non-symmetrical (for 'to be respecter of A' is other than 'to be respected by A'), but most objectionable when the relation is symmetrical. Why it should be so I cannot fathom. If it were replied that the "aspect of duality" is due to the same linguistic fact in *both* cases, viz. that the same noun or a descriptive equivalent must occur twice because the sentence expresses a relationship, Broad would doubtless reply that the answer is circular. If it be asked but why *should* the same name occur twice in the sentence, presumably McTaggart would reply because the sentence expresses a *relation* in which that named by the name stands, and not a quality possessed by it. This point does not seem to be one that could be proved or disproved by analysis of the *language* used to express the situation. McTaggart's position is that 'identity' is the name of a relation not of a quality: 'being identical with I' would be the form of a description describing the generated quality. Broad will have none of this, however, but takes as an example the convenient case "Tully is the same as Cicero", which he analyses into: there exists something having a certain pair of properties ('being called Tully', 'being called Cicero') and such that neither property belongs to more than one thing. Thus, in avoiding recourse to the words "same", "identical", he supposes he has shown the non-existence of identity. At least he says, "if this analysis be right" there is no relation of which 'identity' is the name.—The force of this criticism will naturally depend on whether the reader is satisfied that "this analysis is right", and on his views about the ontological claims made by logical analysts. Is it not conceivable that an alternative analysis of the same situation should be worked out, which seems as plausible and in which reference to 'same' is made, and if so, what then would our analyses of the use of language here prove? Further, I am wondering how Broad would choose to analyse that statement which he alone can truly assert, viz. "I am Broad". I imagine its analysis would not be formally analogous, and even if it dispensed with all use of the word 'same', would it thereby be shown to dispense with identity?

Where the relation is non-symmetrical (e.g. in self-contempt, self-respect, etc.) Broad says it is "indirect" (a "relational product"). But indirect though it be, is it not a relation in which a term stands to itself? I cannot see how the indirectness as explained in pp. 91–2 can take away the sting attaching to direct relations. And if a term can stand in an indirect relation to itself,

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why can it not stand in a direct relation to itself? Broad admits that a term *can* stand in an indirect relation to itself ("Here the relation of x to itself is indirect" p. 91). The matter is important for McTaggart. That there should be *some* relation (e.g. identity) which every particular must have to itself is indispensable for the principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse, which, we shall see, Broad denies.

(iii) Broad's attitude to McTaggart's view that relationships generate qualities in the related terms seems extraordinary; the asserted distinction between a person being in love, and two persons being related by the relation of love is dismissed as "mere verbal moonshine", though dismissed, be it noted, in favour of the *relation*, not in favour of the quality, which is said to be "a figment". McTaggart at least gives a reason for distinguishing, Broad gives none for his denial. Now it would normally be allowed that when A falls in love with B, his being in love contributes importantly to making A the sort of person he then is, and sometimes even to making him the sort of person he will be. If it be argued that this can quite well be expressed by saying A's formerly standing in the relation of love to B is the reason of his later, changed characteristics, are we not admitting that the former relationship has *affected* the term A, made it qualitatively different, or of a different nature, from what it would have been, had A not stood formerly in that relation? Is this not to assign a relationship as a ground of a certain qualitative difference in a term? And if it were argued that these later characteristics (A's changed nature) could be expressed in terms of further *relations* in which A stands to various people, so that none but relational facts are required, shall we not then be maintaining that *facts* (and not, as I understand Broad to require, *events*) are terms in causal relation? I am perplexed how there should be any doubt in this matter. If either entity, quality or relation, were suspect here, my own suspicion would fall rather on the *relation* of love than on the *state* or "*quality*" of love.

That qualities generate relationships Broad agrees with McTaggart. "A is qualified by redness", he admits, expresses a different fact from that expressed by "A is red", since the former is about (*inter alia*) a certain sort of relation, and the latter is not *about* that relation. Broad also agrees that "an original fact" (qualitative or relational) generates an endless series of relationships, and that this series is not vicious.

(iv) McTaggart defines "the nature" of a term as the compound quality composed of all the qualities of the term. And since relations generate qualities in the related terms, a thing's nature changes if any of its relationships change, and all things' natures will change (importantly or unimportantly) if any one thing changes.—Broad objects that (a) compound characters are "probably a figment", and (b) even if not, at least a compound quality consisting of *all* a term's qualities is an illegitimate totality, since it would have to include itself as a component. Therefore Broad can accept only a very modified account of what is "the nature" of a thing.—McTaggart's own statement (*N. of E.*, p. 65) is certainly too wide and does expose him to the objection (b). But if his statement: "all the qualities possessed by any particular thing form a compound quality" be amended to "all the *non-compound* qualities", etc., Broad's objection would seem to be met, and all McTaggart requires allowed. And this amendment, unlike the one Broad proposes, would still allow for a change in the nature of one term entailing a change in the nature of others. This seems to be a consequence Broad seeks to avoid, but I see no good reason for doing so. Nor can I see that those who object to McTaggart's wide sense of "the nature of" a thing do so for any reason except that in common life a thing's "nature" is often

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used in a narrower sense. This only shows that narrow senses are often more convenient for the business of common life. The 'wide sense' remains, and requires a name by which we can refer to it; the restricted sense, though convenient, may none the less be arbitrarily imposed. In common life we have rarely if ever an occasion to refer to *all* that is 'true of' a thing, as a rule only a few characteristics of an object are important for our purposes, so it is very natural that a narrow sense should be the usual one in common life. But in metaphysics it is necessary to make statements about *all* the characters that a thing has, even though some of them are trivial or unimportant in practical contexts. Hence some word to denote this complete sense is required and unobjectionable. If any short of all of a thing's characteristics are to be called its nature, where should the line be drawn, and why should it be drawn in accordance with practical convenience? And what should the remaining characters be called, for they too contribute in measure to making the thing the sort of thing it is?

In ch. vii, Broad turns to McTaggart's notion of substance. Of the many points raised I select two for notice, viz. that McTaggart's definition allows facts to be substances, and that he tacitly assumes there is no "fundamental difference" between occurrents and continuants, since his sense of "substance" applies indifferently to both.

(i) As Broad says, McTaggart does not intend to include facts among substances. This, indeed, McTaggart confirmed in his later summary, 'An Ontological Idealism', where he redefined substance to exclude facts, after Prof. Moore had pointed out that his book definition was applicable to them. McTaggart added to the definition of substance in Vol. I the clause, "or having qualities or relations among its parts . . . the last part is added to exclude facts" (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, I, p. 253).

(ii) Broad regards the distinction between occurrents and continuants as "fundamental", and appends a long "independent discussion" under the title "Processes and Things".—Their distinction is not in doubt, but I do not understand the force of the epithet "fundamental", unless he means that they are ultimately distinct (cp. qualities and relations) and not merely apparently so. The only relevant question I see apropos of McTaggart is, Are both occurrents and continuants kinds of substance, as McTaggart defines "substance"? Both plainly are, for both have qualities and stand in relations, neither is a quality or a relation and neither has qualities or relations among its parts. I do not therefore understand why Broad should several times repeat his objection, and think it a "most extraordinary fact" that McTaggart does not directly discuss occurrents and continuants, for what relevance would this have to McTaggart's purpose in Vol. I?

On p. 142 Broad is of the opinion that "the notion of Facts was an afterthought in McTaggart's mind", and finds it a defect that their status is left uncertain. This seems too strong, for McTaggart has a good deal to say in Vol. I about relationships, and these (and what in one or two places he misnames relations) are facts. Are there any facts which are *not* relationships? It is only that McTaggart often prefers the word "relationship" to "fact", and this presumably because it connects facts with his doctrine of relations. He pretty plainly regarded facts as derivative entities, and not, with the logical analysts, as primitive ones, and he would presumably argue that in studying existence (particulars, qualities and relations) we should thereby be studying relationships, i.e. facts.

In ch. ix Broad criticises McTaggart's principle that there cannot be two particulars which are exactly similar to each other, i.e. such that every quality

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of one is a quality of both. He points out that if there is a relation of identity in which every term stands to itself, the Dissimilarity of the Diverse follows at once, but that McTaggart did not rest his case on this, but required the dissimilarity to be other than an analytic consequence of plurality. McTaggart claims that his principle is a necessary one, Broad thinks inspection of it shows exceptions to it are conceivable. It is, he points out, sufficient to show that exceptions are logically possible, and unnecessary to establish *de facto* existence of exceptions, in order to refute McTaggart. Broad's argument is too long to reproduce here. Its first part concludes that two sensibilia sensed by the same mind must be non-analytically dissimilar, and thus he agrees, so far, with McTaggart. (I do not know, however, what McTaggart would think about sensibilia which are "processes" having sensible qualities—I cannot find such entities "on inspection", and suspect they may be our old friends, *sensa*, in which the 'patch' has become "process.") It is the second part of the argument in which Broad considers he has refuted McTaggart, but I find the discussion here very wire-drawn and quite unsatisfying. In particular, the use made of the notions of "logically possible" and "logically impossible" strikes me as most suspect. Conceivability proves Dr. Broad's very willing handmaid in chaps. ix and x, and some characteristically Cambridge arguments in which it is claimed to show that certain sorts of 'object' are "logically possible" of existence convince me that whether or not speculative philosophy is sufficiently critical, critical philosophy can be speculative enough when it chooses. That there is a permissible use of "conceivability" is not doubtful. But neither need it be doubted, surely, that it is impermissible to exclude certain characters which the name of your object connotes, show that the remainder are not inconsistent with what you want to assert about your object, and then tacitly suppose the object does not in fact possess the characteristics you have excluded, though still naming the object by a name which includes those excluded characters as part of its connotation! Yet it seems to me certain that this is how Dr. Broad "refutes" two of McTaggart's principles in chaps. ix and x. For he asserts it is "logically possible" for there to exist two unsensed sensibilia having only analytical dissimilarity. Such sensibilia "might be unheard noises". The "refutation" then consists in this proposal: It is logically possible that nothing should exist, in the past, present or future except "two unheard squeaky noises" simultaneously occurrent and of equal duration, and *literally nothing else*,—nobody to hear them, nothing to cause them, no even apparent moment of time, past, present or future at which they "occur", no region of space from which they issue, no physical occurrence of which they are manifestations. We are to accept that it is "logically possible" that there should exist two such uncaused, unheard squeaky noises, and that they are the universe, then McTaggart's Dissimilarity of the Diverse will have been shown false. Thus the recipe for manufacturing "refutations" seems to be that we set aside those elements in the meaning of a term (e.g. a noise) which, in presupposing the existence of other terms of a certain character, promise dissimilarity and diversity in the world, and that we attend only to those characteristics of the term which could be qualitatively similar, and then argue that it is "logically possible" that these latter alone should characterize that term without it being in different character from that which the connotation of its name denotes. Plainly something is wrong with "conceivability" of this kind. I should reply, then, that to speak of a *noise* (as distinct from an *x* with arbitrarily assigned properties) and at the same time deny any cause whatever to it, any region of space or direction from which it issues, is to give a description which *could not ade-*

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quately describe a noise, even if there were unheard noises. Otherwise put: if such an adequate description could apply to anything, that existent would not be a noise.

Similar remarks apply to Broad's refutation of the principle of Sufficient Description. Broad invites us to "imagine a universe consisting of just three minds, A, B, C", in which A is jealous of B on account of C, B of C on account of A, and C of A on account of B. "Imagine" such a universe perhaps we may, conceive it *possible* for this to be the whole character of an actual universe, I at least cannot. Broad is easily able to show that there would be an exclusive description of each, A, B, C, but a sufficient description of none of them. The argument is supposed to be about possible persons and their jealousy, it is, however, *really* about symbols that symbolize nothing in particular, bare X, Y, Z given as being related each in turn by a triadic relation R which is such that *any terms it relates (X, Y, Z) would not therefore have to be related by any other relation whatever*.—Why jealousy should be thought to be a relation satisfying this requirement (R) I do not see. I suggest that what Broad has really proved is something different from what he supposed himself to prove. He has not proved the logical possibility of an actual world in which three people and jealousy exist, and in which nothing else whatever exists. For to have proved this it would have to be true that 'being a person' and 'being jealous' were non-complex properties whose applicability does not entail the possession of any other property. But these are plainly properties that presuppose the applicability of other properties to whatever they apply to, and Broad has not considered whether those other properties would not be such that one at least did not apply to all three existents, and thus serve to distinguish one from the others, and so render possible a sufficient description of the one.—I think there has been a deal of loose thinking about "logical possibility" and that some usages of it have been illegitimate. We may remember that Leibniz was careful to distinguish between possibility and *compossibility*, and I could wish that Broad had discussed the whole matter on its own account in an "independent discussion".

So, to sum up, I cannot agree that Broad has established his contentions (i) that McTaggart has not shown reason for his principle of the dissimilarity of the diverse, (ii) and therefore shown no reason for believing that every particular must have an exclusive description, and (iii) that the principle of Sufficient Description is "nothing but a fallacious inference from a doubtful premise".

(3) *Determination*.—In Bk. III, Broad restates and examines McTaggart's statements about the determination of one quality by another, then considers Intrinsic Determination and the two connected relations, Presupposition and Requirement, next examines McTaggart's views on Causation as a special case of Intrinsic Determination, and passes in conclusion to Extrinsic Determination. He finds McTaggart's views about Intrinsic Determination "highly confused" and believes he failed to distinguish it from another relation which Broad calls Conveyance. McTaggart's position may be summarized thus: Not every quality of a particular intrinsically determines every other (there are non-reciprocating causes), yet none of its qualities are completely contingent to any of its others, so it follows that none of the qualities could be different from what they are and the rest remain unchanged. Extrinsic determination is both universal and reciprocal; all the qualities of a particular extrinsically determine one another.—When Broad reviewed Vol. I in 1921 (*Mind*, xxx, p. 324) he thought "this must be admitted", but he has since changed his mind. He now substitutes for McTaggart's statement an

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"accurate account" of what McTaggart meant, decides that extrinsic determination is not, as McTaggart said and he thought, a relation between characteristics, but one between facts, and now objects that in the argument on p. 113 of *N. of E.* McTaggart "probably failed to distinguish" two verbally similar though really different propositions, to wit: (1) one and the same particular cannot have each of two different natures, (2) one and the same particular could not have had one or other of two different natures. Broad then deals in his own way with the question whether it is ever consistent to suppose that a particular which in fact did exist might not have existed. The discussion seems very involved and after three careful readings I have failed to make sure that I grasp the meaning clearly.

(4) *The Composition and Division of Particulars, and Determining Correspondence.*—Broad first examines the views about groups and classes from which McTaggart led up to the conclusion that all substances are endlessly divisible. Though "quite certain" that there are "collective facts", Broad is uncertain whether there are particulars which are groups. He then turns to the notion of the content of a group, modifies McTaggart's definition of this, shows that every group *has* content, and that content in Broad's sense has the characteristics that McTaggart assigned to content in his own sense. McTaggart found no difficulty in one substance being several groups, as many as it has sets of parts. To Dr. Broad this is "sheer nonsense", and sense only if "is" be held to mean "is adequately divisible into". But *this* interpretation involves that the particulars so divisible will be *diverse* from all the groups, therefore not identical with them. What McTaggart asserts in defence of his view (*N. of E.*, p. 139) requires, in order to be true, that a group should be a quality, according to Broad, but for McTaggart a group is a particular. He therefore suggests that McTaggart should have said that one particular may be adequately divisible into each of several different groups. This "has the merit of not being nonsensical", but even so, Broad finds no reason to believe that there is an additional particular diverse from the particulars which are groups, hence no reason to believe there is anything to be called 'the universe' (i.e. one particular which contains all other particulars as parts). Broad, however, offers an alternative definition of the property of 'being a universe', and claims to show there is a particular answering to it.

He now passes to what he aptly calls "the watershed of the system" (i.e. the materials of chaps. xxi-xxiii *N. of E.*). There McTaggart holds that after due explanation it can be seen to be a self-evident and necessary truth that every particular is composed of other particulars; none is simple. We are thus "debarred from finding any natural units". Yet this endless divisibility of particulars, McTaggart admits, leads to almost insuperable difficulties, and he holds that there is only one supposition about the structure of the universe upon which the difficulties can be resolved. If the universe is a determining correspondence system, then there must be "an intrinsic natural system of classification in which all the content of the universe finds its place". It is enough that the divisibility of each particular be in one dimension. Broad discusses this point at length, decides that there is only one dimension in which the endless divisibility appears at all plausible, viz. duration, or what appears as such. Yet this is the very dimension in which McTaggart holds particulars to be *indivisible*, so Broad is led to deny the asserted self-evidence of the principle, and to doubt its truth.—I am uncertain whether McTaggart meant by "dimension" a Johnsonian "determinable"; also whether failure to find an *empirical* instance of a suitable dimension is a sufficient ground for rejecting the principle, though it is sufficient to cast doubt on it.

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Broad next restates what he thinks McTaggart claimed to prove in ch. xxiii of *N. of E.*, viz. that each set of parts of any particular must contain a term whose members have sufficient descriptions such that from them further sufficient descriptions are derivable of all members of all subsequent terms in the series. Broad concludes (a) that McTaggart's argument to prove this contains two fallacies ("gross" and "grosser"), and (b) that either the principle of Minimum Adequate Description is not self-evident or else it applies to no character. He adds that the latter alternative "would have served McTaggart's purpose as well as the conclusion he actually draws."

In Bk. V, Broad explores the difficult conception of determining correspondence. The whole analysis is long and the points involved complicated. It is not possible to abridge Broad's restatement, therefore impossible to reproduce it here. McTaggart maintains that the condition specified in the last paragraph can be satisfied only by showing that what exists has a certain form of structure (i.e. that the universe must either itself be a Determining Correspondence Hierarchy, or have sets of parts each of which is such an Hierarchy). Broad then gives a geometrical example. This, he claims, accomplishes three things: it illustrates what McTaggart means, provides an alternative solution to McTaggart's problem (without introducing determining correspondence), and applies to a spatially extended particular. The corollary from all this is, that if Broad's solution stands, McTaggart's conclusion in Vol. II that no particular can be extended, as distinct from being perceived as extended, is disproved. The complicated conception of determining correspondence is analysed into an array of conditions, and these happily illustrated in Dr. Broad's best manner by a hypothetical "mutual admiration society" (I fail to see where the "admiration" comes in), viz. a society of minds which perceive themselves and each other, their own and each other's perceptions, and nothing else; where "perception" throughout is allowed to be of the kind that McTaggart describes in Vol. II. "If we are allowed to play such tricks with the properties of Matter and Space", says Broad, "as McTaggart has played" with those of Mind and Perception in order to represent 'being a perception of' as a determining correspondence relation, then non-mental examples of determining correspondence could be provided. Several consequences of the determining correspondence principle are examined, and it is shown that if the only relation of determining correspondence is that of 'being a perception of', then Primary Wholes in the universe will be societies, Primary Parts the selves which are their members, and Secondary Parts those selves' perceptions of various kinds. And since it is more appropriate to regard those parts as being "differentiated into parts" than as "built out of parts", it follows that a pluralistic view of the structure of the universe will be more appropriate than a monistic view.

Lastly Broad gives his own explanation, with diagrams, of the six suppositions McTaggart proposed as being alternatively possible specifications of the structure of the universe, the degree of its internal unity depending on which of these suppositions is true, this being a matter which McTaggart recognized could not be settled on *a priori* grounds.

What is the proper verdict to return on this examination I do not pretend to know, but I think there are several comments that may be fairly made.

Firstly, I think there is little doubt, as Broad says, that "had McTaggart lived to read the present work, he would certainly have refuted some of the criticisms, have produced amazingly ingenious and unexpected answer

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to others, and have started to rebuild those parts of the system which really had suffered in the bombardment" (p. li). Broad also admits "it is also very likely that *some* of the many criticisms I have made on the various links in the chain of argument by which McTaggart professes to prove the Principle of Determining Correspondence are positively fallacious. . . . Again, it may well be that some of the criticisms which are valid could be obviated by a slight modification of the argument" (p. 452). Yet, he thinks, "enough thrusts must have got home to riddle so long and so sinuous an argument."—It is certainly the argument by which McTaggart thought to establish determining correspondence which, far more than any of his others, left me in a state of disturbing uncertainty, and this has only deepened since I have read Broad's discussion. If there are some "thrusts which must have got home", I think it vastly more probable that they will be found in his criticism concerned with the implications of endless divisibility of particulars and with the Determining Correspondence principle, than in his criticisms falling in the first three books of his work. It is extremely improbable, of course, that McTaggart produced a wholly impeccable system, and I should have thought as improbable that he produced one so extremely erroneous as Broad would have his reader suppose. For in my extensive list of references I find only four places recorded where Broad admits himself in agreement with McTaggart, and one of these views (concerning Causation) though compatible with his system is not implied in it or in any way special to it, but held by many who would not accept McTaggart's method, arguments or conclusions.

Secondly, I doubt whether some of Broad's numerous restatements do put what McTaggart "really means" more clearly and better than McTaggart's own statements. That the restatements are "exact", and in accordance with the preferred forms of expression at Cambridge since Russellian logic took root there, is not in question. But if exact statement of meaning is a logical matter, clear and sure apprehension of it is a psychological one. Though I am not a stranger to the forms of expression preferred at Cambridge, I had not infrequently to hunt up McTaggart's own words to make sure I had grasped the meaning of a restatement. It seems to be tacitly supposed that an exact statement must be clear. But an exact statement is often a long one, and for a clear and sure apprehension of meaning, a briefer, more natural, and perhaps even less exact statement may be more effective.

It was a matter of surprise and admiration for Dr. Broad that McTaggart managed to keep his head through his long and complicated trains of formal argument without recourse to the aid of a symbolism. I think this was a double advantage. For had he paid more attention than he did he might have become beset with problems concerned with the refinements of that symbolism, and never reached any philosophical conclusions worth noticing. Further, since the value of a symbolic notation in philosophy is extremely limited—for one can have no confidence in what is served up in symbolic dress until it has been re-translated into good, clear English—he avoided the risk of the 'slips' that attends such re-translation, and was able to use a more attractive and less tedious medium of expression. Some too may feel, like Descartes, that while our thinking proceeds as 'concretely' as possible, with the least dependence on notational devices, the risk of error, or of becoming lost in ungrounded abstractions, is minimized.

Thirdly, among errors of omission, there is one, I think, which is serious in a system which claims to demonstrate all its conclusions from self-evident premises and require only two empirical premises to be granted. Dr. Broad notices it, but does not harp on it. McTaggart claims to have proved that there is more than one particular existent. From this, it seems, he passes

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silently to assuming an unlimited number of particulars existent. That there are two existents at least may be certified experientially; that there is an indefinite number is presupposed up and down the system, but so far as I can see it is nowhere proved.

Fourthly, Broad relates (pp. 13, 14) that McTaggart's earliest drafts of Vol. I were entitled *Dialectic of Existence*, but that he dropped his original plan of using a dialectical method similar to Hegel's, because (a) it "would be questioned *in limine* by many philosophers" (though McTaggart continued to hold that his own interpretation of the method could be defended against their preliminary objections), therefore (b) "he wisely decided in the end to use straightforward deduction" rather than "the compromising help" of the dialectical method; (c) though he affirmed the possibility of the chief characteristics of reality being connected in the way required by the dialectical method, he admitted that "they did not seem, as a matter of fact," to be so connected, and that "this was conclusive for him."—On this I would suggest (i) that McTaggart may have been "wise" for the reason (c) but certainly not for reason (a). No matter what method he had used, some philosophers, and probably quite competent ones, would have objected. For there is no separate, "antecedent" and extra-philosophical question of what is the proper method in philosophy. Not only is this question itself a philosophical one, but it is one that cannot be solved "antecedently" and, if soluble at all, probably only after that "proper method" has actually been employed and found successful. And (ii) even though McTaggart were wise in using "straightforward deduction", it does not follow that he need also have taken over from his Cambridge colleagues their atomistic conceptions. Here he may have been unwise. I have long surmised that the forms of statement which the use of those conceptions involves may have led him to compromise unnecessarily the presentation of his philosophy, and that he might have reached its conclusions by straightforward deduction but without the particular logical armature we find introduced in the *Nature of Existence*. Broad's *Examination* tends to confirm me in this surmise.

Lastly, although the temper of Dr. Broad's conclusions must be understood as extremely unfavourable to all that is most important in Vol. I of the *Nature of Existence*, it is a very desirable thing that his *Examination* should be available for admirers of McTaggart's masterpiece. I should like to say I have benefited immensely from it, though by way of reaction; and as a result of seeing McTaggart's positions from an unaccustomed angle, I have been able to appreciate more fully than before the excellence and profundity of his work.

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PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE.

SOME AFTER-THOUGHTS OF M. BERGSON.

It is precision, M. Bergson suggests in his last book,¹ that has most been lacking in philosophy. Imprecision declares itself in two respects: philosophical systems of the past apply indifferently to many imaginary worlds, and so allows this actual world to slip through their meshes; and they ignore the sense or direction evinced in the order and process of this actual world. Such systems "do not fit the reality in which we live, but are too large for it. Any of them would apply equally well to a world in which plants, animals, and men did not exist, or one in which men went without food and drink and did not sleep or dream or rave, to a world in which men were born decrepit and suckled in old age. . . . Such systems of conceptions are so abstract, consequently so vast, that they can be made to hold everything possible alongside the real". That we should interpret them always with an eye on this actual world and so regard them as being literal transcriptions of the actual is a witness to the practical bias of our thinking and a quite arbitrary reading of them. Contrasted with these highly abstract systems, M. Bergson claims that his own explanation "adheres to its object" and leaves no gap in which an alternative one could find foothold.

It was Spencer's *First Principles* that early stirred M. Bergson's dogmatic slumber. Spencer had not sufficiently examined the ultimate concepts of mechanics, and Bergson, in attempting to make good this defect, realized the necessity of taking time seriously. Spencer's whole enterprise remained to be begun again. Time escapes the mathematicians: its essence being to *pass*, no one of its parts remains when another presents itself, therefore superposition of part upon part for the purpose of measurement is impossible. "For a duration to be superposable, hence measurable, it would have to be non-enduring, hence not be a duration. To postulate an occurrence at the end of time *t* is simply to express the fact that we have counted, from now to then, a number *t* of simultaneities of a certain kind. Between them may intervene what we choose; time may accelerate enormously, even infinitely, nothing would be changed for the mathematician, physicist or astronomer." Time in process science uniformly treats as time elapsed, and when plain people speak of time, what they are commonly thinking of is not duration itself but its measure. Reflection requires us to abandon this practice. A direct vision of duration into which common prejudices have not entered shows us "continuity which is neither unity nor multiplicity," and this character is destroyed when translated into the spatial form of our normal concept of time. Throughout the history of philosophy and science we find space and time represented as co-ordinates of the same genus; to pass from one to the other it suffices to replace "juxtaposition" by "succession". Science had its own reasons for thus turning its back on real duration, but meta-

¹ HENRI BERGSON, *La Pensée et le Mouvant: Essais et Conférences*. Pp. 323, 1934. Paris: Alcan, 25 francs.

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physics, without having those reasons, none the less copied it. Language too aided and abetted the conspiracy, for the words which designate time-distinctions are borrowed from the vocabulary of space. The conception of moments juxtaposed in linear file prove a convenient substitute for real duration for social purposes,—action, conversation and calculation—but such moments cannot be so recomposed as to give real duration.

M. Bergson believes that the "eternal" problems of metaphysics are not eternal, i.e., insoluble. He believes that these *problems* really relate not to what such words as time, change and motion denote, but only to "their conceptual envelopes" which we falsely take for the realities or their equivalents. So the reform he sought to introduce into philosophy does not assume the form of elaborating a conceptual explanation which should win acceptance over others already conceptually elaborated. It consists in showing for each of the traditional problems of which his several works treat that what in each case constitutes the problem a *problem* is precisely the character of the *conceptions* in which it is stated, so that once the misleading representation is eliminated the problem is seen no longer to exist, and what exists is directly intuited in its real character, "duration is seen as continual creation"—and metaphysics issues in self-revealing experience. So, since philosophy is the study of philosophical *problems*, and since these originate in, and are constituted by, conceptions incarnate in our language and our customary habits and categories of thought, it follows that whatever be the problem in hand, the effort to solve it will always be an attempt to undo the work of intellectual transposition. What intellect can make it also can unmake. So for M. Bergson discovery in philosophy does not consist in forming a conception which has not been formed before, it consists in uncovering what has been concealed under a variety of conceptual accretions, and in experiencing the existence thus revealed. It will also follow that philosophical knowledge is not a theoretically obtainable system of propositions, nor a body of results conceptually and linguistically communicable, but an experience of that whose positive character cannot be transmitted through spatializing concepts, except when the existent is itself spatial.

That conception and language are the philosopher's *faux amis* Bergson finds aptly illustrated in a prevalent view of possibility and its relation to the actual. Direct experience of duration discloses "perpetual creation of possibility and not only of reality". Now many hold that any event which occurs would not occur had it not been possible of occurrence; in order to be actual it must have been possible. But this is to pun on two senses of "possible". From the negative sense, 'there exists no insurmountable obstacle to that thing's occurrence', we pass unwittingly to the positive one, conceiving that whatever is actual could have been foreseen or foreknown to be about to become actual by a mind sufficiently informed in advance. Thus in this second sense, we commonly suppose that the possibility of a thing's existence itself pre-existed, and there arises "the mirage of the present in the past". The former sense is of course a truism, the latter Bergson thinks plainly false. "So soon as the musician has a precise and complete idea of the symphony he will compose, his symphony is composed". And *a fortiori* of any state of the universe—"whose novelty is far more rich and unanticipated than that of the greatest symphony"—the pre-existence of its possibility is absurd. To Bradley's "once true, always true", Bergson would deny the "retroactive effect"—"as if a judgment could exist before the terms which compose it", "as if the terms do not date from the apparition of the objects they represent". The consequences of this illusion are numerous; one is an error which vitiates our conception of the past, another is our pretension to anticipate

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the future. In all these cases possibility is confused with knowledge 'after the event'. Since, Bergson maintains, we have sensed red and yellow, we can know orange to be composed of them, but if orange alone had been sensed and red and yellow not appeared in the world, then orange would not be composed of red and yellow.

The conclusions which issued from this earlier work of Bergson, and appeared at that time somewhat daring, required psychology to break with associationism, and philosophy to reject the positivism of Comte, the agnosticism of Spencer and the Kantian relativity of knowledge. Reassured about duration and its knowability through acquaintance alone, Bergson then examined the claim of intuition to become the method of his whole philosophy. Many thinkers before had employed this supra-intellectual faculty, but believing intelligence to operate in time, they falsely inferred that an intuition which transcended intelligence would therefore operate out of time. This step Bergson did not take. He conceived that the object of an intuitive philosophy should be, not to encircle synoptically the totality of existences, but to secure for each "an explanation which would adapt to it exactly and exclusively". Whether the universe is a unity experience alone can decide, and decide only at the end of its search. Each new problem requires its own and a new effort, the solution of one problem would not be deducible from that of another, and the expectation of a universal science has to be renounced. Once more M. Bergson seeks to correct certain misunderstandings about intuition into which he believes his critics have fallen. Intuition is said to "seize a succession which is not juxtaposition", "the uninterrupted prolongation of the past into the present which is encroaching on the future". Intuition is "the direct vision of mind by mind", "a seeing which is hardly to be distinguished from the object seen", a knowing "which is contact and even coincidence." Our own consciousness is divided from that of others less sharply than is our own body from other bodies, and "irreflective sympathy and antipathy testify to a possible interpenetration of minds." Intuition is laborious and can be practised only intermittently, and, like intellect, it makes use of language and so finishes by lodging itself in concepts (e.g. duration, qualitative multiplicity, unconscious, etc.). The concepts of intelligence are immediately clear, but the idea which issues from an intuition usually begins in obscurity. Yet there are two sorts of clarity to distinguish. An idea may be clear because it presents us with a new arrangement of component ideas with all of which we are already familiar, or it may be clear because it is "radically new and absolutely simple", and therefore impossible of being reconstituted with pre-existent elements. Since this latter kind of idea cannot be easily and readily related with conceptions already systematized, we are tempted to declare it incomprehensible. But if we accept it provisionally, carrying it with us into the several departments of our knowledge, that which at first seemed obscure will now be seen to dissipate obscurities. It will resolve or dissolve problems we thought insoluble, they will be seen either to disappear or to require different statement.

In assigning to metaphysics a limited field (mind) and a special method (intuition), Bergson distinguishes metaphysics from science. But to each he attributes an equal value, and uses the opportunity to correct further misunderstandings of his views on intellect and on the 'knowledge-value' of science. Science as well as philosophy can attain to the ultimate character of reality, and "every natural belief should be taken as true, every appearance for a reality, until its illusory character has been established." The burden of proof falls to those who allege science to be relative or assert knowing to deform or to construct its objects.—"We ask only that science remains

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scientific and does not unwittingly dress itself out in metaphysics, and offer itself thus to the ignorant and semi-scientific as being science." In this way science fulfils half the programme of ancient metaphysics, the other half falling to intuitive metaphysics. So metaphysics does not study the same objects as science with the hope of attaining to a more ultimate knowledge about them, each has a different object and the knowledge each yields is equally ultimate. Both may become equally exact and certain, so it is a verbal matter and solely one of convenience whether we regard them as being two departments of science or of metaphysics. Inner experience finds no language strictly appropriate to its needs, and is compelled to resort to concepts and eke them out with suitable images. But M. Bergson thinks when metaphysics has "enlarged" these concepts and "rendered them more supple", it will have accomplished a reform comparable with that which modern physics has effected. Yet this does not mean that we are to expect definite conclusions and radical solutions from metaphysics, for this would exact from it a manipulation of concepts, and so leave it in the region of pure possibilities. The incomplete solutions and provisional conclusions it does reach will, however, acquire an increasing probability. From the moment philosophy sets its problem in terms of mind and not of matter, when it renounces the use of concepts in an enterprise for which they were not made, we are straightway released from the servitude speculation imposes. The real problem here as elsewhere is really to *find* the problem, thence to *state* it, rather than to solve it, for a speculative problem is solved directly it is properly stated. From the moment of correct statement the solution exists; though it remains covered, it has but to be *uncovered*. To state the problem, however, is not merely to discover but to invent—discovery relates to what already exists and is sure to reveal itself soon or late; invention gives existence to that which does not exist, and so could never become revealed.

Every philosophical problem implicitly raises the question of the origin and value of general ideas and the question demands a separate solution for each special problem. Diversification of mental functions must be explained by the fundamental exigencies of life. Applying this principle to the origin of general ideas, we see that every living being, perhaps every organ and tissue of it, generalizes and classifies in virtue of its capacity to select from the most diverse objects and substances of its environment those which best can satisfy this or that want, and to neglect the rest. Such generalization is usually of course lived, and not thought. And the general idea, reflectively and consciously created, originates similarly in an "automatic extraction of resemblances". The resemblance of objects and states we perceive is that property they all possess of eliciting from our bodies the same reaction, inducing the same attitude and inciting the same movement. Some few resemblances are objective—"inherent in reality itself"—others again are partly relative to the convenience of individual and society. We may discern three groups of resemblances which are translated into general ideas. The first, essentially biological, represents vital activity as itself exhibiting certain resemblances, e.g. genus and species, as if it followed a limited number of plans of structure, as if it had, by hereditary transmission and by transformation, ordered organisms in hierarchical series. Again, there are those resemblances in inorganic matter which we translate into the general ideas of sensible qualities of determinate kinds, of chemical elements and compounds, and of physical properties. The principle of comparison connecting those of the former group is *resemblance* in a strict sense, that connecting those of the second set is that of *identity*, where the identical appertains to the geometrical and static, and resemblance to the vital. The third group of resemblances which find

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expression in general ideas is created wholly by human action and speculation—an instance of human fabrication not exercised on matter. Once possessed of these three categories of general ideas, intelligence is able to perceive yet a further resemblance, viz. that which it translates into the general idea of a general idea, thence to proceed to construct others at will, so facilitating social life and pure speculation.

M. Bergson lastly employs these findings to illustrate in what respects, and how far, there is need to reform, modify or even eliminate conceptual thought in order to open the way for the free play of intuition and enable us to exorcise such "false problems" as those of Greek sceptics and of Kant and the Neo-Kantians.—"The merit of Kant was to have developed a natural illusion in all its consequences and have presented it in the most systematic form. But he preserved the illusion and indeed based his philosophy upon it. Let us dissipate that illusion, and thereby restore to mind, through science and metaphysics, knowledge of absolute reality." There will then be but one philosophy as there is but one science, and a progressive and co-operative effort of both.

S. V. KEELING.

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Die Philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien. By RUDOLF METZ. 2 Bände. (Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1935. Bd. i, pp. xv + 442; Bd. ii, pp. vi + 359. Price for the two Bände Geh. 40 R.M., Geb. 44 R.M.)

Dr. Rudolf Metz has been known long to students as a German Gelehrter possessed of a very thorough and competent knowledge of English philosophy. He is the author of two valuable monographs in Fromman's series, entitled *Klassiker der Philosophie*. One on *Berkeley*, which appeared in 1925, is a careful and reliable exposition of Berkeley's idealism in its various phases; the other on *Hume* appeared in 1929, and in it the writer not only provides a trustworthy account of Hume's analysis of experience but endeavours to indicate the influence of Hume's thought on subsequent speculation. In the two volumes now before us, Dr. Metz has set before himself a far larger and more ambitious task. His aim here is no less than to trace the development and progress of British philosophical inquiry from about the middle of the nineteenth century to the present day. He is mindful of the fact that until the end of the last century the relation between German and English speculative thinking was a close and fruitful one, and that this relation has been sadly impeded through the War and the political conditions since the War. He is hopeful that his work may do something towards restoring the kind of relationship that once subsisted between Leibniz and Locke, between Hume and Kant, between Hegel and his English followers. He ventured, so he tells us, upon his undertaking with the express purpose of trying to do what he could towards bringing the philosophical reflexion in the two lands closer together and awakening mutual understanding between the thinkers of both countries.

Let it be said at once that the work has been accomplished with admirable skill and genuine scholarship. The author's acquaintance with recent English speculation is amazingly wide, circumspect, and accurate. He appears to have read wellnigh everything, not only the books of outstanding importance, but those also of more modest pretensions; and not only books but contributions to the Aristotelian Society and other learned bodies, articles in *Mind* and various philosophical journals, let alone periodicals of a more popular sort. Hardly anything, indeed, seems to have escaped his ken. And he has been remarkably successful in stationing himself at the standpoint of the particular thinker whose thought he is engaged in expounding, and in viewing such reflexion from within its own position, rather than from without as an external spectator. Moreover, he brings to bear upon his material a perfectly impartial and unprejudiced judgment; one may read through the whole of these eight hundred pages without discovering where the author's own sympathies lie.

I write as one who is not unfamiliar with the immense labour involved in an enterprise of this description. Nearly forty years ago I was induced, as a young student, by Professor Heinze, of Leipzig, to furnish a survey of English philosophy in the nineteenth century for Ueberweg's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, which Professor Heinze was at that time editing. Several editions of this work have been issued later; and in the last edition, published in 1928, I have covered—on a much smaller scale, of course—the ground which Dr. Metz

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traverses. One of the difficulties in the way of writing such a survey is alluded to by Dr. Metz in his Preface. It is almost impossible, namely, to deal with the various philosophical movements which call for consideration without arranging them under certain headings or labels, such as "empirical," "idealistic," "realistic," and so on, labels which in numerous instances, are positively misleading, and which are becoming more and more so. Dr. Metz takes me to task (ii, p. 283), for instance, for grouping Stout under the head of critical idealists, and maintains that his position would be more appropriately designated neo-realistic. I imagine Stout himself would exclaim: "A plague on both your houses!" Yet it is, perhaps, worth while pointing out that in the Abstract of the second course of Gifford Lectures, delivered in 1921, but not yet published in book-form, Stout observes that "if we drop the untenable view of knowledge as an external relation, the points urged by the neo-realists confirm instead of upset the idealist position." But I agree entirely with Dr. Metz when he insists that these short labels should be taken for no more than mere guide-posts, and in no way be introduced as substitutes for a critical treatment of the material itself.

The work as a whole is divided into two chief Parts. The first Part, occupying about half of the first volume, is devoted to a description of the philosophical movements dominant in England and Scotland during most of the nineteenth century; in the second Part, which occupies three-fourths of the entire work, the more recent movements from the end of the last century to the present day are handled in much greater detail.

Four sections subdivide the first Part. These deal respectively with the Scotch school of Reid, Hamilton, and Mansel, the empirical and utilitarian school, the evolutionist school, and the religious philosophical writers from Newman onwards. Naturally, in the second section the lion's share of space is accorded to John Stuart Mill, of whose logical doctrines and theory of knowledge a fairly adequate account is given. I suppose it must be admitted that German philosophy was to Mill "a book with seven seals, to lift the secrets of which he felt not the slightest inclination" (i, p. 40); but it is rightly noted that Croom Robertson clearly saw that English empiricism needed to be supplemented by the profounder insight of the Kantian Critique (*Ibid.*, p. 52). There follows a careful summary of the ethical teaching of Henry Sidgwick, and then a shorter notice of Carveth Read's metaphysic of nature and of his treatise on moral science. In the third section, as was inevitable in a German book on the subject, Herbert Spencer is treated as the central figure, "one of the greatest master-builders and systematizers, which the history of philosophy has ever seen" (i, p. 81), although the writings of Edith Simcox, Leslie Stephen, and Samuel Butler are by no means neglected. The section concludes with a full and well-informed account of the metaphysical, ethical, and sociological work of Leonard Hobhouse. There is, further, a short Appendix on English positivism. I am particularly glad to find that in the fourth section, Dr. Metz does justice to the predominant position of James Martineau, and the strikingly original character of his philosophy of religion, which unfortunately is scarcely known at all in Germany. Emphasis is rightly laid upon Martineau's theory of the Will as the true causal activity in the universe, and a full treatment is accorded to his attempt to elaborate a theistic philosophy on purely rational lines. My only regret is that Dr. Metz has passed over Martineau's analysis of perception and his theory of knowledge, which have always seemed to me most valuable portions of his philosophizing, and, in fact, to anticipate not a few of the theories current at the present time.

To pass now to the second Part, the first section of which, taking up the last two hundred pages of vol. i, is concerned with the new Idealistic Movement.

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An opening sketch is given of its initiation and early history in the hands of such men as Coleridge, Carlyle, John Grote, and, above all, J. F. Ferrier. Here the author is manifestly largely indebted to Professor Muirhead's recent volume, *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*. Then follows a description of the work of "the pioneers" (*die Bahnbrecher*), as the author calls them—Hutchison Stirling, T. H. Green, and Lewis Nettleship. Hutchison Stirling's *Secret of Hegel* almost, it is true, defies any attempt to outline its contents, yet it abounds in ideas of a suggestive and thought-provoking kind. Has, I wonder, any German, with the exception of Dr. Metz, ever read it? Dr. Metz is, however, of opinion that Hutchison Stirling did penetrate to the essence of the Hegelian system. "Over and over again Stirling lays stress upon the concrete character of Kant's and Hegel's thinking and upon the difficulty of advancing from the abstractions of the understanding to the concrete thought of reason, in which the truth of a notion comes first of all to light, through means of a comprehensive grasp of its opposing factors" (i, p. 245). An exposition of T. H. Green's position is comparatively easy; and Dr. Metz brings out, I think, its main features with praiseworthy lucidity. Green's ultimate "spiritual principle" exhibits itself, he argues, in several different aspects—now as Kantian *Vernunft*, now as Hegelian *Geist*, and now as Berkeleyan God (i, p. 256). Probably, the British philosopher who stood nearest to Hegel was Edward Caird, and our author's account of Caird's method of advancing from Kant to Hegel is especially noteworthy. Caird's religion is, he insists, in a certain sense, pantheism, far as he himself would have been from acknowledging the fact (i, p. 273). As other English Hegelians, William Wallace, D. G. Ritchie, Henry Jones, J. H. Muirhead, J. S. Mackenzie, Lord Haldane, Sir James Baillie, and J. A. Smith, each receive a share of recognition. Under the head of "Absolute Idealism," a very full and exhaustive exposition is given of Bradley's system, whose *Appearance and Reality* was translated into German in 1928. Bradley, it is held, was led to an independent handling of philosophical problems by a study of Hegel, and his philosophical work as a whole and in special directions was deeply indebted to Hegelian influence, yet in all that he wrote the impress of his own original reflexion is apparent, and he was in no sense a strict Hegelian (i, p. 303). In particular, it is rightly urged that his thinking owed not a little to Herbart and Lotze. From Bradley, the author passes to Bosanquet and Joachim, and then proceeds to unfold in greater detail the pluralism of McTaggart. McTaggart stands, he thinks, at the extreme wing of the Hegelian Left (i, p. 349). The main difference between Hegel's thought and McTaggart's is to be discerned in the concrete and experiential character of the one and the abstract and non-experiential character of the other (i, p. 357). Then follows a treatment of the "personal idealists"—Pringle-Pattison, James Seth, Sorley and Rashdall. James Ward is rather awkwardly dealt with under the head of "Theists and Religious Philosophers," seeing that the thinkers just named have an equal claim to be so designated. But the main principles of Ward's philosophy are faithfully delineated. And, alongside of Ward's writings, those of Professor A. E. Taylor are handled, although I imagine Professor Taylor would now hesitate in calling his philosophy idealistic, at all events in a metaphysical sense.

The second volume of Dr. Metz's work opens with a description of pragmatism, mainly as portrayed in the writings of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, although the contributions of Alfred Sidgwick, Howard V. Knox, and Henry Sturt likewise receive due recognition. But the major part of the volume is devoted to a treatment of recent realism, under what I cannot but regard as the misleading headings, the older and the new realism.

As initiating the former, a sketch is given of Shadworth Hodgson's meta-

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physic, whose system is, however, more accurately described as a system of critical empiricism (ii, p. 33). It is gratifying to find that Dr. Metz is fully alive to the great worth and value of Robert Adamson's contribution to English philosophical thought, a contribution which has rarely had assigned to it the importance it unquestionably possesses. Adamson himself was doubtful whether the change of view which he desiderated ought to be described as that from idealism to realism, or as that from rationalism to naturalism. But there can, I think, be little doubt that in his later period he was tending towards a distinctively realistic position. Mind, he held, only knows itself in knowing a nature which is distinct from itself. Mind knows nature only in so far as it is a part of nature, and its knowledge of nature, its apprehension of fact other than itself, is the living tie that binds it to nature and to the sum-total of reality. Dr. Metz links me with Adamson, and I am proud enough to rank as a disciple of my distinguished teacher. I have no fault to find with the account which is given of my work, save that I could have wished that the import of the distinction I have drawn between the content of an act of apprehension and the content apprehended had been pointed out. There is, I have urged, a fundamental difference between the awareness (say) of a blue colour and the blue colour itself. Dr. Metz concludes this section with accounts of Case's "physical realism," of Cook Wilson's logical and epistemological theories, and of the work of Professor Prichard, Mr. Joseph, Dr. Ross, and Professor Aaron.

The next section on the "New Realism" opens with a long and appreciative account of the writings of Professor G. E. Moore, starting with the celebrated essay on "The Refutation of Idealism," published in 1903, and proceeding to the essay entitled "A Defence of Common Sense," published in 1925. A concise summary is also given of Moore's ethical theories. Then follows a still more detailed treatment of the philosophies of Bertrand Russell and of Professor Whitehead, which seem to be handled in a careful and discerning way. Finally, of course, the systems of Alexander and of Lloyd Morgan are expounded at considerable length; and the contributions of Professor Broad, Professor Laird, and Professor Kemp Smith receive proper attention. Strangely enough, Mr. W. E. Johnson is also included under the label "new realists."

The last sections are devoted to cursory accounts of modern mathematical logic, the scientific theories of Eddington, Jeans, and J. S. Haldane, the recent developments in psychology, and the religious philosophy of Lord Balfour, Dean Inge, and Baron von Hügel.

The printers are to be congratulated on the way in which they have produced the two volumes. These are remarkably free from misprints (although a curious liberty is taken with Professor Broad's christian name), and the titles of English books are almost invariably correctly given.

G. DAWES HICKS.

Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends. Edited by J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL.D., F.B.A.
(London: Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. 1 p. 326. Price 12s. 6d.)

Bosanquet was on terms of friendship with the leading philosophers of his own generation, and with several of his juniors. He was not disinclined to amicable discussions on paper, and his correspondents naturally treasured the more important of his letters. These, collected by Professor Muirhead, reveal him as a man of charming character, gentle and courteous and always eager to find points of agreement rather than of difference. This courtesy must be allowed for by those who (like myself) were disposed to be elated by kindly appreciation from him.

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I do not think that Bosanquet's philosophical opinions altered much between his earlier and his latest books. He wished to be ranked as an idealist, but not as a mentalist. In an interesting letter to Hoernlé (p. 152) he says: "I want to give up the term Idealism and say Speculative philosophy or something of that kind. The muddle with mentalism is so recurrent." I have long thought—ever since I read Sorley's brilliant article in the *Hibbert Journal* on the two meanings of idealism—that this confusion is inevitable as long as post-Kantian "idealism" is allowed to bear the same name as the Platonic tradition. Bosanquet defines realism as "the conviction that certain objects are independent of mind." This position is defended by some realists, but it is not the doctrine of Platonism, which, nevertheless, is realistic in its strong opposition to mentalism.

Bosanquet also wished to be regarded as a disciple as well as a friend of Bradley, and I do not think he ever willingly opposed Bradley's views. But in temperament they were unlike. Bradley has been called a mystic; and though some may think this absurd, I do not agree with them. Bosanquet, though a Platonist, distrusted, I think, the poetical, imaginative, myth-making method which Plato employed when he tried to give vividness to his deepest intuitions. In his letter to me he says: "We are not to look, in principle, for another world consisting of pure values and nothing else." "A true dialectical advance is necessarily from abstract to concrete. I shrink from the dialectical pyramid." To which I think I should answer that though we must accept the hard saying of Plotinus that "there is nothing yonder that is not also here," and though we must try not to picture heaven as a second physical world in which the evils of earth are redressed, the ideal which floats before us can only be made real to us by poetry, imagination, and symbolism, which are the natural language of religion. Bosanquet's stern intellectual integrity checked him when he approached this region.

He belonged to his own generation in rejecting the Christian idea of beatitude as *fruition*. "There is nothing anywhere but probation" (p. 249). And so, as there can hardly be any probation for minds removed from earthly conditions, he explicitly gives up the hope of individual immortality. I am a little surprised that while rejecting the idea of fruition, he quotes with approval the well-known and exquisite passage from Bradley's book on Truth and Reality. "For love and beauty and delight, it is no matter where they have shown themselves, there is no death, no change; and this conclusion is true. These things do not die, since the paradise in which they bloom is immortal. This paradise is in no special region nor in any given particular spot in time and space. It is here, it is everywhere where any finite being is lifted into that higher life which alone is making reality." There is not a word of this which Plotinus might not have written.

There does not seem to be any very wide difference between Bosanquet and the moderate realists. But when, towards the end of his life, he entered upon a civil correspondence with some of the Italian New Idealists, he must soon have realized that his divergence from them was fundamental. No two attitudes could be further apart than the deification of history in Croce and the rooted distrust of its value which Bosanquet expresses in no uncertain language. "To throw our ideals into the future is the death of all sane idealism." Neither from the past nor from the future did he expect to find much guidance in philosophy. "I do not think history can reform itself except by ceasing to be history" (p. 148).

To Professor Webb he writes: "Jesus is, *qua* human, a part, so to speak, of the incarnation; it is only the special historical tradition that makes him the whole of it" (p. 215). Christians who have any sense of the way in which new

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ideas establish themselves in history will be ready to admit the truth of this statement. It takes two to tell the truth, one to speak, and one to hear; and it takes many more than two to found a great religion.

My personal debt to Bosanquet's books is very great. The only doctrine of his which I refuse to swallow is that of the General Will, which seems to me to be metaphysically a figment, and practically a stick for the backs of minorities.

We are very grateful to Professor Muirhead for his labour of love. Bosanquet is secure of his place among the great British philosophers.

W. R. INGE.

The Ethics of Power, or The Problem of Evil. By PHILIP LEON, M.A. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 315. Price 10s. 6d.)

We are being told that philosophy is too remote from practice and has too little to say on the pressing questions of the hour. This is a book which neither in intention nor effect is open to this charge. "The fundamental characteristic of our day," writes its author, "is worship of power or greatness," and the task he sets himself is to trace this characteristic to its roots, to expose its fundamental wrongness, and to indicate the only way of escape from it. It is in fact, as he calls it, a "Sermon."

Mr. Leon has hitherto been known chiefly by his articles in *Mind* and *Philosophy*, but these have raised great expectations in his readers which his book more than fulfils. Following Plato's division of the elements in human nature he states his thesis in so many (rather more) words as follows: "Appetition or the desire for processes in oneself or in others yields the egoistic life which includes altruism. Ambition is the desire for position and for processes only as symbols of this. It seeks supremacy, superiority. It makes the egotistic life. The moral desire is for right situations (union, at-oneness) embodying Goodness, and for processes only as ingredients in these. It makes the genuinely moral life."¹ But in the sequel the first and the third of these subjects receive comparatively little attention. The main portion of the book is concerned with the second. It is necessary to remember this, and that the book does not profess to be one on general moral philosophy, as otherwise it would be too like a logic which started with an analysis of negative judgments, or (to borrow a metaphor from Mr. Leon's own picturesque phraseology) like a voyage which started for the Isles of the Blest through the pit of Avernus. What we have is an extremely suggestive study of evil in the particular form of Egotism by the method of what the author calls "cumulative description," giving us a kind of "moral phenomenology" rather than a moral philosophy. He thus is enabled to approach his subject in a thoroughly modernist spirit, but he is too widely read both in literature and philosophy, and too keenly aware of the snares of Modernism to commit himself to the crudities with which in the writings of too many of its leaders it has become identified. Coming at once to the central contention, he has done well in trying to make clear the difference between the two attitudes of concernment with states of the self, in their nature passing, which he calls "processes" and concernment with the self as occupying a certain position, either as an individual or as a member of one or other of the social groups with which the individual "identifies" himself. Whether (*pace* George Meredith's *Egoist* and the *Oxford Dictionary*) he is justified in taking egoism as the right word for a state of the soul, the vice of which is precisely that the idea of

¹ P. 23 (abbreviated).

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the ego or self, as a whole of some kind, has simply dropped out, its place being taken by passing likes and dislikes, is another question. For the rest the reader will find a wealth of subtle analysis and admirable literary illustration in the central chapters on "Egotism in Itself," "Collective Egotism" in its various forms, family, class, national and racial, "The Differentiation of Egotism," "Egotism and Morality." These are followed by two chapters on "Egotism and Evil" and "Moral Error and Punishment," one (all too short) on "Rightness and Goodness" and an epilogue on the "Sermon's Moral."

I have already noted the author's adherence to the Platonic psychology. But he makes no secret of his departure from it in one important particular. While Plato attributes to the element he calls "spirit," a secret alliance with "reason," Mr. Leon sees in the corresponding element of "ambition," the very soul of unreason and evil. Which is the truer view? We must, I think, agree that there can be no genuine goodness so long as conduct is egocentric instead of agathocentric. It was because the older definition of the principle of goodness as "self-realization" left so much ambiguity on this head, and required so much pulling about to make it serve the purpose intended, that it failed to find general acceptance. But to remove the idea of self from the centre is one thing, to refuse it any place at all in the good man's consciousness is quite another. On the principle *corruptio optimi pessima* (in the present case *corruptio melioris prior*) is not the very fact that the idea of the self, when corrupted, is more destructive of the good than that of the merely liked or disliked, a sign that it has more of the possibility of good in it? If the idea of being something in oneself and of being true to that self is to be expunged from the moral vocabulary, shall we not have to make our peace with literature, including the Gospels and Shakespeare, as well as with academic philosophy? Taking the same point from the objective side, is there really, we might ask, the discontinuity which the writer, here following Bergson, seems to find between the higher or "open" morality of loyalty to the good and the lower or closed morality of loyalty to a group? True, to escape from the narrowness of family, class, nation, and race, there is needed what the writer calls "conversion" or "substitution"; but through the conversions morality remains essentially social in the sense of implying a "beloved community" of some kind with which the member identifies himself or seeks to be at one. It surely all depends on the depth at which what the writer calls "the organizing spirit of goodness" operates. Perhaps I am here pushing an open door. But one cannot help feeling that if the author had recognized this continuity more clearly, he would have been more on his guard against the note of Carlylean exaggeration, if not cynicism, in such statements as "man's life is mostly folly," "ordinary sanity is simply insanity adjusted to the insanity of others," "the career of civilization, because it is the career of egotism, is the Dance of Death."

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

The Philosophy of Spinoza, Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning.

By HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON. Two volumes. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Vol. I, pp. xix + 440. Vol. II, pp. xii + 424. Price \$7.50, 31s. 6d. the two volumes.)

This is undoubtedly the most important work on Spinoza that has appeared in the English tongue since the publication of Professor Joachim's *Study of the Ethics of Spinoza* in 1901, and in its own direction is likely to be as

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influential. Professor Wolfson has for long been known to Spinoza-scholars, some portions of the present work having been published several years ago in the *Chronicon Spinozanum*—that much-regretted organ of the *Societas Spinozana*. The appearance of this completed historico-critical study of the *Ethics* is likely to enhance Dr. Wolfson's reputation as a learned commentator and expositor. This is not the place for an extended examination and estimate of the arguments and conclusions of the work, even if I were qualified to undertake it: my business is to give a brief account of its scope, with a personal appraisal of its soundness and worth. Let me say at once that the work is well produced and carefully documented and indexed; I have noticed very few misprints, and apart from a few Homeric nods, to which I will not call individual attention, the diction is sufficiently English to ensure forgetfulness of its transatlantic origin. It is a work of which even the President and Fellows of Harvard College, the owners of the copyright, may be proud.

I think that Professor Wolfson will not deny that he is primarily a scholar rather than a philosopher, and that it is this that determines the special approach adopted, and must guide our estimate of his results. For him the *Ethics* is not so much a great original venture of the creative mind of its author as "a criticism of the fundamental problems of mediaeval philosophy" (to quote the presumably inspired publisher's note on the dust cover), and his method is therefore, as he says in the Preface, to read the finished text of Benedictus, the explicit Spinoza, the first of the moderns, in the light of the largely reconstructed implicit Baruch, the last of the mediaevals with his mind "crammed with traditional philosophic lore" turning ever "along the beaten paths of mediaeval reasoning." From that investigation it must be admitted in the end nothing but good can come, even though Dr. Wolfson's own conclusions may savour more of the Professor of Jewish Literature than of the pure philosopher. Philosophy can always wait, and will profit richly in proportion as it takes advantage of the results of precise scholarship to give an objective interpretation in place of the too frequent subjective or rationalizing estimates that serve only or mainly the ends of the disciple or historian.

In his opening chapter Professor Wolfson has some very wise remarks upon the study of Spinoza in the light of what we know of his personality, and indicates the reaction of his excommunication upon the literary form of his work. "He who among his own people never hesitated to speak out with boldness became cautious, hesitant, and reserved. It was a caution which sprang not from fear but from an inner sense of decorum which inevitably enforces itself on one in the presence of strangers, especially strangers who are kind." "So long had the thoughts of this book been simmering in his uncommunicative mind that it was boiled down to a concentrated essence." "The *Ethics* is not a communication to the world; it is Spinoza's communication with himself" (I, pp. 23-24). It is thus that the real difficulties of Spinoza-study arise, and Professor Wolfson compares the *Ethics* with the Talmudic writings on which Spinoza had been brought up. It presupposes an entire literary background in the absence of which it loses its clarity and becomes obscure and dead like a commentary without a text or a polemical speech in which the speaker's nods and winks and allusions are unnoted or unintelligible. And on the whole, although I am not as yet able to see eye to eye with a great deal in his book, I have no doubt that Professor Wolfson makes out his case. This is what the Spinoza-text requires far more than the texts of other philosophers.

The second introductory chapter under the title: *The Geometrical Method*,

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though it contains much of great importance, is to me marred by the uncomfortable feeling that the writer has not himself understood the logical principles involved: a feeling that almost reaches certainty when I read on p. 45 that "the geometrical method of demonstration of the synthetic type is nothing but valid syllogistic reasoning as practised throughout the history of philosophy." Doubtless there is an etymological sense in which "syllogism" can stand for such reasonings in so far as a synthesis of thought is involved; but in the more usual and precise use of the term no geometrical proof is syllogistic except in incidental features such as the quotation of the authority of a prior truth. Indeed this must be so, for *Barbara* that alone can prove a universal affirmative, can only prove a *generic* property.

The remaining chapters (III-XII) of the first volume are concerned with the main topics of *Ethica I*: the distinction of Substance and Mode; the unity and simplicity of Substance; proofs of the existence of God; the Attributes and their infinity; Divine causality; Time and Eternity; Necessity and Purpose. On the doctrine of these chapters I can only make the very slightest and most inadequate, because mainly negative, comment. On the distinction of Substance and Modes I find Dr. Wolfson unsatisfactory; and this arises, I think, from his absorbing interest in mediaeval conceptions. It must surely be incorrect to speak of the relation between mode and substance as that between the individual essence and its genus (I, pp. 75-76), and of Substance as a *summun genus* (I, p. 76) even allowing the distinction of real and nominal universals (I, p. 75). And it seems to me no more than scholastic perversity to interpret the *in se* of Substance and the *in alio* of the mode as implying the relations of instances to their species or genus. Surely the *aliud* of a finite mode is not Substance at all but the mode's finite genetic cause; and Substance is *in se*, i.e. *causa sui*, as a self-maintaining and self-explanatory individual. I may, perhaps, be allowed to refer here also, a little out of the order of exposition, to Dr. Wolfson's comments on the Attributes of Substance. I confess that I find it amazing that anyone should to-day favour the subjective interpretation of this doctrine: "Attributes . . . are said to be perceived by the intellect or the mind in the sense that they are *invented* by the mind" (I, p. 328, author's italics). I am very far indeed from denying that the distinctions of the Attributes are in some manner relative to the intellect, but the doctrine advanced by Professor Wolfson is, it seems to me, wholly indefensible. Consistently, however, with the interpretation that to be perceived by the intellect as constituting the essence of Substance means to be an invention of the intellect, we are also asked to believe that for Spinoza Substance, being conceived through itself, is inconceivable, and its essence unknowable (I, p. 76). Doubtless this is true if the Attributes that constitute the essence of Substance are subjective inventions; but is not Dr. Wolfson nearer the mind of Spinoza when he makes the Attributes "one and identical with Substance", and not in the impossible sense to which he immediately returns: "the Attributes are only different *words* expressing the same reality and being of Substance (I, p. 156, my italics)? On the whole I feel that these distinctions of Substance, Mode, and Attribute have eluded the grasp of our author because he has not realized how remote was the thought of Spinoza from the mediaeval background against which his doctrine was elaborated as an abrupt contrast. I question whether in the whole history of Spinoza-scholarship a more inept analogy has ever been elaborated by a responsible expositor than the one which Professor Wolfson ventures even to repeat: "God or substance is to him an infinite logical crust which holds together the crumbs of the infinite number of the finite modes" (I, p. 398); "His substance . . . is nothing but a logical

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shell holding the particular things of the universe together" (II, p. 346)—the figure is not even redeemed by its own grim humour, as is the equally false description of Spinoza's God as "an eternal paralytic" (II, p. 346). In connexion also with the denial that God is knowable I note that the author does not make much of the doctrine of the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* that the idea of the most perfect being is the very standard of truth; and further that he finds the ontological proof a *petitio principii*: no other conclusion is possible on the principles emphasized (though not exclusively) by Dr. Wolfson (cf. I, p. 177).

I am sorry that my review should contain so many points of dissent, but I am afraid that I must confess that the account given in the seventh chapter of the development of Spinoza's account of the Attributes of Extension and Thought out of the Aristotelian distinction of matter and form gives me grave intellectual discomfort. I suppose it must be admitted that the two distinctions must have some kind of relation to each other—even, perhaps, that the second developed out of the first by some obscure dialectical path, but in the finished form in which Extension and Thought appear in the *Ethics* the contrast cuts right across the relative distinction of matter and form which can be applied under both Attributes. How otherwise could Spinoza have entertained the notion of infinite Attributes? Matter and form constitute a finished duality. It is true that Professor Wolfson explains how far the original mediaeval framework had been left behind by Spinoza, but I gravely question whether the account that he gives of the steps of the development is more than the mythical construction of a scholar determined to discover mediaeval architecture and to disbelieve in the possibility of genuinely original thought's finding baroque expression in a verbal masonry of classical and mediaeval fragments.

The remainder of Professor Wolfson's comment on *Ethica I* must be passed over even more rapidly. A very useful chapter on Spinoza's argument for the infinity of Extension is followed by one on God's causality which is likely to be instructive to beginners. I hope I shall not be expected to say that his chapter on Duration, Time, and Eternity cuts much ice. Divorced as it is from the doctrine of the eternity of the human mind (perversely expounded in Vol. II as a doctrine of Immortality), it must fail to advance our knowledge of Spinoza's special teaching. This is, I fancy, one of the most obvious instances of the failure of the historico-critical method of exposition.

Spinoza's doctrine of final causes is generally recognized as rather unsatisfactory even on his own principles, but I think that the two questions of the purposiveness of the *parts* of nature, and the purposiveness of *Deus sive Natura*, should be kept more distinct than has been usual. Spinoza is on very sure ground indeed in the main contention of *Ethica I App.* that God has no ends to pursue, because he is perfect. This is only another assertion of the nontemporal character of the ultimate Real. But whether Spinoza's argument implies in every sense that all final causes are human figments, as he himself says, is another question. Does the mere fact that the end is only effective in so far as we purpose it (or desire it) imply that the conception of purpose is fictitious? And the question is the more pertinent when we remember that for Spinoza the causes of events are not temporally prior events as in the empiricist tradition, but their "specious" grounds or genetic causes. Determination by past causes is as impossible as determination by final causes thought of as future. Is there not room here for a genuine doctrine of finite teleology that Spinoza does not deny?

In the second volume Professor Wolfson turns to the remaining *Parts* of the *Ethics*: Chs. XIII to XVIII on *Ethica II*; Ch. XVIII on *Ethica III*;

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Ch. XIX on *Ethica IV*; Ch. XX on *Ethica V*; with a concluding chapter, and a very necessary one, on *What is New in Spinoza*. The opening chapter of this volume might, I think, have been much enriched if the historico-critical method had been made to provide a more extended account of the microcosm-macrocosm doctrine than a mere page and a half of general references. This is precisely the kind of discussion that might prove extremely valuable in the exposition of Spinoza's doctrine where it is absolutely central. It would also have had the effect of vitalizing the discussion of *Ethica II, III, et IV*, which as it stands does not seem to me to advance our knowledge very much, though it is of course a distinct advantage to see how the details of their doctrines stand related to the common mediaeval views in which Spinoza was educated.

I have already referred to Professor Wolfson's interpretation of the important Spinozistic doctrine of the eternity of the human mind: that he understands it as the immortality of the soul—the survival of the individual soul, or part of it, after death (and its existence before birth) in the same time-series as that in which it endures its embodied life. And the immortality is denied not only of memory and imagination, but also of the body itself which has only a limited duration as an individual thing. The soul survives as a soul, i.e. it retains its particular characteristics; the body perishes as a body, i.e. it loses its particular characteristics. This is obviously not the place for an extended discussion of this most disputed part of Spinoza's doctrine, but Professor Wolfson will not deny that there is great difficulty in reconciling such an interpretation as his own with the notion of the mind as the *essentia objectiva* of the body *et nihil aliud* (as Spinoza says); and it does not explain the use of the term "eternity" rather than "immortality" in the second section of *Pars V*. Unfortunately Dr. Wolfson does not find it necessary to discuss these matters at all fully: the historico-critical method holds his attention unflinchingly to the search for analogies and verbal agreements with the past—to the implicit Baruch—rather than to the original elements of philosophic speculation characteristic of the explicit Benedictus. Not that he finds Spinoza to be a mere eclectic or echo of the past: in the final chapter he enumerates the four cardinal innovations of the system, viz. the materiality of God; the uniformity of *Natura (sive Deus)*; the inseparability (*sic*) of soul and body in man as in God; and the unreality of human freedom. It is hard to be compelled to lay down the pen without joining issue on every one of these most debatable themes.

II. F. HALLETT.

Hume's Theory of the Understanding. By R. W. CHURCH. (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 238. Price 7s. 6d.)

Professor Taylor has recently confessed to a "haunting doubt" whether Hume was "really a great philosopher or only 'a very clever man.'" This doubt must have assailed most readers of Hume, and Dr. Church's book is meant to repel it. His main object is to rescue Hume's philosophy from the position assigned to it by T. H. Green as the *reductio ad absurdum* of English analytic empiricism. He begins with a chapter on Hume's theory of relations and universals which attempts very ingeniously to argue that the acceptance of Berkeley's doctrine concerning general ideas leads him to the view that no impressions are *per se* really related and that all actual relations are the work of the gentle force of association. It is true that this conclusion would also follow from Hume's dogma that whatever can be distinguished can be separated, but here it is made to fill a place in a complete logical theory,

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and in a way which clears up the very puzzling distinction between natural and philosophical relations.

Dr. Church continues his rehabilitation of Hume by considering how far his conclusions necessarily depend on his other initial dogma that every idea is derived from a corresponding impression. He admits that this principle enables Hume to dismiss with ease the problems of self, cause, substance, and necessity by demanding "From what impression did the idea arise?" But he maintains that even without the aid of this crude and dubious empiricism, Hume presents a massive system of argument and analysis with which any subsequent philosophy must reckon. On causality, for instance, Hume's argument is not merely or even primarily that we can have no idea of cause because we have no corresponding impression. His main line of thought is independent of this approach. It involves (a) a demonstration of the incapacity of reason to defend causal inference, (b) a critical analysis of the notion of cause, and (c) a positive theory of causal inference as the work of a non-rational associative faculty. All this argument both negative and positive retains its value and interest, even if the empiricist dogma is denied. Dr. Church shows that is true also of Hume's treatment of self and substance, and of the subjective theory of probability and chances which he carefully expounds and elucidates. This central section of Dr. Church's book is very thorough and convincing, though both here and in the first chapter the style is so compact as to make it difficult on a first reading to grasp its full force. The recent articles of Hobart, Kemp Smith, and Broad have done much to rectify the one-sidedness of Green's account of Hume, but this is the first work in English in which the value of Hume's work is shown to lie in all those elements which Green neglected, and in which Hume's achievement in the history of philosophy is shown to be not merely the suicide of sensationalism.

On this part of the book I have only one criticism. Dr. Church does not follow up the distinction he notes (p. 69) between causality and causation. Had he done so he would have revealed a radical flaw in the whole theory. The distinction is drawn by Hume when he says there are two questions to be answered: "First, For what reason we pronounce it *necessary*, that everything whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause? Secondly, Why we conclude that such particular causes must *necessarily* have such particular effects." Hume proceeds to show that reason cannot demonstrate the first principle—the general law of causality. He then says it would naturally follow to show how experience gives rise to such a principle, but he will "sink this question in the following, why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects." He adds—and this is the flaw referred to—that "It will, perhaps, be found in the end that the same answer will serve for both questions." To illustrate the difficulty, if I hear a bang there will arise two questions, why I should believe that the bang has some cause or other, and why I should believe that the bang was caused by a squib. Now Hume's answer to the second question is that the belief arises from the association of that particular kind of noise with the particular kind of visual datum we call a squib. But it is surely plain that the same account will not serve for both questions, for how could custom associate a kind of bang with "something or other." What experiences could have given rise to the custom leading to such an expectation? Looked at from another angle, his suggestion that a belief in the general causal law could arise from association is a particular form of the fallacy of supposing that the presuppositions of induction can be inductively established. He might, indeed, have maintained as an alternative to this theory that the general law of causality is not the result of a custom or repetition of particular

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experiences, but is itself the general description of the method by which association works. This would have come close to the Kantian answer; and it would also have raised for Hume an insoluble problem, the question whether he is going to regard philosophy itself (or psychology) as a specimen of associative imagination.

Dr. Church goes on in his last chapter to give a general account of Hume's theory of experience and his consequent philosophical position. On the latter question he is vigorous and uncompromising. Hume is an agnostic and not a sceptic. He himself rejects "the total scepticism of the fantastic sect," and he does not deny the independent reality of substances, causes, and selves. He "allows" that there may be material objects, and he asserts that our impressions arise from unknown causes. Dr. Church sees that there is a difficulty in this interpretation if we stress the empiricist principle that every idea derives from a corresponding impression, but he is explicitly making the experiment of ridding Hume's philosophy of this dogma and discovering what remains, so it is obviously unfair to stress this inconsistency. However, the difficulty of making Hume an agnostic and not a sceptic goes deeper than this, for we should have in the end to sacrifice not only the empiricist dogma but also the analysis of cause, and for that matter of self and substance also. If "cause" simply *means* an impression regularly associated with another so that the recurrence of the one gives rise to an idea of the other, and if "self" simply *means* a bundle of ideas and impressions, then unknown causes and permanent selves are self-contradictory notions. Yet this is the position Hume frequently maintains. "Necessity is . . . nothing but an internal impression of the mind." We can find no relevant experience except "that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This, therefore, is the essence of necessity" (*Treatise*, Bk. I, part iii, section 14. Ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 165). Now if we are to represent Hume as an agnostic we must surely take him to be maintaining (1) that we know what we mean by self, substance, cause, or necessity; (2) that we know we do *not* mean bundle of impressions, sequences of impressions contiguous and smoothly successive, ideas regularly associated with impressions or propensities of the mind to pass from one to another; (3) that we do mean permanent spiritual subject, continuing identical object, productive power, or real connection between external objects, but (4) that we can find no warrant for asserting the actual existence of instances of any of these natures. We do not find ourselves able to demonstrate the existence of any actual self or cause or substance or objective necessary connection, or generally of any matter of fact. We find no instance of cause; what we find in its stead is constant conjunction, and so on. Surely this is not the real Hume. Would he not have maintained the contradictory of proposition (2) above, and can we not find in him the progenitor of the modern theory of analysis which maintains that the meaning of a proposition is its verification?

One last query. Was Hume entitled to assert the existence of mental habits? Whitehead (as Dr. Church reminds us) says he was not. Dr. Church replies: "It would be a mistake to assert that in Hume's view there is no *internal* impression of habit" (p. 83). Surely Whitehead is right here. The feelings which arise from the habit—expectancy, familiarity, or smooth transition from impression to idea—all these may be directly experienced. But none of these is the habit. For the difficulty here is that ultimate crux for Hume that expectings and transitions simply happen, but a habit endures and develops. (Dr. Church points out elsewhere that Hume can give no account of development.) Hume could only have evaded this difficulty by giving an account of "habit" in terms of his theory of general ideas. A habit would then be the

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aggregate of the separate and independent expectings or transitions which are attached each to a similar pair of impressions in a single psychical history. But of the necessity or possibility of such a fundamental recasting of Hume's account of human nature, neither Hume nor his expositor are cognizant.

I have insisted on these difficulties at some length because I believe they are only developments of Dr. Church's method and approach, and I am convinced that this approach is far more fruitful than the older orthodox account of Hume. Dr. Church's essay is very closely reasoned, compact, and coherent. His previous work on Malebranche has enabled him to rehabilitate Hume in another way. He finds in Hume's treatment of causality the culmination, both historically and logically considered, of a continental development which begins with Descartes' doubt and ultimate denial of causal interaction between mind and body, continues through the occasionalism of his immediate successors, and is extended in Malebranche to the denial of all physical causation. Altogether then Dr. Church fully justifies his claim to have worked out systematically the positive side of Hume's philosophy, and to have shown that it is not merely a philosophy worthy of serious consideration, but in many respects a permanent basis for modern theories of induction and analysis.

J. D. MABBOTT.

Must Philosophers Disagree? And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. By F. C. S. SCHILLER. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1934. Pp. xi + 359. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The essays and addresses in this volume have for the most part been printed before, several of them in American journals such as *The Personalist*; and all that have hitherto been unprinted were given to American audiences. British readers, therefore, who know what they missed when Dr. Schiller became half a Californian will be particularly grateful to him for publishing this volume, and delighted with the activity of his pen during recent years; for although one of these essays is as old as 1908, and two others appeared before 1920, the great majority are quite recent. Together they give a vivid impression of Dr. Schiller's shrewdness in the wide range of topics to which he has given his mind. As well as pragmatism (or humanism or personalism) and accounts of the discomfiture of Formal Logic, we have here discussions of theology, religion, ethics, psychical research, the Darwinian theory, and eugenics. There is also an account of the examination system in which a very catty member of the feline species, accompanied by certain undeniable truths, is let out of an Oxford bag for the benefit of undergraduates on the Pacific coast.

Dr. Schiller regards himself as a "desperado" with a passion for singeing professorial beards and for unstarching academic bands. In most of these essays, however, he is rather a mellow buccaneer; and, if one chose to imitate his style, one might say that these fireside talks from a former desperado attempted much wit and achieved some wisdom; that, unlike history, they repeated themselves a good deal; and so forth. Such comments, however, would convey an illusion. The breezy desperado of these essays is really a ventriloquist's puppet; and the ventriloquist himself is very much in earnest with a great deal of importance to say.

Philosophers, I dare say, are likely to disagree about the conclusiveness of Dr. Schiller's contentions, but those who suspect they will be unconvinced would be very unwise to neglect these contentions. I must confess, however,

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that a part of the fascination of this volume (for me) is the adequacy with which Dr. Schiller seems to answer himself. Thus he tells us on p. 188 that truth is "valid" because and so long as it is "strong," but, criticizing Nietzsche, points out that we have a right to ask the spokesman of the "strong" what precisely he means by "strength." He tells us on p. 8 that in ultimate analysis the "world" is "an artefact, a construction and a fiction," but on pp. 122 seqq. takes Nietzsche to task for saying something very similar. He is fond of stressing the great fact and the inescapability of personal idiosyncrasy, but tells us on p. 159 that what is really wanted is a "detailed scientific study" of *how* man "starting from his own individuality, continues to transcend its limitations, and to build up the objects and the institutions of the common world."

Although thinkers are individuals, I confess I cannot see why they are restricted to their own individuality, either at the start or at any other time; but if it were so, many of us would be very grateful indeed if Dr. Schiller abandoned the guerilla warfare appropriate to these essays, but characteristic of all his work, and gave us instead this "detailed scientific study" in its detail. As things are, the suggestions in this volume seem, for the most part, to be provocative rather than fully developed. We are told that knowing is always making and that all "facts" are made; and yet we are supposed to know facts *when made* in a non-pragmatic way, and are not supposed to be remaking them into something different. Similarly, we are supposed to know the results of "testing" in a non-pragmatic way, although, in the pragmatic sense, our tests should always and inevitably be *in the testing* and never out of it. Again, since not all consequences of cognitive states are fitted or are ever intended to be a pragmatic "test," it might be advisable if Dr. Schiller essayed the methods of the Cambridge analysts (whom he ridicules) and explained with greater clarity what sort of "consequences" are selected to be such for pragmatist purposes. Such requests, I suppose, would be dismissed as "verbalism" by all good pragmatists; but until we find a pragmatist who can tell us things without using words it is difficult to see how "verbalism" could be avoided.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Frontiers of Psychology. By WILLIAM McDougall, F.R.S. (Contemporary Library of Psychology. London and Cambridge: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., and Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. xiv + 232. Price 5s. net.)

Professor McDougall, like a true frontiersman, goes well armed, with his finger ready on the trigger. The suspicious characters whom he meets in "the extensive tracts of still unsettled wilderness" around the frontiers of psychology are dealt with firmly in a most readable and provocative book. It is provocative in two senses, for it should excite retort and stimulate further examination of the many problems which it raises. The size of the book limits the author to divergent raids with little attempt at permanent settlement, and from some of his expeditions he returns with slight booty. His encounter with mathematics yields only the scalps of a few mathematical prodigies, and his dealings with philosophy are not much more fruitful. "Philosophy is a matter of wisdom, science a matter of knowledge" (p. 41). So to be a philosopher is to have "sound opinions about the relative values of things," a statement based upon the writer's distinction between knowledge of fact and judgment of values, only the former being concerned with truth, while the latter yields opinions of varying degree of validity. He strenuously

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advocates pragmatism, but holds that it does not "pretend to assert a new theory of truth. It accepts the correspondence theory of truth" (p. 27). It would appear at times to accept the coherence theory also, and is, in fact, reduced to its proper sphere of verification by correspondence with expectation, and verification does not affect truth (p. 52). Verification can never be complete in the world of observed fact, so that science cannot attain more than probable truth, a conclusion which presumably holds good of psychology as of other sciences. If so, Professor McDougall has furnished rival explorers with a useful weapon.

For he maintains that psychology is the fundamental science, being the basis even of physics, and, like Professor Whitehead, he is concerned about modern physics. "Physical science has, throughout its development, been perverted by its hasty and false psychological assumptions, and can only be set right by bringing to its aid a less inadequate and less misleading psychology" (p. 152). Observing that recent writers have in fact introduced psychological topics into their expositions, he complains with justice that they have either accepted uncritically the views of the man in the street, or have invented a psychology *ad hoc*. There are some very entertaining passages in which he analyses the statements put forward by certain authors in popular accounts of current physical theory, and his arguments, incisively put, are pertinent. But he gives little guidance on the urgent question whether the abstract theories of physics are to be accepted as descriptions of reality, or only as useful mental constructions for marshalling observed facts. Are they in the end only expressive of the constitutive laws of the human mind? This is a problem well worth the attention of an adventurous psychologist. His chief charge against physical science is that it has excluded teleology, but we cannot see that he has shown any profit which physics, with the best will in the world, could derive from it. It is asserted that, since any science embodies the purposes of the scientist, he is illogical if he rules out purpose from his science. But there is no force in this argument, which assumes that the goal of a purpose must itself be purposive in the same sense. The agent and the instrument which he constructs to accomplish his ends are both describable as purposive, but the adjective has different meanings in the two applications.

There is a rather long and, we think, convincing analysis of the psychological genesis of the concept of energy. But the only things which can matter to the scientist are the nature of the concept as he now accepts it, and the use which he can make of it. We cannot see that psychology can assist him here, except perhaps by making him aware of his own activities.

The concluding sections, dealing with the relations of psychology to history and the other human sciences, are equally stimulating and probably more fruitful. We can only mention here one of the important issues which Professor McDougall resolutely faces. Why has European man progressed so rapidly in knowledge, organization, and kindliness during the last few centuries? Holding to the fundamental principles already stated, Professor McDougall insists that quasi-mechanistic explanations are inadequate, and that the cause must be found in directed mental activity. At certain epochs the impact of new problems upon a fixed society stirs latent mental powers into activity. Convinced by his experiments upon rats that the Lamarckian hypothesis is true and applicable to mental characters, he concludes that the effects of this heightened mental activity will affect later generations by direct inheritance. But the same experiments suggest that some thirty generations are required before the consequences are fully manifest, and this may be the explanation of the alternation of long periods of relative stagnation and of intense activity

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and progress in human affairs. If so, the outbreak of intellectual activity at and since the Renaissance is the direct biological consequence of the ferment accompanying the collapse of the Roman Empire. He applies his theory of sentiment to the further elucidation of his problem. A child, brought under the influence of Christian ideals, will form new sentiments with regard to them. "Then, if the Lamarckian principle is valid, the susceptibility to such emotional sympathetic reactions will not only be increasingly exercised in each such individual, but his offspring will be endowed . . . with a similarly enhanced susceptibility" (p. 206).

The argument mainly depends upon the acceptance of the Lamarckian hypothesis, and Dr. McDougall is at least entitled to claim that his truly heroic research has made this once more an open question. But even if its validity be granted, it may still be urged that he has underestimated the importance of cumulative social tradition. In the tightly woven fabric of social man's activities a single chance discovery may initiate revolutionary changes, which will gradually transform all social values and build up a new tradition which decisively affects new entrants into society. The example to which we have referred suggests also that his argument is double-edged. Other children were brought up to accept cruelty as proper and desirable. The same psychological principles would apply to them, and the consequence should be the development within a given territory of two antagonistic societies, becoming more and more divergent in their sentiments and ideals. We wish that the writer had enjoyed more space to work out his theory. And we await the plea of his many victims that since frontiers in wildernesses are notoriously ill-surveyed, trespass is a venial offence, though none of us appear at our best when so engaged.

A. W. WOLTERS.

Books received also:—

- D. KATZ, Dr.Phil. *The World of Colour*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xvi + 300. 15s.
- H. F. MINNS, JR. *Materialism the Scientific Bias*. New York: The Journal of Philosophy. 1934. Pp. 120. \$1.
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CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

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Monsieur le Commissaire Général de l'Exposition a décidé à l'occasion du TRICENTENAIRE DU DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE, d'Organiser une grandiose Manifestation au cours de l'Exposition Internationale de Paris en 1937

Une Commission, que je préside, a été constituée et, en accord avec les Sociétés de Philosophie et les plus hautes Personnalités des milieux intellectuels français, s'occupe de prendre toutes les dispositions, afin que cette cérémonie soit digne de Descartes et de son Œuvre.

Pour que cette Manifestation ait l'ampleur que nous désirons et puisse représenter, le plus exactement possible, le développement dans le monde de la Pensée Cartésienne, il est indispensable que toutes les Nations soient invitées à nous prêter leur concours intellectuel.

La Célébration du Tricentenaire du Discours de la Méthode devant donner lieu également à la réunion de divers congrès, tant philosophiques que scientifiques, il serait utile que les Personnalités compétentes soient prevenues dès à présent afin de leur permettre de préparer à loisir les communications qu'elles désireraient faire à nos congrès.

Les renseignements détaillés sur l'organisation des réunions des Expositions et des Cérémonies qui constitueront la célébration officielle seront adressées personnellement en temps utile à tous ceux qui, désirant collaborer à notre Œuvre, voudront bien nous en manifester le désir.

Les Inscriptions seront reçues dès à présent par Monsieur LEVEILLE, Groupe I, "*Expression de la Pensée.*"

Exposition Internationale de 1937
35 Rue Saint-Didier, Paris (XVIe).

PAUL VALERY,
de l'Académie Française.

PARIS,
le 10 Avril, 1935.

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

MY DEAR EDITOR,

My attention has been called to the fact that Professor Webb in his too kind notice of my Gifford Lectures in the last number of *Philosophy*, picks out for special approbation a passage which was, in fact, borrowed from another writer. When I wrote the sentence about the *robot* I was not conscious that it came from another source, but as I had not long before read Dr. Oman's book *Natural and Supernatural*, where something extremely similar occurs on page 45, it is obvious that my mind had retained his image and then reproduced it.

I shall be grateful if you will allow me to pass on to Dr. Oman the credit for this illustration which plainly belongs to him and not to me.

Yours faithfully,
WILLIAM EBOR.

"BISHOPTHORPE,"
YORK,
May 2, 1935.

PHILOSOPHY

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

MR. DUNNE'S THEORY OF TIME

MY DEAR EDITOR,

An initial error seems to vitiate Dunne's theory of Time; two complaints, separately emphasized by two critics, seem to direct attention to this initial error. Newman complains that Dunne ought to serialize Space as well as Time. Broad complains that the infinite regress in Dunne's notion of Time is detrimental to the theory because it is vicious. Broad's complaint seems to be just, and, because it is just, to expose an inherent fallaciousness in Dunne's system. Newman's complaint seems to be mistaken, and, because it is mistaken, to expose the source, or nature, of the fallaciousness.

After counting the six men in a room, the enumerator can rest on his count though there is a number seven beyond the number six, and an infinite series of numbers beyond the seven. Dunne cannot rest on his $T(1)$ in his infinite regress of Times because $T(1)$ requires $T(2)$, nor on any $T(n)$ because it requires $T(n+1)$. He is compelled to employ both an Absolute Time and an Observer at infinity, although, as Broad comments, he assumes a last term to a series which cannot have one. He is compelled to end the infinite regress peremptorily at an infinite terminus because he cannot have $T(1)$ without also having $T(2)$, or $T(2)$ without also having $T(3)$, and so on up the series. The enumerator need not pass on to 7 after counting 6; Dunne must pass on to $T(7)$ after considering $T(6)$.

Dunne's serialization, however, is not vicious as an infinite regress of Times. He condemns himself to an endless chase after Time, and to an arbitrary claim of capture at the infinite finish, by doing what Newman complains he does not do. He adds to tri-dimensional Space the *spatialized* Time which becomes $T(1)$ in the series. He himself refers to it as "a 'real' fourth dimension, akin to any of the three dimensions of Space." Since Time has been expelled from the world by spatializing it, it must be put back again. $T(2)$ does not put it back again because it too is spatialized. Dunne's $T(1)$ should be changed to $S(1)$, or $S'(1)$, as he passes on to $T(2)$, and so each $T(n)$ should be revised into $S(n)$, or $S'(n)$, as the analysis proceeds. The infinite regress of Times is actually a serialized system of spatial dimensions, or of pseudo-spatial dimensions which are more like the three original dimensions of Space than they are like Times. The series of Times is not properly an infinite regress of terms, but a pathway of chase. Dunne must put in the initially excluded Time, but whenever he considers a $T(n)$ it becomes an $S'(n)$: Time itself is continually chased and continuously eludes pursuit by becoming spatial, or pseudo-spatial.

This note does not discuss the general indebtedness of thought to Dunne: this may still be great though the presumed infinite regress of Time is based fallaciously on an illegitimate spatialization. Neither does it intend to correct Professor Broad's careful analysis. It simply directs attention to a seeming initial error—an attempt to convert Time into a kind of Space.

JOSHUA C. GREGORY.

3 OAK VILLAS,
BRADFORD, YORKS,
May 20, 1935.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

THE Syllabus of Lectures and Evening Meetings for the Session 1935-36 is now in course of preparation, and will be sent to members in the early autumn.

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OCTOBER 1935

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

At the tenth General Meeting of the Institute held at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1, on Monday, June 17th, the following Addresses were given by the President, Sir Herbert Samuel, and Professor H. F. Hallett.

ADDRESS BY SIR HERBERT SAMUEL

In the choice of a subject on which to address you to-day I have taken a suggestion from the title of a recent book by Professor Schiller, *Must Philosophers Disagree?* The conclusion of the paper which gives its title to that book is that apparently they must disagree. And the reason which Professor Schiller gives is that philosophers think and write according to their own individual characters; since those characters differ, so must their philosophies. He says: "Actually every philosophy was the offspring, the legitimate offspring, of an idiosyncrasy, and the history and psychology of its author had far more to do with its development than *der Gang der Sache selbst*."

Since reading that book, I have come across several other observations of the same kind from other writers. There is, for example, the saying, often quoted, by Bradley: "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct."

In Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*, he says: "The greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels." And again: "It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of—namely, the confession of its originator, and

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a species of involuntary and unconscious autobiography." I find the same idea expressed by Mr. Joad in his recent book, *Return to Philosophy*: "While the facts are the same for all, the conclusions which we base upon them will be different. Nor need this difference be deplored; just as it takes all sorts of men to make a world, so does it take all sorts of minds to make the truth about the world, and philosophy is no more to be dismissed because each philosopher has a different system than morality is to be invalidated by the fact of differing moral judgments, or religion proclaimed to be nonsense because there are innumerable variations of religious belief." Many other similar statements have been made. Who was it who said, "Behind every philosopher there lurks a man"?

Now if these views are put forward in a semi-humorous spirit, consciously offering a paradox, less in order to convince than to interest and amuse—well and good. No doubt that is the spirit in which Bradley, at all events, wrote what he did. But if it is seriously meant, then here is a matter which clearly demands examination; and particularly perhaps by the members of this Institute. For this view, if it were to be generally accepted, would, I suggest, undermine the very basis of philosophic thinking, deprive it of the greater part of its value, destroy the greater part of such attraction as it may have for ordinary men. It would treat philosophy as being more akin to poetry than to logic, to art than to science. Each contribution to philosophy would be merely a matter of idiosyncrasy, temperament, intuition, on the part of the philosopher.

It is quite true that it must depend upon a man's personality to what matters he gives his attention, whether he is interested in philosophy at all, and if so, in what branch of it. This is true, indeed, of science also. As Max Planck says: "In actual practice individual physicists are influenced in their investigations by their personal preference for metaphysical, or for positivist, ideas." And recently Schrödinger, the eminent physicist, has written a book with the title, *Science and the Human Temperament*, in which this idea is further developed. He points out how the human element must come in with respect to the choice of the investigations which any scientist may undertake, and of the experiments and observations which he shall make. It is obvious that there is scope for original genius in the exact sciences as elsewhere, both in the management of each inquiry and in finding the clues to its results. And of course all human thought, being human, must be subject to its limitations, and may or may not accord with truth and reality. Nevertheless, the exact sciences are objective rather than subjective, in that when an observation or an experiment has led to a particular result at the hands of one scientist, any other scientist anywhere can repeat the same procedure and will arrive at the same result. Are the

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INSTITUTE

processes of philosophy wholly different from this, and to be regarded as entirely, or even mainly, subjective? I suggest to you that they are not. If one philosopher, proceeding from certain premisses, reaches by a train of reasoning certain conclusions, and if his methods are sound, the same reasoning ought to appeal to every sane man everywhere, regardless of his individual temperament. That is so in logic, and it ought to be so in philosophy.

This is not a matter of abstract, academic discussion. It is of immediate practical importance. In the present day the world is passing through a phase of disillusionment. There is widespread an intellectual cynicism, a spirit of moral defeatism. Anything which tends to undermine faith in the foundations of thought increases these tendencies. In physics the promulgation of the so-called Principle of Indeterminism by Heisenberg, Bohr, Eddington, and others, contributes in that direction. It is satisfactory to know that many of the leading figures in the world of physical science, particularly Einstein, Planck, and Rutherford, are not Indeterminists. If a belief in the Principle of Causality and in the Uniformity of Nature had to be abandoned, the effect could not fail to be injurious throughout the whole sphere of thought. So also, if philosophy came to be regarded, not as a strenuous effort of clear thinkers to arrive at truths capable of universal acceptance, but merely as the spontaneous attempts of a number of individuals to express their own personal beliefs, which themselves were the result merely of temperament or intuition, that, too, would be an ill service to the world.

At these Annual Meetings, and on other occasions when I have had the honour of addressing the Institute, the chief burden of my song has been that philosophy, if it is to be positive and constructive, must base itself upon science. It should not indeed take its direction from science: that is its own affair. But from science it must draw at least the greater part of its materials. This is the view, in fact, so powerfully advocated by our colleague, Professor Alexander, and by Professor Whitehead, among others of our contemporaries. Philosophy is not a form of poetry. It is a matter of precise and universal reasoning. I believe that the members of this Institute, if they are animated by that conception, will best serve the cause which it is designed to promote.

ADDRESS BY PROFESSOR H. F. HALLETT

In a recent article in one of the weekly political journals Lord Russell commented upon the perennial division among philosophers between those who would concern themselves with public affairs and those who preferred to retire to a mountain-top to meditate; and I suppose that Plato is the supreme example of the attempt to

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combine the two functions, and taste the sweets of the contemplative life, and also the pains and disappointments, ignominy and zest of social and political activity. But even the synoptic majesty of Plato was not a little distressed, tossed, and sickened by the adventure, so that one feels that he too at times suspected that "useless, stargazing babbler" was not an altogether unjust assemblage of epithets for a man pretending to be a god, and that the philosophic city was permanently beyond all hope of human attainment. I wonder what Plato really thought at the end of his long life!

And you too, sir, have recently tried to stir the philosophic dry bones of the desert of epistemological wrangling with a plea that philosophers should give direction in these difficult times to a troubled world; should deal with those larger issues that lie beyond the domain of natural science; and provide (if I understood you rightly) if not the captains of the ships of state, at least the rudiments of a nautical almanac, a compass steadily pointing along the route in which we would lie, and a chart giving some of the ports of call, if not the final destination of the human race. About the fact there cannot be any doubt. The divorce between philosophy and life, between those who pursue endless inquiries into what you style "fictional abstractions", into universal values and the nature of the Ultimate Real, and those who drift, mainly unconsciously and partly under the domination of monstrous myths, down the grooves of human evolution, is almost complete. Philosophers cannot get to grips with the detail-problems of practical life, their smooth broad principles will not articulate with the cog-wheels of practice; and the practical men, guided only by catchwords and clichés, superstitions and taboos, dogmas and anthropomorphisms, drift aimlessly on the unknown sea, delighted by chance events that seem favourable to their latest purposes, and amazed by the disasters that overtake them from time to time—largely as a result of the folly of simple, inoffensive individuals and classes.

Now the question to which I propose to direct your attention in the few minutes allotted to me is: What is the source of this age-long division and isolation? For I think that we have not advanced one step beyond the position so graphically portrayed in the *Republic* of Plato: the philosophers still pursue their speculations, honestly or sophistically, or both; and the practical men succeed in getting all sorts of things done, either through sheer insensitivity or by keeping opposing principles in watertight compartments, or by failing to bring past experience to bear on the present; by making use of irrelevant desires and fears and impulses (and more is done in the world through fear of one sort or another than from all other motives put together); by appeals to non-evident axioms, by taking advantage of the fatigue, ignorance, and fatuity of opponents; by

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means of the lingering remnants of institutions, beliefs, and customs of mortified or senescent cultures and civilizations. The philosopher is up amongst the stars; the practical man is damaging his fingers (and other people's toes) with brass tacks. But it is stupidity every time that gets things done!

And what I want to say is that this is no mere recurrent accident of history, but belongs to the very substance of the Real in its relation to human personality. Man's place in nature was a favourite topic half a century and more ago though the subject is a little out of fashion to-day, for the predominant conclusions did little to foster human self-importance. Thus, though it is often remarked in footnotes and appendices, it is too often overlooked in prefaces and the main text that there is something incongruous in the little thinking animal understanding the nature of the Immensity that has produced him and sustains him. Descartes found that man's understanding was limited but his freedom boundless; we are only too prone to believe that human freedom is a fiction but the capacity of the human mind in principle unlimited, so that human knowledge is a real section of knowledge as such. We assume that the human mind *can* know the Real, though we hardly suppose that any particular human mind actually *does* know it. Think for a moment how simple and how serene a world we might enjoy if philosophers were at once in possession of perfect knowledge of the pertinent principles and details, and in complete control of human organization, with a descending hierarchy of officials "prone to philosophy" and a rank and file "patient of philosophy". Heaven would have descended upon earth! And how out of joint things are as a result of the simple principle that knowledge, its instrument, and its object are necessarily congruent; so that the philosopher, being after all but a man, lacks perfect apprehension, his world is pulverized by his partiality, and the perfect poise of complete understanding degraded into temporal process and piecemeal activity. Yet, being a philosopher, he is harassed unflaggingly by his foreshortened vision of the perfection that belongs to wholeness, to the Real that he recognizes as the proper object of all his striving.

Is the case, then, hopeless? Must the divorce of philosophy and life continue unmitigated? If we are looking for detailed practical help with the daily perplexities of social and individual life, I think the answer is Yes. Who would go to a philosopher for advice on the simplest matter of human conduct; how to conduct a friendship; the limits to which pleasures should be pursued or pains avoided; the relations of the sexes; marriage and divorce; the team spirit and conscientious gaucherie? In these regions of definite practice the advice of the philosopher is likely to be as much vitiated by long sight as the advice of our relations and friends is vitiated by

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short sight, and the advice of the dogmatists and sophists by no-sight. Philosophers have always been the sport of Thracian hand-maids and practical wisecracks. For here Reason is lost among the infinite details, qualifications, and corrections that are at once only details and yet absolutely essential to the main issue. If there are principles that apply, they do so with so many qualifications that it were better to be without them, and to trust to trial and error and the main chance. And the fact is, sir, that brass tacks are best dealt with by ironmongers.

But perhaps, though philosophers are useless in the affairs of daily life, there may be, as Dr. Oakeley has said, "certain problems of modern civilization with which only philosophy can deal." Philosophy, she has told us, is "necessary to the sanity of the world", and she has cited such problems as the future of civilization, the value of human life, the mental activities by which values are discovered, pursued, and enjoyed, the criticism of "objective mind" and of tendencies and qualities commonly taken as self-evident. And it was, perhaps, such broad utility in the enlightenment of society about the wider ends of human life that you desiderated, sir, in your plea that the unconscious and more or less automatic evolution of the human race in the past might give place to consciously directed progress over the whole front of human life. I am very far indeed from denying that philosophy—indeed, any clear thought and resolute purpose—can perform a useful function here; but even so, it is not all plain sailing, for the universe of human life in its natural environment is not the proper object of philosophical contemplation. It is a tissue of contradictions, compromises, and makeshifts. Society itself is a makeshift: an essential multiplicity masquerading as a unity. The principles governing such mock-individuals can hardly be fully rational; and the social and political "ironmonger" is as likely to be right in his compromises and hesitations as the philosopher in his resolute rationality. Plaster demands rags and wires and supports that the marble cannot tolerate; and political and social entities are plaster, and not the pure crystal of unity. I am not sure, therefore, whether I should fully trust the judgment of the philosopher even in these more generalized, if not more refined, regions of practice.

I fear that my conclusions so far will appear to you as exclusively sceptical: let me try to finish on a more constructive note. In the article to which I have already referred, and which appeared in immediate sequence to Sir Herbert Samuel's appeal, Dr. Oakeley spoke of the significance of human existence as consisting in the contact of the individual with the real sources of his being—a conception that she connected with Plato's figure of the Den and the soul's emergence from illusion; and I am sure that she was here

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emphasizing one of the main interests and functions of philosophy. For man, however he may concentrate his attention upon the nature of Being or Essence, however he may dwell upon the heights and find satisfaction in the ideal Beauty, if he is in earnest with his life he must meet, and if possible resolve, the problem of his own place in the Real, his capacity for understanding it, and the basis of that capacity. He must unbend from the rigid contemplation of Ultimate Reality to observe his own navel. He must defend himself against himself. Man himself, rooted within himself in a reality that is other than he, must be man's central study, and "Man, know thyself" his final imperative, just because in very truth he is thus himself the essential object of all his knowledge. And for the same reason *the main function of philosophy is its de-anthropomorphicalatory function*; for here man's desire for intellectual freedom reaches its climax in the determination to conquer humanity's obsession with the human and approach to a perfect understanding content with its proper object. "I have laboured carefully," says Spinoza, "not to mock, lament, or execrate, but to *understand* human actions", and it is this that we remember when we think of him as the philosopher, and not that other and very human picture of him, hardly restrained from rushing out among the bloody mob, shouting "The last of the barbarians!" For the one is the picture of man playing with thought; the other of thought playing with a man. "To understand"—that is the proper activity of the philosopher, contemplation of events and ideas without loss of self-command, without the grimaces and awkward gestures of the fanatic. And this, I think, is philosophy's chief contribution to practice: the cultivation of objectivity and sanity, the penetration beneath the anthropomorphisms of feeling and crude intuition; but all this *with the decent scepticism proper to Reason seeking to penetrate a world of unreason*. For that is where the Stoic fails: whatever Diogenes the spy may report to us in the figure of Epictetus, there *is* something terrible in death, in slander, in want, though Reason exiled in man may refuse to admit it and speak of sackcloth as better than Tyrian purple and the bare ground than the softest couch. In a world of unreason, a world *constituted* by unreason, reason must give place to a "mitigated scepticism". And so my sceptical doubt returns, for this philosophic calm, this objectivity to the values of feeling, cannot be imparted or taught or even justified save as it is fostered by man's viridical delusion that he can rise above his partiality and become as a god "twisting into garlands the brambles that impede him"; which is, I submit, sir, a better figure than Hegel's owl of Minerva fluttering in the twilight.

FREEDOM IN THE PRESENT-DAY WORLD:

PROFESSOR R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ

A FEW months ago General Smuts, as Rector of St. Andrews University, addressed a stirring appeal to the youth of the world to dedicate itself to the defence of the threatened cause of Freedom.¹

As a young man, General Smuts fought in the Anglo-Boer war for the political freedom of the South African Republics. As a member of the British War Cabinet during the Great War, he was prominent among the Allied leaders in what was declared to be a war to "make the world safe for democracy". As a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles, he was the first outstanding statesman who, on the very morrow of the signing, had the courage to confess the inadequacies of that settlement, and to appeal to a war-torn world to lay aside the passions of bitter conflict and return to sanity and co-operation. In the League of Nations, which he, more than anyone else, helped to conceive and bring into being, he has sought to create the machinery for the peaceful co-operation between nations. For more than thirty years, in his own country, he has, as Minister and Prime Minister, as leader of a party in power and of that same party in opposition, practised his faith in democratic institutions. Most recently, subordinating personal ambition and one-sided party interests, he has joined with his old political opponent, General Hertzog, in founding the United Party for the healing of the ancient feud between the two White peoples in South Africa. Nor has it been only as a General and a Statesman that he has achieved fame, but also as a Scientist and Philosopher.

When a man such as he, the greatest living South African, declares Freedom to be in danger, I need make no apology for taking his Rectorial Address as my text and submitting his plea for Freedom to a sympathetic examination.

I

Let me say, at once, that I am in fundamental agreement with General Smuts. I desire to emphasize this at the outset, lest some things which I have to say later are misunderstood as expressing fundamental disagreement.

¹ Presidential Address to the Witwatersrand University Philosophical Society, March 1935.

² *Freedom*, by J. C. Smuts. London, Alexander MacLehose & Co.

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I am at one with General Smuts in what he calls his "ultimate Credo": "There is nothing in the nature of things which is alien to what is best in us. There is no malign fatalism which makes fools of us in our dark striving towards the good. On the contrary, what is highest in us is deepest in the nature of things, and as virtue is its own reward, so life carries its own sanctions and the guarantee of its own highest fulfilments and perfections. That is my ultimate credo; and it is not founded on hearsay, but on first-hand experience in that cross-section of the world which I have lived through. This is no doubt a slender basis of fact for so large a conclusion. But the final convictions are not inductions from experience but insights into it. I remain at heart an optimist."¹

Again, I am at one with General Smuts in prizing the liberal and democratic tradition of the nineteenth century. With him, I feel repelled by many of the manifestations of the "new Dictatorship which is but the old Tyranny writ large,"² whether these manifestations occur on behalf of a revolution or of a counter-revolution, and whether they be employed by a Capitalist society against Communism, or by Communism against its Capitalist enemies. With General Smuts, I value intellectual freedom even higher than political freedom. With him, I try to work for, and I certainly hope for, the triumph of "creative freedom" in the world—defined as he defines it: "Inner freedom and harmony of soul; social freedom and equality before the law as the fundamental foundation of the State; international freedom in the rule of peace and justice."³

However, even if I may assume that in these words General Smuts speaks for all of us, I feel that we have no right to range ourselves under his banner without doing something which he had not the time to do in his Address at St. Andrews, viz. to think out in detail what the ideals mean to which we have committed ourselves in response to his call; what these ideals demand of us when they are applied to the actual texture of our modern world.

After all, only the last ten pages (out of thirty-five) of General Smuts's Address deal with the topic of Freedom which gives to the whole Address its title. Thus, all that General Smuts could do was to create an atmosphere and sound a clarion call to his hearers. We who read his words at leisure and can ponder them, owe it to him, no less than we owe it to ourselves and our civilization, to think them out in all their implications. He points us to the far-off goal of our endeavours: we have to map out the path to it in detail. General Smuts tells us that the anti-democratic spirit so prevalent in the world to-day threatens, not only to replace the individual's participation in government by a new slavery which is made effective through the curtailing of "the freedom of thought, speech,

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 21.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 30.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 35.

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action, self-expression," but also to substitute for the old spirit of sturdy independence a propaganda-moulded, servile mass-mentality which, in the end, will kill all creative activity and, thereby, all possibility of progress in the future. "For me," says General Smuts, "the individual is basic to any world-order which is worth while."¹ And in this spirit he stands forth as the apostle of that "sturdy individualism which has inspired progress in the past . . . which has created all our best human values."²

II. "STURDY INDIVIDUALISM"

General Smuts, I feel sure, would be the first to admit that the large and emotion-stirring words which he has used in praise of Freedom are, in fact, very vague and indefinite in meaning, and can be interpreted in different and even mutually contradictory ways.

When he speaks of sturdy individualism, it is reasonable to suppose that he is thinking, e.g., of the Voortrekkers of his own people who, a century ago, set out into unknown lands, there to settle and live their lives according to their own conception of the fitness of things, and who, though they neither knew it nor desired it, proved to be the pioneers of European civilization in Southern Africa and the forerunners of that industrial and economic system which others, following in their wake, superimposed upon their simple farmers' and hunters' existence. In other passages he may be thinking of men whose individualism took the form of braving the opposition of Church and State in the cause of truth, whether religious or scientific, or, again, in the cause of some vision of social justice which bade them fight against entrenched privilege and vested interest. In short, we can all think, each according to his taste, of some noble adventure, some brave challenge to an order outworn, which, when called "sturdy individualism," seems to invest individualism, as such, with the halo of the heroic.

True, General Smuts may fairly claim that he has guarded himself against the charge of having commended individualism indiscriminately, by defining the individualism which he advocates as that which "inspires progress" and has "created all our best human values." But, even these words still leave the door open for contradictory interpretations. What is progress for one, is retrogression and even degeneration for another. What some hail as freedom, others denounce as licence and lack of principle. And some, at any rate, of the best human values have been just those things for the sake of which men have been most ready to persecute and destroy one another.

No doubt, freedom of thought, speech, action are good things.

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 26.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 27.

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But does not their goodness depend, at least to some extent, on *what* is thought, said, done? The thoughts of the ignorant, the words of the fool, the acts of the law-breaker are not, as such, a contribution to civilization and progress. By all means let us make the individual "basic to any world-order which is worth while," but on condition that we may demand of the individual the faithful and effective service of some supra-individual value. By all means let us endow the individual with liberty, but on condition that he is a responsible individual who knows how to use his liberty. If one half of the truth is: Be yourself, surely the other half is: Be something which it is worth while being. If one half of the truth is: Have the courage of your convictions, the other half is: Be sure that your convictions are well grounded. Self-expression is a good slogan, provided that it does not abolish the difference between liberty and licence, just as on the social and political plane the premise that the established order is defective and unjust, does not justify the conclusion that anarchy is the ideal, or that lawlessness is the true remedy for bad law.

There is, in short, a profound truth in the well-known phrase from the English Prayer Book concerning the "service" of God "which is perfect freedom," if I may for my present purpose generalize its principle into the formula: Inner freedom (to use General Smuts's own words) consists in the individual devoting himself to the service of supra-individual values; and only on this condition is he entitled to social freedom and equality before the law. And, even then, we have still to add that the supra-individual values to which individuals may devote their lives, and the ways in which they seek to serve them, may not be compatible with each other, and, leading to conflicts between the individuals concerned, may endanger the stability of the social order which is also a "supra-individual value." Is not the moral that freedom of thought, speech, and action, so far as it depends on the mutual toleration of individuals, is possible only within a framework, and on a basis, of mutual agreement which thereby defines the limits within which, or the directions in which, that freedom is to be used?

III. "CREATIVE FREEDOM"

A blessed verb, "to create"! Whose heart is not thrilled at the suggestion that it is his destiny as a human being to create and to be free to create? Let us say that to create is to realize, to bring into existence, supra-individual values.

Modern philosophy, never so remote from the general movements of thought as it is often accused of being by those who either do not read, or, reading, do not understand, the writings of modern

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thinkers, has long been in the fashion and talked of "creation" and "creative activity." Bergson's *Creative Evolution* was a best-seller before the Great War. And of recent years many different thinkers, elaborating the notion of creativity, have told us that the Universe is dynamic; that it is activity, through and through; not chaotic activity, but ordered activity; not haphazard, but with an inner direction which is "progressive," which moves towards the ever-better, towards perfection. The formulae for this ever-better have varied, but the underlying consensus has been vastly impressive. General Smuts himself, in his *Holism and Evolution*, has proved himself not the least of this band of thinkers. A Universe evolving, a Universe progressing by its own nature and momentum towards the realization of ever higher values; and man, or man's mind, as the spearpoint of this advance—in the language of theologizing philosophers, like James Ward, God, the supreme creator, creating creators—such has been the *Leitmotif*. To create is our destiny, and in creating we have the whole drive of a creative Universe behind us!

But let us descend from heaven to earth. What might it mean for you or me "to create"? If we define "creating" as bringing something into the world, causing something to exist, which was not there before, and which is good or worth while; and, negatively, annihilating, or preventing something evil, the enemy of the good—what sorts of activities might "creating," in this sense, be supposed to cover?

In attempting to answer this question, I am troubled by *embarras de richesse*: my difficulty is not that we create so little, but that we create so much.

We create in begetting and bearing children; in making two blades of grass grow where only one grew before; in manufacturing machines and goods for the satisfaction of our needs. We create in painting pictures and in writing poems, even though they be poor ones. We create in making laws; we create in making scientific inventions and discoveries. General Smuts was a creator no less in helping to shape the League of Nations than in writing *Holism and Evolution*. We create not only on the material, but also on the mental, plane: I should reject any definition of creation which excluded what, e.g., St. Francis made of his life. We create as individuals and we create as peoples and States. If we create armies, we also create Churches and Universities. It seems to me that in an intelligible sense Hitler and Mussolini—the one creating a new Germany, the other a new Italy—are creators, no less than Lenin and Stalin who before our eyes are creating a new Russia as an example of a new order of society which, they claim, we shall all one day be glad to copy. General Smuts himself, if his freedom

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were not effectively restricted by public opinion in South Africa, might add yet another line to his creative activities, by attempting the solution of South Africa's great problem of the relations between Whites and Blacks, on the lines of his own principle that "Man's progress through the ages is from a regime of domination to one of understanding, consent, and free co-operation."¹ He will no doubt plead that a political leader cannot run too far ahead of his followers, and that the time is not yet ripe for freedom for the great majority of the inhabitants of South Africa. But, if that be his defence, he should perhaps have drawn the consequences for his own advocacy of freedom in his Rectorial Address. If there must needs remain so wide a gap between the planes on which the Rector of St. Andrews and the South African party leader move, it is South Africa which suffers.

However, I am digressing. Let me, then, return to the problem of creative activities. To create, we had agreed, is to bring into being something which is good. But are the results of all the activities in the tentative list just given, in fact, good? This question at once opens up infinite argument. We all want the good—the best, in fact; but on what it is we disagree widely and passionately. The militarist may rejoice at the creation of new armies in Europe: the pacifist cannot but condemn the same development as evil. On the one side, economists exhort us to produce and produce more. On the other, they warn us of the evil of over-production. And, paradoxically enough, the concept of over-production has no relation to actual human needs. Under our economic system, as we all know, men remain hungry and poor in the midst of plenty, and the man who makes two blades of grass grow, or two mealies, where there was only one, may well be a public enemy. When we add that many of the creative activities, listed above, flourish equally under a democratic and under a dictatorial form of government, and do not require the air of political freedom, we have perhaps said enough to show that the ideal of creative activity is beset with difficulties of its own, and that its relation to the ideal of political freedom is by no means obvious.

IV. "POLITICAL FREEDOM"

What is the relation of political freedom to other forms of freedom? Is democracy the basis and precondition of all other forms of freedom? Can, e.g., intellectual freedom, or academic freedom, flourish only under a democratic form of government? Or is democracy but one manifestation of a general spirit of freedom, which has found many other avenues of expression, some of them

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 34.

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preceding democracy in time, and none of them necessarily bound up with the maintenance of democratic institutions in the political field?

Some of General Smuts's phrases seem to imply the former, others are compatible with the latter, view.

In actual fact, *all* forms of government in the present-day world practise persecution—the so-called democratic no less than the anti-democratic ones. There is at most only a difference of degree between the treatment which has been meted out to Communists and Socialists ("Reds") in democratic U.S.A. and in Fascist Germany. Fascist Germany is peculiar in persecuting a racial group among its citizens—though, assuredly, South Africa has no right to cast stones at Germany for practising the principle of racial discrimination. But all governments persecute—or, at any rate, claim the right to persecute and invest themselves with legal powers to persecute—convictions hostile to themselves, when held by groups actively making propaganda for such convictions, and thus threatening the established order with "revolution." In some countries, like England, public opinion is more sensitive about restrictions of the freedom of speech than in others. But the difference is only one of degree, and it is not only in war-time that the wings of freedom are liable to be severely clipped.

It is true—and here lies the strength of General Smuts's plea—that democracy *in principle* should be exempt from this criticism. For the essence of democracy lies, not so much in the detail of parliamentary institutions, as in the agreement to reach decisions by discussion and vote of all concerned, on the understanding that the out-voted minority accepts the will of the majority as its own. This is the essence of that "progress" in which for "domination" is substituted "consent" and "co-operation." Democracy avoids civil war and domesticates revolution by "counting heads instead of breaking them." This is to conduct political affairs on the plane of "reason" and "persuasion" instead of on the plane of "brute force" and "compulsion."¹

But, unfortunately, there are limits to the application of this method in practice. It breaks down when interests are so opposed, and the passions aroused are so fierce, that the minority can be held in obedience only by force, because it will fight rather than accept the result of a vote. Unhappily, modern democracies all too often have to deal with issues which are just of this sort—which escape "persuasion" (even of the Pickwickian kind in which the minority, though unconvinced, agrees to let the majority have its way), because the antagonisms go too deep. Such, e.g., are the "racial" issues here in South Africa: Can Whites contemplate

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 34.

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being out-voted by a Black majority? Such are the issues of social and economic power between Capitalism and Socialism. Such are, sometimes, "national" issues, as in Ireland.

To put this another way: The democratic method operates on two planes—the plane of discussion and the plane of vote. On the latter plane decisions are made. Decisions are necessary for action: for determining policy, making laws, maintaining or changing established institutions. The ideal, as pictured for us by the classical apologists for democracy, is that decisions shall be taken only after, on the plane of discussion, the "truth" has emerged; after all relevant considerations have been presented and men's minds have been allowed to discern, and agree on, what it is best to do. Here, in leading men to the common perception of truth, is the proper place for free speech and free press. Here lies the superior merit of democracy as the method of reason, persuasion, consent.

But the flaw in the ideal is that the argument is not, in fact, conducted exclusively in the objective, dispassionate spirit of scientific investigation, but that it is an interlocking in debating combat of wills, interests, power-factors which will presently test their relative strengths by the vote. No scientific debate settles truth by a majority vote: parliamentary debates issue in voting, because the point to be decided is, not which line of thought is true, but which is to prevail and to be acted on. Even Mill had to admit that majorities might err.

In a democracy, it is true, the party in power is more tolerant of opposition propaganda than in a dictatorship. But it is a tolerance practised always subject to overriding considerations of power-politics. Much depends on the effective control of the means of propaganda for influencing public opinion—the press, the broadcasting stations, political patronage, etc. More depends on a shrewd judgment concerning the point at which the freedom of thought and speech claimed by the advocates of a certain view, becomes dangerous to the interests whose right to exist is challenged by the view in question. If counter-propaganda does not avail to check the danger, other modes of pressure may be used, and in the end laws may be passed making the advocacy of the dangerous view illegal, and giving the interest threatened the protection of the police and the courts.¹ And so, even in a democracy, the principle that everyone should have the right to speak his mind freely and to seek to convince others to his point of view, is apt to be progressively curtailed.

What, in fact, are the conditions of effective toleration? The question is directly relevant to our topic of the relation of political

¹ Cf., e.g., the Riotous Assemblies Act in South Africa, aimed chiefly against Communist and anti-White propaganda among Natives.

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to other forms of freedom. When, e.g. intellectual or academic freedom is claimed, what is meant is that no one, and more particularly no properly trained expert, especially in an academic position, is to be prevented from publishing the conclusions to which he has been led by his studies, by the fear of losing his life or his position and income, or, in general, by any other form of social and economic pressure which forces him to choose between the personal well-being of himself and his dependants at the price of keeping his mouth shut, and personal sacrifice and suffering for the sake of proclaiming aloud the truth as he sees it.

My thesis is that the fields of human thought in which the battle for freedom, in this sense, has been effectively won, are those in which the truth (or, rather, the conflicting "truths") have wholly, or almost wholly, lost their political importance, whereas any "truths" which are dangerous to politically powerful interests are liable to meet with a denial of freedom even in democratically governed countries.

To illustrate this thesis: Religious persecution flourished and religious freedom was denied, so long as religious conformity was regarded as an all-important social bond, and the State, for the sake of social unity and stability, was willing to play executioner for the Church. When the religious unity of Christendom was broken by the Reformation, and the Protestant movement continued to split up into ever-fresh denominations, the State discovered that religious unanimity is unnecessary as a social bond, so long as men of different religious beliefs, or even of no religious belief at all, are willing to be equally loyal citizens and good patriots. The principle of religious toleration has given us the "secular," i.e., religiously neutral or indifferent, State, to which it does not matter whether a citizen is a Roman Catholic or a Protestant, a Christian or a Jew, a Theist or an Atheist, so long as they all pay their taxes and obey conscription in war-time. Citizenship, not Churchmanship, became the politically important bond. Religion became the concern of private groups, and even of purely individual consciences, and was "tolerated" by the State, because happily the Churches continued to teach that obedience to the State is part of obedience to God's will, even when the State calls upon the citizens to bear arms in war. That is why the State can deny freedom to conscientious objectors in war-time with the approval of most Christian consciences.

When religion became politically unimportant, freedom of scientific research could also develop. For, once more, men might safely (from the State's point of view) deny points in the traditional Christian dogma, or develop a non-religious, "materialistic" world-view, so long as they remained good citizens and patriots.

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At the present day, in Germany, religion seems to have become once more politically important, because religious divisions threaten, or are suspected by Nazi-leaders to be an obstacle to, the complete unification of the German people on the basis of the new Nazi faith. The correct explanation of this phenomenon, as recent events have shown, is that devotion to Nazi ideals is itself a religion, and a religion in conflict with all forms of Christianity which have not been Nazified or "gleichgeschaltet."

To sum up: modern democracy flourished and satisfied, because, and as long as, the issues on which men were passionately divided, such as rival forms of Christianity, or Religion *v.* Science, were compatible with passionate agreement on common civic loyalties, taking the form of willing acceptance of the established order, and of the distribution of economic and social power in that order. The moment such fundamental agreement breaks down—as it has broken down or is in process of breaking down in many States—because the citizen-body is riven by racial, or nationalistic, or economic-class antagonisms, democracy fails to banish the spectres of revolution and civil war (or, at least, the persecution of one section by another). Democratic institutions then become the instruments of the race, or the national group, or the economic class which is defending its power and vested interest. Democracy, then, employs force and compulsion like a tyranny. It ends by denying the liberties which it had been its pride to guarantee. It may even rationalize its betrayal of liberty by pleading that it is denying liberty for the sake of defending it. No wonder that, in these circumstances, democracy is being replaced by dictatorships which achieve the desired result with more efficiency and less make-believe.

V. "ACADEMIC (OR INTELLECTUAL) FREEDOM"

At this point a word on academic freedom may not be out of place, especially as there are some distinctions to be insisted on which are sometimes overlooked.

(a) There is, first, the exclusion from academic positions of certain men, solely on the ground of their race. Not for a moment would I wish to defend this policy. But, it is relevant to point out that it cannot be fairly treated as an attack on academic freedom, as such. It is an attempt to exclude individuals of a certain race from academic teaching and research, but it is not an attempt to control or restrict what shall be taught or made matter of research. It is a persecution of persons, not of doctrines.

(b) We come nearer to an attack on academic freedom when we find men excluded from Universities, and debarred from making an academic career, on the ground of their religious or political

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convictions. The desired end is usually achieved by positive means, viz. by requiring candidates to subscribe to the political or religious principles which those in control of the Universities seek to maintain. This is definitely to prescribe orthodoxy, and banish unorthodoxy, within the political or religious field. And the principle is the same, whether it demands, as in modern Italy, adherence to Fascism, or, as in the Oxford of a hundred years ago, subscription to the thirty-nine articles of the Established Church. No doubt, the assumption is that only convinced adherents will apply, and that thus no violence is done to any conscience. Actually, the University suffers by limiting its field of choice among available scholars and experts, and individuals are tempted to be insincere in their declarations, either from fear of losing a position which they already hold, or else from thinking that outward conformity in a matter in which they may be at heart indifferent, is a small price to pay for the chance of devoting their lives to kind of work which they care for above all else. It is certainly pitiful to observe how some German scholars, with the growth of Nazi power, have striven to give their work the colouring of the fashionable Nazi ideology. Still, a good mathematician, e.g., remains a good mathematician, whether he be a convinced Nazi or only pretends to be one. There is, fortunately, a considerable degree of logical independence between most subjects in the academic curriculum and a particular set of religious or political principles, and the requirement of religious or political orthodoxy is, so far, compatible with freedom in the specialist's own field. If his freedom is restricted, it is the freedom of the citizen, not that of the scholar and specialist which suffers.¹ Here, again, I am not arguing that the imposition of religious or political tests is desirable or right in itself. I am merely pointing out that this restriction of freedom to think and to teach is confined to the area of the tests, and even then will not be felt by those whose sincere convictions accord with the tests.

(c) But more important than these considerations is the point that, in this complicated world of ours, even freedom cannot be treated as an absolute, unconditional value which ought, on all occasions and under all circumstances, to override all other values. There are defenders of freedom who advocate an individualism so unqualified and unrestrained that, if it were really to be practised, the result would be chaos and anarchy, alike in the realms of knowledge and of conduct. Thus, e.g., I read that the Marquess of Lothian, addressing the annual conference of Educational Associations, and recommending the cultivation of the "scientific spirit and the free mind," declared that "Human progress, the attainment

¹ Except, of course, where the scholar's special field is Political Theory, or, in present-day Germany, *Rassenanthropologie*.

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of the immense possibilities which I believe are now within human grasp, the emergence of that new religious attitude to life which is the final solution of the problem, will come only if there are enough people who refuse to submit their minds to external controls, who think for themselves, think actively, think scientifically, think honestly, lovingly, mercifully, about everything which comes within the range of their consciousness, and then act fearlessly in the light of that thinking."

Of course, the qualifying adverbs imply a *standard* of thinking, and I am fully prepared to believe that the Marquess means that standard to be a high one. But I miss all emphasis on the need of *learning* so to think, on the *discipline* which alone makes the competent thinker. Broadly speaking, the individual can learn to think only by being taught to think, and such teaching is a social responsibility and implies, therefore, a working agreement on what the standard of good thinking is. It would be a wholesome reply to the individualism, above illustrated, to say that only those have the right to think "for themselves" who are *fit* to think for themselves; and that relatively few people, even among our modern "educated" multitudes, are fit to think for themselves on the vast majority of the countless subjects which, at some time or another, "come within the range of their consciousness." Even men highly trained to think in some special field, who when they utter their thoughts about their speciality do so with authority, have been found to think very badly in other fields of which they either do not know enough, or where they are biased by prejudice and emotion. Professor H. J. Laski, in a recent article in the *New Republic*, pleaded eloquently for the freedom of the instructed mind to teach what it believes to be the truth. Yes—the *instructed* mind: that little word "instructed" makes all the difference. And instruction, to begin with, implies instructors: indeed, it is precisely Professor Laski's point that the instructed mind shall be free to instruct others, just as it was originally instructed itself. Scientists are made by scientists: the practice of the scientific outlook and method is learned by working with those who are already masters of it. Is this "external control"? Obviously, it is—not, indeed, control in the sense of compulsion to believe under the pressure of fear or other logically irrelevant motives, but the control of those who know, the control of the truth which they convey. Teachers are "external" to the learner in that they are other than he; and the truth is "external" to him so long as he has not yet made it his own.

Certainly, in the end the mind that has been instructed may pass beyond, add to, criticize, reject, even revolutionize, the tradition in which it has been instructed. But it will be fit to do so only because it has first mastered what it criticizes or surpasses.

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Even this, however, is not the last word. For it does not follow, though it is often lightly assumed, that even "instructed" minds always agree on the subjects to which they have devoted their thought and study. An instructed theologian and an instructed rationalist will widely diverge in what they severally believe to be the truth about the Christian religion. It may be well for a community to tolerate all these different brands of "truth" in its midst. It may even be worth while for all, or most, to be taught from chairs in the same University, and for the youths attending to be exposed, not to a homogeneous intellectual atmosphere, but to a welter and even a chaos in which each must learn to select for himself and to mould himself.

Certainly this is possible and may be desirable on the plane of pure speculation, where different views, even when they have specific practical applications, are none the less kept deliberately divorced from issuing in action. But when "teaching" becomes the propagation of "truths" demanding to be acted on, when, in fact, the teacher's aim is not merely to convince, but to incite to action—what then? Is it wise, is it compatible with citizen-duty, then *always* to "act fearlessly in the light of one's thinking"?

Clearly, a community can tolerate differences, and even contradictions, on the plane of mere thinking among its members, where it cannot tolerate the translation of all these differing and mutually contradictory convictions into simultaneous actions, for the result might well be the destruction of all social order, and its replacement by disruption and anarchy.

In short, the conditions under which, as we had found above, the democratic method becomes unworkable, are also the conditions under which the practice of academic freedom comes to be curtailed, at any rate on all those subjects and problems which touch the fight for power on the political plane.

VI. CONCLUSION

If democracy, and with it freedom in all its socially desirable forms, is threatened in the modern world, then, clearly, the moral of the preceding argument is that the preservation of democracy requires the preservation, or re-establishment, of certain fundamental convictions concerning the principles on which the community is to be organized. Without a common basis, there can be no unity and coherence. After all, if the democratic method is the method of reason and persuasion, how can you "reason" with a man who denies your fundamental premises? Or how can you "persuade" another, unless you both start from some common ground?

Paradoxical as it may seem: Freedom can flourish only within

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the framework of common convictions; and the society which could tolerate among its members an infinite diversity of convictions and actions on these convictions, has not yet been invented, and is, in fact, unthinkable.

Even freedom to differ, implying an agreement to differ, is possible only, either if two people can avoid having to live a common life, or else, if they are held together by bonds so strong that their differences, though they may strain these bonds, are none the less kept in check by a deeper unity.

Hence, how much freedom may be practically realizable depends on historic circumstances in the lives of peoples. Can we deny that situations may arise in which the fundamental unity has been, or is in danger of being, so completely lost, that its restoration overrides all other considerations? Can we deny that this restoration, where groups are divided against each other by utterly conflicting principles, can be effected, if at all, only by force, not by argument? Must we not admit on behalf of the new tyrannies, however much we may dislike them, that—desperate remedies for desperate situations—they try to re-establish broken unities, and to substitute order for chaos? Such re-establishment, through the victory of one party and its set of principles over the other party and its principles, is a war-phenomenon and must be judged as such. All the new tyrannies have done in these wars, as all people will always do in wars, things in themselves utterly indefensible, and they are doing them still. All of them have used, and are using, force—threatened democracies no less than anti-democratic forms of government—against their unyielding enemies. Whom they cannot persuade at least to keep quiet, him they suppress. But the rising generations are their genuine field. Here an education, deliberately planned to inculcate the required loyalties and convictions, may be expected to mould the minds of future citizens to the desired pattern; and so moulded, they will feel free in that pattern. The strength of these tyrannies is that they give youth something to live for: an adventure in building a better world and mastering adverse circumstances. Whether the faith to be communicated be Fascism or Communism, for those who accept it heart and soul and live and work for it, it does offer a supra-individual value as an object of devotion. The lives of these believers will be to themselves supremely worth living: they will find perfect freedom in that service.

Those lovers of democratic freedom who focus their minds narrowly on contemporary events, to the exclusion of wider historic vistas, may often be tempted to despair. But, a philosopher, at any rate, may learn from the history of human thought that no "truth" is ever completely lost. There is no reason to think that the truth of democracy is lost for good and all, merely because it

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is temporarily eclipsed in a sick world. Democratic method can flourish only in a healthy society among sane men, and common fundamental convictions concerning the order of society to be maintained are a necessary condition of social health and sanity. In sick societies of men, maddened by war and the aftermath of war, by defeat and shame, by poverty and unemployment, in a society of men who have nothing to live for, democratic method cannot flourish. And just as little can it flourish among fanatics fighting to set up a new order by revolution and maintaining it by ruthless force until it has taken root. Even Plato admits that there are times when the wise man can do no better than shelter behind a wall until the storm has blown past. Such a storm has overtaken the adherents of democratic method in large areas of the modern world. But their day will come again.

SCIENCE AND THE EXPLANATION OF PHENOMENA.¹

PROFESSOR W. T. STACE

My subject to-day falls within that branch of philosophy which is commonly called the philosophy of science. And it is intended, among other things, to illustrate, by the particular case of science, the suggestion which I made in my first lecture that all subjects, scientific, literary, moral, if you examine their first principles, will lead you back into philosophy.

Perhaps I ought to begin, however, by apologizing for talking about science at all. In these days it is a perilous thing for the lay man to do. There are some philosophers, I believe, who can claim to possess a fairly expert knowledge of some one or other of the sciences. But I, assuredly, am not one of them. But by way of an excuse I would plead that science, after all, is but one of many forms of human intellectual endeavour, and that as such it must have its special place and its special function in the general economy of human culture. My purpose in this lecture is simply to inquire what the special function of science is. And that problem, the problem of the function of science, is not itself, I submit, a scientific problem. For to which of the particular sciences can it possibly belong? It is not a biological problem, or a geographical problem, or a chemical problem. There is no science which claims it. You must stand *outside* science to investigate it. And it is, I should say, a philosophical problem.

I suppose I shall be allowed to say, at any rate, that science deals in some way with nature, with things that happen in nature, with events, with phenomena. Now when anything happens in nature, there are two questions regarding it which human beings are prone to ask. The first is, "*What* happened?" The second is, "*Why* did it happen?" We may distinguish these two questions by calling the first the question of the "*what*," the second the question of the "*why*." To give a very simple example. Suppose a child who has observed for the first time in his life the freezing of a pond. He may ask, "What has happened?" In reply he will be told that when the thermometer falls to below 0 degrees centigrade, the previously liquid water turns solid, its volume increases by roughly one-eighth, and so on. He may also perhaps be told something about the mole-

¹ The second of a series of public lectures delivered at Princeton University.

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cular processes involved. But in all such information he is being given simply a *description* of what happens. The answer to the question "what?" is always necessarily a description, and nothing but a description.

But the child may frame his question in a different way. Instead of asking what has happened to the water, he may ask, "*Why* does water freeze?" And if his teacher is a very unsophisticated scientist, he may reply that water freezes *because* the temperature falls below 0 degrees centigrade, and *because*, when that happens, the molecules do so and so. Here, apparently, the child is being given, not a mere description of what happens, but a reason *why* it happens, or in other words an *explanation*. Thus the question "what?" asks simply for a *description* of events. The question "why?" asks for an *explanation* of them.

Now the essence of my thesis to-day is simply this: that the function of science is to answer the question "what?" but never the question "why?" In other words, its function is simply to *describe* phenomena, never to *explain* them. But it is also part of my thesis that from the earliest times scientists have as a matter of fact attempted, not only to describe phenomena, but also to explain them; and that this false striving after explanations has led science astray in the past, and that it may very possibly lead it astray again in the present and in the future, if the situation is not watched. And what I am going to do is to try to justify these statements.

Science arose in the beginning out of ordinary human curiosity, the curiosity of ordinary ignorant men. But the two questions, "what happens?" and "why does it happen?" are the natural questions which ordinary human curiosity always puts. This simple psychological fact has to a large extent governed the development of science. It accounts for the fact that science from the beginning has always attempted to answer both these questions. And although the demand for explanation is, scientifically speaking, an illegitimate demand, science has never quite freed itself from the idea of explanation which it has inherited from its ancestry in naïve human curiosity.

If one leaves out of account certain tentative beginnings in Babylonia and Egypt, science proper may be said to have begun its career in ancient Greece. And the greatest of the Greek scientists was Aristotle. It is extremely instructive to note how Aristotle set about dealing with natural phenomena. When anything came into existence, whether it was an oak-tree, or a hen's egg, or a flash of lightning, Aristotle thought that there were four principles which must be used in attempting to understand it. You must ascertain, he said, the material cause of the thing, its efficient cause, its final cause, and its formal cause. With formal causes I am not here concerned, and I will say nothing about them. Roughly speaking, and

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neglecting fine metaphysical points, the other three principles may be described as follows. The material cause of a thing was the matter of which it was made. The efficient cause was the preceding events or phenomena which brought the thing into being—that is to say, what we should now call simply the cause. The final cause of a thing was the *purpose* which it served in the universe. Thus one might say that in order fully to understand anything one had, for Aristotle, to know three things about it, what it was made of, what its cause was, and what purpose it served in the world.

The first two of these principles, you will see, answered the question "what?" They met the demand for description and nothing else. What is it made of? If you answer that it is made of wood or iron, you are obviously describing it. What is its cause? That is, what other phenomena invariably precede it, or lead up to it? If you answer that question, you are describing not the phenomenon itself, but the one that went before it. You are describing the *series* of phenomena of which this phenomenon is a member.

But the third principle, which Aristotle called the final cause, was intended to answer the question "why?" and to give, not a description, but an explanation. What does the word "why" mean? Well, it is ambiguous, and has several meanings. But one of the commonest interprets it in terms of purpose. We say to a man, "What did you do?" which is a form of the question, "What happened?" And when he has told us what he did, we ask, "Why did you do it?" And by that we mean, "What was your purpose?" And Aristotle thought that we could question nature in the same way. After we had ascertained what nature does, we could then go on to ask why nature does it. The answer, in the case of any particular phenomenon, was the final cause of that phenomenon, the purpose which it served in the cosmos. So that in Greece, the country in which science originated, the conception of the function of science which was entertained by its most distinguished representative was that this function included both the description and the explanation of phenomena.

Throughout the Middle Ages, I should say, Aristotle's conception of science held the field more or less unchanged. But when you come to the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, to the age of Galileo and Newton, you find a sudden change. Most of the conceptions of Aristotle are attacked. And among these the conception of final causes. Aristotle was accused, among other sins, of having introduced into science the futile and fatal idea of final causes, that is to say, the conception of purpose. The modern scientific era began with the firm determination to vanish final causes altogether from science. Science was not in the future to probe into the cosmic purpose of anything.

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It was not that the seventeenth-century scientists were disposed to deny the existence of purposes in nature. They were most of them religious men who believed that the world is governed by God's purposes. But they supposed that these purposes were beyond the reach of science. They might fall within the sphere of religion, or perhaps of philosophy. But science, in pursuing the will o' the wisp of purpose, had been led into a wilderness, had failed to make useful discoveries, and would continue to do so. Its business was to discover the facts, to describe the facts, and to leave all ulterior questions of purpose out of account. So the point which I am trying to make is this. The seventeenth century in effect rejected the Aristotelian conception of science as concerned both with description and explanation, and declared that the proper function of science is description alone. And it is under this banner that modern science has marched forward ever since.

Scientific laws, I should say, explain nothing. Science never *can* explain even the simplest event. At this statement some one may be inclined to cavil. "Surely," it will be said, "modern science does attempt to explain things, and does, moreover, succeed. Surely the germ theory explains many diseases. Surely the law of gravitation explains the movements of the planets. Surely the theory of evolution explains the appearance of new species on the planet." And so on. It is worth while to consider this.

Let us take a very simple case. Suppose that a savage from Central Africa, who has never seen ice, is brought to this country, and is astonished to find water turning solid in the winter. How do you "explain" this to him? You tell him—assuming that he is capable of understanding you—that it is a law of nature that when the temperature falls below 0 degrees centigrade, and when certain other conditions are fulfilled, water turns solid. That is your explanation. It consists in reducing this particular event, happening here and now, to an example of a general law of nature. But what is a law of nature? Instead of telling the savage that in this particular case the temperature fell below zero, and that the water then froze, you tell him that in *all* cases, *whenever* the temperature falls below zero, water *always* freezes. You are simply telling him what *always* happens. Your explanation of a particular phenomenon by reducing it to a general law merely consists in saying that this phenomenon, which is happening now, is an example of what always happens. A scientific law, in fact, is nothing but a *description* of what always happens. It does nothing towards explaining *why* it happens.

But, it will be objected, this is merely elementary. The scientist does not merely say that at a certain temperature water freezes. He *explains* the phenomenon by means of molecular processes. He explains that, when the temperature reaches zero, then the mole-

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cules do so and so, and the water becomes solid, But what is this, once more, beyond mere description? When the temperature reaches zero, then the molecules do so and so. That just tells us what the molecules do, what happens, not *why* it happens. And however far you go with your molecular, your atomic, or your sub-atomic processes, it will always be just the same. Always you will have description, and never explanation.

Is it different, to take another example, with the law of gravitation? Why does an unsupported stone fall to the ground? On the Newtonian view it is because all particles attract one another with a certain force. But what does this mean? It means only that all particles tend to fall together. This happens here because it always happens everywhere. Newton's law of gravitation, like every other law, simply states what always happens. It gives no reason why.

Nor would it make the slightest difference if we substitute Einstein's law for Newton's. We should only be substituting one law for another. And a law, as such, simply states what always happens.

Now I can well imagine that at this point someone may exclaim, "Well, what on earth do you want? The laws of nature tell you what happens. What else do you want to know? You seem to want to know also *why* things happen. What do you *mean* by why?"

I hasten to say that I personally do *not* want the scientist to tell me anything except what happens. I do not want him to tell me why it happens. In fact, my whole contention is that he should confine himself strictly to telling me what happens, and that when he tries to tell me why it happens, he is deserting the proper function of science. But I will come to that later. Meanwhile let us attend to the last question which was put to me. "What do you *mean* by the question, Why?"

As we have seen, human curiosity always has asked the question "why?" as well as the question "what?" And now the problem seems to be what is it that ordinary human curiosity wants to know when it asks the question "why?" What kind of information does it expect in reply to this question?

Thinking over this problem, I have come to the conclusion that the question "why?" does not really express a desire for information at all. It expresses a *feeling*. It does not proceed from the intellect, but from the emotions. It indicates simply that men want to be made to feel *at home* in the universe. They want to escape from the sense of loneliness, the sense of strangeness and unfamiliarity, the sense even of hostility, which the universe is apt to inspire. For the lonely, the strange, the unfamiliar are terrifying. At this point we tap the psychological source of that desire for explanation which has always haunted the human mind, and which has dogged the footsteps of science. The whole conception of explanation has its

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roots here. To explain a thing *means*, I believe, to exhibit it as friendly to ourselves, or at least, as not menacing. When a strange, surprising, hitherto unknown phenomenon occurs in nature, when some totally new experience comes upon us, we want to know that this strange new thing is not going to be a menace to us, is not going to be disastrous to us. When by some intellectual process we have become assured of this, we feel that the phenomenon has been *explained*. That, I believe, is the *meaning* of explanation, and of the question "why?"

But historically this demand of our emotional nature has satisfied itself in two quite distinct ways, and this fact has given rise to two quite distinct types of explanation.

The first way of satisfaction has lain in developing the belief that the world is rational, purposive. We ourselves are purposive beings. Our actions are governed by purposes. If we could extend this conception to the universe at large, if we could suppose that whatever happens in the universe happens because of some purpose, and especially if the purpose were something to our advantage, we should certainly feel more at home in the world. We should feel that the universe is like ourselves, and perhaps even that it is on our side. It would cease then to be strange, terrifying, and incomprehensible. If we could show the purpose which a phenomenon serves in the universe, the phenomenon would then be explained. This was the significance of Aristotle's final causes. And this is *one* kind of explanation.

Explanation by means of purposes is out of date for science. It was definitely banished from science in the seventeenth century. I do not mean by this to affirm that there is in fact no cosmic purpose in the universe; or that this is the view of science. The universe may, for all I know, be governed by purpose. And any science which *denies* that the world is purposive, is, in my opinion, stupid and dogmatic. But science has long ago decided that the question of purpose lies outside its scope. Perhaps it is a question for philosophy, or perhaps for religion. I do not discuss that here.¹ My only point is that this kind of explanation no longer finds a place in science.

But there is a second type of explanation, which depends psychologically upon another way of making ourselves at home with things. It depends upon the psychological commonplace that familiarity breeds contempt. If anything in the universe appears strange, extraordinary, or menacing, then we try to show that it is after all something quite familiar and ordinary. When an utterly new experience comes upon us, threatening us, we try to show that it is after all only an old friend in a new disguise. It thereupon loses

¹ But see the "Note on the Concept of Explanation" at the end of this lecture.

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its terrors for us. From this psychological root grows the second type of explanation, which consists simply in reducing the strange to the familiar, the unknown to the known. And my contention will be that, although science has emancipated itself from the first kind of explanation, it has not yet completely emancipated itself from the second.

Is not this what is at the bottom of the common idea that the phenomena of nature are explained by the *laws* of nature? We supposed our African savage to be astonished at the freezing of water. As we saw, you explain this to him by showing that it is nothing unique, but merely an example of what always happens. It is, in other words, nothing strange. It is quite familiar. When you have made him understand this, he feels satisfied that you have explained the matter. And not only the African savage. We all of us feel the same. Which shows that what we *mean* by explanation is simply the showing that the phenomenon in question is not strange, but familiar, that it is something that always happens.

It follows that this idea of explanation is quite arbitrary and unscientific; quite personal and subjective. For what is strange to one person may be quite familiar to another. Hence what explains a phenomenon to me may not explain it to you.¹ And I think you will agree with me that it cannot be the function of science to supply various different individuals with the various different kinds of emotions which will make each of them feel at home in the world. In other words, the function of science is not explanation at all.

But evidence that the idea of explanation has not altogether been dropped from the sciences is found in our linguistic habits, in the ordinary turns of phrase used alike by the layman and the scientist. Nothing is commoner than to hear the question, "What is the scientific explanation of this or that phenomenon?" Nothing is commoner than to hear the question "why?" put to the scientist, and answered by him. *Why* do the planets move in ellipses? *Why* has the mammoth become extinct? And wherever the word "why" is used instead of the word "what," you know that our old mental habit still holds sway, that the old craving for explanation, for making the world seem homely and familiar, instead of strange and alarming, is still alive.

But perhaps you will think that this is a mere verbal matter, a matter of words which does not affect the substance of science. Perhaps it may be a slight terminological inaccuracy to say that the law of gravitation "explains" the movements of the planets. We ought, no doubt, to use some other word. But this is a matter of no importance to anyone except grammatical purists and philosophical hair-splitters. It has never misled science.

¹ I owe this point to Professor Bridgman's *Logic of Modern Physics*.

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I am afraid that such a view cannot be maintained. I am afraid that the false idea of explanation has misled science in the past. And with great deference I venture to suggest that it may possibly be misleading science now, and may continue to do so in the future. I will try to give a few examples to show this.

You will remember the common idea that a thing cannot act, or produce an effect, at a distance from the place where it is. Action at a distance, it used to be said, is an impossibility. That maxim has played a great part in the history of thought. And yet it is a pure *a priori* dogma, without the slightest foundation in evidence. To settle whether it is true or not ought always to have been a matter of observation or experiment, and nothing else. If it were found, as a matter of observed fact, that an event X, happening in one part of the universe, was invariably followed by another event Y at a distance of a million miles, and if there were no empirical evidence of anything happening in between, then it should have been declared, on the basis of such evidence, that X was the cause of Y, or in other words that X acted at a distance.

But what actually happened was that *a priori* dogmas were allowed to intervene. The question was not settled upon the evidence, but by supposed considerations of pure reason. It was supposed to be *incomprehensible* that anything should act at a distance. And, therefore, it was declared to be impossible.

Now what is this supposed incomprehensibility? Examine it carefully, for it is profoundly instructive in the ways of human thought. You think that if an event *here*, say the blow of a hammer, is followed by another event *here*, say a blue flash, as may happen in an explosion, then this is quite comprehensible, and you will call the two events cause and effect. But suppose it is alleged that the blow of the hammer *here* is followed by a blue flash a million miles away, with nothing happening in between, then you say this is incomprehensible. I want to know what you *mean* by "incomprehensible."

In the first, you do not mean "logically self-contradictory." For there is no logical contradiction in a blow *here* being followed by a blue flash a million miles away. The proposition, "a blow occurred *here*," is obviously not contradicted by the proposition, "a blue flash occurred a million miles away."

I will suggest a second possible meaning. The only way in which science ever understands any phenomenon consists in describing it accurately and in detail. The freezing of water is understood, so far as science can understand it, when all the molecular and other processes involved have been described. Therefore a thing is "comprehensible" for science if it can be described. And it would be "incom-

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prehensible" if, for some reason, it could not be described. But now, there is nothing difficult to describe in a blow of a hammer here followed by a blue flash a million miles away. It is just as easy to describe as the blow of a hammer here followed by a blue flash here. The only difference between the two cases consists in the intervening distance in the first case. And all you have to do is to insert that fact in your description. The one, therefore, is as scientifically comprehensible as the other. This, therefore, cannot be your meaning. Or, at any rate, action at a distance is not incomprehensible in this, the only scientifically legitimate sense.

By a process of elimination I arrive at the following conclusion. What you really mean by the word "incomprehensible" is simply "unfamiliar." Man in his ordinary avocations of life has been accustomed for hundreds of thousands of years to what we may call action at one place. It is the ordinary type of action. We have seen one thing hitting another and this other thing bouncing off. All man's ordinary everyday experience has been of action at one place. Such action is absolutely familiar. And it seems to need no explanation. So when man suddenly comes across a case of apparent action at a distance, such as gravitation, it seems astonishing. He declares it to be incomprehensible and impossible. And he demands that the appearance of it be explained. And by explanation of it he *means* that it be shown to be really a case of action at one place after all. Then it will become comprehensible, because it will seem familiar.

As against this it may be urged that gravitational action at a distance, as in the case of the stone falling to the ground, has always been familiar to mankind, quite as familiar as the bumping and hitting of things against one another. I reply that this was not thought of, by pre-scientific man, as action at a distance. It was not realized that the *earth* causes the stone to fall. The cause of the stone falling was supposed to be its own *weight*, which was a property of the stone itself. It was therefore the stone that acted, and this was an example of action at one place. It was only when science introduced the idea of gravitational *attraction* of one body by a distant body that man for the first time had the experience of action at a distance.

The demand of the average human consciousness for an explanation of gravitation actually set science to work. It resulted in the immense amount of time and labour devoted by scientists of an earlier generation in attempts to explain gravitation, that is, to reduce it to a case of action at one place, by means of such hypotheses as that space is full of flying particles which, by beating upon the unprotected sides of bodies, tended to drive them together.

These attempts, then, and the *a priori* dogma which led to them, namely, that action at a distance is impossible, were actual examples

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of how science has been influenced by the false idea that its function is explanation.

The same idea is at the bottom of the view that for the propagation of light through space there is necessary a medium. I am not here concerned with the question whether there actually is or is not such a medium as the ether of space. That is a matter for the experts. But what I am concerned to say is that whether there is or is not such a medium is a pure question of evidence. It must not be decided by *a priori* dogmas. And the suggestion that, apart from any actual empirical evidence of the existence of ether, it must necessarily exist because it is *inconceivable* that light should travel across space without a medium is simply a deduction from the *a priori* dogma that action at a distance is impossible. There is nothing *a priori* impossible in the suggestion that certain events in the sun have here on the earth, or on any other distant object, the effects which we attribute to light, without anything, either particles or waves, travelling across the intervening distance.¹ Such a view may, of course, be wrong, and I do not say that there is anything to recommend it. But if anyone thinks it *a priori impossible*, it must be because he supposes that cause and effect cannot jump across a distance, but must be propagated from point to point, or in other words that action at a distance is impossible. And this view we have shown to have its roots in the false concept of explanation.

If experts hold, on the basis of positive evidence, that light is propagated through a medium, then that conclusion must be accepted. But if they hold this view merely on the basis of the supposed impossibility of causal action jumping over a distance of space, then we should have a case of science being misled by the false idea that its function is explanation.

All questions of fact ought to be decided solely upon the basis of evidence without the intrusion of *a priori* dogmas. One might lay down the principle that nothing that is actually observed to happen in nature, nothing for which there is the warrant of experience, ought to be declared impossible on the ground of any supposed *a priori* law. And I would call this *the principle of radical empiricism*. The phrase "radical empiricism," I have, of course, stolen from William James. But James used it in a different meaning.

But to return to the concept of explanation. One may find, I think, another example of its unfortunate influence in Newton's law of gravitation. Newton introduced into this law the concept of "force." The present tendency, I believe, is to dismiss gravitational force as a fiction. Now quite apart from any questions raised by the work of Einstein, it appears that Newton could perfectly well have stated his law without introducing the concept of force at all. He could

¹ This suggestion, too, I owe to Professor Bridgman.

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have stated it in terms of empirically verifiable factors, such as velocities, masses, and distances. Why then did Newton introduce the concept of force which was unnecessary even for his own law? What was his motive in so doing?

The motive, I think, was the ordinary human craving for explanation, for an answer to the question "why?" If Newton had simply stated the relations between the masses, distances, and velocities of moving particles without any mention of forces, he would have given a perfectly good description of what happens and therefore a perfectly good law of gravitation, so far as the data available in his time allowed. But it would have appeared a mystery simply to say that, as a matter of brute fact, particles move in such and such ways and with such and such velocities, and that that was an end of the matter. People would have asked, "*Why* does this happen? *Why* do particles move in this way? *Why* do they move at all?" Newton obviously asked himself these questions and was puzzled by them, and thought he ought to give some reason. And he answered, "Particles move because of forces." And this seemed to explain the mystery because the conception of force is derived from our everyday familiar sensations of stress and strain in our muscles. The explanation consisted in reducing the strange and unfamiliar motions of the heavenly bodies to the ordinary experiences of pushing and pulling of our daily life. Thus the otiose concept of force was introduced because Newton was not satisfied with a law which should simply describe what happens, but erroneously thought that the law should also explain *why* it happens.

The theory of gravitation, however, has been revolutionized in recent years. The concept of force is no longer the centre of it. Einstein's law is not stated in terms of forces, but in terms of geometry. We might suppose, then, that the objectionable features of illusory explanations by means of fictitious entities such as forces would have disappeared. Let us see whether this is so.

I do not profess to understand the mathematics of relativity. But when those who do understand it attempt to enlighten the darkness of us others, we find them using some such language as the following. Space-time, they say, is curved or bent round the sun and other massive bodies. Its geometry is non-Euclidean. One must conceive, then, that space-time has, as it were, hills and valleys in it. Because of these hills and valleys the planets cannot run in straight lines. They have to run round about. This explains the curvature of their orbits.

This, of course, is merely the sort of language used by popularizers, and I dare say it may make some sensitive mathematicians shudder. But it must be remembered that some of these popularizers are themselves experts, and they are presumably responsible for the

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language they use. It seems a fair conclusion that they suppose that such language, though popular, is not wholly false. They think that, in some sense, space-time really is bent, and that this curvature explains the curved motions of the planets.

When the plain man hears such language he is apt, if he is courageous enough to open his mouth at all, to express his puzzled bewilderment somewhat as follows. "I can understand," he may say, "the idea of a bent stick, or a bent material object of any sort. The stick is bent *in* space. But how can space-time itself be bent? What is there to *be* bent? And what is it bent *in*? And if space-time is bent, and so finite, what is outside it?"

I do not know what the expert says in reply to this no doubt crude talk. And I will not pursue the dialogue further. But the whole situation suggests certain reflections to me.

I suspect that there is something wrong here, and that the root of the trouble lies once more in the baneful influence of the false idea that scientific laws ought to explain phenomena. Is not the true position this? Einstein's law, in its strict, that is, its mathematical, form, contains nothing about hills and valleys and bumps in space-time. It contains nothing but mathematical formulæ. These formulae are simply a generalized geometrical description of the curves which might be followed by all possible gravitating bodies. They do not explain anything at all. They are simply a description of certain curves.

Suppose you draw on the blackboard a certain curve, say, an ellipse. A simple geometrical equation will describe that ellipse. Such an equation would not, of course, explain why a particle, which happened to be travelling in that ellipse, was doing so. It would simply describe the curve. Now suppose you draw on the board a number of other ellipses of varying eccentricities. You can get a generalized mathematical formula which will describe, not one of the ellipses, but all of them. Once again this formula will not explain why a number of particles which happen to be travelling on these paths, are so travelling. It will be simply a generalized description of all the curves. Suppose, finally, you draw on the board a number of other curves, circles, parabolas, and so on, in addition to the ellipses. You can still get a more generalized formula which will describe them. I believe that Einstein's law of gravitation is nothing but such a formula, only it describes, not merely a few ellipses and circles, but every possible path of every possible gravitating body. It does not explain their movements. It merely describes them.

No doubt it is the case that, in order to reach this vastly generalized and complicated description, it has been necessary to introduce time as a fourth co-ordinate, and to make use of non-Euclidean geometry.

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But that does not alter the principle. The non-Euclidean geometry was not introduced to explain anything, but simply for purposes of description.

And it was rendered necessary only because of the variety and complication of the curves which had to be described. You might imagine a universe in which all possible gravitating bodies moved in circles. In such a universe the simple equation of the circle would be the law of gravitation, and neither time as a fourth co-ordinate, nor non-Euclidean geometry, would be necessary.

We are usually told that Einstein's law is a description of the curvature of space-time. This, I am convinced, is absolutely meaningless. It is absolutely meaningless to say that space, or space-time, are either curved or straight, that they are either non-Euclidean or Euclidean. A stick may be bent or straight *in* space. But the space in which it lies is neither. It is usually assumed that space had hitherto been regarded as Euclidean, and that this was quite easy to understand, but that with the advent of Einstein we have to think of space as non-Euclidean. Now the essence of my present contention is that it was quite as meaningless to say that space is Euclidean as to say that it is "bent." It is only things *in* space which can be described in either of these ways. Space itself is absolutely amorphous. It has no shape; and therefore no geometry. And if we now ask, "What is it, then, that in Einstein's law is described by the formulæ of a four-dimensional non-Euclidean geometry?" I answer that it is the curves followed by gravitating bodies. The law is not a description of space-time, but a generalized description of certain curves.

But the common way of looking at the matter supposes that space-time is itself curved, and that this curvature *causes* the planets to move as they do. There are supposed to be, as it were, two distinct facts, first the curvature of space-time, and then, secondly, the resulting orbits of the planets. These two are separated, and the first, the curvature, is then supposed to be the cause of the second, the planetary motions.

Now if I were to say that the cause of this table being square is that it occupies a square piece of space, you would rightly think such a statement nonsense. You cannot separate the space from the table which occupies it, attribute a shape to this pure space, and say that this is the cause of the table being square. You cannot in point of fact attribute any shape at all to pure space. It is tables and chairs, material things *in* space, which have shape. In just the same way, I think, it is nonsense to speak of space-time itself as being either Euclidean or non-Euclidean, *apart* from the things which are in it. And it is just as meaningless to say that the hills and valleys in space-time *cause* the planets to move in curved courses as it would

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be to say that the square shape of the space which this table occupies *causes* the table to be square.

But because this is not realized, the illusory idea of causal explanation slips in. Space-time itself is supposed to have hills and valleys in it, and these are supposed to thrust the planets out of their straight courses. As if the hill or the valley were all there waiting in space-time before the planet comes to it.

What is this but the old idea of pushing and pulling? Only instead of the planets being pulled by forces, as they were for Newton, they are now being pushed by coming up against the sides of hills in space-time, just as the billiard ball is pushed out of the straight by an unevenness in the surface of the table.

What, then, is it which has misled so many writers on relativity? What is the psychological cause of the mental confusion which I have just been trying to clear up. I answer that the root cause of all this confused thinking is *the craving for explanation*, the desire to try to show that Einstein's law, not merely describes, but *explains* the phenomena.

Of course formulae in non-Euclidean geometry may correctly describe the motion of the planets. But I suggest that the curvature of space-time is just as fictitious as the forces of Newton. And it has been foisted into discussions of relativity for precisely the same reason as forces were foisted into Newton's law. Forces were supposed to explain *why* bodies move as they do. They explained these motions by appealing to familiar sensations of muscular strain. And now the hills and bumps in space-time are introduced for an identical reason. They make the phenomena seem familiar by comparing them to what happens when I go round a hill instead of through it. Einstein's law, as a pure mathematical formula, explains nothing. It simply says, "This is what happens. Bodies move in such and such curves." But inevitably the human mind asks, "*Why* do they move in these curves?" There is, of course, no answer to this question. It is meaningless. But just as Newton was puzzled by it in regard to his law, and answered, "Oh, it is because of forces," so now modern writers, equally puzzled by the question "why?" in regard to Einstein's law, say, "Oh, it is because the planets are pushed about by the curvature of space-time." This too, like the forces, seems familiar and easy to understand. It seems to explain the phenomena, that is, to make them familiar, until one realizes that the whole idea of scientific explanation is a bogus idea.

And though it is true that this talk about hills and valleys in space-time is a mere popular mode of expression, still I am not convinced that men of science, in their talk of "expanding universes" and "exploding universes," do not take it at least half-seriously, some of them perhaps quite seriously. I am not convinced that their

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own thought is not infected by it. And if so, I do now know what misguidance of science may not follow. And if there is a misguidance, then it will be due to the fact that science has not *even yet* completely emancipated itself from the belief that its function is to explain phenomena.

I am not suggesting that the current scientific theories of expanding and exploding universes are false. That, again, is a matter for the experts, not for the philosophers. No doubt these theories can be *interpreted* so as to be true. And I dare say their pure mathematical expression *is* true, just as is Einstein's law of gravitation. They doubtless describe admirably the known facts about the motions of distant nebulae and other astronomical entities. But if they are interpreted to mean that space itself, or space-time itself, is a sort of round ball which is getting bigger and bigger in the middle of nothingness, with nothing, not even empty space, outside it, then I am certain that it becomes perfectly meaningless. And I do think that there is grave danger that, not only the minds of the general public, but the minds of scientists themselves, may be misled.

I do not know whether I have succeeded in convincing you of anything. But what I have been trying to prove to you is simply this: that such questions as "What are the exact functions of science? What precisely is its business? What is it trying to do? What ought it to try to do? What are its boundaries?" are important questions for the scientist himself. Because, if they are wrongly answered, or if, as more often happens, they are not considered at all, then science may be seriously misled *in its own field*. Such questions are usually regarded as belonging to the philosophy of science, and are studied by philosophers to the best of their ability. Perhaps it is a pity that scientists themselves do not usually investigate them, because they might study them so much the more effectually. The important thing, however, is that they should be studied.

NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF EXPLANATION

The reader may ask whether explanation, if it is not the business of science, is the business of philosophy. Should we, in other words, admit that there *is* such a thing as explanation, that it is a meaningful concept, even though science is not the place for it? Or should we say, on the contrary, that the whole idea of explanation is illusory, wherever it is found, whether in science or philosophy? Obviously this is much the same as asking whether in the last resort the universe is rational or irrational. If there is no such thing as explanation at all, then all we can say is that the world is as it is, and that things happen as they do, that that is the end of the matter, and that there is in the last analysis no rhyme or reason for anything. Equally

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obviously, this is the vastest question that the human mind can ask, and one which it is ridiculous to treat in a footnote! Nevertheless, since the question is bound to frame itself in the mind of the reader of the lecture, I think it is better at least to indicate my personal attitude to it in however brief and unsatisfactory a way.

In the lecture I have mentioned only two types of explanation. One is teleological explanation, or explanation by means of purposes. The other is explanation by familiarity.

There is, however, a third type of explanation which I did not think it necessary to mention in a lecture devoted exclusively to science, because this third type of explanation has never been used in science, and has made its appearance only in the writings of philosophers. I will now say something about this.

The question "why?" may mean "for what purpose?" If so interpreted it gives rise to teleological explanation. Or it may indicate simply a desire to have the unfamiliar reduced to the familiar, and this gives rise to the second type of explanation. But thirdly, the question "why?" may be a request for a *logical reason* or *ground*. Thus the logical reason for any proposition is that prior proposition which implies it and by means of which it is proved. If $A = B$, and $B = C$, then $A = C$. And the facts that $A = B$, and $B = C$, may be given as the logical reason why $A = C$. In this sense, too, the axiom of parallels (in Euclidean geometry) may be given as the reason why the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.

If the question "why?" is interpreted in this sense, then we get the third or *logical* type of explanation. To explain a fact will then mean to give a logical reason for which the fact follows. If the world could be logically deduced from some first principle, if the relation of the ultimate reality to the world could be exhibited, not as the relation of cause to effect, but as the relation of logical antecedent to logical consequent, then the world would be so far, in this sense, "explained."

This idea makes its appearance in the philosophy of Spinoza, in most modern idealism, but most clearly of all in the philosophy of Hegel. Suppose that the universe consists of the things A, B, C, D, . . . etc. If one could show that A logically implies B, while B logically implies C, and so on throughout the whole universe, then everything in the universe might be said to be explained. B exists *because* A exists, and A is the logical reason for B. The whole universe would be rational, i.e. logical. Hegel attempted to deduce the main features of the universe (categories) from one another in this way. To give an example. He tried to show that the idea of *being* logically implies the idea of *becoming* (change). If this were valid, it would explain why the universe is everywhere characterized by imper-


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manence and flux. For if being logically implies becoming, then any being whatever, from an atom to a nebula, must *necessarily* be in a state of becoming or flux. And Hegel attempted to carry out this kind of explanation for all the features of the universe.

To this it may be objected that the first term in the series, A, must itself be an unexplained mystery, since there is no prior term by which it can be explained. And this means that the whole series is really a mystery, and nothing is, in the end, explained. Hegel attempted to meet this difficulty by thinking of the universe as a closed system, which we may symbolize by a circle. The beginning and the end meet. The first term, A, explains all the others until we come to the last term, Z. Here the circle returns upon itself, for Z logically implies A. Thus there is no unexplained term, no ultimate mystery. The universe is a closed system of which every term really implies every other term, so that the whole system is self-explanatory.

It is right to mention that Hegel's own philosophy is an attempt to blend together both the teleological and the logical types of explanation.

From the point of view of motivation, logical explanation may be grouped with teleological explanation, since the motive of both is to show that the universe is rational, and therefore like ourselves. For the word "rational" means either logical or purposive. A man is said to be rational if he is logical, and he is also called rational if his conduct is governed by intelligent purpose. Thus the three types of explanation may be arranged as follows:



As to the question whether any sort of explanation is ever possible or whether in the last resort all explanation, even in philosophy, is as illusory as we have seen it to be in science, the position seems to me to be as follows. Explanation by familiarity is totally worthless both in science and philosophy for the reasons given in the lecture. The other two kinds of explanation fall outside science, and have their place in philosophy, if anywhere. Have they, then, any real place even in philosophy? Opinions differ about this.

(1) *Teleological Explanation*. We may feel vaguely that the universe is driving towards something, and we may envisage this as

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goodness, beauty, or what not. And there may in all this be a real groping towards some truth. But mere feelings, even though they may vaguely indicate something true, do not constitute knowledge. And as far as any real or definite knowledge regarding the cosmic purpose is concerned, we may well think, with Omar, that

The revelations of devout and learned,
Who rose before us and as prophets burned,
Are all but stories which, awoke from sleep,
They told their comrades and to sleep returned.

And it is not unlikely that philosophy will conclude, as did science in the seventeenth century, that "divine purposes" are beyond human comprehension, and will turn to more profitable fields of study where something can be accomplished. At any rate, no philosophy so far has had the least success in the teleological explanation of anything.

(2) *Logical Explanation.* The position is even more hopeless than in the case of teleological explanation. For all I know, everything in the universe may logically imply everything else. But no one has ever shown that it is so. Hegel's philosophy is the only attempt ever made on the grand scale, and it was, in my opinion, completely unsuccessful. And this is also, I think, the general opinion at the present day.

Hence the prospects of philosophical explanation do not appear to be rosy. Theoretically philosophy might still perhaps, in spite of past failures, aim at explanation. But in practice I should say that the philosopher, like the scientist, has never succeeded in explaining a single solitary fact.

Has philosophy, then, a descriptive function, like science, to which it can turn and do useful work? The answer is that it has. In fact, much of the best philosophical work, both in the past and at the present time, has been purely descriptive. This has always been true, for example, of the British empirical tradition. But philosophy will be descriptive of principles more general in character than those which form the subject matter of science. For example, to give a description of particular causal laws is the business of particular sciences. But to give a description or definition of the principle of causality as such is one part of the business of philosophy. Is the essence of causality properly described as simply invariable sequence? Or should the ideas of necessity, compulsion, force, be included in the description? These are the kinds of questions, I think, to which philosophy can attempt an answer with some hope of success, and

¹ This example will make it evident to philosophical readers that what I have here called the "descriptive" function of philosophy is much the same as what many philosophers call "analysis."

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without condemning itself to that futility which seems always to attend upon its efforts at "explanation." Mediaeval science stagnated for centuries until the seventeenth-century scientists made an end of attempts to pursue final causes. Is not the stagnation and futility which have always been charged against philosophy probably due to the fact that philosophy still hankers after explanations?

Hence if any philosopher wishes to include explanation among the functions of philosophy, I should not entirely warn him off the ground. There is just the *faint* possibility that he may be right and that he might succeed. For *if* explanation is possible at all, it certainly is the business of philosophy and not of science. But I should unquestionably regard his enterprise with the same sorrowful tolerance as that with which one views any other forlorn hope. Thus while making a polite bow to the possibility that there may be such a thing as explanation, I should personally advocate a philosophy which excludes explanation from its objectives. I should advocate a reform in philosophy similar to that which occurred when science in the seventeenth century turned its back upon final causes. Only in such a reform, I believe, lies the possibility of advance.

GREAT THINKERS

(VI) DESCARTES

PROFESSOR A. BOYCE GIBSON

THERE is a belief among the aborigines of Central Australia that the attributes of the divine ancestor are parcelled out among the component members of the tribe: and there are long periods in the history of ideas in which "divine philosophy" is similarly dismembered. The reason is that all great philosophical systems rest on a balanced tension of contemporary cultural elements, and as these change, and especially if they change rapidly or decisively, the unity of thought under which they have been gathered begins to disintegrate. There follows a period of piecemeal experiment, in which the material of philosophy is too rich and too disorganized to be appropriated in a single conspectus: a period in which there will be no great philosophers, and perhaps little conscious philosophizing, not because philosophic genius is lacking, but because there is no scope for it till the various special tendencies of the age have achieved a certain internal development and a definite sense of direction.

Such a period was the Renaissance. Not only did it encourage fruitful comparisons by confronting the authority of the Church with the still older authority of classical civilization, but it established a new outlook in science and religion, and out of the resultant intellectual chaos came a new cultural *motif*, the passion for personal independence. While these changes were taking place, the official philosophy stood still: and indeed, vested interests apart, there was little else it could do. In philosophy a culture becomes self-conscious: and first of all it must be clearer about its own nature than it can possibly be in its early stages. But the time came, early in the seventeenth century, when a provisional estimate of the forces at work became possible: and fortunately (for the hour does not always bring forth the man) a "great thinker" was there to attempt it. That thinker was Descartes.

The mental equipment required by the philosopher in an era of reconstruction is not at all points the same as that which is needed at the culminating synthetic stage of development. Then what is especially indispensable is a wide intellectual sympathy which extends to every sphere of knowledge the range of a centralizing logic. For this task Descartes might have been ill adapted. He

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was too impatient, too contemptuous, too much a man of high lights and straight lines, too little inclined to bend in accord with the significant sinuosities of experience. But in the initial stages a certain radicalism of thought and temper is the supreme virtue. The old outlines have to be cleared out of the way before the new factors can assume philosophic expression. What is important is that the philosopher shall be acquainted from the inside with the important tendencies of the new culture, reproducing its conflicts microcosmically, and not without agony, in his own soul. He does not need a sense of history (which Descartes completely lacked) but he does need a sense of contemporaneity. To such a demand Descartes was entirely equal. As a mathematician, he was the discoverer of co-ordinate geometry. As a physicist he propounded the theory of vortices, which, if soon displaced, seriously occupied the attention of his contemporaries. He was independently and disinterestedly concerned for religion, and in the Oratorian circle had learnt to dissociate it, in the modern fashion, from all cosmologies. Finally, he shared with the men of the Renaissance a spirit of personal initiative and sceptical freedom on which, as all other certainties gave way under the dissolving influence of methodical doubt, he was to stake the whole success of his great intellectual adventure.

The danger to which a philosophical personalism is always exposed is that of turning philosophy into psychology. Descartes escaped it, for the self which is his primary metaphysical certainty is a thinking self, and subject therefore to the authority of reason. It is in the name of reason that he dismisses tradition: it is his special task to disinter its eternal principles from the venerable débris of accumulated learning. But, with the fine precision of his nation, he knew that reason could be revealed only in actual reasoning: and so his personalism and his rationalism go together. They are part of a single protest against the laborious compilation of precedents which condemned philosophy to proceed by increasing subtlety of self-criticism alone, to the exclusion of new non-philosophical material now clamouring to be heard. It may be that his personal approach to philosophy made him press too hard the antithesis between authority and reason: but it fairly excluded any appeal beyond reason save such as reason itself could justify. Moreover, where there was as yet no rational solution of a problem in sight, as in the case of morals, Descartes was almost excessively emphatic in recommending a provisional conformity with established usage.

The first rule of method laid down by Descartes for the regulation of the understanding is "never to accept anything as true which I did not evidently know to be true." There are two sides to this injunction: a moral and an epistemological. There are out-

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standing temptations to emotional bias which all sound thinking must resist, and sooner or later they are all reducible to precipitate judgment. This, according to Descartes, is chargeable to the will, which in its "potential infinity" outruns intellectual certainty. A practical illustration of the error induced by the incongruity is the acceptance of sensory evidence at its face value. Another is continued reliance on early instruction which, in the nature of things, could not have been rationally sifted. A third is illustrated in the actual life of Descartes, who withdrew from the distractions of Parisian society in order to keep the field clear for meditation. The intellect must maintain its directness of vision, or it will misapprehend its object; and the will to defend it is part of morality.

The fundamental bearing of the rule, however, is epistemological, as the end of such morality is to hold fast to knowledge conceived in a peculiar way. The primary object of all the rules of method is to give an account of the reasoning process which shall be true to the actual procedure of science, and thus to eliminate the initial obscurities which Descartes holds to have been incorporated into the Aristotelean philosophy of nature. Now in science as Descartes understood it, that is, in physics, the investigator selects from what is given in perception what he desires to isolate for closer study. Descartes took the momentous and questionable step of qualifying this abstraction as real, thereby committing himself, and philosophers for some time to come, to a materialistic interpretation of nature, and leaving the phenomena of perception uneasily suspended between two worlds. At least one reason why Descartes condemns reliance on the senses is that it has given rise to the pseudo-science of powers and essences, while true science must pass beyond it. His religious prepossessions, however, pointed in the same direction, for the Oratory was in the straight line of succession through St. Augustine from Plato: and Descartes also claimed that an analysis of perception itself (of a piece of wax, for example) will show that there is a hard core which is irreducible, namely extension in space, together with much else that is both changing and fortuitous, and so a mere deceptive appearance.

The original clarity of ideas, from which all reconstruction must begin, is thus effected by a series of disjunctive judgments in which what is clear is rendered distinct from what is obscure: whence the phrase, "clear and distinct ideas." This is the bearing of the second rule of method, which enjoins a thoroughgoing analysis of presentations into their constituent elements. It is Descartes's belief that perfect clarity is in fact attainable; that the confusions of his predecessors have been due to defective analysis alone; and that the "natural light" assures us that clear and distinct ideas are

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true. Provided we eliminate confusion, the rational intuition which is the soul of reason will go straight to its goal.

Original intuition is immediate: it does not depend on the previous recognition of general principles, such as the law of contradiction. On the contrary, all such laws are revealed in the first place in the concrete context of rational intuition. Nor does the truth of intuitions depend on a system of judgments to be later unfolded. It is in principle both ungrounded and incorrigible. But it is not on that account unconditioned. Indeed, the fact that it needs no ground and suffers no correction is due to a certain structure of the universe. The epistemological solution pushes us back to metaphysics.

The isolation of essential factors through analysis is not, however, the whole of scientific procedure. The positive aspect of it is the construction of hypothetical syntheses followed by exhaustive verification. To these activities Descartes refers in his third and fourth rules of method. But he is by no means clear in his detailed account of them. He describes the constructive aspect of science as "deduction," as if it were analytically deducible from the first principles isolated by the original disjunction. Either the term is misleading, or Descartes is guilty of a contradiction; for that which is clearly and distinctly perceived is already a "simple nature" and therefore insusceptible of further analysis. On his own showing, there must be a synthetic element in scientific knowledge: a putting together of elements detached from various contexts, in a new and significant order. But in actual scientific procedure what is synthesized is the evidence of the senses: concepts, as Kant was to point out, are not objects of intuition, but principles of interpretation. Descartes, having eliminated the senses, has nothing left to synthesize, except the general principles which should be doing the synthesizing. This is why, in the long run, he slurs his third rule of method, and falls back, inconsistently enough, on an analytic theory of knowledge and the doctrine of innate ideas.

As time went on, it became increasingly clear that the understanding of nature depends on the range of observations and the relevance of the questions put to nature by the investigator. Descartes was probably misled by an over-simple conception of the application of mathematical formulæ to nature. His geometrical view of physics implied the annihilation of the material of physics, besides forcing him to appeal to a *deus ex machina* to explain motion. Whatever the cause of the confusion, the consequence is serious enough. Descartes is unable to explain what part is to be played in science by verification. Theoretically, his physics requires no experiment, and its use is purely expository. If knowledge is of the relation of concepts which are assumed in advance to cover particular cases, and knowledge advances solely through the manipulation of

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the concepts themselves, there can be no relevant verification at all. Thus Descartes's theory of science does justice neither to contemporary practice, nor to his own practice, nor to his programme as set forth in the rules of method. It is a striking illustration of the power of established modes of logical thought over the most temerarious innovator.¹ But by insisting on clarity prior to construction, and by pitting intuition against precedent, he cleared the way for a more adequate estimate of the significance of science at a later date.

But apart from difficulties of detail, Descartes's whole epistemological position depends on the assumption that what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true. Now this is possible only if there is some proportion between our minds at their best and the objective order of the world. That such an order should exist is not self-evident: and Descartes personifies the possible discrepancy in the shape of the wicked genius. Now the strength of the wicked genius lies in his strategic occupation of the passage from subject to object, which he blocks at all points. He can be circumvented only if there is no need to attempt the passage, that is to say, if there is a form of existence which is from the beginning both subject and object, which both thinks and exists. Such a form of existence can be discovered, at the end of a persistent process of methodical doubt, in the thinking, or, more accurately, the doubting self; for, in order to doubt, I must exist: and of this I am aware in an unmediated act of intuitive introspection, independently of any further truth whatever.

In one sense the *cogito*, i.e. the identity of thought and existence in the thinker, is a clear and distinct conception just like any other: and Descartes sometimes holds that its metaphysical certainty forthwith justifies all the rest. But it could not provide the necessary justification if it were not in some sense unique, for nothing can be justified by a mere duplicate of itself. Perhaps it may be said that "the difference is one of metaphysical status, not of internal structure."² The truth of other clear and distinct ideas depends on the truth of the *cogito*, not merely because the *cogito* is a clear and distinct idea, but because it is metaphysical. But even so the dependence is not direct. A metaphysical self cannot give metaphysical status to its objects: however much I may think a statement to be true, it does not follow that it *is* true. Only in a completely rational universe would the conclusion hold. The wicked genius, who has recoiled from the centre, has now to be driven from the outworks. Descartes has to widen the scope of metaphysical reality till it includes all existence: and he has to

¹ For the development of this point, see C. R. Morris, *Idealistic Logic*, ch. iv.

² See my *Philosophy of Descartes*, p. 161, note.

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start with only the thinking self. His next step is to follow its expanding implications till they include the existence of God.

The originality of Descartes's proofs of the existence of God lies less in their argumentation, which is full of scholastic reminiscence, than in their starting-point, which lends a new meaning to old terms and old methods of reasoning. They all start, directly or indirectly, from the self of the *cogito*, with its baffling sense of defect, and its no less baffling sense of perfection. This is true even of the revived ontological proof: the essence from which, in the special case of God, it is claimed to be permissible to pass to existence cannot, in the context, be conceived abstractly, but only as an idea or concept in the human mind. The other proofs, which proceed respectively from the idea of a possible perfection and from the fact of the self which possesses it, to inquire into their origin, leave no room for ambiguity. The general contention is that perfection cannot issue from imperfection, and that the imperfect cannot have created itself, because if it had it would have created itself perfect. With the theory of evolution fresh in our minds we may find it hard to assent to such propositions as statements about history. But regarded as statements about the conditions of the existence of the imperfect as such they have a permanent claim on our attention. The existence of the imperfect may be traceable to the less perfect: but its consciousness of itself as imperfect implies a reference to an independent standard of value, or, as Descartes would have said, of perfection.

There is no reason to doubt that Descartes was satisfied with his proofs of God's existence, or that he was entirely sincere in his frequent professions of piety. The recent researches of French scholars, and particularly of M. Gilson, have revealed his religious preoccupations so convincingly that it is no longer possible to suppose that the religious bias of his metaphysics is merely a cover for his theory of science, or unscrupulously adapted to its needs. Moreover, the emphasis, even the exclusive emphasis, on the approach to God through personal experience was thoroughly in accord with the religious tendencies of the age, not only among Protestants, who openly acknowledged it, but also in the Catholic Church itself: and in stating it philosophically Descartes was fulfilling his function of bringing under a rational synthesis the cultural developments of recent history. But there is also no doubt that the exclusively personal approach saved Descartes from embarrassment on the side of science. It enabled him "to banish final causes from the universe," or, more strictly, from nature. As long as nature is thought of as adapted in detail to formal qualitative principles, natural law will, in its own province, be at the best based on abstraction, and at the worst subject to arbitrary interference. But as

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Descartes appeals not to the incompleteness of nature, but to the incompleteness of the person, he is able to assert at the same time both that nature as a whole is dependent externally on God, and that it is a closed quantitative system wholly regulated by natural law. Dependence as a whole does not threaten the integrity of science, but only the *amour propre* of scientists. As a matter of fact, Descartes usually envisages God in relation to nature simply as creator, though he occasionally hints that the mechanical system of nature, internally free from teleology, none the less fits as a whole, though distantly and indirectly, into a teleological structure.

The proofs of the existence of God raise at once the most controversial of all the issues connected with the interpretation of Descartes: the Cartesian circle, and the nature of the divine guarantee. In the first place, the metaphysical validity of the causal axiom is assumed to prove the existence of God, without whose concurrence no axiom has more than an abstract validity. There is here a vicious circle, which can be escaped only by reinterpreting one or both of the arguments. If causality could be softened into implication, or if the intuition of the self were held to include from the first a wider intuition of God, the supremacy of God over the primary axioms could be indicated without the prior assumption of those axioms, and there would be no contradiction. Or if the truth of axioms did not require the guarantee of God, but were self-evident in its own right, and the guarantee were invoked merely to certify that what I now remember to have been true is in fact identical with what I once perceived to be true, then the primary axioms could legitimately be used to prove the existence of God, and again there would be no contradiction. In reply to the charge of circularity, Descartes usually takes the second way of escape; and most of the critics think it is a fair one. Actually it ignores several capital passages, and it leads to the conclusion, which Descartes could never have accepted, that the elements of a rational universe are independent of the concurrence of God. In another mood, more disinterested, because there is no question of escaping from a dilemma, he actually asserts that God might have created the "eternal verities" otherwise than He did: and whatever the difficulties of this theory, it is at least inconsistent with the view that the verities are self-subsistent.

The first way of escape also has its difficulties, as it tends to reduce the whole of metaphysics to a single simultaneous intuition of the self and God. But, though it is hard to state it in a shape free from formal objection, it does, I am convinced, embody the underlying spirit of Descartes's philosophy. The apprehension of the self in the *cogito* is not the apprehension of a distinct entity. The aspirations which form its link with God, and in view of which it is conscious of its defect simultaneously with its existence, "actually

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constitute it, and without them it would simply not be there at all." If this is so, "the discovery of God is effected, not by argument, but by sustained attention to the (original) intuition, which reveals under scrutiny more than we first observed in it."¹ It can hardly be too much emphasized that Descartes was a strongly religious man, and much of the difficulty of his "natural theology" arises from his attempt to convey the immediacies of the religious life in the form of logical arguments. What appears as a process from point to point really represents a deepening appreciation of the inseparability of the self from God.

However this may be, the theory of the divine guarantee enables Descartes to solve the most pressing antinomy of the times, as reflected in his own divided interests: that which arose from the conflicting claims of religion and science. Descartes has succeeded in maintaining the supremacy of God and at the same time handing over to the physicist a charter of complete independence in his own delegated sphere. The theory does not mean that God makes true what once was not true: it means that what is true, and was always true, is in fact true because there is, and always was, a God. It is wholly true, but only because of a truth more fundamental on which the whole principle of truth depends. Thus the scientist can exercise his privilege and drive the philosopher out of science, but only because he has a philosophical credential to do so. The philosopher, on the other hand, standing by the ultimate religious verities, admits and insists upon the independence of science, but maintains that he alone is in a position to bestow it.

In a rational universe such as our universe has now been proved to be, it follows that that which can be conceived apart from other things is essentially distinct from them. Now the self can be conceived without any reference to the extended world: therefore it is essentially distinct from the extended world. On the other hand, the extended world can be clearly conceived in isolation from the human spirit: therefore it is essentially distinct from the human spirit.

This rigorous dualism is essential to a proper adjustment of the respective claims of science and religion. If Descartes is to justify the new mechanistic physics against the mediaeval philosophy of nature he must refuse to allow spiritual causation in nature. If he is to justify religion against the growing naturalism of his times, he must show that spirit is not subject to natural law, because it lives in a world, not of necessity, but of standards and aspirations. The dualism is, of course, subject to the overarching unity of God; but the two factors are in no sense dependent upon each other.

¹ This point is treated more fully in *The Philosophy of Descartes*, p. 321, from which these passages are quoted.

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It is to be observed that the distinction is one of essence and not of fact, and does not involve the absurd conclusion that soul and body do not co-exist in the human being. The most it can mean is that their association is fortuitous, and is not implied in the nature of either. But even this moderate conclusion is hard to sustain in face of the facts of emotion and sense-perception. These are phenomena involving a mutual impact of mind and body: and if they are classed as aspects of spirit (which is how Descartes does class them), then it is part of the essence of spirit to contain elements depending on the co-operation of the body: and this is contrary to the hypothesis of essential separation. Descartes is so much impressed by these considerations that he sometimes seems to treat the human being as a new sort of quasi-substance, body-mind, or mind-body: and on this basis he founds his account of sense-perception. This is a tribute to his sense of fact (always a matter to be reckoned with in Descartes) rather than to his consistency. On the other hand, in his account of the "animal-machine," and in certain isolated concessions to Occasionalism, consistency prevails. In any case, in view of the importance of his dualism to his philosophy as a whole, it indicates a deep-seated defect that he is unable to maintain it without either compromise or blindness.

Descartes is sometimes alluded to as the father of Idealism: and we may conclude this cursory review by inquiring in what sense (if any) he deserves the title. There are two senses in which its use is plausible; and they are both associated with the method of doubt. In the first place, Descartes holds the representative theory of perception: and it is on the gap between the idea which represents and the reality which is represented that the first attack of methodical doubt is concentrated. As the existence of the idea *qua* idea is undeniable, while it is at least possible to think away the object, then, as long as metaphysical certainty is lacking, we can know nothing but ideas. But Descartes's whole philosophy is one long struggle for metaphysical certainty, and the real question therefore is whether, when it has been achieved, his Idealism is overthrown together with the doubts which give rise to it. Descartes's usual reply is that to attain certainty we must leave the senses behind us, and that perception can never be anything but indirect. He comes to be assured that there is a real material world, "the existence of which was never doubted by any sensible person," but what we have in perception is merely a selected appearance adapted to our practical needs. Thus, though Descartes is not an idealist in the sense of believing that the real world is ideal, he is an idealist in his theory of perception: and his view was to have important consequences in the hands of successors who held that the senses are the only gateway to knowledge.

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In the second place, in allowing himself to doubt the truth of clear and distinct ideas, Descartes drives another wedge between idea and reality: and as long as the discrepancy remains, no knowledge, even the most scientific, can be more than ideal. As before, the question is what happens when idea and reality are reconciled. The answer is that some knowledge, including the abstract knowledge of logic and mathematics, is ontologically certificated, but does not thereby become knowledge of the real: that other knowledge, namely knowledge of nature as conceived by the physicist, is of extension which really exists, but is mediated through the former kind of knowledge which is ideal: and that the supreme knowledge, knowledge of the self and of God, is knowledge of the real without any qualification whatever. How far this constitutes Idealism may be left to the private judgment of individuals, and will depend on the sense they assign to their terms. But as any Idealist tendencies it contains are ultimately subject to a theistic realism, it is perhaps best to say that the true bent of Descartes's philosophy is not Idealist, though it embodies Idealist trends whose historical significance is greater than their importance in their original context.

If we ask, in the phrase made familiar by Croce, what is living and what is dead in the philosophy of Descartes, we shall find that there is much to discard, including structurally central positions essential to a synthesis of contemporary culture. His dualism died early, and the distinction of soul and body, which he affirmed so stoutly against the quasi-behaviourism of Aristotle, is now, even in most reasonable forms, somewhat outmoded. His views on perception, though not wholly abandoned, are regarded in the most advanced quarters as an obstacle to progress. His theory of the logic of science, though it has recently had a St. Martin's Summer revival, has never really recovered from the criticism of Kant. For these and other alleged philosophical crimes, he has been branded by Professor Hoernlé as "the father of all evil in modern philosophy."¹ But it will perhaps repay us better to dwell on what is living, and it may then appear that the aberrations are the complement of the triumphs. In any case, it is well to remember that doctrines of great philosophers which seem to be dead are often only sleeping until other philosophers see good to revive them.

The permanent contributions of Descartes to philosophy, that is to say, those which have been, and still are, continuously fruitful, may be concentrated under three headings.

(1) Descartes was the first philosopher of any age to put the conception of personality at the centre of his system. Greek philosophy was so exclusively outward-looking that it did not pause to

¹ *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, p. 241.

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contemplate the process of contemplation; and it thus omitted from its explanation of things that which most of all needed explaining, namely, the fact that there *is* explaining. The philosophy of the Middle Ages, while enhancing the importance of the human soul, and thus making possible the personalist philosophies of a later epoch, was in spirit traditional and anonymous, and continued to view souls in the Greek manner, from the outside. The spiritual self of the *cogito* is not simply an object, whether of contemplation or of moral duty, but a subject, only to be understood through the immediate experience of a subject. Henceforward, thanks to the new and inward conception of the person, he will always be a source of action as well as merely active. He will be distinguished from nature by the gift of freedom, or the capacity to choose and originate; and it is this one unescapable fact which has for ever made materialism impossible.

It is sometimes suggested that the new conception threw the shadow of humanity over all objects of knowledge, rendering the clear apprehension of nature difficult till our own time. This would be a tragically ironical result for a philosophy which set out to destroy the anthropomorphism of mediaeval science, but in so far as Descartes's conclusions have contributed to it, it is through other people's misunderstandings. As a matter of fact, the Cartesian conception of the person combines with the Cartesian conception of nature to abolish a conception of both person and nature in which each was misunderstood owing to the influence of the other: and the salient contrast, which was then first revealed, brought out for the first time the undramatic, unspiritual, and unhuman quality of nature as such.

Again, Descartes's discovery of the self is not simply the discovery of a principle of apprehension: and in this sense it is far removed from that intellectualist abstraction, the "transcendental unity of apperception." This is due to the admirable, and thoroughly French, concreteness of Descartes's approach to the issue. The self as he depicts it not merely knows, but *comes* to know through the positive exercise of freedom: it *refuses* to be satisfied with anything less than the indubitable. The self revealed in the moment of doubt is a moral and a thinking self at the same time: the occasion of its resistance is a threat to intellectual integrity, but the resistance itself is moral in its quality.

(2) It may seem strange to reckon Descartes's philosophical theology among his permanent contributions, and still stranger to award them a high contemporary significance. It is supposed to have been demolished by Kant in the Transcendental Dialectic (though, as a matter of fact, Kant's keenest shafts were meant for others, and leave him unscathed), and to be worthy of discreet oblivion. But Descartes really anticipates the modern theological

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emphasis which came in with Kant's positive contribution to the subject in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. What Kant should have put an end to for all time was the purely intellectual conception of God. He may have been wrong in holding that the intellect has nothing to do with the apprehension of God, but he was surely right in affirming that a God whose attributes may be apprehended by philosophy alone has nothing in common with the God of religion. Now from Descartes's own position, though he certainly did not fully understand it, the same conclusion necessarily follows. God, for him, is not so much an object as the complement of the subject, and hence responsive not merely to apprehension, but to the subject as a whole. Challenged for a definition of what he meant by God, Descartes replied, "the greatest perfection which it is possible to conceive." Such a perfection can only be reflected in the *whole* life of man. It is true that Descartes essays proofs in the traditional manner, and to that extent Kant's criticism may apply to him. On the other hand, he avoids the still narrower error of Kant, who looked for evidence of God in the moral life alone. The conception of perfection covers every form of valuation: and the evidence of defect and aspiration establishes in each case the objectivity of the value.

It is on this point, the objectivity of value, that Descartes's conceptions are of modern interest. His argument "that the more cannot come from the less" may be ontologically false, but it is axiologically true. Moreover, the main consideration which he urges, that the self cannot be the source of the standards by reference to which alone it exists, is still the main contention of those who deny that value is merely a projection of the subject. Even the concentration of value in a supreme ontological entity, which is not fashionable in modern discussion, may eventually provide inspiration to those who, starting from other hypotheses, are perplexed by the participation of values in each other, and by the participation of the person in all. Indeed, if ever I were tempted to formulate a philosophy of religion based on recent inquiries into value, it is from Descartes that I should begin.

(3) Descartes, partly through his dualism, and partly by his subjection of scientific method to metaphysical verification, has bequeathed to his successors a clear sense, which they can ill afford to lose, of the difference, both of province and of method, between philosophy and science. Taken as a whole, Descartes's dualism is a stone of stumbling, but it does at least have the effect of precluding the unreasoning application of the categories of natural science to human behaviour. Descartes may be wrong in holding that extension cannot belong to the essence of a spiritual being. He is certainly right in holding that the essence of a spiritual being is not merely extension. Moreover, he has made it clear, by presenting the human

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spirit as undergoing the temptations of the wicked genius, that one of its distinguishing qualities is a critical freedom. His conclusions on this head are confirmed by his doctrine of the divine guarantee, which implies that science receives a certificate of certainty from philosophy. It is a heartening precedent for such unrepentant believers in metaphysics as still exist, and are dismayed by the copious contemporary burning of sufficiently stale incense to "the idol of scientific method." After all, the great ages of philosophy are those in which she makes great claims for herself: and Descartes, himself a scientist of no mean distinction, who had helped, both by his theoretical revolution and by his practical discoveries, to deliver science from Aristotelean bondage, could admit and press them without prejudice and without embarrassment. His estimate is therefore of peculiar significance.

No account of Descartes can be complete without some reference to his position on the watershed between two epochs. His was a curious, eager, restless, essentially practical nature, with a contradictory passion for solitude and contemplation. Owing to his inner complexity, he was able to enter intimately into the diverse sympathies of his day. At times, absorbed in the prospect of the mastery of nature through science, he speaks with the breathless confidence of the coming age of progress. At others, he goes out of his way to stress the unimportance of environment, and preaches Seneca's doctrine of contentment in oneself almost in Seneca's words. As in his life, so in his intellectual emphasis, he alternated between two unreconciled tendencies, and never effected a satisfactory synthesis. He was mediaeval or intensely modern, Stoic or utilitarian, naively pious or radically sceptical, gazing raptly into eternity or peering greedily into the future, according to mood and circumstance. There is something of this shifting antinomical tendency in his philosophy: for example, the contrast between his trenchant dualism of mind and body, and his interactionist theory of perception. It is the result of a passion for clear outline combined with a scrupulous honesty in the facing of facts. A less vivid and less impatient mind might have halted before presenting its conclusions in their original sharpness. A less inquiring or a less balanced mind might have overlooked the difficulties which beset them. A less rigorous or a less honourable mind might have covered the retreat more skilfully, and confused the issue by a false pretence of consistency. Descartes was not of those thinkers who can cut a philosophy all of a piece. Perhaps this is part of his fascination and suggestiveness. If I may quote the saying of a beloved senior and former colleague, Descartes would not have been called "the father of modern philosophy," if he had not left so many problems behind him for his children.

MORALITY AND THE RETRIBUTIVE EMOTIONS

PHILIP LEON, M.A.

JUST as the pleasant experience differs from the non-pleasant or unpleasant, and (according to many at least) the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic, internally or qualitatively, and not merely in degree, or externally or relationally, so, it is natural to expect, a moment of moral living differs from a moral or immoral moment. Indeed, from many quarters, and most emphatically from the Stoic and Christian, we have been wont to hear that if we but leave our sinful or indifferent lives and put on righteousness or goodness, we shall become new men or men reborn, even creatures of a different species. But according to many (perhaps most) analyses of morality these promises of transfiguration or translation are nonsensical lies: for the moral experience, as exhibited in these analyses, differs from the non-moral or immoral only in respect of external relations, or at the most in degree. Whether the truth resides in the promises or in the analyses is, obviously, a question of no mean import. It is also a vast one, while the time and space that can be given up to an article are brief; hence the following will be barely more than a raising of the question, or a provocation, by means of rough statements, some dogmatic, others hypothetical.

First, we must make clear beyond the possibility of misunderstanding what we mean by a merely external or relational difference, or difference in degree. The man, then, who, thinking that thus only can he assert his superiority or greatness, should kill another who had set himself against his whim, would differ only in degree, or only externally or relationally, from the man who, actuated by a similar thought, should revenge himself only with beneficence on one who had deeply wronged him.¹ Internally in both cases the state of mind would be the same: egocentric preoccupation with grandeur; the difference would lie merely in the relation to a different external expression or act. We might, no doubt, think that the idea of invariably responding with beneficence (but not as revenge or self-assertion) had originated, probably in some other man, from an impulse very different from the concernment with one's grandeur, and had subsequently, after disguise as an idea of grandeur-

¹ Seneca (quoted by Westermarck) says in *De ira*, II, 32: "The most contemptuous form of revenge is not to deem one's adversary worth taking vengeance upon."

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realization, been foisted externally upon the grandeur-loving man; we might even think that since he has accepted it, there must be something in him restraining or diluting his lust for greatness, power, self-assertion, or revenge. But we should declare that his state differed from that of his counterpart, the killer, at the most in degree only. If the one state had to be called moral and the other immoral or non-moral we should say that morality, as something lived, differs only externally, or relationally, or at the most in degree, from non-morality or immorality.

Of the aforementioned disillusioning analyses those of Westermarck and McDougall are among the clearest and most uncompromising. According to Westermarck¹ there are two moral emotions: moral approval and disapproval or indignation. They belong both to the general class of retributive emotions, of which many are non-moral. The second, like anger and revenge (both non-moral), forms a subspecies of resentment; the first, like gratitude (non-moral), forms a subspecies of retributive kindly emotion.² All the moral concepts, viz. ought or duty, bad and wrong, right, injustice and justice, on the one hand, and goodness, virtue, merit, on the other, are based on, or originate from, the second and the first of these two emotions respectively.³ The "qualities assigned to the subjects of moral judgments really are generalizations derived from" these emotions, "tendencies to feel one or the other of these emotions interpreted as qualities, as dynamic tendencies, in the phenomena which give rise to the emotion."⁴ The morality Westermarck treats of is chiefly a social growth, and consists in the carrying out of a code of written or unwritten rules and in the practice of virtues. On the hypothesis that there may be some other morality also, or something which better deserves the name of morality, we shall call his kind "customary morality." Granting for the moment the truth of his analysis of it, the question to be asked here is whether he exhibits any qualitative or internal difference between the moment of moral living and the non-moral or immoral. I think he does not. Nor, indeed, does he claim to do so. He does claim, against McDougall, that the moral emotions are differentiated from the non-moral.⁵ But what differentiates them? Only impartiality, including disinterestedness, which is a form of impartiality.⁶ But this is only an external relational characteristic. The non-moral or immoral resentment which one man feels against one who has baffled his or his friend's non-moral or immoral will, and the moral resentment (i.e. such that any member of the community might tend to feel it) of another against someone who has wronged not himself or his friend but a stranger, are both resentment or "hos-

¹ *Ethical Relativity*, 1932.

² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

³ *Ibid.*, Ch. V.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-93.

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tility." They differ only as regards the external situations and the objects whereon they are directed. They may differ also in degree; but then, often, the moral "hostility" may be the more intense, the grimmer, and more terrible of the two. Furthermore, whether an internal or merely external characteristic, impartiality is not really a differentia of the moral emotions, for it can characterize also non-moral admiration or contempt (for the skilled or for the unskilled, for example). If Westermarck should urge that these are at any rate not "retributive" emotions he would overlook the almost ineradicable tendency in all of us to give to (i.e. to reward) him that hath and to take away from (or to mulct) him that hath not, a tendency which, in his own language at least, we should have to describe as arising from the pleasure or displeasure caused in us and as therefore retributive. He might urge that, unlike the moral emotions, such admiration or contempt is not directed towards the will, person, or character. And, indeed, it is in their direction that we should have expected him to look for the differentia of the moral emotions: such a direction, constituting personal relationship, might, although itself a relational characteristic, differentiate the *relatum* internally. But he himself specially insists that it belongs also to non-moral retribution.¹ Besides, it does not go deep enough so as to constitute a qualitatively or internally specific personal relationship. Customary moral judgment, although it makes, as he points out,² a great ado about intention, motive, will, character, is concerned with a person only *qua* executor of the code of general rules or practitioner of one or other of the received virtues in its generic aspect. These, the general rule or the generic virtue, and not the person in his personality or individuality, are at bottom its subjects. Westermarck emphasizes the necessity to customary morality of computation by general rules,³ and describes the moral judgment as referring its subject to a class, as "labelling the act according to certain obvious characteristics which it presents in common with others belonging to the same group."⁴ Now, a person can be computed, classified, or labelled only in respect of some generic attribute, and not in respect of his individuality; it is the attribute, and not he, that is morally judged. It is, of course, true and very important that, as Westermarck insists,⁵ retributive hostility and kindness cannot make any distinction or separation between the attribute and the person: they identify the one with the other (so long as we do hate, we cannot hate the sin without hating the sinner); but this means, not that they are essentially directed, as he maintains, upon persons, but that they preclude personal relationship and the appreciation of personality. Com-

¹ *Ethical Relativity*, p. 172.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 115.

² *Ibid.*, Ch. VI.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

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firmatory of this, there stands, in spite of all his attempts to explain it away,¹ the glaring fact that judgments indistinguishable from the moral, and often taken as moral, are frequently passed in connection with matters which by no stretch of the imagination can be said to refer to the will—and that too, not only in the undeveloped societies which he chiefly considers, but in our own: Try as we will, it is impossible to find an internal or qualitative difference, or even one which is not merely of names, rites, and ceremonial, between the attitude to another, or for that matter, to oneself—call it condemnation, or resentment, or hostility, or disfavour, or exclusion, or what you will—for not having been born into the right class or heir to sufficient money, or for ignorantly not wearing the right clothes or committing a social *faux pas* or being aitchless or even, at one time, for not mispronouncing Latin in the English way, and the attitude to another or oneself for having wilfully committed murder or robbery or perjury. The truth—a most important one, and for that reason here dwelt upon at some length—is that between the judge upon the bench of customary morality and the prisoner at its bar the relation is, in more senses than the obvious one, impersonal.

I am convinced, then, by Westermarck's analysis that, as regards the morality he treats of, there is no qualitative or internal difference between the moral moment and the non-moral or immoral. A difference, of course, there is, but it lies entirely in the external acts done or favoured and the external objects pursued or approved. I have called the morality in question "customary," but this term may conveniently be used to cover all morality which, whether customary or not, consists, like customary morality, in the execution of a code of rules or programme of measures and in the practice of virtues, and consequently pronounces judgments which are impersonal in the sense that they do not touch personality or individuality. I am further convinced that, with Westermarck, we must place such morality in the region of retribution. It is with his idea of the nature of retribution that I differ. Does retribution always and necessarily involve "self-feeling" or the "self-regarding sentiment" or not? That is the question.

First a minor point, chiefly of terminology, must be disposed of. Wherever, in order to refer to Westermarck, I speak of returning pleasure for pleasure and pain for pain (he also uses "benefit" synonymously for the one, and "harm," "loss," "injury," "suffering," for the other), I use "pleasure" and "pain" as respectively brachylogies for "liked" and "disliked" processes, physical or psychical or psycho-physical, for I do not think that the consideration of abstract pleasure and pain, except in comparatively rare cases,

¹ *Ethical Relativity*, pp. 162 ff.

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influences conduct or enters into our deliberation about conduct.¹ The concernment with processes for their own sake or as ends it will be convenient to refer to as "biological."

I accept from Westermarck, as a legitimate technical adaptation, "resentment" (tending to issue into hostile retribution) for that genus of which anger and revenge are species, and I emphatically agree with him that "it is impossible to draw any distinct limit between these two types of resentment."² But he uses "resentment" for any reaction to inflicted pain (disliked process) as such, even apart from self-feeling, and it is from this reaction that he wishes to derive moral disapproval. Herein, I maintain, he departs both from ordinary language and from fact. The reaction in question would more appropriately be called "vexation" or "annoyance," and it leads primarily to shunning the nuisance, and to paining or destroying only in self-defence or as a removing or preventive or deterrent measure, which is, of course, not retribution proper. The latter, the retaliation with pain as an end in itself (though this, we shall see, is not quite an adequate description), inspired by resentment, angry or vengeful, and in response, as we shall maintain, not to inflicted pain as such but to inflicted pain, if at all, only when taken for something else, comes only with the emergence of at least inchoate self-feeling. Moral disapproval, since it is a form of resentment, while resentment is impossible without self-feeling, is, therefore, a manifestation of self-feeling.³ But the latter, or the "self-regarding sentiment," is in many persons very undeveloped or inactive,⁴ and it is significant that, just as they are not much given to anger and revenge, so they have little use for the moral concepts in general and for moral disapproval in particular: they admit that they refrain from lying or adultery or stealing because they *dislike* them—that is, their reaction even to these is mere annoyance and not resentment or moral disapproval. Such a one—and he would be of their class even though he were utterly beneficent instead of being a scamp—is Tito Melema in George Eliot's *Romola*, who, almost completely devoid of the self-regarding sentiment, is bewildered by moral disapproval as by revenge, both equally incomprehensible phenomena to him, and whose nearest approach to anger is "a cold dislike." On the other hand, observation of life teaches us

¹ My use is, I believe, actually that of a good many so-called hedonists. If I differ at all from Westermarck (see *Ethical Relativity*, pp. 259-61), the difference is not material to the argument.

² *Ibid.*, p. 69.

³ For the present purpose self-feeling may be understood as that which develops into the feeling of inferiority and superiority.

⁴ In some anger, though not in revenge, it may be little developed. Such anger is very like mere annoyance and leads to the phenomena the consideration of which induces Westermarck to use "resentment" for the reaction to inflicted pain as such.

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that the people most inspired by self-feeling are both most susceptible to anger and revenge and also most apt to be moralists, while moralists are particularly liable both to the self-regarding sentiment and to anger and revenge. Such observation is most happily "coadunated" by Plato in his term *τὸ θυμοειδές*,¹ which may be translated by "the self-regarding sentiment," "the irascible principle," "the principle of moral disapproval," or "the moral policeman principle." Westermarck himself, although he covers them both by the same name, "resentment," and although he does not distinguish between being pained and being offended,² seems to feel that there is a gap between the protective reaction against inflicted pain as such (compared by him to "protective reflex action") and retaliation with pain as such or as an end in itself. He makes intelligence bridge the gap: "But," he says, "as a successful attack is necessarily accompanied with such [the enemy's] suffering, the desire to produce it naturally became, with the increase of intelligence, an important factor in resentment. And when pain was distinguished as a normal effect of resentment, the infliction of it could also be aimed at as an end in itself."³ But if that is all, this, surely, is a veritable *pons asinorum* for "intelligence" to make.⁴ The fact is that the two reactions are different in kind, and that the one is not a development of the other. Self-feeling is the differentiator. Indeed, he himself, in the next sentence, goes on to say: "Resentment is particularly⁵ apt to assume this character under the influence of self-feeling of the injured party, as a means of humiliating the offender."

The rôle of self-feeling in resentment can best be studied in the latter's most palpable form, revenge. To say that the vengeful man desires the infliction upon his enemy of pain as an end in itself is to preserve one important truth—namely, that for him the act of retribution is an end in itself and aims neither at the cure nor deterrence of the offender nor at anything else. But to think that the infliction of *pain* as an end in itself is the meaning of that act is to be misled by one of those many philosophic abstractions which do away with all real problems and raise false ones in their stead because they obliterate the vital distinctions which are carefully marked by common speech. The latter tells us that the vengeful man desires, not to pain or hurt his enemy, but to "be even with him," or, better still, to "bring him to the dust," to "humiliate" him, "lower," "bring down," "diminish" him, to reduce him to everlasting subjection or submission. All these phrases, we find,

¹ *The Republic*.

² *Ethical Relativity*, p. 72.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 69; cf. p. 83.

⁴ Nascent intelligence is supposed to distinguish, growing intelligence to confuse, means and end.

⁵ "Exclusively," according to me.

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describe, not a biological concernment, a concernment with any process or quality of process (pain),¹ with any doing or suffering on the part of any one, but a concernment with *position* ("even," "low," "lower," "down," "under").² In so far as any pains or processes enter into the question, they do so because they are taken to stand for, or to symbolize, position, the redress of the balance of power or the return of the *status quo*. The symbols of retaliation are strangely diverse from circle to circle: the infliction on the offender of physical or mental suffering or of death, rebuke or admonition, giving him a certain look, extorting an apology from him, exchanging pistol shots with him, even "heaping coals of fire upon his head." A study of them leads to the conclusion that though the notion of position comes from revenge itself (from the self-regarding sentiment or the concernment with superiority and inferiority), the denotation of that concept is determined by other factors in human nature. As its *terminus ad quem*, so is its *terminus a quo*: revenge is caused, not by pain as such, but by whatever is taken to stand for affront or insult or humiliation or lowering, or violation or diminution of one's position, for an attack upon self-feeling. Here, too, the symbols are very diverse and are determined not by the individual's self-feeling but by his whole history and that of his circle.

The apparent desire to retaliate with the infliction of pain as such, which Westermarck takes to be revenge, can only be understood in the light of the less specific apparent desire to inflict pain as such without any provocation whatsoever, or to have others suffer, whether at our hands or not. This sadism or malice, in its turn, remains an opaque phenomenon until it is seen to be also a manifestation of self-feeling. Such a manifestation it indeed is: the suffering or loss or misfortune or other state of others delights us only because it is taken as a lowering of their position and consequently a comparative heightening of ours (where the suffering is taken for elevation of rank we do not desire it for them). Self-feeling contains an ambiguous impulse, satisfiable alike in destruction and in construction—for we may be higher than others alike by their falling as by our rising—but more tempted by destruction, which is easier while construction always meets with difficulties

¹ To say that the vengeful man desires to inflict the pain of humiliation is merely to flee from the real problem to words. For "humiliation" is the defining term of the phrase and is therefore the term to be defined.

² It is impossible to exaggerate the importance for Ethics of the fact, most often neglected, that there are desires, both moral and non-moral, not only for pleasure, processes, experiences or states of mind, but also for position, form, structure, relations; and that position, etc., can no more be reduced to process (or pleasure or experience) than a square can be described as an event.

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which, until at any rate they are overcome, are always humiliating. The ambiguity, especially in favour of construction, is never resolved by our own self-feeling, but partly by the thrust upon us of the self-feeling of others, partly by other impulses in them and in ourselves. These, especially in a settled society, set strict limits to the destructive manifestation, limits generally observed until there occurs a disturbance to the position which, at least in the overt and effective part of our life, we have had to accept. The disturbance may arise from the chance highering of others or the chance lowering of ourselves, or from the wilful aggression of others against ourselves. In any case it provokes the impulse to self-assertion or self-vindication or self-exaltation in its primordial ambiguity and indiscriminateness; we then desire our own elevation over *any* others in *any* way and whether by our own efforts or others' or by chance. This explains why, when our spite, envy, or jealousy, or revenge are aroused, *anyone* who comes in our way is liable to fall victim to it. It explains why revenge, as McDougall maintains along with Steinmetz,¹ is originally undirected: not only the Malay *amok* but also civilized Europeans are apt, according to common speech, to "revenge" themselves upon *anyone* instead of, or even in addition to, the offender. It explains, further, why revenge can be constructive as well as destructive: in spite of what Westermarck says,² a man severely criticized for having written a bad book and thus wounded in his self-feeling might very well "consider the writing of a better book to be an act of revenge." It explains, lastly, such common expressions as "he was avenged by others," or "by the turn of events." Ambiguity and indiscriminateness are inherent in self-feeling; it is not they that need explaining but rather such determinateness and discrimination as it presents. These are formed by the limits imposed by others' self-feeling or other impulses in them or in us, for even when disturbed in our position we still observe limits and do not simply strive for unlicensed omnipotence: such a limit is, for example, the normal relevance of revenge, its direction upon the aggressor only.

In desiring to explain revenge I have inevitably been led into giving a composite photograph of many manifestations of offended or obstructed self-feeling: spite, jealousy, envy, anger, revenge. This is because it is impossible to draw any distinct limit between them, since they are differentiated, not internally or qualitatively, but only externally (e.g. by the external occasion or situation), so that the more self-feeling predominates in a man's nature the more they are apt all to resemble the most extreme of them, revenge. In this they are resembled by other manifestations which have not been mentioned above but which are also concernments with one's

¹ *Social Psychology* (21st. ed.), pp. 121-122.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

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own superiority and others' inferiority: scorn and contempt. All may be said to be species of the negative reaction of self-feeling or of the reaction of offended or obstructed self-feeling. This reaction may be called resentment or the affective-conative aspect of disvaluing or negative valuing. Revenge is the extremest form of resentment.

Moral resentment or disapproval is a species of resentment or of negative valuing. As we have seen, it is not differentiated from the other species by its reference to the will. The only differentia there remains is impartiality, an external one and one which, since the moral reference to the will is unimportant, will make us include in the species "moral disapproval" all impartial contempt for any attribute. The impartiality may be said to consist in the fact that the offence is not simply to the self-regarding sentiment of the particular individual as such but to that sentiment in so far as the individual identifies himself with a system of definable and therefore generic positions (rights) or functions. (The system may be regarded as society, or as in Heaven, or as the Moral Law, or as the Kingdom of Values.) The impartial man regards himself and others simply as the incumbents of such positions or mandataries of such functions. He resents, disapproves, blames, or condemns whatever stands for an affront or violation to any position or function, whether his or others', and thus for belittlement or diminution or lowering of the *supremacy* of the whole system; he despises or scorns or disvalues (excludes) whatever comes outside or short of the system. The meaning of retributive action (punishment) is simply in the restoration or assertion of that supremacy or in the declaration or exclusion of the low or the outsider as low or outsider, but the form such assertion or declaration or exclusion takes (admonition, degrading, banishment, fining, imprisonment, flogging, death) and the other purposes it subserves (deterrence or reformation) are determined by other impulses than the retributive.¹ Apart then from the external characteristic of impartiality, we meet here the same concernment with position as we have already reviewed. Nor is there any disinterestedness except in so far as this is synonymous with impartiality. Disinterestedness in the sense of freedom from one's self there is not. For the disapprover has identified himself with the system and an offence to it is an offence to his own self-feeling. *Mutatis mutandis* we may extend to him the quotation about Australian savages given by Westermarck:² "Strike the gens [system] anywhere, and every member of it considers himself struck." Hence the intensity of the impartial resentment varies in direct proportion to the reality which the identification has for the imagination: consider, for

¹ Above all, reformation is not the aim of moral indignation or resentment. The ideal of the latter is a Hell of the eternally damned to act as a foil to the Heaven of the elect.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 104-105.

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example, the difference in our resentment of a wrong to "Humanity," to China, to our country, to our class, or of a violation of Christian ethics, of a code fought for by our ancestors, and of a code invented and championed by ourselves.

Whatever has here been said about resentment and moral disapproval applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to their contraries, which, therefore, need be treated only briefly. The term "retributive kindly emotion," chosen by Westermarck for the contrary of resentment, like his detailed description, does not differentiate this fundamentally from the altruistic sentiment or from sympathy, although it is fundamentally different from them, being a concernment with position, whereas they are concernments with pleasure (process). It is the positive or expansive reaction of gratified self-feeling; we might call it "positive valuing" simply, were it not that this term implies impartiality; we will call it "acclamation." Acclamation is not for the pleasure-giving as such but for whatever is interpreted as high, or elevating or exalting, and the aim of its active expression (e.g. of honouring) is not to give pleasure as such or to confer benefit—we honour largely, or chiefly, the dead—but to express or declare height, elevation, exaltation, although, as in the case of their contraries, the strangely variable denotation of these notions and consequently the active expressions are determined by other impulses than our own self-feeling. The aim is, above all, to identify ourselves with the acclaimed by finding either the latter in ourselves or ourselves in him or it: ultimately, as many wise men have pointed out, it is always ourselves we magnify, extol, praise, worship, etc. Contrary to the proverb, the prophet finds honour most easily in his own country, provided he magnifies what is already there magnified, since his countrymen in honouring him honour themselves; even into the awe-inspiring mountain we project ourselves, according to the Empathy theory, and the sublime in Literature, Longinus says, fills the reader's soul with exultation, vaunting, and pride as though he were the author.¹

Discounting, for the reasons already given, reference to the will, we must reckon as "moral approval" all impartial positive valuing (worshipping, venerating, respecting, honouring, prizing, praising, esteeming, etc.). "Impartial," as has already been explained, means "generic." Impartial approval is the inclusion of something or someone regarded generically in a system of generic positions or functions; it is an exaltation of that system. Disinterested it is not: ultimately it is ourselves, identified with the system, that we approve.²

Beginning with Westermarck, I end with McDougall. For the soul

¹ *On the Sublime*, VII.

² Even in self-condemnation, wherein we approve our "higher self" and are proud because the condemnation, after all, comes from our own self.

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of what I have in an extended sense called "customary morality," I make out to be self-feeling or the self-regarding sentiment. And so, apparently, does McDougall. At any rate he tells us that "moral advance consists, not in the coming into play of factors of a new order, . . . the moral instinct or conscience, but in the development of the self-regarding sentiment and in the improvement and refinement of the 'gallery' before which we display ourselves . . . until the 'gallery' becomes, . . . in the last resort, one's own critical self standing as the representative of such spectators."¹ No stronger expression than this could be given to the contention that between the moral moment and the non-moral or immoral the difference is not qualitative or internal. As against the analysis here favoured Westermarck's would have resentment and its contrary, and therefore the moral impulse, biological concerns with pleasure and pain (or processes); and he explains them genetically as derivatives from the impulse to living or survival, which are favoured by natural selection.² If genetic explanation there must be, one could point even to the repelling, excluding, or destructive activity of the electron as analogous to resentment, and thus proceed to derivation. Whether the survival function is really primary in resentment or in any other manifestation of self-feeling may, however, be doubted: of all their impulses, anger or its analogue in animals most often makes them deviate from the path of survival, while only something analogous to vanity (a form of self-feeling) can explain in them so many features which do not make for survival or even militate against it. But not everything need be explained by Natural Selection, for she has long ago been exposed as a careless judge. To understand resentment and its contrary, we must explain, not the impulse to living, not processes or pleasure and pain, but self-feeling and "position." The explanation of these two will also explain customary morality, in which "good" and "bad," "right" and "good," terms used for so many things, connote, briefly, "position-making." It is a thorny and intriguing explanation which cannot be even indicated here³ except by the remark that perhaps greater light is thrown on the subject by Adler's treatment of neuroticism than by most treatises on Ethics or values.

If customary morality (in the extended sense here given) is the only morality, then we must conclude that the moral moment is, qualitatively or internally, not at all different from the non-moral or immoral. This conclusion will be paradoxical to those who have taken seriously what I have referred to as the promises of transfiguration or translation.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 213-221.

² *Ethical Relativity*, pp. 68-69, 95 ff.

³ I have attempted it in a forthcoming book, *The Ethics of Power* (Allen & Unwin).

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There may, however, be another morality, one which does not consist in the carrying out of a code or programme or in the practice of virtues but in full and free communication and appreciation between persons in their individuality, one wherein the moral concernment is neither with process as such nor with position but with meaning articulated in a situation free from reference to self. In such a morality the moral moment, the "enjoyment"¹ of such meaning, would differ qualitatively or internally from the non-moral or immoral; at any rate it would so differ both from biological concernment and from the concernment of self-feeling. But such a morality, having no room for self-feeling, will have no room for "values," for any praise or blame, approval or disapproval. This will certainly sound paradoxical to many. These will maintain (indeed they do maintain) that if such a life is conceivable and possible, it ought not to be called "moral" but "supra-moral," "beyond good and evil," "mystical," "religious," or "of grace." The issue thus raised might be a mere logomachy: what is important to decide is whether such a life is that which should be preached and practised. If we decide in the affirmative we shall call it "moral", on the ground that this term can only be of use to denote the life which should be lived; to customary morality, on the other hand, we shall refuse the title "moral," on the ground that, as something "lived" or "enjoyed" by the agent, it is not materially different from what, even in the language of customary morality, is called "not moral." We shall not need to show that this real morality has ever been lived by anyone, for we have long since learnt that morality is something preached rather than practised. None the less, it will be possible to show that, as regards at least its content, and even as far as the mitigation, though not the transformation, of its temper, customary morality has been not a little influenced by it.²

¹ The word is used in Professor Alexander's sense.

² I have so worded the article as to avoid the question whether approval or disapproval is a judgment or merely an emotion or sentiment, for the simple reason that for my purpose I needed to examine only the affective-conative aspects of these attitudes, aspects which, most people agree, are essential to them. I have also avoided the question of objectivity and universality. But I have indicated that the denotation of "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong" (i.e. "high" and "low," or in general, "position-making") in customary morality is strangely variable: the only possible account of it is a historical one, such as none has better given than Westermarck.

THE PHYSICAL WORLD AND REALITY

JOEL GOMBOROW, B.Sc.

IN his masterly article, "Sir Arthur Eddington and the Physical World," which appeared in the January 1934 issue of *Philosophy*, Dr. Stace has brought out a number of interesting points on which I should like to comment. However, as the main issues between Professor Stace and Professor Eddington are with regard to the physical world and reality, these will form the main topics of my remarks.

My first objection is against the "bifurcation of nature" into a "familiar world" and a "physical world." It is true that the phenomena of nature are so exceedingly numerous that no one can manage to study them all, at least not properly. Our studies of nature are therefore subdivided for convenience into physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, psychology, etc. As each of these sciences expands, it is in turn subdivided into various branches; and in practical life most men devote themselves to some narrow specialty for the purpose of earning a livelihood, while their knowledge of other parts of their own science in time becomes rather superficial. Are we going on that account to subdivide nature into a physical world, a chemical world, etc.?

In other words, granted that "the physical world has no colour or smell or taste," does that necessarily mean that it forms an entirely different world? May it not be merely a different part of the same world? As I look at the tree outside my window, the leaves look green to me. My physicist friend informs me that on a spectrum, green corresponds to about 600 million million electromagnetic cycles per second. Does that make the green colour an illusion? Cannot the green colour and the electromagnetic cycles be independent facts of equal standing in the same world? That the one fact is familiar and the other is not may be due merely to the circumstance that the one is observable with scarcely an effort, while a knowledge of the other involves the use of special apparatus and a good deal of theoretical reasoning and calculations. My botanist friend tells me that the leaves are not green in themselves, but that the green colour is due to a substance called chlorophyll contained in them. Well and good, he certainly knows much more about leaves than I do. But he is not claiming that the leaves he knows and the leaves I know belong to radically different worlds. It is simply that he knows more facts about that part of the world than I do.

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A good many of the statements with regard to the physical world given out by Sir Arthur Eddington from time to time can be traced in his famous book *The Nature of the Physical World*. In the Introduction to that book, he tells us that he is writing simultaneously at two different tables, one of them a *familiar* table which is quite substantial, and the other a *scientific* table which is mostly emptiness. As to the meaning of "substantial," he tells us merely "I do not think substantiality can be described better than by saying that it is the kind of nature exemplified by an ordinary table." I am afraid this is hardly sufficiently illuminating to serve as a guide for picking other members of the familiar world. I can readily extend the idea to the other furniture in the room, and to include my books, my stationery, the walls and the floors of the room. But what about the water we drink and the air we breathe? I cannot admit any "instinctive tightening of the fingers" (*The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 274) in thinking of them. Are they on that account to be excluded from the familiar world? But we cannot possibly afford to do that, as we simply cannot manage without them.

As to the extreme emptiness of the scientific table, I have some mental reservations. My impression is that it contains some 30×10^{21} atoms (or some such number) to the cubic centimetre, which I should consider a reasonably dense population. Considering the great force of cohesion between the atoms which makes them so clannish, Sir Arthur is certainly justified in saying that "the chance of my scientific elbow going through my scientific table is so excessively small that it can be neglected in practical life." Matters are further helped out by the fact that in the emptiness of the table "are numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed." That their combined bulk is exceedingly small need not bother us in the slightest. An unauthorized party entering a bank in the stillness of the night may consider the premises entirely deserted; but before he has proceeded far with his business he may find himself in the clutches of the watchman. The bulk of the latter may be very small in comparison with the size of the bank; but, if he is rushing about with sufficient speed, the bank may be considered to be full of him.

Sir Arthur continues further: "There is nothing *substantial* about my second table. It is nearly all empty space—space pervaded, it is true, by fields of force, but those are assigned to the category of 'influences,' not of 'things.' Even in the minute part which is not empty we must not transfer the old notion of substance. . . . The whole trend of modern scientific views is to break down the separate categories of 'things,' 'influences,' 'forms,' etc., and to substitute a common background of all experience. Whether we are studying a material object, a magnetic field, a geometrical figure, or a

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duration of time, our scientific information is summed up in measures; . . ."

It seems to me that in this excerpt we have a glimpse of Sir Arthur's philosophy as laid out at length in his *The Nature of the Physical World*. That "common background of all experience" is an external inscrutable world, and the "things" referred to are Kant's "things in themselves." It is these "things in themselves" that compose the world of *reality*, but they are absolutely unobservable and indescribable. They are a sort of disembodied spirits. If we ascribe to them colour, hardness, smoothness, and so on, these are merely idiosyncrasies of ours, or, as Dr. Stace says, "illusions and subjective interpretations." Not that we are altogether to blame, because these disembodied spirits seem to have some important messages to convey to us and are for ever signalling to us, but our minds are not the proper code book to translate these messages correctly.

The trained scientist, however, is not to be deceived. He is no more in possession of the correct code book than we ordinary mortals are, but he can discern certain features about the signals which he is quite capable of handling. "An elephant slides down a grassy hillside. . . ." This doesn't fool him in the slightest. He understands perfectly well that the elephant is no elephant, and that the hillside is no hillside, and that the supposed event is merely a figment of our imagination. "The mass of the elephant is two tons." Now, this is business. A mass of two tons is a pointer reading on some weighing machine, something with which the scientist has extensive experience and in which he has great confidence. Similarly, the bulkiness of the elephant is to be replaced by a series of readings of a pair of callipers, and his greyish black appearance by the readings of a photometer for various wave-lengths of light (*The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 251-54). By the time the scientist has completely reduced the elephant to "a bundle of pointer readings," he feels that he knows all that is humanly possible to know about the *real* elephant or his counterpart in the "physical world." If somebody else is telling other stories about the "elephant," he is talking about an elephant in the "familiar world," the world of misinterpreted signals, which the scientist, as scientist, regards but lightly.

An immense amount of work on how to obtain reliable pointer readings of length, mass, time, force, position, velocity, acceleration, momentum, stress, energy, wave-lengths, and the like, and how to relate these to each other, has been done by Newton, Euler, Lagrange, Laplace, Legendre, Hamilton, Jacobi, Maxwell, Mach, and many others. The engineering profession has turned a good deal of this work to good account in the familiar world; but most of it, however, remained in the physical world, and has, if I may be pardoned the expression, an odour of musty mathematics. In any case, the

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novelty has largely worn off. Some people may still delight in it, but the bulk of humanity finds a world of pointer readings rather dreary.

In the last half-century, however, a number of events happened to liven things up. Electricity in the form of positive and negative charges on solid bodies has been known for centuries. Faraday passed electric currents through solutions, and found these solutions to consist largely of oppositely electrified atoms or groups of atoms, known as ions. But it was the Crookes tube in 1879 that gave us for the first time electric particles all by themselves. Just fancy, electricity in pure culture, unencumbered by any matter whatever! These particles of pure negative electricity became known as electrons, and their principal practical use before the advent of radio was that of generating X-rays. There are also the positive Goldstein rays, but they may be regarded as chemical atoms. These negative and positive "rays," which were at first produced artificially, were found afterwards to occur in nature in radio-active materials with their α , β , and γ rays.

With the turn of the century, Max Planck, as a result of his thermodynamic studies on "black bodies," propounded the revolutionary idea that radiation energy did not come in a continuous stream but in neat packets, the amount of energy in each packet being proportional to the frequency (cycles per second) of the particular radiation. Applying this idea to Rutherford's model of the atom, Niels Bohr, followed closely by A. Sommerfeld and scores of other ingenious experimenters and mathematicians, gave us a model of the atom consisting of a positive nucleus surrounded at various distances by negative electrons. The nucleus is supposed to consist of a number of positive charges, called protons, equal to the atomic weight of the element in question; but some of these protons are neutralized by electrons in the nucleus itself, while the balance is neutralized by "planetary" electrons. The latter revolve about the nucleus in various orbits, each electron at the same time spinning about its axis. The entire system broadly imitates our solar system.

Among Bohr's principal triumphs was the deduction of a rational formula equivalent to Balmer's empirical formula for the spectrum of hydrogen, and with this formula he and his associates explained and even predicted other spectra and parts of spectra. In the early twenties of the present century, a crisis was reached when the refinements of practical spectroscopy outran the available theory and could no longer be covered by it. Very soon, however, the mathematicians caught up with the situation, and for the last few years it was a neck-and-neck race between the experimenters and the theoreticians, both sides being highly pleased.

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Here, then, it is no longer a case of applying callipers to a phantom elephant in the familiar world and not having the slightest idea what "thing in itself" was the counterpart of it in *reality*. Here the callipers are applied to wave-lengths on a spectrum, and the measurements are overwhelmingly almost inconceivably fine. Wave-lengths are measured not only in Ångström units, an Ångström being 10^{-8} cm, but in minute fractions of an Ångström. On the other hand, the mathematician kept close pace, and by means of his protons, electrons, their orbits and sub-orbits, he can give a theoretical account not only for every wave-length but also for the intensity of every wave-length. He can even predict wave-lengths and intensities before, on account of faintness or other technical difficulties, they have been observed, thus rivalling the exploits of Adams and Lowell in predicting Neptune and Pluto.

To be sure, we are not in *Reality* yet, and the protons and electrons are still only signals from the "things in themselves." But the theoretician has an unconquerable feeling that now he has the signals correctly, and if he but follows them up he will before long arrive at the very portals of Reality. Should those portals be closed, he is ready to bring up sufficient battering-rams, either of the type used by Rutherford in shattering the nitrogen atom or in the form of scores of millions of volts, and force them; and then . . .

Of course, there still remains the question whether there is a Reality after all. Sir Arthur, old hand that he is with theories, shakes his head dubiously. Says he (*The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 282): "I am afraid of this word Reality, not connoting an ordinary definable characteristic of the things it is applied to, but used as though it were some kind of celestial halo." However, he is not going to doubt for an instant the existence of protons and electrons. Not only have they shown themselves in various ways, but it is possible to assign to them precise dimensions and weights. It is also possible to assign precise dimensions to the various orbits within an atom. Surely, non-existent things cannot have dimensions and weights.

All this, however, leaves Dr. Stace quite cold. He may admire and applaud the brilliancy of the work described above, but otherwise his equanimity is not seriously disturbed. Says he rather provocatively: "Now I do not believe that protons and electrons are real. I believe they are just what Sir Arthur says they are not, namely, fictitious or hypothetical entities, or, as I prefer to call them, mental constructions."

And so, the doctors disagree, and everybody is therefore at liberty to use his own wits as best he can. For my own part, not seeing my way to follow either of the great men, I was forced to formulate a theory of my own with regard to the external world and reality.

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However, before laying it out here, I should like to comment some more on Dr. Stace's article.

Apparently in retaliation for Sir Arthur's making a mere halo of reality, he is attempting to make a halo also of existence. Says he:

"Sir Arthur says that the physical world has no colour, no sound, no taste, no smell. It has no spatiality. Probably it has not even number. We must not suppose that it is in any way like our world, or that we can understand it by attributing to it the characters of our world. Why not carry this progress to its logical conclusion? Why not give up the idea that it has even the character of 'existence' which our familiar world has? We have given up smell, colour, taste. We have given up even space and shape. We have given up number. Surely, after all that, mere existence is but a little thing to give up. No? Then is it that the idea of existence conveys 'a sort of halo'? I suspect so."

This sounds a bit strong. We have all learned in our elementary chemistry about "colourless, odourless, tasteless" gases, among which oxygen, the very breath of our nostrils, holds a prominent place. Do these gases have sound, spatiality, number? If not, are we going to refuse them existence? Or take the case of vitamins. Nobody has ever seen, heard, tasted, smelled, or touched a vitamin. We may even deny them spatiality and number without serious objection from anybody. But can we deny them existence? Think of the immense amount of work done *on* them in classifying them out into A, B, C, D, E, and G, and into subs. of these letters. Think of the immense amount of work done *by* them in preventing and curing various diseases, and even in promoting growth. The point I wish to make is that a thing may lack all the characteristics enumerated by Dr. Stace and still be very much in existence indeed. Some people went as far as denying existence to mind just because it lacks the characteristics of other human organs, so that Einstein must have used his legs in discovering relativity.

With regard to the old and the modern ways of explaining gravitation, it is certainly regrettable that some of our popularizers of science seem to take a sort of delight in mystifying their readers. To tell a man that the sun compels the earth to follow a curved path without exerting any force on it is to bewilder him, and the "humps and hills in space-time" as an explanation do not help much. Obviously, if it is on account of the sun that the earth deviates from the straight path it would have followed if the sun were not there, the sun must be doing *something* to the earth, and "exerting a force" seems to be as good an expression as any. The situation is simply that Newton's law of gravitation, like Coulomb's law of electrodynamics, is an "action at a distance" law, taking account only

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of the terminal bodies and ignoring the intervening medium. Einstein's law, on the contrary, like the Faraday-Maxwell laws of electrodynamics, is a "field of force" law, expressible in differential equations involving space and time from point to point and from instant to instant. In the absence of the sun, the mathematical statement of the earth's motion would be "linear," but with the sun present that statement becomes "curved." The "curvature" and the "humps and hills" are not in space but in the mathematical equations of motion.

The above paragraph is really no part of my theme, but I brought up the subject only because it led Dr. Stace to the momentous declaration that "scientific laws, properly stated, never 'explain' anything. They simply state, in an abbreviated and generalized form, *what happens*. No scientist, and in my opinion no philosopher, knows *why* anything happens, or can 'explain' anything." This is in direct contradiction to the claims of a certain class of people that science is quite capable of explaining everything, and that if there are still some "gaps" here and there, it would be unsafe for anybody to try to take advantage of them, as they are liable to "close up" any day.

The truth of the matter is that the scientist is only a lawyer, and his job is to learn the laws of nature, to the sum total of which we shall apply the name Book of Nature, and to turn them to the advantage of himself and of his fellow men. Whether you take up chemistry, engineering, medicine, or broadcasting, the first thing you come up against is "laws of nature." Some people keep constantly choking over this expression; it is like a bone in their throat, neither to void nor to swallow. They like to tell you that the sun attracts the earth *because it does*, that an electric current passing through a coil magnetizes it *because it does*, and that zinc displaces copper in solutions *because it does*. Such tautological explanations will satisfy an intelligent person no more than if he were told that every automobile in London carries a name plate of a particular type because it does.

The scientist therefore makes up his mind that "laws of nature" is not some metaphor but an actuality, and he proceeds with the study of some portion of the Book of Nature in much of the same spirit that the ordinary lawyer proceeds with the study of the statute books of his country. Unfortunately, however, the text of that Book is not available to us, and its contents must be guessed from painstaking observations of what is going on in the world, much as a person would learn the laws of a country the language of which he does not understand. This is, of course, a hit-and-miss process, and it may take a long time and the co-operation of many persons before all the clauses, provisos, and exceptions of a law can be

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learned in that manner. Perseverance, however, will bring its usual rewards.

But as to the *whys* of the laws of nature, this is entirely outside of the scientist's province. Even the ordinary lawyer cannot always give the reason for every law on the statute books. Yet, the lawyer being the same kind of creature as those who enacted the statute books, can often easily enter into their mental processes. The Author of the Book of Nature, however, is a radically Superior Being, Whose ideas are as unfathomable to us as the tensor calculus is to the cat.

But why introduce a Superior Being? Because that seems to be the only way out of my endless difficulties. For instance, I look up at the star Sirius to which the three little stars in the belt of the Orion are pointing, and I am beset by innumerable questions, only a few of which I may mention here. I am told that Sirius weighs about 49×10^{26} tons, is at a distance of 51×10^{12} miles away from us, and has a surface temperature of $11,000^{\circ}$ C., and I like to know how that gigantic body happens to be at that enormous distance and how it acquired that terrific temperature. I am told that big as it is, it consists of atoms of something like 10^{-8} in. in diameter, and that each atom, in turn, consists of a nucleus around which many electrons travel in various orbits, and I am bewildered as to how the ultra-minute atom can contain so complicated a structure. The electrons in the atom, I am told, keep amusing themselves by jumping from orbit to orbit, and every such jump results in the emission (or absorption) of a packet of energy. The size of the packet depends on the orbits between which the jump took place; but every packet, large or small, becomes in some mysterious way transformed into a radiation of some frequency or other, frequencies being measured in hundreds of billions of electromagnetic cycles per second. All this is weird enough; but the most marvellous thing of all is that between each packet and its corresponding frequency of radiation there is always the same ratio h which is equal to 6.55×10^{-27} . Where did every electron in every atom in that gigantic star and everywhere else in the universe learn the value of h , and why must every packet conform itself to it?

When the packet of radiation has left the particular atom in Sirius which has generated it, it naturally spreads out in all directions in ever-increasing spherical surfaces. By the time it has reached the retina of my eye, it is spread out over a sphere of 51 billions of miles in radius, and the amount of it per square inch must be infinitesimal. But unless the quotient of the amount of energy entering any particular atom of my retina by the frequency of the particular radiation is just equal to h , that atom will not be affected and no vision will result? But how is that managed?

The radiation energy impinging on my retina effects chemical

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changes in it. But why? The retina must respond to an immense variety of frequencies in accordance with the different colours and shades of colours we can distinguish. But how? Whatever changes take place in the retina must be propagated somehow along the optic nerves. But how? The current along the optic nerve must, through the intermediacy of the brain, produce a picture in the mind. But how? With my questions "how," I am not after the details of the mechanisms involved, such as the cones and rods in the retina, but why do these mechanisms produce just these results. There are really many more questions to be asked in connection with the simple phenomenon of seeing Sirius and in connection with every phenomenon in nature, but anyone who cares to can easily find them for himself.

But what are the answers to all these questions? It seems like an insoluble problem. But whenever you are up against an apparently insoluble problem, it is often a good suggestion to formulate a somewhat similar problem but with simple features, say, with very small numbers. After you have found a solution for your imitation problem, a way may be indicated to you for solving the actual problem.

I look about my room and my eye falls on my footstool. How did its component parts come to be shaped and assembled into a footstool? I was not present when the footstool came into being, and my question remains unanswered. I examine the arm-chair I am sitting in and ask a similar question about it, and this also remains unanswered. Similar questions with regard to my desk, bookcase, bed, chiffonier, wardrobe, and other articles of furniture seem to result in so many apparently independent mysteries. Occam's razor, however, suggests a way out of the difficulty by replacing the various individual mysteries by a single mystery, which is not so much of a mystery, after all, in so far as it agrees very well with my daily experience. I decide that it was a carpenter who designed and constructed every piece of my furniture. Of course, never having seen that carpenter, I have no means of telling whether he was tall or short, blonde or brunette, or any other details about him. But these details are really of no consequence. Suffice it that he had ideas about furniture and the ability to carry these ideas into effect.

To the many questions in connection with Sirius and thousands of similar questions my reply is the same. All the phenomena of the world are thus and so, because a Superior Being wished them so. My inability to describe His appearance in detail is really of no consequence. I can only say with the utmost confidence that He is a Being with wishes and the ability to make these wishes effective.

And now for the various topics forming the subject-matter of Dr. Stace's article and of mine.

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I am at one with Dr. Stace that "this familiar world is the only real world, the only world that really exists." The physical world consists of those phenomena which have not as yet become familiar because of the elaborate apparatus required to observe them and because of their comparative unimportance in our daily life. Not so many years ago radio was part of the physical world; now it is quite familiar and it has taught people a good many words they have not known before, and which they as yet only partly understand. Television is still mainly in the physical world, but it is expected to be transferred before long to the familiar world and thus extend the everyday vocabulary still more. The inscrutable world of Reality is a myth, and need not be considered.

The "things in themselves" are fictions, incapable of being observed either directly or indirectly. It is the so-called signals that they are sending to us that form the realities of our world. Lorentz missed being the father of relativity merely because he had a fixed idea of some mysterious "true time" and regarded all "local times" as illusions. We shall, with Einstein, regard all permanent illusions as realities, even if they be only local.

The stuff of the world is properties, meaning by a property that which, interacting with some part of our body, is capable of evoking some interpretation from our mind. All the objects in the world, our minds included, are but aggregates of properties. My table is an aggregate of brownness, hardness, sonority, floatability, combustibility, cleavability, and many other physical, chemical, and electrical properties, some of which may not be known as yet. If it is important for some purposes to know just how brown my table is, this can be given in terms of a wave-length on a spectrum scale. The hardness may be referred to a table on which the hardness of shellbark hickory is 100, of yellow oak is 60, of chestnut is 52, etc. The sonority may be expressed in so many vibrations per second, the floatability in terms of some specific gravity table, and so on. In this manner, our table, like Sir Arthur's elephant, may become a mere "bundle of pointer readings." But, whether we can devise measurements for the properties or not, the properties are the realities of our world. To repeat, the "table in itself" is a fiction; our real table is a name given to a certain aggregate of properties, some of which properties may be still unknown to us.

Our mind is not something *sui generis*; like any other organ of our body, it is merely an aggregate of properties. Our liver is an aggregate of properties or abilities to manufacture bile, to convert glucose into glycogen, to make fats oxidizable, and so on. Our mind is an aggregate of properties or abilities to think, wish, imagine, feel, interpret, and so on. It is its component property in virtue of which it is able to put interpretations on interactions between other

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bodies and our own body that interests us most in our present discussion. But, of course, this is but one component of a large aggregate of properties.

An aggregate of properties may consist of *any* properties whatever, and colour, sound, taste, smell, etc., need not necessarily be components of the aggregate. Mass, for instance, is supposed to be a component property of all bodies; but should it be proven at some future date that mind is absolute massless, that would not debar it from being a body. Such proof, however, would be extremely difficult. Relativity tells us that a gram calorie has a mass of 4.7×10^{-14} gram; that is, if 4.7×10^{14} calories were suddenly added to a body and before any of this heat was lost it were weighed, its weight would be found to have increased by one gram. Possibly, when this statement is verified experimentally, a way will be found to ascertain the mass of a mind.

One thing in particular must be clearly understood. When God made the first ninety-nine properties of a one hundred property aggregate, He was not under the slightest compulsion whatever as to what that last property should be. He could make it anything He pleased, so long as it was not a direct cancellation of any of the previous properties. Consequently, when a scientist has ascertained ninety-nine properties of an aggregate, he may, of course, on the basis of previous experience, venture a guess as to what the next property may be. But, should the guess prove wrong, there is not the least ground for surprise.

There is, for instance, a certain property in virtue of which electromagnetic cycles may be transmitted through vacant space. As this property is not a component of any known aggregate, we may give it a name by itself and call it "aether." But we have no right to endow that aether arbitrarily with other properties such as rigidity, elasticity, etc. There may or there may not be other properties to form an aggregate with the one just mentioned; but, if there are each and every one of them must be determined independently by experiment.

Scientists have been greatly perturbed a few years ago to find that light, which was supposed to have been definitely proven to be a wave motion, exhibited corpuscular properties. Their surprise was first increased and then decreased when it was found that the electron, which was always understood to be a particle of negative electricity, exhibited wave phenomena. By this time they have ceased to be surprised at anything. They are no longer constructing "models" from which, on the basis of a few ascertained properties, the others can be guessed. Each and every property in an aggregate must be determined independently.

Dr. Stace objects to the term "potential energy," arguing that if

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the energy is not being exerted, it must be only a fiction or a mathematical expression. However, a coal dealer may quote us different prices for different kinds of coal on the basis that the one kind had 11,000 B.t.u. per lb., the second kind had 12,000 B.t.u. per lb., the third kind had 13,000 B.t.u. per lb., etc. Should we protest that all his coals were as cold as rocks and there was no evidence of any B.t.u. about them, he will suavely explain that we have but to bring kindling wood, matches, and a calorimeter, and the various B.t.u. per lb. obtained will justify the different prices demanded. Or the boss may insult us with a cheque for £25 in remuneration for our valuable services during the past month. Should we demur that the cheque is no money but only a scrap of paper, he will tartly suggest that we have but to take it to the bank and the cheque will become actual money, and in fact exactly £25, which is rather more than our work is worth to him.

I have brought up this matter because I have to point out that an aggregate of properties may consist of both active properties, which may evince themselves immediately either directly or by the use of suitable apparatus, and of potential properties which may come into evidence only after the lapse of years or after the aggregate has given birth to another aggregate of properties. J. Reinke, in his *Die Welt als Tat* and *Die Natur und Wir*, has coined a word "dominants," which in plain English means compulsions, and I shall have to use this word in the following paragraphs.

When God set an electron spinning on its axis and revolving about a proton and told it to be hydrogen, He first of all endowed it with the properties of forming water when properly brought together with oxygen, hydrochloric acid with chlorine, ammonia with nitrogen, etc. But in addition He instructed it to place dominants in each drop of water it formed not only that the water be wet, a solvent, a thirst quencher, and so on, but that it know at what temperature to boil under any particular pressure, and the corresponding density, heat content, etc. I have heard sometimes that a man using a powerful magnifying glass has written out the Declaration of Independence on the back of a postage stamp. If this be true, it is certainly marvellous. But to write out a complete steam table, for both saturated and superheated steam, in every drop of water in the world, is a feat worthy of the Creator Himself. If you have any doubts on the subject, just ascertain the boiling points of water for various pressures in London, ask a friend of yours in New York and another friend in Australia to do the same, and then compare notes. The tautological explanation offered by some people that the reason why water everywhere and always when under a pressure of 14.7 lb. per sq. in. boils at a temperature of 212° F. is *because it does* deserves no consideration.

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Dominants for similar tables must be placed in every drop of ammonia, carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, mercury, and other vaporizable liquids. How else would each liquid know how to behave?

A fertilized ovum is but a speck of protoplasm; and no matter how you scrutinize it, you will never discern in it anything like eyes, ears, arms, legs, lungs, kidneys, etc. And yet there must be in the ovum dominants determining the structure, size, and function of every organ in the offspring not only at the moment it is born, but also a year later, ten years later, twenty years later, and throughout life. One of the dominants determines the various faculties of the mind, providing, for instance, that grass should evoke in it an interpretation of greenness. It could just as easily and just as "naturally" have provided that grass should give us a sensation of a high C note, or of a voltage varying inversely as the fourth power of the distance.

It was stated above that the name Book of Nature was given to the sum total of all the laws of nature. It must be remarked here that properties and laws of nature are equivalent terms. Gravitation, for instance, is a component of every aggregate of properties. This means that every atom of matter in the world must contain a copy of Einstein's law of gravitation including the exact numerical value of the "gravitation constant." For otherwise, how would the moon know how fast to fall towards the earth, how would Jupiter know how fast to fall towards the sun, and how would the astronomer know how to compute the weights of binary stars.

To some people the idea that the world was created by a series of commands seems preposterous and incredible. To their knowledge, all the doings in this world are by means of hands, tools, and machinery. But all human doings consist only of transportations, either the transportation of a body as a whole, or the transportation of the parts of a body relative to each other, as in the winding up of a spring. To make a table, the carpenter transports tools over lumber, transports the resulting parts into a certain arrangement, transports nails over them, and transports a hammer over the nails; he may also transport glue, sandpaper, and varnish. But in each and every transportation of his, he is making use of one or more properties of materials, which means of the laws of nature. To produce urea, F. Wohler made certain transportations of ammonium cyanate, potassium cyanate, and water under certain conditions. He had previously made other transportations which were of no avail. It was only when he happened to make exactly the transportations prescribed in the Book of Nature that he got the desired result. If you examine carefully the activities of every human being, from those of the cobbler to those of the constructor of television appara-

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tus, they invariably consist of transporations, and the results are strictly in accordance with the laws of nature. But when God came to create the world, there was nothing to be transported, and the Book of Nature was still to be written. His *will* was His only material and His only tool.

To sum up, "things in themselves" are fictions. They are intrinsically unobservable, and, in accordance with the Einstein-Heisenberg ideas, whatever is intrinsically unobservable is to be regarded as non-existent. The only observables are properties, and every object in the world, mind included, is therefore to be regarded as an aggregate of properties. But if similar objects, such as water, in different parts of the world behave exactly alike, it is not because they have at some time held a conference and have agreed to do so. It is because they are all obeying the same commands or laws, just as all the automobiles in a given district carry nameplates of a certain size and pattern in obedience to the same law. In other words, properties and laws of nature are equivalent terms. But a law is always the expression of the will of someone who has the power to make that will effective, whether that someone be a king, a parliament, or some other legislator. Indeed, all attempts in defining laws of nature to avoid the idea of a will and the ability to enforce it have invariably resulted in meaningless mystifying tautology. Consequently, since every object is an aggregate of properties or laws, and since a law is always the expression of one having the power to make that will effective, it follows that every object in the world is but the embodiment of the will of Him whose will is law.

Therefore, our world is but the embodiment of God's will as recorded in the Book of Nature and as made evident to us in the form of properties, active or potential. Properties are thus the only realities, and they are by no means will-o'-the-wisps, but they are wisps of the will of the Creator.

TRUTH IN POETRY

MAUD BODKIN, M.A.

THE nature of poetic truth, and of the belief claimed by poetry, has become for many thinkers a question of keener interest through the discussions of Dr. I. A. Richards. In a recent article in this Journal,¹ Dr. Helen Wodehouse has expressed her own view, elicited in relation to that of Dr. Richards, concerning truth in poetry. She urges that "a great poem seems sometimes centrally to be showing us the full measure and nature of some aspect of the actual world." Our response involves essentially an element of belief in something revealed as rooted in reality, laying necessity upon the poet; even though that belief may not attach to all that the poet accepted as fact, and though we may be unable to formulate in reflective terms the nature of the truth discerned.

Sharing this conviction in regard to poetry, I wish to follow up Dr. Wodehouse's discussion by some further consideration of the nature of the truth apprehended in those poems to which we make full response. How does such truth differ from that which we recognize in scientific statement?

Our question may first be cleared from one possible source of misapprehension. When we ask concerning the truth of a great poem, such as *Paradise Lost*, we do not refer to any literal acceptance of its mythology. The distinction is well put by Professor Elton in his discussion of this poem. In regard to the central myth of *Paradise Lost* he asks:

"Does it in Milton's hands embody some enduring truth that speaks to the imagination? . . . It is of no consequence that we do not accept it as a fact; but what of it as a symbol?"

He goes on to set forth his own reaction to the myth as Milton presents it—a reaction negative, as respects belief:

"The topic is the irruption of evil through the misuse of man's free will. But Milton fails, through the whole transaction, really to make us feel either the presence or the power of evil. He puts his whole force into the crisis, in the ninth book. But many a reader must have obscurely felt that there is something amiss with the argument. . . . Neither the lofty eulogy on pure love nor the wonderful picture of Eve's 'distemper' after she

¹ "Poetry and Truth," *Philosophy*, VIII, p. 32.

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has eaten can make us see why the caresses of the pair should be less innocent after their disobedience, than before . . . their punishment is not made otherwise than absurd."¹

I quote this statement because I should like the reader, as philosophic critic, to question himself concerning his own attitude to this type of criticism. Does he accept the principle assumed, that one important source of value in a poem is its revelation to the imagination of some enduring truth? Does he agree that part of our task as readers and critics is to question our experience of the poem to find where its main energies are concentrated, and whether at these focal points we feel the presence and power of some reality that belongs to our actual world?

If this assumption is granted, there arises a second question: Can we attribute to these reactions of criticism any general validity? The critic uses collective forms of speech: *Milton fails to make us feel*. But is it true that Milton so fails in the case of every reader?

For sharp contrast with Professor Elton's verdict we might compare the view of Mr. Charles Williams, to whom the story of the fall, as Milton tells it, communicates in symbolic form a "matter of experience." To him it appears that Milton has presented "the most extraordinarily exact description of the state of most men who refuse their wills to the power of a known love that any English poet ever found."² To strengthen further our sense of the diversities of critics, we might compare the exposition of Professor Abercrombie, to whom, as to Mr. Williams, *Paradise Lost* conveys a true image of human existence; but who, focusing the poem differently, finds its central significance not in God and Heaven as symbol of a known love refused, but in the colossal figure of Satan, symbol of the human will striving unmastered in the midst of destiny.³

Confronted by this and many other such examples of disagreement among eminent critics of poems deeply studied, we may feel ourselves driven back upon the conclusion of Dr. Richards, that the sense of revelation in poetry is illusory. Belief given to poetry, we may say—in the phrase of another writer⁴—belongs to the "private world" of emotional response; it has no place in that "public world" in which scientific truth exists.

If forced to this conclusion, we may be grateful for the terms Dr. Richards has provided for description of the values and effects of poetry within the individual mind. These values, he urges, depend upon "the texture and form of the attitudes evoked" in the course of the reader's experience—the "incipient promptings, lightly

¹ *The English Muse*, 1933, pp. 238-9.

² *Reason or Beauty in the Poetic Mind*, 1933, p. 100.

³ *The Epic*, 1922, p. 105.

⁴ A Sewell, *The Physiology of Beauty*, 1931.

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stimulated tendencies to acts of one kind or another,"¹ which in their interplay and resolution make up the imaginative realization of the poem, and leave their persisting effect upon the emotional organization of the mind.

It seems possible, in terms of an organization of attitudes through imaginative activity, to reach better understanding of the varying results of criticism than when we speak in terms of a revelation of truth. Whatever psychological knowledge we possess concerning the conditioning of emotional attitudes through the course of a life history can be brought into play to help us, as we read a critic's work, to grasp the nature of his individual standpoint, or perspective. We may seek for the time to share this perspective imaginatively, then detach ourselves for the comparison of our own individual experience and that of others.

Such psychological interest and such independence of judgment seem to me necessary for anyone who is to concern himself critically with poetry: yet I feel that the problem of individual differences among critics is not adequately met by a reference to private worlds in which readers remain enclosed, enjoying their subjective responses and "objectless beliefs." The phrase we have employed, "individual perspective," suggests a more satisfying solution. For the notion of a perspective involves a common object appearing within the different visions, and, by virtue of that common object, a relation potentially discoverable of the different visions one to another.

The concept of the individual perspective has received notable development recently in the work of several philosophers. We may refer especially to the writings of Professor Whitehead and of the late Professor Mead.

Professor Mead follows Dr. Whitehead in attaching central importance to the conception of nature as an organization of perspectives. The thought of "the perspective as there in nature" is, he urges, "in a sense a donation to philosophy by the most abstruse physical science." The new theories of relativity have swept away that world of independent physical entities, of which the "distorted" perspectives were "relegated to consciousness." "In the place of such a world appear all the perspectives in their inter-relationships to each other." The characters and qualities found in conscious apprehension are restored to an organic nature which both science and philosophy can recognize.²

Anyone accepting this general outlook upon reality must give a different form to that distinction made by Dr. Richards between the scientific and the emotive, or poetic, use of language—the scien-

¹ *Principles of Literary Criticism*, 1926, pp. 113, 132.

² See Essay IV, "The Objective Reality of Perspectives," in *The Philosophy of the Present*, by G. H. Mead. Edited by A. E. Murphy, Chicago. London, 1932.

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tific use for public reference, the poetic for the organizing of individual emotional attitudes. Dr. Richards has spoken of the field of science as that in which references are left undisturbed by needs and feelings—impulses roused by sensory stimuli reflect or correspond with external states of affairs without disturbance from within. Such a mode of speech may serve, on the level of naïve common sense, to express the contrast between generally valid scientific truth and the more individually biased thought of the poet, or writer on moral and æsthetic themes. If, however, we desire more philosophic exactness in expressing that freedom from bias achieved by science, we must recognize that it is attained not by any "letting alone" of sensory experiences, but by abstraction from their initial richness, severe restriction of admitted aspects. "By limiting the sensory equipment of our observers," Sir Arthur Eddington has remarked, "we do a great deal to prevent their quarrelling."¹ When the content of scientific observation has been rendered sufficiently abstract, such differences as remain between observers' results can be dealt with by "formulae of transformation." The scientific goal of perfect generality is achieved. But can it be claimed for this particular mode of achieving objectivity that it is the only one deserving consideration?

"The intolerant use of abstractions," Whitehead has declared, "is the major vice of the intellect."² To correct this vice, he urges, we should compare the various schemes of abstraction well founded in different types of experience; and among these types he reckons of special importance that of the poet. The survival of great poems "is evidence that they express deep intuitions of mankind penetrating into what is universal in concrete fact."³

It is from this philosophic standpoint that I feel one may press the contention that the belief, or sense of truth, realized in apprehending a great poem is not objectless, nor of merely private significance. It is a different mode of abstraction that is involved in poetic speech from that which the scientist uses. Let us examine in what this difference consists.

Whitehead has spoken⁴ of "the extreme difficulty of expressing in language the final generalities" by dim apprehension of which human life is driven forward. He is illustrating from the concept of the human soul, its status and function in the world of experience. The idea of the self, in relation to the world of his fellows and of nature, that is active within any man's apprehension is determined largely by tradition, and this again by "accidents of genius"—the achievement of powerfully persuasive expressions of the idea, by

¹ *Philosophy*, VIII, 29, p. 35.

² *Science and the Modern World*, 1932, p. 23.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁴ *Adventures of Ideas*, Part I, Ch. II.

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such men as Plato, or Jesus and the first Evangelists. The intuition concerning the human soul that we find in the writings of Plato, and, in another "special expression" in the New Testament, is a supreme example of that mode of abstraction which pertains to poetic, or imaginative, as contrasted with scientific, experience. We may compare this intuition, coming to us through great literature, known as a determining force in our civilization, with the intuitions of Newton and of Einstein, moulding the development of mathematical science.

In each case we recognize what Whitehead has described¹ as the private, subjective, and the public, objective aspects of the act of experience. The intuition that came into being with its own subjective form and private intensity, as an event in an individual life history, becomes a determinant of other events. I, or any civilized individual to-day, recognize within my "given" world elements depending on the communicated intuitions of Plato and of Christ, as well as on those of Newton and Einstein. Yet the manner in which I grasp these elements depends in the one case upon an emotional development of which the stages are obscure to me, lacking inherited means of definition, while to the notions of mathematical science there is a defined pathway of approach. Though there may be few minds that can fulfil the conditions required for apprehension of the great quantitative generalizations of science, yet these conditions are laid down. I know that if my intellect can follow the path, it will attain the vision. To the qualitative generalities apprehended by poetic and moral genius the whole man must respond, and there is no recognizable path by which the vision may be certainly attained.

So we are back at the problem of the many individual perspectives of poetic truth. Does the *Paradise Lost* of Milton, do the myths of Plato, or the Parables of the Gospels, embody for me enduring truth ordering my experience of reality? According to my individual standpoint I answer Yes or No; and, within my world of social and intellectual contacts, there is no universally accepted test for determining whether I am right or wrong.

Yet the philosophic view to which we have made reference indicates a line of procedure in meeting this problem of diverse responses. Through the co-ordinating of communicated perspectives the individual can pass from the relatively private truth which his more habitual attitudes determine, towards a truth more objective and universal. Though from a great poem, living with its many aspects within the manifold life of a community, I can take only what is relevant to the form of my own acts of feeling-- which may lead me, experiencing (e.g.) *Paradise Lost*, to emphasize mainly the element

¹ *Process and Reality, passim.*

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of conflict, or mainly the element of harmony, subordinating the other—yet through the discipline of communication, both imaginative and reflective, I can use others' experience to extend and articulate my own. "God," says Gasset,¹ "enjoys the use of every point of view, resuming and harmonizing . . . all our horizons." It is the ideal of our socialized reason that we express in our concept of the vision of God; and our homage to the all-embracing truth God sees should find its issue in tolerance and eagerness to comprehend the sincere vision of every human spirit.

As I clarify, through reflective analysis of imaginative communication, my intellectual references to those social objects—states and forces entering our common life—which the poet may portray through heroic figures, or name God, Devil, Heaven, Hell, I am at the same time ordering my emotional attitudes toward those objects. The gain which has come to those of us whom Dr. Richards's writings have stimulated to keener interest in the attitudes harmonized by poetry is enhanced, it seems to me, when we restore to those attitudes and references which Richards separates the unity claimed for them by the philosophy of organism.

¹ *The Modern Theme*, by J. Ortega Y. Gasset, 1931.

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PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

BENEDETTO CROCE's latest book, recently published under the title *Ultimi Saggi*,¹ is a copious collection of philosophical writings which have already appeared for the most part in Italian and foreign reviews. Yet it does not convey the impression of a collection of sporadic essays, either because a strongly unifying inspiration pervades all its pages, or because the actual contents of the writings group themselves naturally round certain focal points about which the author's intellectual interests tend to concentrate. Aesthetics, ethics, the principles of historical writing, afford the greater part of the problems and arguments treated in this book. The English public are already acquainted with some of them, such as the essay entitled *Aesthetica in nuce*, which contains the article on Aesthetics in the last edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and the *Difesa della poesia*, which takes its starting-point from Shelley's *Defence of Poetry* and was delivered as a lecture in Oxford in 1933 at Lady Margaret Hall. Other essays on aesthetics of no less importance round off and reveal under fresh aspects some questions already treated by Croce in his systematic work. I shall confine myself to pointing out an article entitled *Le due scienze mondane*, which gives a historical demonstration of the wholly modern origin of the sciences of aesthetics and economics, and explains this modernity as arising from the new philosophical subjectivity which succeeds classical and mediaeval objectivism. The article entitled *Rileggendo l'Aesthetica del Baumgarten* affectionately recalls to mind and at the same time gives a concise critical exposition of the work of the founder of aesthetics. It was occasioned by Croce's acquisition of a very rare copy of that work which for thirty years had eluded his bibliophile zeal. And the fresh reading that his acquisition of the book has permitted him to make has given rise to a much more intensive and organic exposition than that contained in his history of aesthetics published in 1903. Here, too, as in all Croce's writings, are to be found polemical outbursts against some alleged innovators in contemporary aesthetics who appear unable to maintain even the historical positions won by Baumgarten two centuries ago with his definition of art as *oratio sensitiva perfecta*. In this connection it is pleasant to record that Croce's article in its turn has prompted a group of his friends and admirers to reprint Baumgarten's *Aesthetica* in honour of Croce's seventieth birthday, which falls in 1936.

The essay *Iniziazione all'estetica del Settecento* is a model of the new style to which Croce, in the fullness of his intellectual maturity, has attained in the treatment of the history of aesthetics. If in his history published in 1903 he still indulged in somewhat academic habits of treating the history of thought as a history of dynastic successions of thinkers, here on the other hand the substantial interest that the problems have for him in their development has made a marked advance over his interest in their human protagonists; but this change does not carry with it any devaluation of the men themselves in their individuality, but rather a different valuation, necessitated by the facts and latent in them. The great problems of eighteenth-century aesthetics are

¹ B. CROCE, *Ultimi Saggi*, Bari, Laterza, 1935 (8vo. 1p. viii, 300).

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concerned with the beautiful in nature and in art, genius and taste, sensibility and sentiment in relation to the intellect. Beside the historical figures of the first rank—Vico, Baumgarten, Kant—in the consideration of these problems there stand out also the secondary figures to whom the histories of aesthetics generally make only perfunctory allusion. In Croce's essay these stand out in bold relief from the background of the problems as investigators and discoverers, though still anxious and uncertain, of concepts whose paternity we had been accustomed to attribute to more eminent thinkers, who on the contrary have the different merit of focusing more clearly the discoveries of others. From this point of view Kant's *Critique of Judgment* appears to be not merely a solitary elaboration by the philosopher of Königsberg, but the point to which converge all the currents of eighteenth-century aesthetics, to radiate afresh in different directions.¹

The numerous ethical, historical, and philosophical writings that form the second and third sections of the volume cluster to a great extent round the new conception of philosophy as the "methodology of history" of which Croce, in the latest phase of his intellectual evolution, has made himself the increasingly vigorous spokesman. The traditional figure of the "philosopher" as the proposer and solver of a single eternal problem has always been repugnant to his realistic temperament, which from the beginning has approached philosophy from the starting-point of a rich multiplicity of particular concrete problems, and he has seen in philosophy no more than a means of focussing them and co-ordinating them among themselves. In this regard there is a certain affinity between Croce's standpoint and the instrumentalist position of Dewey—as Croce himself has noted in one of his essays—but the nature of the instrument is different. On the philosophical judgment-seat the Italian philosopher is severely rationalistic, and does not allow himself any irrational or pragmatic deviations, not even those that appear here and there among the ramifications of Hegel's system (on this point see the essay: *Circolo vizioso nella critica della filosofia hegeliana*). But the affirmation of rationalism in philosophy does not mean for him a fall into panlogism. Philosophy stands face to face with life, praxis, in all the multiplicity of its interests, not to be assimilated in empty intellectual schemes. Thus thought is led back to its function of understanding, that is rationalizing life, not substituting itself for life as in panlogism. Hence the great riches of Croce's philosophy which, instead of secluding itself in supramundane remoteness from every worldly interest, continually plunges back into life, to emerge from time to time with new intellectual experiences.

In a preceding Survey I drew attention to the first volume of Stefanini's *Plato*,² and I am now able to announce the publication of the second volume, which proceeds from the *Symposium* to Plato's last writings.³ The two volumes together, in the course of a thousand elaborate and closely printed pages, give a complete and organic exposition of the whole Platonic philosophy, and represent, in Italian historical studies, an effort of research and synthesis that can easily stand comparison with the most noted foreign works, such as those of Ritter, Taylor, and other contemporary students of Plato. The method of treatment in this second volume is still that of the investigation of origins, as is the general rule in all Platonic studies of the last few decades. But,

¹ I may be permitted a personal allusion. Prompted by Croce's essay, I have attempted a reduction to a smaller scale of the *Critique of Judgment*, freeing it from its connection with the other Kantian Critiques and considering it instead in the light of the evolution of aesthetic thought in the eighteenth century (KANT, *Principii di estetica*—Estratti della Critica del Giudizio tradotti e commentati da Guido de Ruggiero, Bari, Laterza, 1935, 8vo. Pp. 117).

² Vide the Philosophical Survey in *Philosophy*, October 1934.

³ L. STEFANINI, *Platone*, vol. II, Cedam, Padova, 1935 (8vo. Pp. 538).

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together with the accurate exposition of single dialogues in their chronological order, one must take into account in this work the author's constant care to establish comparisons and relationships between the various dialogues, so as to display fully the great problems, which are scarcely ever exhausted in the course of a single dialogue. Further there is conveniently prefixed to the analysis of each dialogue a judicious bibliographical note which explains the present state of the particular questions therein treated, and illuminates and directs the whole study of the text. Finally at the end of the volume there are gathered together some bird's-eye views of vast groupings of problems—logical, metaphysical, ethical, political, etc., in which the same material that has already been analysed in its historical origins is redistributed and re-examined in its great systematic connections. A detailed account of the questions and the particular solutions proposed by the author would be impossible in the present survey; it would mean bringing once more into the arena the most hotly debated interpretations of Platonic criticism, both ancient and modern. Let it suffice to point out that Stefanini brings to bear everywhere his own original contribution, a balanced judgment, and a clear synthetic vision.

In the matter of the history of Greek philosophy another work worthy of much consideration is that of Mondolfo on the Infinite in Greek thought.¹ For some years past Mondolfo has undertaken the translation and bringing up to date of Zeller's classic *Philosophie der Griechen*, a large-scale work that exceeds in wealth of information and completeness Nestle's analogous undertaking. It may be said that the above-mentioned work on the Infinite was suggested by the study of the great tendencies in historical writing that have succeeded Zeller, which in contrast to his classicism have given prominence to numerous irrationalistic and romantic elements in Greek thought, thus opportunely completing the too one-sided and defective view of the spirit of antiquity that had been formed by the historians of the nineteenth century. The problem of the Infinite is precisely one of the problems about which the two opposing views are polarized. According to the classical party, Greek thought has expunged the idea of the infinite from its conception of the world, and is content solely with a harmonic vision of the finite and limited. According to those who favour the romantic interpretation, there is no need to go as far as Neo-Platonism, that is the age of the dissolution of the purely Hellenic spirit, to find a positive appreciation of the infinite; on the contrary, it is present at all stages of Greek thought, and especially at the beginnings, that is in the historical strata nearest to the religious and romantic fountain-heads of the Greek spirit. Proceeding from this antithesis and from the recognition of the validity of the romantic thesis, Mondolfo has completed a patient and sagacious exploration of the whole material of Greek philosophy that has come down to us, in order to trace an erudite and suggestive history of the idea of the infinite from the pre-Socratic to the Neo-Platonic thinkers. The character itself of his treatment causes him to place in the foreground the idea of the infinite in all the phases of Greek thought; at the same time he does not ignore the fact that in the general economy of that history the idea of the infinite has not always had the same importance or the same prominence, but has often been eclipsed by the opposite idea of the finite. But—and this is the most positive result of his investigation—the eclipse has not been total, and the re-emergence from time to time of that idea into full daylight at least allows the more obscure and attenuated parts of its path to be glimpsed.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by CONSTANCE M. ALLEN.)

¹ R. MONDOLFO, *L'infinito nel pensiero dei Greci*, Le Monnier, Firenze, 1934 (Svo. Pp. 439).

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Art and Industry. By HERBERT READ. (Faber & Faber. 1934. Pp. 143. Price 12s. 6d.)

From the standpoint of aesthetics, the most recent essay of Mr. Read, once one has seen through a title that does less than justice to its ambitious scope, leaves his previous publications—the *Art Now*, the *Meaning of Art*—miles behind; it is, in fact, by far his most important contribution to the subject. The author divides this slender work into four Parts, of which the last is in reality an amplification of some remarks on the importance of aesthetic education for the young let fall during the course of Part I. His starting-point is no less a problem than that presented by the existence of art as a tangible, audible, or visible product of human inventiveness. Following a certain school of art, scientists and historians—notably Worringer, of whose *Form in Gothic* he has given us an admirable translation—he distinguishes two entirely separate and individual types, “humanistic” and “abstract” art; the former flourished, for instance, both in the ancient Greco-Roman civilization and in Western Europe since the revival of this culture at the Renaissance, and aims at communicating emotions or ideas by a representation of real people or things; the latter flourished during the Middle Ages and its purpose is to please in immediate perception by means of harmony, symmetry, or proportion among shapes, figures, and lines. Those arts which include objects of daily use naturally belong to the “abstract” or “formal” category. This rigid dichotomy is not one that can be justified, in our opinion, by the common facts of art history or of personal artistic experience; for any work of art worthy of the name, to whatever period it may belong, whether it was designed to serve a practical purpose or no purpose at all, exhibits both form and content, both pattern and expression, in a unity that can only be severed by analytic thought. It lands Mr. Read, whose taste in this instance is surer than his theorizing, in a palpable contradiction; having told us in Part I that useful art appeals exclusively to the formal sense, he then admits in Part II that patterns often possess “vitality,” and that this “vitality” can be either “dynamic” or “organic” in quality. The principal defect in this essay derives from the same source; for it is responsible for a marked tendency to neglect the movement and striving suggested by lines in favour of their geometrical relations.

Two practical consequences of the utmost importance are drawn in Part I from the agreed aesthetic character which industrial products should possess; that the young must be taught to enjoy and desire harmonious proportions in the ordinary objects visible at home or in the school, “that we have to create a new consciousness of aesthetic form,” and that the abstract artist must be given a place in all industries, where his verdict on design should be unchallenged by business philistines. These, indeed, are the conditions without which industrial art will never recover the ground it lost when machinery suddenly interrupted the admirable handicraft traditions of the pre-industrial era.

Part II contains the marrow of the book; it is a brilliant and remarkably successful attempt to systematize the minor arts, so far as I am aware the best we have in English. Adopting the famous principle of Semper, he classifies

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them according to the raw materials they employ; these may be either "organic" or "inorganic," according as they are derived from living or inanimate sources, or a compound if made from both together. This gives us, in one group, pottery, glass, and metallurgy; in another woodwork and textiles; and in another still those works of constructional art which combine wood and steel, or wood and stone. Having explained in this manner how it is that useful art is not a unity but a manifold, he goes on, like von Falke, to trace the separate effects of material, of technical processes, and of functional purpose, on the ultimate form its objects assume. This section is worked out in a masterly fashion, thanks to the writer's rare understanding of the technical side of industrial art.

Part III deals, very briefly, with colour, ornament, and decorative design in the sphere of practical art. He lays down in this chapter the golden rule that governs decoration, according to which it should never spoil the organic unity of the object by superfluous or redundant additions; "ornament should emphasize form." He then proceeds to distinguish between "structural" and "applied" ornament, the former being an accidental by-product of a raw material—such as the grain in wood—or of the technical processes employed in its transformation into a finished product, the latter a deliberate artistic embellishment of the object by means of naturalistic, stylized, or geometrical forms. Geometrical patterns or stylized figures are best adapted to the machine-made products of the modern era.

It is a little surprising that, though Mr. Read mentions with approbation certain German experiments in wedding the useful to the beautiful, he makes no reference at all to the remarkable progress Sweden has made in this direction since the beginning of the present century; here is another source from which British industrialists might receive valuable hints. One has bitter regrets, again and again, when a fruitful idea is suddenly dropped instead of being developed, when an historical introduction is sketched in a bare outline lacking both detail and chiaroscuro. But how could omniscience itself do full justice to so many important topics within the narrow limit of 143 pages, most of which are occupied by a collection of skilfully chosen illustrations? Let us be thankful for a brilliant and original contribution to the theory of the minor arts, and for a plea for artistic design in the workshop, for artistic sensibility in the home, that is none the less eloquent because it is sober, learned, and well-reasoned.

LISTOWEL.

George Holmes Howison, *Philosopher and Teacher*. A selection from his writings with a biographical sketch. By JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM and GEORGE MALCOLM STRATTON. (Berkeley: University of California Press. London: Cambridge University Press, 1934. Pp. xiii + 418. Price 11s. 6d.)

This handsome volume is a monument to the distinguished founder of the flourishing school of philosophy at Berkeley, California. Howison (a contemporary, in the broad, of James, Royce, and Palmer) brought to the Mills Chair the temper of a true *Metaphysiker* and the flair of a great teacher. His work has gone on. How deeply and widely philosophic influences have been active in North American culture is not yet, I fancy, fully appreciated on this side of the ocean.

The selections include parts of his chief work, *The Limits of Evolution and Other Essays*, and a number of other papers on such themes as Pantheism, Determinism, and Freedom, and the like. His view is self-designated "Per-

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sonal Idealism," and has much in common with that of a British group. His closest historical affiliation is with Leibniz, while his method of attaining this position owes much to the extreme subjective arguments of Kant. He parts from the former, however, in rejecting the "caste-system" of the *Monadology*, in positing a social reference "within the self-defining thought of the individual mind," and in giving "to natural objects, as items in the real experience of minds, a reality, secondary and derivative, indeed, but still unquestionable, and associated *essentially* with the self-defining activity of every mind . . ." (p. 137). This sounds well as a programme, but how this intrinsic sociality and "unquestionable" nature can be effected in the republic of "self-originate" minds is not at all clear. On the side of consistency a more thorough-paced pluralist—such as McTaggart—seems the sounder; while the deviations of Howison appear to point to some other principle or being than that attaching to our own limited minds. In seeking to establish the eternity and integrity of our minds and selves Howison overlooks or minimizes the quite obvious limitations of these minds and selves. Contemporary readers may wonder whether we can put a finger on anything in our experience corresponding to "the self-defining activity of every mind," which is something Howison confidently assumes. Most of us feel that our minds are anything but "self-defined."

But these selections concern much beside personal idealism. An essay, e.g. on *The Duty of the University to the State*, is admirable.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Essentials in the Development of Religion: A Philosophic and Psychological Study. By J. E. TURNER, M.A., Ph.D. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1934. Pp. 308. Price 12s. 6d.)

In this work Dr. Turner discusses the central topics of the philosophy of religion in the context of their historical development, and brings out the logical stages in this development, as one after another the different notions, either presupposed by or embodied in the religious life, are made explicit in the organized life and thought of human society. This involves a good deal of psychological investigation, as well as philosophical argument, and the book is made the richer by the mixture: Dr. Turner is right in refusing to be deterred by labels from utilizing material which can be of value to his exposition. The book ranges over a wide field in a systematic manner, and shows evidence of very considerable learning, but it is not for these reasons at all heavy or hard to read: on the contrary, it is written with life and enthusiasm and is all the fresher for the writer's breadth of knowledge. The opening chapters deal first with methodological considerations and then with the general nature and place in experience of the subject-matter of the philosophy of religion. The next section is concerned with some general characteristics of experience, metaphysical and epistemological in kind; it is followed by a series of chapters on the development of morality leading to a discussion of the moral self and a statement of the relation between good and evil. The last section deals in the light of the results achieved in the foregoing chapters with topics such as Immortality, the Supremacy of Religion, Knowledge and Faith, Authority, and Divine Personality. The conclusion of the whole matter is that man lives in a friendly universe; "it is then no merely empty metaphor to say that the Universe is friendly to every form of perfection, no matter how trivial at first sight this may seem to be, and equally to every process that makes perfection possible and brings it into being: the exhaustless beauties

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of inorganic nature and of the realm of life: unknown heroisms and silent self-sacrifice: every desire and effort for whatever is good and beautiful and true: all these are eternally sustained by the dynamic force of Reality, and all that opposes them is in the end destroyed."

O. S. FRANKS.

Waking World. By OLAF STAPLEDON. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1934. Pp. viii + 280. Price 7s. 6d.)

This book, as its title suggests, is rather a prayer of aspiration than a work of philosophy; but, since its author believes—with reason—that world awakening waits for a sufficient *Weltanschauung*, it involves a philosophy. It ranges from communism and fascism *via* an outline of "modern knowledge," a survey of art, science, philosophy and religion, to pacifism, democracy, free-speech, and the World-State. The human and social aspiration claims much sympathy; while for the details of the social plan there is a good deal to be said. The survey of art, science, and philosophy is, in the main, admirably done. The critique of religion (and of Christianity in particular) is obviously that of an amateur. Its two chief *bêtes-noires*, 'soul-saving' and the 'loving God,' have no place in first-rate theology and religious practice in the forms in which Mr. Stapledon envisages them; and with the second-rate we need not treat, since the ideals both of churches and of Mr. Stapledon suffer from the mediocrity and obtuseness of men. The concept of 'salvation,' indeed, holds in Christian theology much the same place that 'fully awakened living' does in Mr. Stapledon's, though, of course, the two theologies differ in what they take to be the 'chief end of man'; and the Christian doctrine of the Love of God does not abate a jot of the Hebrew sense of His awfulness. That in practice much weak sentimentalism creeps in there is no need to deny.

The author's criticism of 'sham' religion is central to his theme, since he has the 'real thing' to recommend, which, he hopes, is to prove the dynamic of a 'waking world.' This religion is reminiscent of "The Free Man's Worship," but whereas Russell preaches defiance of Fate, Mr. Stapledon preaches admiration of its tragic theme. That an "overwhelming apprehension of *something* both superhuman and beautiful" (p. 204) lies at or near the root of religion would, I think, be granted (with qualification) by most theologians. The difference between these and the author lies in this, that the former accept developments from this primordial 'something' along the lines of rational and moral anthropomorphism, while the latter, denouncing anthropomorphism in general, develops a no less anthropomorphic aestheticism in religion, one of the chief advantages of which is its immunity from reason.

More than a touch of Spinozism (or Bradleyism) marks Mr. Stapledon's world-view. "The perfectly awakened mind," he observes, "at last sees clearly that, though the defects and agony of the myriad beings of the cosmos are undeniable facts, they are also needed factors in the excellence of the cosmos" (p. 237). But one may doubt whether either Spinoza or Bradley would altogether approve of this book as a whole. Indeed, with all syncretists, Mr. Stapledon (who, in effect, accepts the designation) wants the best of *all* possible worlds, including that of M. Bergson, as well as that of Spinoza. He wants, e.g., 'creative leaps' which are also 'determined.'

The book concludes on a lower plane, urging, as means subordinate to ecstatic fatalism in the pursuit of the 'world-aim,' free-speech, pacifism, and bigger and better schools. The continuity between elements so diverse must, of necessity, be somewhat tenuous; hence it may not be unfair to say of the book as a unit that, while by no means 'void,' it is certainly 'without form.'

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

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La metafisica del bello e dei costumi di Arturo Schopenhauer. By A. CAVOTTI. (Naples: Rondinella. 1934. Pp. xiv + 206. Price 15 lire.)

A comprehensive survey of the aesthetic and ethical theories of Schopenhauer. Being divided into thirty-one chapters, each of these is perforce brief. The beauty and intimacy of the style combined with this brevity leave the savour rather of an essay than of a chapter. The nature of the aesthetic object and the specific condition of artistic creation and of aesthetic appreciation are first considered, and then the fine arts are treated severally. A chapter on Schopenhauer's metaphysics of love effects a transition to the exposition of the ethics, which is extended to include some account of his views on law and the State. The treatment is throughout positive, in accordance with the author's declaration that "the task of the historian is simply to understand and expound." Judged within these perfectly legitimate limits, the book can be recommended as at once a very able and an extremely charming, even seductive, introduction to Schopenhauer's thought—an introduction because the field is cultivated extensively rather than intensively. The entire absence of evaluation, however, though involved in the positive method, seems to me to lessen the paedagogical value of the work: the abnegation of internal along with external criticism will not only leave unsatisfied the critical reader who at many points will want an obscurity clarified or an apparent inconsistency explained (obscurities and inconsistencies on the part of Schopenhauer, not of his expositor), but will also leave unimproved the reader who does not notice these flaws. But the book is highly informative, admirably planned, very well documented, and a sheer pleasure to read.

T. E. JESSOP.

Friends of God: Practical Mystics of the Fourteenth Century. By ANNA GROH SEESHOLTZ. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. viii + 247. Price 12s. 6d.)

The study of mediaeval German mysticism has been revolutionized during the present century, chiefly by the devoted labours of German scholars; and the importance of the movement known as that of the "Friends of God"—and especially of its founder, the great Meister Eckhart—for the history of religious philosophy has received fresh recognition. But since much of the work which has been done is hard for English readers to come by, a new and comprehensive account of the *Gottesfreunde* by one who had access to all the fresh sources of information was much to be desired. This it is which Miss Seesholtz has now given us. She is well equipped on the intellectual side for her difficult task; having evidently examined with care the vast literature of the subject, and further had the great advantage of working with Professor Rudolf Otto on the writings of Eckhart, whose intrepid genius dominates the mystical thought of the period. Eckhart, condemned by the Roman Church for "wishing to know more than one should," is a strangely modern figure in his passionate devotion to truth: which he declared that he would prefer to God Himself, were he called upon to choose between them, but added "God is Truth." Miss Seesholtz's account of his doctrines, and those of his disciples Tauler and Suso, is excellent. So, too, is her study of the great Flemish mystic, Ruysbroeck; who, though hardly to be reckoned among the "Friends of God," was deeply influenced by Eckhart's religious ideas. The normal outlook and discipline of mediaeval Catholicism, within which all these mystics arose, is evidently less familiar to her: and it is on this side that her book is weakest. Nevertheless, it constitutes on the whole an excellent and

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well-documented account of a very intricate subject. Hardly any relevant facts appear to have been missed, and the result will be of great use to all students of Christian mysticism.

Whether from the point of view of social history, of philosophy, or of psychology, the Friends of God are among the most interesting of Christian mystical groups. In the first place, though so strongly influenced by Dominican teaching, they were, essentially, a lay movement brought into being by the necessities of the time and the corruption of the secular clergy. Some of their most influential personalities, e.g. Rulman Merswin the merchant, were laymen living in the world. Women, too, entered fully into the life of the movement. The "Friends" at the height of their development formed a vast informal association of spiritual realists, dominated on the one hand by the exalted spiritual philosophy of Eckhart and his disciples, on the other by the visionary and "tendacious" writings of Merswin and his associates. We owe to them some of the most interesting vernacular literature of fourteenth-century Germany. Their intellectual level, too, was astonishingly high; as we realize when we remember that the sermons of Tauler and Suso, largely inspired by the lofty speculations of Eckhart, were addressed either to general congregations or communities of nuns, and assumed in the hearers a considerable acquaintance with mystical theology, and the power of dealing with abstract religious ideas of a formidable kind.

Students interested in the peculiar psychological problems which the movement presents will turn at once to Miss Seesholtz's chapter on that mysterious figure, the "Great Friend of God of the Oberland"; whose identity is one of the outstanding puzzles of mystical history. Some have held that this personage was really Nicholas of Basle; others, that he was a mystical "Mrs. Harris." Miss Seesholtz gives good reason for supposing that this opinion is correct; and that his story, like that of "Sister Katrei," is a religious romance forming part of the abundant "tendency literature" produced by the Friends of God. She carries her study forward to a consideration of the influence of the Friends and their writings on subsequent religious movements, such as the New Devotion, and, through Luther, on post-Reformation Germany: and ends by an account of later religious groups who were inspired by similar ideals.

EVELYN UNDERHILL.

Practical Ethics. By the RT. HON. SIR HERBERT SAMUEL. (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd. 1935. Pp. 256. Price 2s. 6d.)

The editors of the Home University Library had the happy thought of supplementing Professor Moore's well-known discussion of *Ethics*, which came out nearly twenty-five years ago, with another volume on the same subject, directed primarily to the problems of the moral life and called *Practical Ethics*; and they had another happy thought when they secured the President of the British Institute of Philosophy, Sir Herbert Samuel, to contribute the volume. His wide interest in philosophical ideas and his comprehensive experience of practical life in many fields marked him out as the ideal person to supply the kind of middle principle required for a survey of the ethical problem in its bearing on the life of the present day. Such a book will, of course, necessarily be written primarily for non-philosophers, though that does not mean that it will not be of interest to philosophers also. It should discuss, on a philosophical background, vexed questions of conduct, in regard to which contemporary society is puzzled, doubting what is right and what is wrong, and should presumably at the same time suggest that the

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answer to the philosophical problem has some relevance to these practical problems. Sir Herbert Samuel could be trusted to keep both points in mind.

The book falls into three parts. The first three chapters provide the theoretical foundation, discussing the question what right action is. The utilitarian test of consequences is defended and the laudability of a proper self-interest maintained. After a brief discussion of free will, in which Sir Herbert Samuel takes up a determinist position, there follow four chapters in which a rather more practical treatment of the motives to right action occupies the field. Education, religion, rewards and punishments are the main social factors discussed here. In the third section the author reaches the open questions of the day. He opens with a general discussion of moral and social progress, to which he also returns at the end. Within this frame the main topics considered are three: the status of the family, the claims of the nation-state, and the rights of animals. It would not be profitable to attempt a survey of the considerations advanced under these heads. Sir Herbert Samuel is no seeker after paradox or novelty. He shows himself essentially a paractical man, sensitive, tolerant, and open-minded, wise and prudent in advice. But considering the book as a whole, I must confess to a feeling that it would have been more effective if it had been written the other way round; if the practical problems had been put first instead of last. Coming first, the treatment of the theoretical issues seems, to a philosopher at least, brief almost to the point of discourtesy—a point which is surely reached when the author excuses himself from considering the controversy as to the relations of 'right' and 'good' on the ground that it is "too technical and too linguistic in character to be entered upon here." If the theoretical issues had been stated last, the author would have needed no excuse for confining himself to those aspects of them which had special relevance to the problems raised; and the discussion, for instance, of motives would have had more actuality because of its obvious importance to such problems as those of the family and the nation. The other criticism which I should be inclined to offer is that if it were possible a more systematic survey of the practical field would be a gain. As it is, the impression is unavoidable that the selection of topics for discussion is quite arbitrary. Two problems which have been much discussed in recent times find, I think, no mention in these pages. One is the ethics of gambling; another is the class-ethics of Marxism. A systematic survey of the field could hardly have missed these. But I admit that I cannot provide the principles for such a survey, and that in such a book, confined within so narrow limits, it must always be easy to allege errors of omission. Every reader will ask for more, but they will all be ready, I think, at the same time to thank Sir Herbert Samuel for a workmanlike performance of a difficult task.

J. L. STOCKS.

The Philosophy of Communism. By JOHN MACMURRAY. (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd. 1933. Pp. 96. Price 3s. 6d.)

When is a contradiction not a contradiction? The answer is: When it is either organic or super-organic. Thus we should expect the English and the Romans (p. 52) to have been exceptionally bellicose because they were exceptionally peace-loving. But if they believed they loved peace and yet went to war we should call them hypocrites and discover a contradiction.

When is a contradiction a contradiction? The answer is: When it is mechanical. When is it mechanical? The answer is: When it relies on too narrow a historical induction. Thus anyone who says the English are constitutional

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in their ideas is mechanical because he thinks only of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. When he remembers that the English had a brisk little revolution of their own in the seventeenth century, he ceases to be mechanical.

Why will communism come? The answer is: (a) Because it may not (p. 69), (b) because communism *means* a classless society, (c) because the bourgeoisie cannot "plan" (p. 77), (d) because classes are masses and masses are infra-organic, (e) because "power" is malign, being always competitive.

Why is theory subordinate to practice? The answer is: "Because practice is realistic and theory is idealistic"; but it is "a completely unscientific and unphilosophical method" (p. 59) to find grounds in theory for rejecting what we have a practical interest in rejecting.

If I were a praying man, I would pray to be delivered from the philosophy of communism, but I would not pray to be delivered either from communism itself or from Mr. Macmurray's books about it. His ideas are penetrating, electrifying, and even shrewd—despite his philosophy. In my judgment he is the most stimulating of all contemporary British sociological authors.

JOHN LAIRD.

New Pathways in Science. By Sir ARTHUR EDDINGTON, D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S. Messenger Lectures, 1934. (London and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1935. Pp. x, 333. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

The topics dealt with in this book are mainly scientific. Professor Eddington has endeavoured to give a picture of the developments in physics in the last few years, and to bring out some of the general problems of method and of principle to which those developments have given rise. Thus Chapters VII to XI deal successively with The Constitution of the Stars, Subatomic Energy, Cosmic Clouds and Nebulae, the Expanding Universe, and the Constants of Nature. Of the other chapters, Chapter IV on the Decline of Determinism and Chapter VI on Probability may be instanced as showing the scope of the book. In Chapter XII Professor Eddington tries (by way of experiment) to give a popular illustration of the fundamental principles underlying the theory of groups.

Only the first chapter, and the last two chapters, have definite reference to philosophical problems, and I shall confine myself to a few remarks on them.

Professor Eddington's account of the nature of science seems to be conditioned by the following principles:

I. (i) All knowledge is a matter either of immediate awareness or of inference. (ii) The only things of which I am immediately aware are my own sensations, thoughts, emotions. (iii) Among the things of which I am immediately aware are (a) that I am responsible, truth-seeking, reasoning, striving; (b) that there are certain time sequences in my experiences (e.g. I-perceive-a-taste-which-I-perceived-yesterday). (a) Is the basis of the problems which arise later in regard to freedom. (b) Is the basic experience from which the scientist starts.

II. But before anything in the nature of science can arise, we have to take a step beyond our own immediate experiences. This step involves our "committing ourselves" to "the recognition of other minds than our own." As a physicist Sir Arthur is not concerned with the problems arising from this commitment, nor with the question whether this commitment would be possible at all, for a being whose sole immediate experiences were those (as he sometimes puts it) of the "contents of his own consciousness." For Sir Arthur this "commitment" is a kind of inference, however it is made.

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III. Once we have so committed ourselves, a further step becomes possible. We can recognize that some of the contents of our own consciousness communicate to us part of the experience (or content?) of other consciousnesses. Or perhaps it might be less obscure to say: we can recognize that regularities occur in the sensory experience of other consciousnesses. It is this fact that sets the problem for the scientist.

The problem of the scientist is to link these regularities (occurring within, and so limited to various consciousnesses) with a scheme of regularities occurring outside all consciousness, and so not limited to any. The two characteristics the scientist is insisting on are externality and regularity; and it is clear that these characteristics belong to the world of which the scientist is in search, by definition: he is seeking a world with just these characteristics.

IV. The process of making remote inferences from the experiences of many consciousnesses puts us in a position to give a further description of the task of science.

For by a complicated set of inferences it is concluded that the bodies of consciousnesses (I use this phrase because the relation indicated by "of" is about the vaguest and most ambiguous it is possible to use) have nervous systems, and that these nervous systems are the only channel of communication between a consciousness and the external world; so that the ultimate data of science are the nervous impulses received by consciousness in its inner sanctum. Out of these impulses so received consciousness makes a fairy story about a world of things, with colours, sounds, tastes, smells, etc.; but the scientist has learned to distrust this story: he turns back to the regularities of nervous impulse, dissociating them from the familiar story: and these regularities are the material of a cryptogram he as scientist takes upon himself to solve.

V. Ultimately, then, it is the business of physical science to get a complicated system of regularities, external to all consciousness, which will produce through particular parts of it (designated nervous systems in the familiar story) all the regularities that are discerned inside all those individual consciousnesses whose communications to each other come within the ambit of the scientist. The chapter on the Theory of Groups is an attempt to explain what kind of scheme the scientist is out for.

Something like this, I gather, Sir Arthur regards as practically common ground among scientists; and he cannot see why philosophers should find any fault with it. He would admit it to be tentative and largely a matter of hypothesis; and he would not object to its being found full of gaps and even inconsistent in places: for these characteristics belong to a growing and developing subject. And he wonders whether philosophers think they can get anything complete, systematic, fully self-consistent, at the present stage: and he thinks that many philosophers at present—particularly some of those in the realist camp—in their desire to get self-consistency and finality prematurely, are adopting views that are scientifically untenable.

It looks from all this, I think, as if Professor Eddington's attitude to many philosophical discussions is similar to that of those mathematicians who consider that Zeno's paradox about Achilles and the tortoise is sufficiently settled by calculating the exact point at which Achilles will overtake the tortoise; or to that of the average experimental psychologist toward most philosophical discussions of psychological conceptions. Why waste time in trying to get a perfectly consistent scheme under our present conditions of ignorance? Any scheme we get is provisional, and it is more important to get it in a shape that allows us to make new linkages between old observations

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and new predictions about new observations, than to get it in a shape that is self-consistent. At any rate, if Professor Eddington does not take this attitude to all philosophical discussion, he seems to think that an excessive regard for completeness of scheme at a premature stage of an investigation is liable to lead many philosophers astray. And he does think that if the scientist can work better with a set of ideas that have been exploded by philosophers hundreds of years ago, than with ideas that philosophers object to less, it would be absurd for the scientist to try to use the newer ones. He also thinks that when the scientist, after getting into a mess with the philosophically old-fashioned ideas, discovers that he really can use newer ones with practical success, this is a fact to which the philosopher ought to pay special attention; for he thinks that a philosophical conception found useful in science has more importance than a philosophical conception not yet (or no longer) found useful.

This attitude will be found exhibited in his treatment of determinism, which is dealt with in Chapters IV and XIII. In this treatment there are two main points stressed: first, that science in its present state does not appeal to universal causation, and that this is an important fact; second, that our own immediate experience is of ourselves as responsible for our own nature, at any rate to some extent, and so as not determined by a chain of rigid causes. Since determinism is no longer needed in science, we are free to follow the lead of our immediate experience of ourselves. Indeed, if our immediate experience of ourselves deludes us, it is difficult to see how we can get any trustworthy start in knowledge. On pages 88-89 there is an interesting attempt to suggest a way in which we can think of the activity of a freely operating being without violating the laws of physics.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Social Judgment. By GRAHAM WALLAS. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1934. Pp. 175. Price 5s. net.)

We live in an age when the creative imagination of man is urgently required to exercise social judgments in order to make new patterns of living, especially in the realms of politics and economics. What parts do reason and emotion respectively play in this art of social judgment? This is the question that Graham Wallas set himself to answer in this book, which unhappily he did not live to finish. The half we have here, however, is of real importance as setting forth the nature of the instrument of social judgment and the co-operation between reason and emotion which it requires.

By social judgment Wallas does not imply an operation of the social mind regarded as an organic consciousness. It is the personal mind operating in the field of social conduct that concerns him. Nearly all his later life and writing had been devoted to this difficult and delicate psychological task of tracing the nature of this co-operation between reason and emotion.

The process of reasoning, so far as it is pure, admits no play of emotion and concerns itself not at all with human values, except so far as some desire for truth must enter as a stimulus to the labour of thinking. The notion that man, being a rational animal, could plan his best lines of progress by calculation of utility, which underlay the rationalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was erroneous. For, in the first place, the utility, or happiness, or welfare desiderated was conceived as detached from the reasoning process and no criterion was provided for it. And, secondly, the idea that even in the physical, and much less in the social sciences, emotional

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processes of valuation could and ought to be excluded, showed a psychological simplicity that belonged to an age when subconscious processes were hardly at all envisaged.

Graham Wallas's great contribution to thought has lain in his skilled analysis of the part played by the feelings and emotions in directing social thought and conduct by the secret or semi-conscious imposition of the things called 'values' with which science proper does not concern itself, but either ignores or takes for granted. In chapters keenly descriptive of the materialism and determinism of last century, Wallas shows the waste of thought and conduct involved in a refusal to take proper account of the parts played by imagination and emotion in the processes of directing social conduct. Still more striking is his chapter on 'Economic Laws,' with its account of the sharpening of the opposition between what he terms the 'realists' and the analytic treatment of Economics, the professional teachers becoming more and more devoted to quantitative accuracy and disclaiming all 'normative' considerations, while the realists concern themselves with the administrative problems in which the live human factors, the practical operation of business in processes of production and consumption, are involved.

The growing divergency between the specialized sciences and the related arts of conduct he finds to be inimical to social progress, in that the scientist eschews all obligations to relate his reasoning to human purposes, or to adjust that reasoning to the non-rational forces which operate in social judgment. Both abstract reasoning and the methods of 'laboratory science,' by excluding 'emotion' and 'value,' "tend to produce a distorted picture of the human personality" (p. 145).

In a concluding chapter he discusses the separation between reason and values among religious leaders, supported to some extent by the new school of scientific philosophers and by statesmen. "We are not," says Mr. Baldwin, "a logical nation, and the Church of England could not exist in any other country than our own—it is a Church essentially of comprehension and a Church of compromise, and in it the devotional instinct and rational instinct may each, by its peculiar quality, live and grow together, side by side" (p. 156). In statecraft, as in religion, Wallas demands not toleration but active co-operation, and gives an illustration which is peculiarly timely. "Wise statesmanship in the British Indian situation will depend upon the degree of clearness with which British statesmen realize, both intellectually and emotionally, the probable consequences of their action" (p. 157). It is a thousand pities that Graham Wallas, one of the wisest men of our age, did not live to bring this important work to its conclusion.

J. A. HOBSON.

Elements of Modern Logic. By S. H. MELLONE, M.A., D.Sc. (London: University Tutorial Press Ltd. 1934. Pp. xi + 333. Price 5s.)

Dr. Mellone's *Introductory Textbook of Logic* is familiar in one or other of its many editions to most students of Logic, and it is a matter of some interest that he has written a new textbook instead of revising the older one yet once more.

Apart from the general desire to freshen the whole treatment by rearrangement and abbreviation, two reasons for writing a new book seem to have operated on the author's mind. One was the wish to incorporate some of the results of modern works such as Johnson's or Miss Stebbing's; and with this

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in view Dr. Mellone has put the alternative proposition alongside of the old disjunctive and made a brief statement about relational propositions. But the new material is quite slight in its extent, and it makes no change in the author's point of view.

The other reason for making a new book was that Dr. Mellone had come, quite rightly, to think that his former book, like most textbooks for beginners, made the treatment of the theory of induction and the exposition of the inductive methods unnecessarily difficult by mixing it up with criticism of Mill's empiricism. If any depth is lost by the avoidance of a preoccupation with Mill's views and errors, there is a corresponding gain in simplicity and clarity which will be welcomed by students. For it is a mistake to attempt more in a beginners' book than merely to suggest the deeper logical problems: if they ever come to study the more advanced problems, they ought to have passed beyond a beginners' textbook.

Dr. Mellone is a good expositor, and his new book will be found quite useful by teachers who maintain that a study of formal logic and of elementary induction still have an educational value. But he might have made up his mind more firmly about what was necessary for the presentation of the subject. If the distinction between absolute and relative names is "of no logical importance" (p. 29), surely it ought not to have been mentioned at all: and the same may be said of a similar remark on page 210. It was the less necessary to cumber the text with obsolete or unnecessary matter, presumably on the poor ground that some examiners might require it, inasmuch as Dr. Mellone appends an admirable glossary in which technical terms are briefly and clearly explained.

Misprints have not been eliminated from the review copy. There is a bad one on page 104, where *from* has crept into the text, and there are others on page 190 (*have employed* for *have been employed*), page 193 (*pully* for *pulley*—but this may be Dewey's American spelling), and page 195 (*affirmative* for *affirmation*).

GEORGE BROWN.

A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. By PROFESSOR A. WOLF, with the co-operation of DR. F. DANNEMANN and MR. A. ARMITAGE. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.)

This is the first volume to appear of a more extensive work. Professor Wolf plans to deal next with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and then with ancient and medieval times.

The chapters on pure science and technology give a good account of each subject taken alone, though occasionally the cross connections of some of the allied subjects, and the relations between the work of different men, might have been treated more fully and more clearly. Still, these chapters on the whole are distinctly successful.

The treatment of philosophy is on a smaller scale. In the first chapter, the beginnings of modern science from medieval thought are traced, and at the end of the book one chapter deals with the Psychology and a final one with the Philosophy of the two centuries under consideration. This is a small proportion of the total of twenty-six chapters.

Professor Wolf and his colleagues on the whole give a satisfactory if slight sketch of the philosophic background from which modern science first emerged, but they write as though Scholasticism, with the incorporation of

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Aristotelian science, was the sole philosophy of the Middle Ages, instead of a somewhat late development. They rightly stress the influence of Pythagorean Platonism on Copernicus and Kepler, but miss its survival through the Middle Ages, first as the dominant philosophy, and then as the underlying alternative to thirteenth-century Aristotelian Scholasticism.

Scholasticism, as formulated by Thomas Aquinas, was a logical deduction from the Christian faith as interpreted by the Roman Church and the philosophy and science of Aristotle. Given these two authorities, Scholasticism was a complete, rational, and self-contained body of doctrine, which, to the late medieval mind, seemed to follow, logically and inevitably. That is what Whitehead meant when he described modern science, which is primarily inductive and only secondarily deductive, as a recoil from the inflexible rationality of medieval thought. Professor Wolf seems to miss the point when he criticizes this statement, saying that "due regard for stubborn facts of observation is an essential part of any thoroughgoing rationality." Nevertheless, it is of course true that a jungle of mysticism, and in the late Middle Ages a growing belief in witchcraft and sorcery, made a difficult soil for science to grow in. Professor Wolf does well to stress the help given by the common-sense element introduced by the technical arts, which "learned their lessons from a direct study of the facts" and, especially "after the invention of printing, played a part in the objective attitude of modern science."

The Copernican revolution, at first a mere mathematical simplification, when established as a physical reality by the telescopes of Galileo, did much to dissipate the homocentric philosophy of Aristotle and the Christian Schoolmen. But Galileo's work on the foundations of dynamics and his return to the atomic views of Democritus, which made matter and motion the realities instead of Aristotle's qualities and categories, did even more. Galileo's dynamics were carried further by Huygens and Newton, though the fundamental principle of all three was the same looked at from different aspects. The full philosophic effect of Newton's great synthesis did not appear till the days of the French Encyclopaedists of the eighteenth century, when, indeed, its importance was exaggerated. Thus it is not treated in the present volume.

Galileo recognized that secondary qualities—colour, taste, smell, etc.—were psychological phenomena in the observer, and not essential parts of the body observed. In chapter xxiv, on Psychology, these ideas are traced through the similar views of Hobbes, and an account is given of the psychology involved in the dualism of Descartes, and in Spinoza's theory that "physical and mental processes are concurrent manifestations of one and the same living organism," as well as his conception of free will, according to which its opposite is not necessity or determinism, but external compulsion. Thus Spinoza returns in effect to Bacon's dictum that we conquer Nature by obeying her. Next, an account is given of Locke's sensible empiricism, which regards the mind as a sheet of white paper, written on by experience, and of Leibniz's "monads," the highest of which are self-conscious minds.

In tracing in chapter xxvi the gradual separation first of philosophy and science from theology, and then from each other, Professor Wolf works by describing "the leading ideas of the chief modern philosophers up to the end of the seventeenth century, with some digressions on the philosophical views or pre-suppositions of those pioneers of modern science, who were not primarily philosophers." Thus we get short accounts of Bruno, Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, More, Barrow, Boyle, and Newton.

In his astronomy, Bruno cast off the last traces of pre-Copernican views

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in teaching that the stars were not fixed to a crystal sphere, but were suns scattered through infinite space, but it was his pantheistic philosophy that chiefly brought him into conflict with the Inquisition. There is no denying that Bruno was burned and Galileo somewhat inconvenienced by that meddling body, but, like many historians of science, Professor Wolf overestimates the obstacles thus created. To take one instance: he implies that Leonardo da Vinci refrained from publishing his discoveries and speculations for fear of unpleasant consequences. But Leonard lived in the short interval when the Papal authorities held liberal views; moreover, he wrote also only rough notes on art, where no question of heresy was involved. I think his failure to record his work was due to the multitudinous number of his researches, and his haste to take up a new and thrilling investigation which left no time to write out the results of the last one.

The work of Bacon is described at length. Bacon's great merit, of course, is his condemnation of the authoritarian logic-chopping Schoolmen, and his insistence on experimental facts, ordered by reason, as the right road to knowledge, and by it to improvement in what we now call the standard of life. But, as Professor Wolf points out, "While Galileo and others were already constructing a new physical science in terms of material atoms or corpuscles, motion, and their mathematical laws, Bacon was still thinking in terms of Aristotelian concepts of matter, form, qualities, and the correlated notions of material, formal, efficient, and final causes," though he strove to decrease their number. Bacon tried to reduce scientific discovery to an almost automatic process, and much underrated the value of originality and scientific insight.

Hobbes carried Galileo's explanation of physical bodies in terms of matter and motion into a mechanistic interpretation of the Universe—of mind as well as matter. Descartes, putting in the forefront the methods of mathematics, somewhat underestimated the importance of empirical induction in sciences not ripe for mathematical treatment. From *cogito, ergo sum*, he passes to the belief that all clear intuitions can be accepted as true. Matter is identical with space, and space is continuous and therefore a plenum; whatever part of space moves together is a separate particle. By such ideas Descartes was led to the theory of vortices. The human body is a machine, and the mind is connected with it only in a part of the brain. Thus Descartes's philosophy is ultimately a dualism.

Spinoza regarded reality as at once Nature and God, and developed a philosophy which was pantheistic, naturalistic, and rationalistic, but his naturalism, unlike that of Hobbes, was not materialistic; to him substance is merely the entire system of attributes, and ultimately identical with God. The final test of truth is the harmony of all that is known, and not the bare empiricism of Bacon.

Locke accepts the reality of material bodies, but admits that nothing is known about their "real essences," only that they are bundles of certain primary qualities. The result of his teaching was to disparage ambitious philosophic systems founded prematurely on physics, to encourage the pursuit of science in a strictly empirical spirit, and to uphold a liberal-minded toleration in advance of his age.

Leibniz opposed mechanistic philosophy, and regarded substance as essentially centres of force or "monads," the higher kinds of which are self-conscious human souls, derived from the "Monad of monads" or God. Thus Leibniz's philosophy is the exact opposition of that of Hobbes—all is spirit instead of matter, though both need God to hold their worlds together.

The mechanistic trend of some philosophies founded on science, like that of Hobbes, was opposed also by More and the other Cambridge Platonists,

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More arguing that the direct awareness of self-activity was enough to prove that there is something incorporeal in nature, and Barrow that it was the divine nature of space and time, as the omnipresence and eternity of God, that accounted for the special lucidity and certainty of mathematics. Thus we are led to Robert Boyle, severely empirical in physics and chemistry, but conscious of the importance of the fact that "there are *de facto* in the world certain sensible and rational beings that we call men"; then to Newton's conception of absolute space and time, and his great physical synthesis, which led to the most notable philosophic system of the eighteenth century, and dominated scientific thought for more than two hundred years.

W. C. D. DAMPIER.

Berkeley and Malebranche. A Study in the Origins of Berkeley's Thought.
By A. A. LUCE, D.D. (London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. xii + 214. Price 10s.)

This book is a notable contribution to the history of Berkeley's philosophy. Dr. Luce gives a charming account of how he came to write it. "Reading where Berkeley read, using sometimes the volumes he used, I studied the authorities he mentions. Malebranche was to me, at the outset, simply one of a large number of such authorities. The extent of Berkeley's debt to the *Recherche de la Vérité* came to me as an unanticipated discovery. The following pages contain my attempt at detailed verification, and show surmise passing into assurance."

Dr. Luce's primary aim is to establish on internal evidence that Berkeley used extensively the *Recherche de la Vérité*, and that Malebranche was to him a master-mind, one of his two primary sources, comparable in importance to Locke, and in some ways of higher importance. This thesis is worked out by Dr. Luce in great detail, and all students of Berkeley will be grateful to him for the new light he throws on the relative importance of the sources of Berkeley's thought. It will be generally agreed by most competent readers of Dr. Luce's book that the extent of Berkeley's indebtedness to Malebranche has been underestimated by previous writers on Berkeley, and it will be necessary for every future historian to take account of the results of Dr. Luce's work. Dr. Luce is too good a scholar to attempt to prove his case by belittling the influence of Locke. He agrees that to neglect the Lockian element in Berkeley would be to fly in the face of the facts; and he sums up the relative influence of the two men in a phrase with which it would be difficult to quarrel: "Locke taught him, but Malebranche inspired him."

The method adopted by Dr. Luce is to examine in detail the influence of Malebranche at each stage of the development of Berkeley's thought. He begins with an analysis of Berkeley's relation, as evidenced in his early mathematical work, and in the *Commonplace Book*, to the "angelic rules" of Malebranche. He then passes in review detailed parallels between the *Theory of Vision* and Malebranche's *Search*. The main body of his work, after these introductory chapters, consists in a careful and detailed examination of the influence of Malebranche on the principal features of Berkeley's thought, his attitude to "matter," his doctrine of "ideas," and his general epistemology. Particularly interesting to the historical student is Dr. Luce's chapter entitled "The Alleged Withdrawal," in which he emphasizes the essential continuity and solidarity of the philosophy of Berkeley, who remained throughout "an unrepentant immaterialist, anti-abstractionist, theist, and Trinitarian."

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In an appendix Dr. Luce gives a valuable new argument for determining the time-order of the entries in the *Commonplace Book*. In the main he agrees with the view, first advocated by Lorenz and myself and now generally accepted, that note-book B is prior to note-book A, and he supports this view by a careful examination of the orthography of the word "idea" in the various entries. He shows, I think conclusively, that in the first third of the *Commonplace Book* Berkeley wrote "idea" invariably, in the central third "idea" and "Idea" indifferently, and in the last third "Idea" consistently. This change in orthography is important not only in its bearing on the historical question of the time-order of the entries, but it is also, as Dr. Luce points out, an outward and visible sign of an abiding change of intellectual orientation. On the basis of this argument from orthography, Dr. Luce suggests certain minor changes in the time-order as given in the numbering of the entries in my edition of the *Commonplace Book*. I agree that these changes should be made. While finality has probably not yet been reached on this vexed question of the time-order, we would now appear to have attained a reasonably close approximation to the *Commonplace Book* as Berkeley wrote it.

G. A. JOHNSTON.

Marxism. By J. MIDDLETON MURRY, JOHN MACMURRAY, N. A. HOLDAWAY, and G. D. H. COLE. (London: Chapman & Hall. 1935. Pp. 245. Price 5s. net.)

This book is an elaboration of four lectures on Marxism given in the spring of last year under the auspices of the *Adelphi*. It consists of an introductory chapter on Marxism in general by Mr. Murry, three chapters on Philosophical Presuppositions by Professor Macmurray, two on the Economic Basis by Mr. Holdaway, and two on Political Issues—one by Mr. Murry and one by Mr. Cole. There is a short bibliography, but no index.

The chapters which will be of most interest to readers of this Journal are naturally Professor Macmurray's. Professor Macmurray admits that there are no satisfactory expositions of Marxian philosophy, and that Marx himself, alone amongst Marxians, had the gifts necessary to producing one; and, as the title of his contribution suggests, he does not pretend to make good this defect but simply to bring out "one or two of the fundamental presuppositions of the philosophical attitude of which dialectical materialism is the current and limited expression, and which lie at the roots of Marxism" (p. 29). According to him Marxism consists not so much in a new set of thoughts, as in a new way of applying thoughts to reality; and he exemplifies this by some remarks on Marx's relation to Hegel, in which he suggests that Marx was concerned to apply the old set of ideas consisting of the dialectic in the new way suggested by the substitution of materialism for idealism. He then endeavours to explain what this new way is by means of a discussion of the so-called "unity of thought and action." Admitting that most knowledge, and in particular scientific knowledge, makes no difference to its object, he points out that this does not hold of one's knowledge of oneself or of the society of which one is a part. The philosopher, in fact, whose knowledge is necessarily of himself and of society, is doubly concerned with action; his intellectual efforts are actions upon himself and his society, and they are also representative of the actions of which society essentially consists. Philosophy, therefore, whatever it ought to be, is necessarily propagandist. And in particular "pure" philosophy is propagandist for the *status quo*; since it is generally indifferent to society, and in any case can only be con-

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cerned with the society of the present, it must imply that there is no need to embark on activities directed to bringing about the society of the future.

In the following chapter Professor Macmurray tries to distinguish dialectical materialism from two theories with which its opponents, and also its own more superficial adherents, tend to confuse it, namely mechanistic materialism and pragmatism. Both theories, according to him, fail to recognize the unity of thought and action. Mechanistic materialism does so by presupposing the distinction between mind and matter; whereas dialectical materialism overcomes this distinction and has already been seen to be materialist in a different sense. And further reasons are offered for calling it by that name. For example, "it is action that counts and all action is necessarily material. We act as bodies upon bodies" (p. 48); and the dialectical materialist is concerned, in a purely scientific way, with the material conditions of the realization of ideals instead of with the contemplation of ideals for their own sakes, which is characteristic of the idealist. Pragmatism, on the other hand, depends directly on the distinction between thought and action, and consists of an arbitrary attempt to bring them together by making the latter a criterion of the former; moreover, it presupposes, for the discovery of what actions are satisfactory, the pure knowledge which it officially denies. It is indeed little more than an explanation of how so-called truths come to be believed. Professor Macmurray's final chapter is of less immediate philosophical interest, consisting mainly of a practical application and illustration of his argument up to this point. He is concerned with how "ideologies" grow, how they affect and are affected by social processes; and he attempts to give in terms of his ideas on these questions an explanation of the class struggle and of the prospects of social revolution.

It is presumably natural for philosophers, even if they have no conscious Socialist sympathies, to be interested in a philosophy which enjoys such uniquely close connections with practical affairs as Marxism does. And it is certainly natural for them, even if they have conscious Socialist sympathies, to be discouraged in their efforts to become acquainted with this philosophy by its terminology and by the methods which are generally used in argument on its behalf. They will, therefore, be grateful to Professor Macmurray for having offered them an exposition of which the language and methods of argument are, as far as possible, of the kind familiar to them. Nor can it be questioned that his discussion, whatever its relation to orthodox Marxism, has succeeded in illuminating some of the dark places of the theory. But it is difficult to resist the impression that it has only been able to do so at the cost of creating new difficulties. What, for example, is meant by saying that a thinker "represents" his society? The natural answer to this question is, of course, that his thought is a social product, determined, in accordance with the materialist conception of history, by the social conditions of his time. But how precisely does this happen? Professor Macmurray admits that the determination is not complete, apparently supposing that our ideas affect ourselves and society through their appeal to the mind, and recognizing that there is what he calls (p. 64) a "prophetic element in ideologies"; even Mr. Holdaway, who appears to be more orthodox, admits that action can be "based on" the "abstractions" of which mind consists (p. 123). But there is nowhere any attempt to discuss the extent of the determination, still less to describe the nature of the ultimate "historic impulse" which, since it seems to exert the same dialectical functions as Hegel's idea, is presumably the key to these mysteries. Then what is truth? Professor Macmurray's explicit argument is that "pure" truth is impossible; and he would doubtless say that truth, no less than thought itself, was determined by social conditions

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and was indeed the special quality of those thoughts which were most effectively representative of society. But he does not seem to recognize that, though dialectical materialism may not presuppose pure truth in the way that he accuses pragmatism of doing, it is equally guilty of claiming purity for the truth that there can be no pure truth; and his whole discussion of pragmatism seems to imply that the dialectical materialist is in pursuit of a purer truth than the pragmatist. Nor is it easy to see why pure truth is necessarily reactionary, even if it is necessarily propagandist. It is surely possible to hold, on grounds of pure truth, that society ought to be changed; and there appears to be a good deal of pure truth in Marxist views about what the society of the future ought to be. No doubt these objections will seem irrelevant and unimportant to those who have fully grasped the fundamental revolution of thought involved in Marxism. But many ordinary philosophers will continue to be troubled by them and will regret that Professor Macmurray does not show how he would meet them. It is probable that they could only be effectively met in a comprehensive and detailed exposition of the Marxian philosophy as a whole. But Professor Macmurray has himself deplored the absence of such an exposition; and he has shown so many of the gifts necessary to explaining these matters to the uninitiated that it is permissible to hope that he will some day produce one.

The other parts of the book are not, of course, without interest, even to philosophers. Those who have been stimulated by Mr. Murry's writings about literature and religion will no doubt also be stimulated by his writing on Marxism, and are not likely to be troubled by his unorthodoxy. In his view the essence of Marxism is to be found in the self-surrender and intellectual humility which are characteristic of all great philosophies and religions, and which in Marxism take the form of recognizing, in a passage which he frequently quotes from the *Theses on Feuerbach*, that "the human essence is not something abstract inhabiting the separate individual: in its concreteness it is the totality of social relations," and of dedicating oneself to the political and social activity demanded by the recognition. But when he comes to discuss what this activity should be, he is hesitating as well as unorthodox, though he has some wise words to say about the necessity for educational equality as a condition of all social progress. Mr. Holdaway writes with ability and subtlety, though not always with lucidity, on the nature and future of capitalism, and is influenced throughout by his view that the mark of scientific knowledge is successful prediction. Perhaps because he is an economist, his Marxism seems to be more orthodox than that of his fellow-contributors; certainly his predictions are not always the same as theirs and often imply a different attitude towards the predictions of Marx. Mr. Cole's chapter is the clearest in the book; he writes objectively and with penetration on the applicability of Marx's analysis of historical development to the present-day political situation, admitting its general validity but at the same time stressing the emergence of new social classes and other factors which Marx could not have foreseen.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. By G. H. MEAD, edited by C. W. MORRIS. (U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1935. Pp. xxxviii + 401. Price 22s. 6d. net.)

This is the first of a projected series of three books, giving to the world a fairly complete presentation of the philosophical ideas of the late Professor

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G. H. Mead of Chicago. The theme of the volume is social psychology in its larger outlines, and the volume itself, according to Mr. Morris, its editor, is the "natural entrance into Mead's intellectual world."

Mr. Morris provides an admirable introductory summary, and in the footnotes gives a sufficient indication of parallels in Mead's various published articles. Certain appendices apart, however, the book has the inevitable disadvantage of being elaborated from lecture notes (very careful and complete) instead of coming direct from Mead's pen; for although the spoken word is often superior to the written, it seldom looks so well in print. On the other hand, very few lectures, delivered as these were without notes, would be so proportionate as well as so satisfying in their phrasing.

Mead's admirers (including his editor) claim that he had a first-rate zetetic mind; that he and Dewey, while complementary in their talents, stood together on the same high intellectual plane; and that both pragmatism and the theory of democracy owe approximately the same debt to these two philosophers, to Mead as the more skilful analyst, and to Dewey as having the greater range of vision. Now that an informal alliance has been struck between the pragmatists and the Wittgensteinians, these high claims will doubtless have an added interest on this side of the Atlantic. True, Mead was sometimes moved to say what he did not mean; for example, that he was not much interested in "the metaphysics of the dog." In reality, however, he was very much interested in that very metaphysic (whether of bees, or of dogs, or of men), and his book is a philosophical (social) psychology of very considerable merit.

Most readers (I opine) will be struck most of all by the thoroughness with which Mead here developed (a) his pragmatism and (b) his social theory, and I shall make a few remarks on these matters, although I should also like to say that many of the incidentals of the book (for example, the fragments on ethics, principally Kantian, at its close) are decidedly worth pondering, and that my selection of topics may very well be much more arbitrary than I think it is.

(a) The pragmatism is behaviouristic but non-Watsonian, and it attempts (with great fidelity to instructive detail) to sketch a theory of mind, of self, and of society. Mind is held to have developed from gesture and from other-observing movements. When gestures become symbolical (as in language), they imply ideal functions, that is to say patterns of response which acquire a certain universality and recognizable stability in others and/or in the agent. Mind exists wherever symbolical action between "biologic individuals" is possible. Self, as distinguished from mind, is regarded as a derivative of self-consciousness.

It is impossible to be just to such a hypothesis in a reasonably short review, but it may be pardonable to observe that Mead appears to me to exaggerate the possibilities of this part of his method. The method allows him to say: "If consciousness, mind, etc., emerged in such and such a context, their utility would be so and so, and developments of a certain type might be anticipated." Mead seems to me to assume, however, that a plausible account of mind's opportunities is also a full account of its origin and essential nature; and any such view looks like a teleology *sibi permissa*. No doubt, Mead might have said that no other method promised useful results, and that there is no more point in asking how knowing is made than in asking how being is made; but I have not noticed that he said these things, and I have the impression that he seldom, if ever, meant them.

(b) John Grote maintained long ago that "all intelligence is co-intelligence," and various attempts have been made, both before and after Grote's time,

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to prove that society is in some important sense prior to individual minds and wills. In any such contention, the principal requisite is patience with stubborn detail and an adequate dose of self-criticism. Mead excelled in both, and his book, largely for that reason, seems to me to be the best I have seen in English on this particular theme. Mead does not deny that the "biologic individual" is in some sense prior to society, but he develops the theory that gestures (including symbolic and linguistic gestures) are always social things, and that, although personal contributions affect society, the predominant truth lies with those who perceive that society is the *prius*, not of biological existence as such, but of mind and selfhood.

It seems highly probable that Mead's work in this field will come to be generally recognized as a definite advance in a fascinating, if perplexing, enterprise.

JOHN LAIRD.

Studies in the Philosophy of Creation. With especial reference to Bergson and Whitehead. By NEWTON P. STALLKNECHT. (Princeton: University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. xiii + 170. Price 9s.)

Can recent philosophy be said to have produced that extremely rare thing, a genuinely new idea? The contention of this book is that the idea of creative process, as described by Bergson and certain other recent and contemporary philosophers, introduces a genuinely new alternative to the traditional views, of the world as having been created by the volition of a transcendent creator who created it for a sufficient reason, or of the world as the temporal mode of expression of eternally necessary being. Creation in the new sense is described as the fusion of different patterns into unpredictable wholes. Such a process demands "material elements," by which Mr. Stallknecht seems to mean whatever is "given" with a determinate structure, including objects of physical experience and mathematical and logical schemata. But creation is not a mere arrangement of material elements—a jig-saw puzzle. There also enter into it *constitutive* elements, which have no determinate structure till the creation is completed. It is a pity that the author has not illustrated this distinction. Presumably he means by "constitutive" such elements as the characters of a novel or the expression on a person's face in a portrait. The distinction seems to be an important one; to make creation the actualization of possibilities which already exist as alternative abstractions with a determinate structure reduces it to selection from a catalogue. Mr. Stallknecht owns that this is the difficulty in Whitehead's view of actuality as the concretion of eternal objects (see p. 137; though he does not seem to feel this difficulty in his summary of Whitehead's view on p. 91). The real question (which Whitehead answers in the negative) is whether there can be creation of new *possibilities*; i.e. not simply that pre-existent possibilities should become relevant for actualization, but that the arising of new actual situations should create genuinely new possible situations—ideal elements and ways in which they might be synthesized. It is probably contrary to Whitehead's intention (though it may seem to be the only way of taking some of the things he says) to reduce creation to a selective decision from a catalogue of alternative possibilities. His real concern is to contend (as against Bergson) that there must be *logical stability* in the world; that there should be logical stability may be ultimately inexplicable, but it is a primitive assumption as the condition of any actual creative process. He is contending that logical order (like the structure of a Bach fugue) is the condition and not the shackle of creative achievement.

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Mr. Stallknecht makes a point of showing that there are really two views to be found in Bergson—the one an irrational, mystical view of pure becoming, the other the description of a process of growth as a unique fusion of elements, on the analogy of aesthetic creation. This distinction is valuable, since it is on the former view alone that logical stability becomes spatialized distortion, destructive of creative freedom. This is the more spectacular interpretation of Bergson, and the one on which his critics have naturally fastened. But on the latter interpretation, Bergson is giving a profoundly sympathetic description of the way in which a number of elements are given concrete embodiment in a new and unique whole, the uniqueness of which can be grasped by imaginative intuition. Intellectual analysis of the formal elements of the new whole is no substitute for such intuitive appreciation, though it may be preparatory to it.

The discussion of Bergson is the principal and most useful part of Mr. Stallknecht's book. The chapters on Alexander, Croce, Gentile, and Whitehead are too short to do these thinkers justice. He would perhaps have been well advised simply to have introduced references to their views by way of comment on his discussion of Bergson. We may doubt whether it serves a very useful purpose to give a brief summary of Whitehead's later philosophy largely in Whitehead's own words. If the reader has already struggled with Whitehead's terminology such a summary is superfluous; if not, it is probably meaningless.

To my mind the book raises two crucial questions for the modern philosophy of creation. First, are we justified in drawing analogies from artistic to cosmic creation? Is art essentially "artificial" or is the artist a spearhead of a creative process, of which the work of art rather than the logical argument is the microcosm, so that through understanding better how the artist does his work we may imagine how new forms of being are fashioned in a plastic world? And, secondly, do the forms "fashion themselves," and, if not, how is the persuasive agency of ideal values in their creation to be conceived?

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

The Origin and Development of Religion in Vedic Literature. By P. S. DESHMUKH, M.A., Ph.D. (Foreword by A. B. KEITH, D.C.L., D.Litt.). (Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. xvi + 378. Price 22s. 6d.)

This work was written as a thesis for the degree of the D.Phil.(Oxon) and its being herewith presented to the public in the same incomplete form in which it was accepted by the University is excused by its author, a pupil of the late Professor A. A. Macdonell, of Oxford, and Professor A. B. Keith, of Edinburgh, with the heavy responsibilities that have meanwhile fallen on him as the Minister of Education in the Central Provinces, India. It is a thoughtful book based on a large material and dealing in four parts with (I) "Definition and Origin of Religion," (II) "Indo-European and Indo-Iranian Religion," (III) "Vedic Religion," and (IV, incomplete) "Brahmanism." Its leading idea, developed mainly in Part I, is that religion does not owe its origin to magic (nor to fetishism, animism, ancestor worship, or totemism), but springs directly from the "belief in powers beyond" which is also the root of magic, and that both of these "existed side by side in the most primitive times." Here magic and religion mean a belief (with corresponding practice) in powers conceived respectively as coercible or uncoercible; and the combated theory is that of Frazer and others believing in an age of magic succeeded by one of religion. The thesis is applied with great ability to the religions under discussion. It throws light first of all on Zoro-

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astrianism which thus appears as a revolt of religion against magic (the Magi) and, consequently, as entirely different from the supersession, in early Vedic India, of the Asuras by the Devas, though in both cases the "gods" of the earlier belief become the "demons" of the later; and it proves fruitful again for understanding the further evolution of Vedic literature where magic is seen to conquer religion until, in the Upaniṣads, a reaction sets in from a non-priestly quarter. It definitely does away with the view (objected to already on other grounds) of the contemporaneousness of the (magically inspired) Atharvaveda with the R̥gveda; and it is in perfect agreement with Carpenter's conviction that nomadic conditions (like those we have to assume for the prehistoric Aryans) are not favourable to magic. The spread of magic in later Vedic India is primarily due, without any doubt, "to the increased contact and association with the aborigines of India" (p. 62). "Magic, generally speaking," says our author (p. 63), "is the curse of a settled, undisturbed, and isolated life"; and it is just this sort of life that is shown by the ruins of Mohenjo-daro to have been for centuries that of the pre-Aryan urbane population of the Indus valley which, moreover, had connections with the stronghold of magic, Mesopotamia.

We are surprised to miss among the many books used Oldenberg's *Vorwissenschaftliche Wissenschaft* (Göttingen, 1919), the only existing work on the magic view of life in ancient India.

F. OTTO SCHRADER.

The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation. By CHARLES HARTSHORNE. (U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. xiv + 288. Price 13s. 6d. net.)

Most psychologists will find it an exceedingly difficult task to arrive at a fair evaluation of the argument of this book. Psychological opinions and hypotheses lie shoulder to shoulder with the widest philosophical generalizations and theories; facts which have been experimentally observed—for the most part by other investigators—jostle interpretations of them by the author. Moreover, the fundamental hypothesis, in spite of the most strenuous and persistent attempts by the author to make it clear, seems to elude definite statement. In the end it is not quite easy to see what it all amounts to, except an exceedingly able effort to get the philosopher to take an interest in the psychologist, and the psychologist to pay attention to the philosopher.

Dr. Hartshorne negatively states his thesis thus: "The currently accepted principles of scientific research and explanation, as well as the most characteristic ideas of contemporary philosophy, have not as yet been applied, with the thoroughness which the problem merits, to the question of the nature and distribution of the qualities immediately given in sensation, such as 'red,' 'sour,' or 'warm'; and as a result the conceptions generally held regarding these qualities conflict with the recognized criteria of a fruitful scientific hypothesis, or of an acceptable philosophical idea."

This defect he proposes to remedy by means of a theory about sensory qualities based on five "fundamental notions": (1) Mathematical continuity; (2) Aesthetic meaning or *affective tone*; (3) The fundamentally social character of experience; (4) Biological adaptiveness; (5) Evolution from a common origin. Obviously not one of these notions is a new one, and so, perhaps, one would look for evidence of the originality which is claimed for this volume in some peculiar novel arrangement of a group of notions which are not, as a rule, considered together. Actually, however, the great bulk of the argument is

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concerned with illustrations and discussions of inter-modal qualities and with a consideration of affective-tone as "the stuff of which the entire content of consciousness is composed."

Professor Hartshorne has studied seriously all the investigations he could find of the type in which colours are called "warm," tastes "hard," sounds "voluminous," and the like. There are a lot more of them than his own introduction might suggest. The account he gives would have been a great deal clearer if it could have been more disconnected than it is from interpretations; but still it is good. It is a little odd that what are probably the most striking experiments of recent times on this topic, those of E. von Hornboste and his students on inter-modal *Helligkeit*, receive mention only in an inadequate appendix. These "complication" phenomena, as they used to be called, are often spoken of in the book as "analogies," but the author clearly thinks them to be more than this. He considers that they must all show a common origin of sensation qualities, and that this common origin is to be found in an affective continuum. Just how they emerge from this common origin it is not at all easy to see, but apparently the job is done through the social character of all experience and the adaptive character of biological response.

At the beginning the author condemns current psychological views about the qualities of sensation as unfruitful, and perhaps he is right. He implies that his own hypotheses are not going to be open to this criticism. Now here it is necessary to be careful. A scientific hypothesis is not fruitful merely because it suggests lines of concrete inquiry. The investigations to which it leads must do more than confirm the relations which it itself states. They must open up a developing field of knowledge, and not merely accumulate more and more illustrations, all of them on precisely the same level. It is therefore particularly interesting to study a section at the end of this volume which is headed "some predictions." Dr. Hartshorne says that future investigation will show (a) that pitch is a physiological analogue of visual brightness to a more complete degree than anybody has as yet realized; (b) that auditory "density" will be further studied; (c) that the auditory neural response will be found to vary in some way "analogous to the 'modulations' or what not which underlie visual chroma"; (d) that red vision will be found to have the same physiological factor in it that warmth possesses, and that green or blue-green will stand in the same relation to coolness; (e) that pleasure will be found to involve "cellular health" and pain "cellular damage." None of these predictions, however, adds anything to his hypothesis; they only say that a physiological basis for it will be found, and the most that any one of them would do would be to add a new illustration on just the same level as all the rest. Meanwhile I am afraid that I cannot see anything much in the book which will help the inquiring psychologist or physiologist who wants to know how to look for these identities.

It may be that the philosophical implications of Professor Hartshorne's views are vastly important and far-reaching. As to that, I cannot venture to express an opinion. I can admire his thoroughness, his decisiveness, the ease with which he writes, and the great range of studies which he has covered. I can agree with him that it is high time that the empirical psychologist attempted a reconsideration of sensory qualities regarded as modes of experience, and not merely as a kind of analytical notion. Yet, writing solely as a psychologist who is not uninterested in the theoretical aspects of his science, I am bound to admit that I have found this book confusing rather than genuinely helpful.

F. C. BARTLETT.

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Sociology. By MORRIS GINSBERG, M.A., D.Litt. (London: Thornton Butterworth. 1934. Pp. 260. Price 2s. 6d.)

It is a difficult task to write a volume for the Home University Library. An authority in a department of knowledge is asked to give an account of it in a brief space, and in such a fashion that the general reader will understand and be interested. The author, being a professional and not an amateur, can take few liberties with the handling of his material in order to facilitate his approach to the public; for he must satisfy professional standards. In dealing with sociology these difficulties are at their maximum since, whatever definition is adopted of the subject, it is of enormous scope and of infinite complication. Professor Ginsberg begins by discussing definitions of sociology, and this is in line with sociological tradition. Indeed many sociologists get no further than attempting to prove that their own conception of sociology is theoretically valid and potentially valuable. This is in marked contrast to the proceedings of those who have opened up other branches of knowledge; they find new territory and go ahead with exploration, leaving it until later to discover the boundary and the scope of the operations which can be conducted within it. It would have been interesting if Professor Ginsberg had seen his way to plunge straight into his material, and to have let it emerge at the end what it is that sociologists have done and are trying to do.

In other words, it would have more original, and perhaps ultimately more illuminating, if Professor Ginsberg had recast his treatment, and had begun with the material that he sets out to present in Chapter 3. Thence onwards we have a discussion built up into a most coherent structure. Chapter 3 deals with the physical environment and with race, and Chapter 4 with a psychological analysis of those elements in human nature which bear most directly upon the relations of man to man. These two chapters are thus devoted to some study of the underlying circumstances which condition social life. This opens the way to a discussion of social organization and social control which occupies Chapter 5. From that we pass in Chapter 6 to some observations on class structure and economic organization. In Chapter 7 follows a discussion of the trends of mental development, and the concluding chapter reflects upon the interrelation of these topics, and upon the future tasks of sociology. Continuity is admirably preserved, and we are led by a most profitable path all round the field of social inquiry whence we get all sorts of interesting and profitable views. But it is a hurried journey, and the comments of our guide are unavoidably condensed; we would often gladly have lingered and heard a little more. Going round the British Museum with a conducted party must be the same sort of experience. No one man could be better informed than Professor Ginsberg is on all these topics, and it is impossible to praise too highly the fairness with which he deals with them; his treatment of the problem of race is especially admirable. These are not common accomplishments, but the mention of them alone would not give a sufficient impression of the quality of the book. The author possesses, what is much more rare, a mind of remarkable power. In everything which he touches he exhibits a grasp and a penetration which make the book really impressive.

Thus we have a book which every social student can read with profit, though, by reason of the compression of the argument and of the paucity of illustration, it is not easy going. But it is another matter to admit that it is a sketch of a subject which can be called sociology. Some very fundamental matters are left undecided. Is sociology wholly reflection upon the results of other social sciences, or does it engage in field work of its own as well? It is usually claimed that sociologists do both. If so, where is the field? It

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would seem that sociologists claim to wander freely over the whole territory of social experience. If so, are they merely workers with interests different from those of ordinary specialists, and are they not claiming to conduct profitable operations in a territory that is too large for any one group of men? It is one thing to welcome a book like this, and another to admit that is an argument for, and far less a proof of, the existence of sociology.

A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS.

The Aesthetic Response: an Antinomy and its Resolution. By MILTON C. NAHM. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1933. Pp. 56.)

This short American thesis is a study of the problem, highly important to the philosophical as distinct from the scientific aspect of aesthetics, that arises on a consideration of the peculiar relation between art and morality, between the beautiful and the good, a question responsible at all times for the most conflicting opinions. The "antinomy" of Mr. Nahm is produced by the diametrically opposite views of those who maintain, like Plato, that art is inimical to those personal qualities essential to the good life, and those others, like Shelley, who have urged that it serves to strengthen and support them. "Art is at once degrading and inspiring." A solution is reached by determining the function of art in terms of its effect on the spectator, by analysing this effect in the light of modern psychology, and by showing that its psychological ingredients are far from inconsistent with the highest personal qualities.

The function of art is to provoke an emotional "aesthetic response," it aims at "affecting or moving the perceiver." But this consists in a muscular reaction that produces a thin, attenuated emotion similar in kind, though not in degree, to the instinctive emotional adaptation of the animal, the child, or the barbarian to its immediate environment. Now education teaches us not to fly suddenly into a paroxysm of anger or fear, but to control our emotions by means of the will and to substitute rational motives for blind impulses in the conduct of life. The aesthetic response is therefore "an indication of progress," and so more encouraging than injurious to the moral life.

Mr. Nahm is to be congratulated on his boldness in attacking a problem at once so delicate and so important, and on selecting the only strictly scientific method of pursuing it to a final solution; but his aesthetic and psychological equipment are unfortunately quite inadequate to the task he has set himself. It is not enough to say that the aesthetic response is "emotional" without distinguishing between aesthetic and practical emotions; it is not enough to say that art aims at "affecting or moving the perceiver" without distinguishing between the various effects of a street-corner oration, a pornographic post-card, and a Beethoven Symphony; and surely the James-Lange theory of the emotions is by now a relic of the past! Neither in the text nor in the foot-notes to this essay can I find an indication that the writer has read anything produced in Germany since the beginning of this century, save only one article by Lipps; and he, poor fellow, is made responsible for a view he disclaimed with Sisyphus persistence, namely that "muscular adjustment is the basis for the theory of empathy or *emfühling*."

LISTOWEL.

The Fundamentals of Psychology. By W. B. PILLSBURY. 3rd edition. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1934. Pp. xii + 663. Price 12s. net.)

In this third edition of *The Fundamentals of Psychology* Professor Pillsbury has kept his aim well in view: to present "an impartial statement of the more

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important facts of the science." He has provided the student with a comprehensive textbook for a year's work in the subject. The subject-matter is set forth with great clarity, although the book is not "easy" and will not hold a casual reader. This is a textbook for a competent student who will not be overwhelmed by a full load of information and who will be prepared to follow up some of the standard references given at the end of each chapter.

As in the earlier editions, the first chapters are devoted to an account of the nervous system and sensations. The selection of material here is excellent, and the reader who may find the going hard will be repaid by returning when he has made some progress with the later chapters.

Descriptions of individual differences, of what is native and what acquired in human conduct, of feeling and of emotion, furnish an introduction to learning and to the problems of knowing. Retention, selection or attention, and meaning are regarded as the primitive functions of knowledge and are dealt with before such specific topics as perception or memory. In the chapters giving a general discussion of these primitive functions the reader is made familiar with the newer doctrines of Gestalt in contrast with the older theories of association. The chapter on selection or attention is particularly good, as might be expected from the author's earlier book on this subject. The problem of meaning is taken up by Professor Pillsbury under the title of "The Unit of Experience." He regards his theory of "types" as standing between the older structural view of knowledge and the newer Gestalt doctrine. For Gestalt psychology knowledge of an object is given as a whole, the *Gestalt* is independent of any building from past experience, it is not a structure of sensations and images. Unlike *Gestalten*, "types" are organizations that develop with experience. In perception the sensations acting at the moment are corrected and *standardized* by past experience. Once such a standard organization has arisen, any sensation or image is merely a sign to be interpreted in terms of the "type." The retinal image will vary as the object is far or near, the brightness will change with the amount of light, but the same standard interpretation of the object will be given. "What is important is the total reference" (p. 389). Similarly, "typical" concepts are formed. "A type for the class . . . is related to the separate objects in much the same way that the type in perception is related to the separate presentations of the same object" (p. 396). What is left vague in this theory is how and why "types" develop. We have the statement, "there is a tendency for perceptions to be standardized" (p. 392), and not much more by way of explanation. Following the general discussion of meaning are two chapters on the perception of space and the perception of movement and time. The treatment of the latter topics is commendably fuller than is usual in a textbook. In the chapter on memory there is a certain overlap with the earlier chapters on learning and recall, but the account of experimental work is clear and valuable. A chapter is given to reasoning, another to imagination and dreams. Under volition the threads of the earlier account of motor learning are gathered up and knitted into a discussion of drives, motives, choice, and freedom of the will. The student will find a good survey of the experiments on fatigue and work curves and of the theories relating to personality and the self in the chapters on these topics.

The final chapter is in some respects the weakest in the book. It is a review of the characteristic schools of psychology. The outlines are too fragmentary to be of value. In the case of Freudian psychology and of the Gestalt school much of what is given here is already presupposed by the more specific references to these doctrines in the chapters on dreams, memory, and perception. Considering the influence which Professor McDougall's teaching has had on social psychology, the short paragraph dealing with the purposive

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school is conspicuously inadequate. But when all is said, the third edition of *The Fundamentals of Psychology* is a textbook to be recommended to students. It is well illustrated by diagrams and well documented.

BEATRICE EDGELL.

Men and their Motives, Psycho-Analytical Studies. By J. C. FLUGEL, with two essays by Ingeborg Flugel. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co. 1934. Pp. vii + 289. Price 10s. 6d.)

With two exceptions the essays contained in this admirably produced and well indexed volume are reprinted from periodicals, and it is good to have brought them together. The contents, ranging from Birth Control to Henry VIII by way of Esperanto, are too miscellaneous to permit of detailed criticism. Professor Flugel's name is an adequate guarantee of the style and temper of the book. He explicitly recognizes that even a psycho-analyst may be prejudiced, but, perhaps in consequence, there is little evidence of any prejudice beyond that which inevitably attends the holding of systematic theories. He presents his views modestly, and usually cautiously, with an ease that disguises the depth of his detailed argument. The most important of these collected papers appear to be those on "The Psychology of Birth Control" and "Sexual and Social Sentiments." The author here applies psycho-analytic theory to the elucidation of the psychological problems presented by social relationships, and by the fervent support of sociological views. The close and profitable discussion demands of the reader an intimate acquaintance with psycho-analytical literature, since it draws conclusions from the details of the underlying theory. These conclusions are eminently reasonable, but to accept them fully requires a prior act of faith. While it was obviously no duty of the writer to demonstrate his fundamental principles in these essays, the unprofessional reader must regret that he has no ready access to the data from which they are derived. To present to the layman the facts, and the mode of argumentation, which lie behind the psycho-analyst's utterances is no doubt difficult, but it is a task which is becoming urgent. For if Professor Flugel's method is sound and his conclusions valid, they are of great theoretical and practical importance, yet their fruits cannot be gathered until educated opinion accepts the basic principles, and this is unlikely to result from authoritative utterances alone. We read, for example, "Patriotic feelings for one's native land are, we know, very frequently derived in part from displacement of the mother-regarding affects; our native land is our mother" (p. 163). It is not improper to ask just how this knowledge was gained, and the psycho-analyst could tell us if he would. So the author's conclusions, so admirably reasoned from his premises, must remain in the air until those premises are not merely stated, but publicly demonstrated. This is disappointing to the reader who feels that the conclusions are probably true, but desires proof that they are so.

The need for some demonstration of principles is perhaps most marked in the *tour de force* entitled "Esperanto and the International Language Movement." In this essay, sufficiently interesting apart from its technical discussion, we learn that if the views of Dr. Ernest Jones are correct, "we must surely suppose that this equivalence of the linguistic with the sexual holds good, not only of speech in our native language, but also of our attempts to speak in foreign tongues" (p. 179). Is the premise so perfectly established that we must accept the conclusion with all its surprising implications? Section V, containing a rich variety of material brought forward for interpretation, will awaken a demand for a stricter method of proof.

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In the concluding essay ("On the Character and Married Life of Henry VIII") the writer explains the king's marital ill success as the consequence of his relations to his father and elder brother. He makes out a strong case, though ignoring other factors, such as physical pain, which may in part account for the more violent manifestations of Henry's character. At the end he argues that such applications of theory to historical data provide a test of the validity of the psycho-analytic method, and claims that such studies have in fact given evidence of its utility and validity. There is a risk of circular reasoning here. If we study Henry's early family history, and endeavour to trace its influence upon the development of his character, we may decide that his family relationships were the cause of his later behaviour, and make that conclusion the nucleus of a general theory; or, assuming the truth of psycho-analysis, we may conclude that the behaviour was caused by the earlier conditions. But we should not argue from effect to cause and from cause to effect at the same time. Dr. Flugel's treatment is in fact an *a priori* application of his theories to the historical material, and his success can at most offer some indirect pragmatic support to the strength of the theory. If his principles are sound, Henry's behaviour is explained. We still await the demonstration of the principles.

The essays by Ingeborg Flugel on "The Significance of Names" and on "Some Psychological Aspects of a Fox-Hunting Rite" add to the attractiveness of the book, which can be commended to those who have some acquaintance with psycho-analytical literature. They will find in an enjoyable and scholarly form fresh evidence of the wide importance of the Freudian psychology.

A. W. WOLTERS.

Combustion from Heracleitos to Lavoisier. By J. C. GREGORY, B.Sc., F.I.C.
(London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1934. Pp. vii + 231. Price 10s. 6d.)

The author of this book has rendered a service to the history of science by putting on record the reactions to the phenomenon of combustion of thinkers of all periods from Heracleitos to Lavoisier. In doing so he has displayed in a most convincing manner the superiority of thought based upon experiment to the abstract thought of the non-experimental philosopher, since, to a chemical reader at least, the early discussions on the nature of fire are incredibly tedious and almost stupidly inconclusive. The importance of the speculative side is, however, illustrated both by the valuable experiments which were made in order to demonstrate or to test the theories which were current during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and also by the stranglehold which they often exercised on the interpretation of experimental results, since correct experiment did not inevitably lead at once to correct theory. As the author points out in his preface, preconceptions play a significant rôle as a directive of thought, a rôle which may be that of a *misleading prepossession* or a *fertile guiding hypothesis*. The long delay between the first experiments on the kindling of flames and the discovery of the part played by oxygen in combustion is therefore assigned by him to two principal causes, since (i) preconceptions blinded insight and (ii) systematic experiment did not mature till the seventeenth century.

The whole story provides a vivid illustration of the maxim which Sir J. J. Thomson delivered to the Science Masters' Association in Cambridge, when he remarked that "A theory is a tool and not a creed," since a tool is only of value when placed in the hand of a worker who is both willing and able to

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use it. The earlier arm-chair philosophers were, perhaps, too proud to use for the purposes of manual labour the tools which they had created so cleverly in their own minds; in an intermediate period, willing workers, such as Priestley and Cavendish, were handicapped by the obsolete tools, which they had inherited; and it was not until the time of Lavoisier that the right tool in the hand of the right worker provided a pattern for all the best developments of modern chemical science. The lesson is a salutary one, and it is of real value that it should be placed on record.

T. M. LOWRY.

Books received also:—

- George Herbert Palmer, 1842–1933. *Memorial Addresses*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. 80, 5s. 6d.
- LORD DAVIES. *Force*. London: Constable & Co. 1935. Pp. x + 242. 3s. 6d.
- CANON C. E. HUDSON. *A Preface to a Christian Sociology*. London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 136. 4s. 6d.
- C. C. J. WEBB, F.B.A. *The Historical Element in Religion*. (Lewis Fry Lectures, 1934.) London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 118. 4s. 6d.
- N. A. ROBB, D.Phil. *Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance*. London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 315. 12s. 6d.
- K. KOFFKA. *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*. (International Library of Psychology and Philosophy.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xi + 720. 25s.
- VARIOUS. *Possibility*. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 17. Berkeley: University of California Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1935. Pp. 223. 10s.
- A Bibliography of the Survival of the Classics*. First volume: The Publications of 1931. The text of the German Edition with an English Introduction. Edited by the Warburg Institute. London: Cassell & Co. 1934. Pp. xxiii + 333.
- F. C. THOMAS, B.Sc. *Ability and Knowledge. The Standpoint of the London School*. (Foreword by C. Spearman, F.R.S., Ph.D.; Appendix by E. Walters, Ph.D.) London: Macmillan & Co. 1935. Pp. xx + 338. 15s.
- R. KARSTEN, Ph.D. *The Origins of Religion*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. vii + 328. 12s. 6d.
- J. W. PARKER, M.A., B.D. *The Idea of Salvation in the World's Religions*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1935. Pp. viii + 259. 6s.
- J. E. BOODIN. *God. A Cosmic Philosophy of Religion*. New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1934. Pp. 240. 8s. 6d.
- J. E. BOODIN. *Three Interpretations of the Universe*. New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1934. Pp. 519. 12s. 6d.
- C. TOLLY. *Janus-Man in Starry Night*. Oxford: Shakespeare Head Press. 1935. Pp. viii + 101. 5s.
- W. K. WRIGHT. *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*. (Revised edition.) New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1935. Pp. xvi + 566. 12s. 6d.
- VARIOUS. *Marxism and Modern Thought*. (Tr. R. Fox.) London: G. Routledge & Sons, Ltd. 1935. Pp. viii + 342. 10s. 6d.
- VARIOUS. *Awareness and the Neuroses of Declining Years*. London: C. W. Daniel Co. 1935. Pp. 53. 2s. 6d.
- T. T. SEGERSTEDT. *The Problem of Knowledge in Scottish Philosophy*. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup. 1935. Pp. 157. 4 kr. 50 öre.

NEW BOOKS

- N. O. LOSSKY and J. S. MARSHALL, *Value and Existence*. (Part I. Tr. by S. S. Vinokooroff.) London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 223. 7s. 6d.
- VARIOUS: *Science, History and Theology*. (Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. XIV.) London: Harrison & Sons. 1935. Pp. 213. 15s.
- ANONYMOUS, *My Philosophy. By an Unprofessional Thinker*. Oxford: Shakespeare Head; Basil Blackwell. 1935. Pp. xvi + 145. 5s.
- C. BARRETT, *Philosophy. An Introductory Study of Fundamental Problems and Attitudes*. New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1935. Pp. xiii + 395. 12s. 6d.
- F. H. BRADLEY, O.M., LL.D., F.B.A. *Collected Essays*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. Vol. I, ix + 347, Vol. II, 348-708. 36s. the two volumes.
- THE REV. HIEROMONK A. VAN DER MENSBRUGGHE, *From Dryad to Triad. A Plea for Duality against Dualism and an Essay Towards the Synthesis of Orthodoxy*. London: The Faith Press. 1935. Pp. xxi + 153. 7s. 6d.
- R. L. NETTLESHIP, *The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic*. (Introduction by S. Leeson.) London and Oxford: Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. viii + 155. 2s. 6d.
- P. F. PRZYWARA, S.J. *Polarity. A German Catholic's Interpretation of Religion*. (Tr. A. C. Bouquet, D.D.) London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xii + 150. 8s. 6d.
- The Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa*. (Ed. and tr. by S. S. S. Sastri. 2nd ed. revised.) Madras: University of Madras. 1935. Pp. xxxviii + 129. Rs. 2. 4s.
- C. GRABO, *The Meaning of "The Witch of Atlas."* Chapel Hill, U.S.A.: University of North Carolina Press. 1935. Pp. ix + 158. \$2.50.
- L. J. HENDERSON, *Pareto's General Sociology. A Physiologist's Interpretation*. Cambridge, U.S.A.: Harvard University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1935. Pp. vii + 119. 5s. 6d.
- Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1933*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1935. Pp. xiv + 476. 70 cents.
- E. W. HIRST, B.Sc. *Jesus and the Moralists. A Comparative Study of the Christian Ethics*. London: The Epworth Press. 1935. Pp. 189. 5s.
- A. J. ARBERRY, M.A. (Translator). *The Doctrine of the Šūfis*, by A. B. al-Kalābādhī. London: Cambridge University Press. 1935. Pp. xviii + 173. 10s. 6d.
- A. M. BOASE, *The Fortunes of Montaigne. A History of the Essays in France, 1580-1669*. London: Methuen & Co. 1935. Pp. xl + 462. 18s.
- VARIÉS: *Recherches Philosophiques*. IV. 1934-35. (Fondées par A. Koyré H-Ch.; et P. A. Spaier). Paris: Boivin et Cie. 1935. Pp. vi + 530. Frs. 65.
- VARIÉS: *Thalès*. Recueil annuel des travaux de l'Institut d'Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques de l'Université de Paris. Première Année: 1934. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1935. Pp. xix + 184. Frs. 30.
- P. DESCOQS, S.J. *Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis. Cours de Théodicée. Tomus secundus. De Dei Cognoscibilitate*, II. Paris: G. Beauchesne et Fils. 1935. Pp. 926. Frs. 112., francs: 122 fr.
- R. LAUN, *Recht und Sittlichkeit*. Berlin: J. Springer. 1935. Pp. 109. RM. 4.80.
- F.-J. VON RINTELEN, *Albert der Deutsche und wir*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner. 1935. Pp. 46. RM. 1.50.
- E. LEWALTER, *Spanisch-Jesuitische und Deutsch-Lutherische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts*. Hamburg: Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut. 1935. Pp. 85.
- DR. J. SCHÄCHTER, *Prolegomena zu einer Kritischen Grammatik*. Wien: J. Springer. 1935. Pp. viii + 193. RM. 12.60.

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NEUVIÈME CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE PHILOSOPHIE PARIS, 1937

Président d'honneur : M. HENRI BERGSON, de l'Académie Française

COMITÉ D'ORGANISATION.—*Président* : M. ÉMILE BRÉHIER, Professeur à la Sorbonne, 40, rue de l'Yvette, Paris XVI^e; *Secrétaire* : M. RAYMOND BAYER, Docteur es-lettres, Agrégé de Philosophie, 26, Avenue Théophile-Gautier, Paris XVI^e.

PARIS,
le 1^{er} juin, 1935.

Le Comité permanent du Congrès réuni à Prague en 1934 a décidé que le prochain Congrès international de philosophie aurait lieu à Paris en 1937; M. Henri Bergson en a été nommé président d'honneur; et la Société française de Philosophie a été chargée de l'organiser. La Société en a dès maintenant fixé la date: du 1^{er} au 6 août 1937.

Si le Comité permanent a décidé d'abaisser d'une année l'intervalle de quatre ans qui sépare habituellement les congrès, c'est qu'il a voulu que le Congrès de 1937 fût une célébration du troisième centenaire du *Discours de la Méthode* et une occasion de réfléchir, selon l'impulsion donnée par Descartes, à ce qui fait l'essence et l'unité d'inspiration de la philosophie moderne.

Le programme du Congrès était tracé par le vœu même du Comité permanent; partant de l'image cartésienne de l'"arbre" de la philosophie, le Comité français d'organisation a pensé que l'unité de la méthode dans les diverses activités spirituelles devait être le problème fondamental posé devant le Congrès; il a considéré que ce problème, qui était celui de Descartes, restait au centre de nos préoccupations actuelles; car il revient à se demander quelle est la nature et quelle est la valeur de la raison; or la méthode n'est que la raison même en exercice. Le Comité a cherché les thèmes qui donneraient l'occasion d'examiner ce problème sous un aspect concret et vivant, et il propose les suivants:

1. L'état actuel des études cartésiennes.
2. L'unité de la science: la Méthode et les méthodes. Histoire du problème dans l'Antiquité, le Moyen-Age, les temps modernes.
3. Logique et mathématique.
4. Causalité et déterminisme en physique et en biologie. Probabilité et statistique.
5. Les rapports de l'âme et du corps.
6. Analyse réflexive et transcendance.
7. La valeur, les normes (morales, sociales et esthétiques) et la réalité.

C'est sur ce programme que le Comité d'organisation invite dès maintenant les philosophes et les sociétés de philosophie à porter leur attention. Au moment voulu, il leur sera adressé, avec le programme définitif, une invitation indiquant les conditions dans lesquelles seront reçues les communications, ainsi que le détail de l'organisation du Congrès. Dès maintenant, pourtant, le Comité accueillera avec plaisir les titres des communications qui pourraient lui être envoyés. Conformément à l'usage, les langues admises au Congrès seront l'allemand, l'anglais, le français et l'italien.

Pour le Comité d'organisation,
ÉMILE BRÉHIER.

on est prié d'adresser les avis et les suggestions à M. Émile BRÉHIER, professeur à la Sorbonne, 40 rue de l'Yvette, Paris XVI^e.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

MY DEAR EDITOR,

It is with the greatest interest, but also with some surprise, that I have read Professor Campbell's article on *Reason and the Problem of Suffering*, published in your April number. The point which Professor Campbell emphasizes is the apparent negation of justice involved in unmerited suffering. A man deserves, or merits, to suffer only for his bad will and deeds (apart from any disciplinary value which the suffering may have). And it is this which Professor Campbell calls justice.¹ We might, however, take another view of the qualifications for suffering: Instead of conceiving the universe as a place for the apportionment of praise and blame we might think of it as the birth-place of whatsoever things are good.

If we do this, we find that our conception of justice and merit change, and we come to the conclusion that he merits to suffer who can do something with his suffering. Our sense of justice now demands that he who can incorporate the value given in a whole situation, and turn suffering and despair, fear and hatred into joy and trust and love, should be granted the opportunity to do so. The difference between the lower and higher levels of values is surely that the higher level includes suffering, ugliness, and error, while the lower one does not—we may compare the innocent happiness of the child with the happiness of Christ on the Cross. It seems only reasonable that the strong and the wise should suffer for the weak and the foolish, and not be kept in a state of placid contentment, in a world empty of real happiness, wide-eyed endurance, and supreme love.

If we accept this view, I think we may even go further and say that there is some proportion between merit and actual suffering. A dog, we know, suffers in a different way from a man, and men differ in the doglikeness of their suffering. We cannot measure the suffering of a dog, but we can measure and compare the suffering of our own lesser and better moments. When we accept suffering patiently and unthinkingly, we suffer dumbly like the dog; mental anguish is excluded, but so is also the wider reference. The suffering will run its own course, becoming relieved partly through finding physical expressions, and partly through our nature adapting itself to the new conditions (madness, even death, we must remember are forms of adaptation).

If we suffer in the above way, we may retain our trust in the goodness of God, but we do so in spite of our suffering; and have we not then failed to find the higher values? These seem to be discovered only by him who enters fully into the suffering, who recognizes it as evil, and by recognizing it as such prepares the path for its assumption into a larger whole. True, recognition involves more pain than acceptance; but it is also the symptom of the strength which can go through the suffering and overcome it.

Whenever we see suffering thus overcome our judgment of God's justice and omnipotence change.

If souls of a finer fibre *do* find the world endurable: if they do preserve through all an imperishable faith in the Perfection of the Supreme Being upon whom all things depend: then it can only be, surely, because this Supreme Being, as He is made known to them through religious experience, is felt so to transcend our finite comprehension that any attempt on our part to grasp and pass judgment upon His universe is repudiated as palpably absurd; if not indeed, as bordering upon the impious.

¹ See especially the following sentence: "No one, I imagine, experiences any difficulty in reconciling with God's Perfection the existence of suffering that is *deserved*, and is roughly proportionate to desert. This, we should say, is but justice: and justice is a virtue. It is the existence of so much apparently *unmerited* suffering that engenders our doubts. "How can a just God let such things be?" we ask, confronted by some peculiarly heart-breaking spectacle of this kind.

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I should have thought that our comprehension was widened, that at last we understood a little better what is meant by divine strength and omnipotence; that, in fact, our trust in God was no longer based on blind faith, but on sight and reason meeting each other, and saying, "God in us can overcome this suffering and evil; therefore He can also overcome this and this and this."

The problem of suffering should not be minimized. But that problem, as I see it, is caused not by unmerited suffering, but by wasted suffering: The agony of the child who does not know how to handle its pain and sorrow, whose mental anguish is far in advance of the resources available to it at the moment; the rabbit which is caught in a trap; the waste of those who break under their sufferings, and who might have lived happy and useful lives in lesser conditions. All these constitute problems which we cannot as yet solve; we may summarize them by saying that we do not know whether God can overcome the suffering in which He is not present.

GRETHE HJORT.

GIRTON COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE,
June 10, 1935.

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"OUTLINES OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY," a class by the Director of Studies, on Wednesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, in the Michaelmas and Lent Terms, beginning Michaelmas Term, October 16th; Lent Term, January 22nd. Fee for the Session £1 1s. Terminal, 12s. 6d. Members free.

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Tuesday, October 15th: Presidential Address: "New Science and Old Philosophy." The Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L., M.P.
Tuesday, November 12th: "The Present Need of a Philosophy." C. E. M. Joad, M.A.

Tuesday, December 10th: "The Place of Myth in Philosophy." The Very Rev. W. R. Inge, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Litt., F.B.A.

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